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Viewing cable 05ROME1859, UNDER SECRETARY BURNS' MAY 13 DISCUSSIONS IN ROME

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05ROME1859 2005-06-01 09:45 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Rome
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T  ROME 001859 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2015 
TAGS: PREL MOPS SY LE AF SR IT EUN BI
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY BURNS' MAY 13 DISCUSSIONS IN ROME 
 
REF: A. ROME 1529 
     B. ROME 1507 
 
Classified By: DCM Emil Skodon for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) Summary. Under Secretary of State for Political 
Affairs Burns exchanged views with senior Italian Foreign 
Ministry officials on UN Security Council reform, the 
Balkans, Afghanistan, Syria/Lebanon, Darfur, and Iran during 
his May 13 stopover in Rome.  On most issues, Italian 
positions were generally in tune with United States views, 
with the glaring exception of Syria, from which senior MFA 
officials had just returned.  The Italians opened the meeting 
with their most pressing concern, UNSC reform.  Surprisingly, 
however, Iraq was not on their agenda, although it was the 
major focus of the press roundtable that U/S Burns hosted 
later in the day.  End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) U/S Burns' May 13 discussions with senior MFA 
officials focused on UN Reform, Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan, 
Syria, Darfur, and Iran.  MFA Political Director Giulio Terzi 
hosted the discussions, accompanied by his deputy, Claudio 
Bisogniero; DG for Europe Giovanni Caracciolo; DG for 
European Integration, Ferdinando Nelli Feroci; Director for 
EU and CFSP Luigi Mattiolo; Vice DG for the Mediterranean 
Luca Del Balzo; Vice DG for Asia Alessandro Cevese; and G-8 
Office Director Giampaolo Cantini.  The U.S. delegation also 
included Ambassador Sembler, Pol M/C, visiting EUR/WE Office 
Director Allegrone, Pol-Mil Counselor, P Special Assistant, 
and PolOff (notetaker). 
 
UN Reform 
--------- 
 
3. (C) Terzi opened the meeting with UN Security Council 
reform, calling the issue a concern of importance to Italian 
foreign policy and European policy and integration.  Terzi 
said Italian officials had discussed the G-4 framework 
resolution and the United for Consensus movement with Kofi 
Annan's facilitators two days earlier in New York.  He said 
Italy understands the US position on Japan, but warned that 
any additional enlargement of the Security Council would be 
very negative in terms of both effectiveness and political 
balance.  Italy is concerned by recent declarations by 
members of the G-4 community (the German and Indian PermReps) 
calling for an enlargement of the P-5 to P-11 as a means of 
diluting or counterbalancing the P-5 structure. 
 
4. (C) U/S Burns assured Terzi that there is great 
recognition, from President Bush on down, on the US' 
responsibility to the UN.  The purpose of reform should be to 
strengthen the UN, and the US supports many of Kofi Annan's 
proposals, such as rebuilding the UN's peacekeeping capacity, 
abolishing the Committee on Human Rights as currently 
structured in Geneva, and financial reforms.  Regarding UNSC 
reform, he emphasized that the US standard is effectiveness. 
While the US has decided to support Japan and hopes that a 
decision on Japan will be taken before September, we have not 
taken any decisions on whether to support other candidates. 
However, the US is listening closely and will consult with 
Italy, one of our closest allies on the continent, prior to 
announcing any decision.  He said the US will decide on the 
G-4 proposal to set the stage before it gathers too much 
steam.  Eliminating the UNSC veto is a non-starter for the 
US, he said, and the President will decide the US position on 
this important issue. 
 
5. (C) U/S Burns also stressed the need to support 
development, noting that, because NGOs and corporations 
contribute as much as the USG, the US does not get credit for 
all that Americans do.  USG aid to Africa has quadrupled, and 
US aid worldwide has doubled, but on paper the US still does 
not make the 0.7 percent target because other types of aid 
are not included.  A better measurement would be to 
incorporate what each country's public and private sectors 
 
do. 
 
Balkans 
------- 
 
6. (C) Turning to the Balkans, Terzi, citing the Quint's 
discussion the previous day, said we must stick to the 
schedule in Kosovo.  Carracciolo continued saying that Italy 
has been very active, especially since DAS Stephens' visit 
(Ref A), and is fine-tuning its position with other Contact 
Group members.  It is important to keep Belgrade in the 
process, he said, a view that increasingly is shared by the 
US and the Contact Group.  Handing U/S Burns a copy of an 
Italian proposal on the way forward (faxed to EUR/SCE), 
Carracciolo said that we need a "Road Map" for Kosovo, 
including more substantial demarches on issues like 
institutions (like those created for Bosnia in the Bonn 
Powers), military involvement (i.e., role of NATO), and the 
economy, where he cited budget autonomy as a possible first 
concession to Kosovar authorities in term of sovereignty. 
Italy is very sensitive to decentralization, noting the need 
to guarantee the security of the Kosovo-Serb minority. 
 
7. (C) On Bosnia, Terzi said it is up to the Bosnian Serbs to 
show flexibility now.  Europe's strategy is to transfer the 
successful Central European model to the former Yugoslav 
republics by offering the prospects of EU accession.  So far, 
the results are not completely satisfactory, but it is still 
the right approach.  Again, a Road Map with conditions and 
concrete incentives such as the Stabilization and Association 
Agreements or the prospect of accession would be a useful 
tool.  There are two elements of uncertainty to this 
approach, however:  1) enlargement fatigue (evident in the 
upcoming French referendum on the EU constitution); and 2) 
the performance of the countries in the region themselves. 
Carracciolo added that the prospect of Partnership for Peace 
cooperation was also an important incentive. 
 
8. (C) U/S Burns noted that the Contact Group would meet 
again in June, on the margins of the G-8 Summit and that he 
would be testifying soon before Congress on the Balkans and 
traveling to the region in early June to present a renewed 
articulation of US policy.  He said the US believes a senior 
European political figure should lead the final status talks. 
 Agreeing with the need to stick to the schedule, U/S Burns 
noted that KFOR has been strengthened since 2004, most 
caveats have been lifted, and Gen. Jones wants to transform 
the mission into task force configurations.  U/S Burns asked 
the Italians to be flexible and listen to Gen. Jones, with a 
focus on effectiveness. 
 
9. (C) Turning briefly to PIFWCs, U/S Burns said Serbia and 
Croatia could entertain no hope of membership in NATO's 
Partnership for Peace until they cooperated on this front, 
although Serbia had turned in some important alleged war 
criminals and may be considering turning over Mladic. Burns 
urged Italy to help keep pressure on the Serbs until Mladic 
and Karadzic are turned over. 
 
Afghanistan 
----------- 
 
10. (C) Terzi stressed Italy's commitment in Afghanistan, 
noting that the Italians took command of the Herat Provincial 
Reconstruction Team (PRT) on March 31.  (Terzi gave U/S Burns 
a copy of the presentation on the Herat PRT recently given at 
NATO by Italian officials.)  Italy is leading the justice 
reform efforts, where it is important to empower the Afghan 
government, he said, but emphasized that the links between 
issues like security and narcotics-trafficking make it 
necessary to look at the reform package as a whole. 
Referencing the June 20-21 donor conference in London, Terzi 
asked how we can promote better coordination and asked for US 
support for better links between security, drug, and judicial 
issues. 
 
11. (C) U/S Burns thanked Italy for its work in Herat and 
said the US would look at the suggested G-8 language. As of 
this summer, NATO will be in north, south, and west 
Afghanistan. The planned OEF-ISAF intergration, he said, 
makes it necessary to link various sectors, and this will be 
a good topic for G-8 discussions.  When the merger does 
occur, it will be necessary to eliminate as many caveats as 
possible, and it might be useful to distinguish between 
combat and peacekeeping forces. 
 
Syria/Lebanon 
------------- 
 
12. (C) Deputy DG for the Middle East Luca Del Balzo opened 
his remarks by summarizing the recent trip to Lebanon and 
Syria (in which he took part) of Italian U/S for the Middle 
East and Africa Alfredo Mantica.  Del Balzo said the purpose 
of the trip was twofold:  1) to make a first-hand assessment, 
by meeting with all of the government and opposition parties, 
of the situation in Lebanon in the run-up to elections, and 
2) to send a loud and clear message to the Syrians on the 
expectations of the international community, including the 
need for free, democratic elections in Lebanon without any 
foreign intervention.  Del Balzo said the message was 
well-received in Damascus.  Noting that the EU intends to 
monitor the Lebanese elections, he  commented that without a 
change in the electoral law, there would not be much change 
in the Parliament's make-up.  Indeed, he said, 90 - 100 MPs 
out of a total of approximately 128 total could already be 
predicted.  Del Balzo also said that he asked the Syrians to 
use the upcoming Baath party Congress to send a clear signal 
on reforms, such as free market and democratic reforms, that 
would help Syria move towards signing an Association 
Agreement with the EU. 
 
13. (C) U/S Burns responded in very clear terms that this is 
not the time to be meeting with the Syrians or signing an 
Association Agreement; the US agrees with the UNSYG and 
Special Representative Roed-Larsen that this is not the time 
to go back to "business as usual."  Rather, we need to keep 
isolating the Syrian regime to pressure it to make the 
changes required under UNSCR 1559. In Iraq, Syria continues 
to play a harmful role by not shutting major crossing points 
that support travel of insurgents and by assisting Former 
Regime Elements (FREs). The US wants to keep isolating the 
Syrian government.  Washington has no plans to return our 
Ambassador to Damascus and Rome should reconsider meeting 
with Syrian officials. In particular, he urged the Italians 
not to receive FM Shara'a in Rome. 
 
14. (C) On Lebanon, U/S Burns praised UNSYG Roed-Larsen's 
excellent work and the major achievement of getting most of 
the Syrians out. Hizbollah, a terrorist organization that is 
responsible for the deaths of hundreds of Americans and that 
we believe will never voluntarily change its stripes or 
disarm, remains a challenge, but U/S Burns said that the 
Lebanese will have to decide how to deal with it. 
 
15. (C) Del Balzo reiterated the MFA's well-known position 
that, because of Italy's historic and close relationships 
with both Lebanon and Syria, the US should use Italy to pass 
the right authoritative messages to Damascus.  U/S Burns 
countered that the Syrians misread such messages, even when 
they come from the US, citing a previous "tough message" 
visit by Secretary Powell that Damascus interpreted as a sign 
that everything was fine.  On the contrary, Syrian military 
intelligence is still in Lebanon and Roed-Larsen has told the 
US he will not certify Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon as 
required under UNSCR 1559.  The US, U/S Burns repeated, is in 
sync with the UN on this issue. 
 
16. (S) Following the MFA meeting, at a lunch hosted by PM 
Berlusconi's Diplomatic Advisor (and Italian 
Ambassador-Designate to Washington) Giovanni Castellaneta, 
 
the Ambassador raised the issue of Italy's proposed sale of 
an Air Defense Integrated System (ADIS) to Syria (Ref B) with 
both Castellaneta and Finmeccanica CEO Pier Francesco 
Guarguaglini, who was also present.  Guarguaglini stated 
unequivocally that Finmeccanica will not pursue the sale. 
 
Darfur 
------ 
 
17. (C) On Darfur, U/S Burns told the Italian officials that 
the African Union (AU) chairman has asked the US for NATO's 
help in providing command, planning, and lift support.  Kofi 
Annan has called Secretary Rice three times with similar 
requests. The French, however, are blocking a NATO role and 
lobbying Francophone countries to this end, based on the 
"theological argument" that NATO troops should not get 
involved in former colonies.  Arguing that both the EU and 
NATO can play useful roles, U/S Burns said that the 
assistance the AU is requesting is what NATO does best, 
whereas the EU has a comparative advantage in areas like 
civilian policing capabilities, and that it is ridiculous to 
allow thousands of people to starve because of a theological 
debate over NATO's role.  U/S Burns asked Italy to help 
encourage the French to stop blocking this effort. (Note. The 
MFA's Deputy NATO Office later called PolOff to report that, 
following the meeting, Italy's PermRep to NATO discussed the 
issue with his French counterpart in Brussels, and that 
things are now "on the right path."  End note.) 
 
Iran/IAEA 
--------- 
 
18. (C) Lack of time precluded a full discussion of Iran, but 
U/S Burns told his interlocutors that the US fully supports 
the EU-3 effort.  He warned, however, that if Iran resumes 
uranium conversion at Isfahan, the issue must be brought 
before the IAEA for referral to the UNSC.  Terzi responded 
that Italy recently demarched Iran at the NPT RevCon in New 
York on Iran's recent statement that it would resume 
processing, and expressed Rome's serious concern. 
 
19. (U) U/S Burns has cleared this cable. 
 
SEMBLER 
 
 
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 2005ROME01859 - Classification: SECRET