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Viewing cable 05NDJAMENA932, LIFTING TERM LIMITS: WHAT IF YOU HELD A REFERENDUM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05NDJAMENA932 2005-06-14 16:33 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ndjamena
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

141633Z Jun 05

ACTION AF-00    

INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AID-00   AMAD-00  CIAE-00  INL-00   DODE-00  
      DOEE-00  DS-00    EAP-00   EB-00    EUR-00   H-00     TEDE-00  
      INR-00   IO-00    LAB-01   L-00     M-00     DCP-00   NRC-00   
      NSAE-00  NSCE-00  OES-00   OIC-00   NIMA-00  PA-00    MCC-00   
      GIWI-00  PRS-00   P-00     FMPC-00  SP-00    IRM-00   SSO-00   
      SS-00    STR-00   TRSE-00  SCRS-00  DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-00   
      G-00     NFAT-00  SAS-00   SWCI-00    /001W
                  ------------------02173C  141758Z /38    
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1778
INFO AMEMBASSY ABUJA 
AMEMBASSY ACCRA 
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 
AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 
AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
C O N F I D E N T I A L  NDJAMENA 000932 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, DRL, INR, LONDON AND PARIS FOR 
AFRICAWATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM CD
SUBJECT: LIFTING TERM LIMITS: WHAT IF YOU HELD A REFERENDUM 
AND NO ONE CAME? 
 
REF: NDJAMENA 902 
 
Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reaso 
ns 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
 1.  (C) Summary:  The low voter turn-out for the public 
referendum on June 6 is still reverberating throughout Chad's 
political arena.  For now, Chad's political players are 
preoccupied with digesting and explaining what happened and 
determining which way forward.  President Deby, the ruling 
party, and the CENI are grappling with the public's vote of 
no-confidence.  Chad's political opposition leaders, press, 
and armed opponents are reveling in the government's failure 
to mobilize Chadian voters despite a large expenditure of 
cash.  For the political opposition, the referendum process 
could increase its leverage with the government and the 
public if it can unite.  The political fall-out from the 
referendum could possibly include a cabinet reshuffle and 
ruling party make-over as well as increased harassment of 
political opponents and journalists.  The Chadian public and 
political players anxiously await the public announcement of 
the results on June 21.  End Summary. 
 
- - - - - 
FOR DEBY 
- - - - - 
 
2.  (C) Various sources have told us that the low voter 
turn-out shocked President Idriss Deby because he viewed the 
referendum as a measure of his popularity and an evaluation 
of his government's performance.  A former Prime Minister's 
advisor said that the referendum was a significant blow 
because it demonstrated that if Deby ran for a third term, he 
might not win a free election.  The President voted near 
Farcha, on the outskirts of N'Djamena.  Reportedly, he was 
surprised to see that at 8:30 a.m., there were no voters at 
the polling stations he passed.  In an interview on June 6, 
the President remarked that the political opposition's call 
for a boycott of the referendum undermined the democratic 
process.  The opposition should have encouraged Chadians to 
vote whether they voted "yes" or "no", according to Deby. 
The President reportedly recalled ministers and party 
officials to N'Djamena for an explanation of the low turn-out 
and the whereabouts of the money they were given to encourage 
the "oui massif".  Rumors of an impending cabinet reshuffle 
abound, but it is not clear who will depart and when. 
Finally, some observers say that the low turn-out also was an 
indication of the unpopularity of Zaghawa rule and could 
provoke some discussion within the President's family over 
the best route to maintaining power. 
 
- - - - - 
FOR CENI 
- - - - - 
 
3.  (C) The low turn-out makes the vote counting--and its 
manipulation--more difficult.  Embassy observers and contacts 
in N'Djamena, Mousoro, and Abeche estimated that only twenty 
percent of the voters turned out.  In addition, informal 
observation of the discarded ballots indicate that many 
Chadians who did vote, voted no.  This means that the CENI 
stands to lose credibility if the announced results are 
greater than observed turn-out and reflect a "oui massif".  A 
blatant rigging of the results will discourage participation 
in future elections.  CENI will also need to correct 
technical irregularities in the run-up to the communal 
elections, tentatively set for October. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
FOR THE RULING PARTY 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
4.  (SBU) Poor participation also reflects the 
ineffectiveness of the ruling party.  Pre-referendum rallies, 
political advertisements, banners, parades and rallies, and 
ministerial campaigning are signs that government and the 
party put significant resources into the campaign with little 
results.  In the immediate days after the referendum, ruling 
Movement for Patriotic Salvation party officials scrambled to 
explain the disappointing turn-out.  Initially, MPS Secretary 
General Mahamat Hissene claimed there was a 65 percent 
 
 
turnout in some areas.  Hissene and others have since changed 
their "spin", saying that of the voters who voted, over 60 
percent voted "yes".  He has also tried to justify the 
results by pointing to the low turn-out in other more 
advanced democracies. 
 
5.  (SBU) Hissene has since been quiet, in sharp contrast to 
the run-up to the referendum.  We have also heard that the 
President visited MPS headquarters to admonish party 
officials for misleading him.  The ruling party, regardless 
of the published results, will likely be reconsidering its 
own policies and strategies prior to its Congress at the end 
of the year.  The refusal of many MPS deputies and governors 
to campaign for the referendum exposed the level of internal 
indiscipline and opposition within the party. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
FOR OPPOSITION LEADERS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
6.  (SBU) Chad's fractious political elite is taking credit 
for the low turn-out, claiming that calls for a boycott of 
the referendum resulted in low voter participation.  However, 
the public pronouncements of the various political party 
leaders indicate that government opponents continue to lack a 
unified strategy towards another term for President Deby. 
Party leaders risk misinterpreting the low turn-out as being 
a result of their "leadership" on the issue.  Instead, the 
poor participation was a sign of Chadians' disillusionment 
with the government unrelated to the opposition's call for a 
boycott.  The opposition's misinterpretation of its own 
resonance risks missing an opportunity to forge a unified 
strategy and back a common candidate to capitalize on the 
widespread anti-regime sentiment evident on June 6.  In the 
past, the government has been able to divide, rule, and coopt 
opposition leaders at will.  The current danger for the 
opposition is that the Presidency may take it more seriously 
and opposition activities will be open to more forms of 
political harassment. 
 
- - - - - - - 
FOR THE PRESS 
- - - - - - - 
 
7.  (C) Various government agencies, such as the High Council 
for Communications and the National Security Agency (ANS), 
are showing signs of an increasing willingness to limit press 
freedoms and intimidate opponents.  The HCC's closure of 
Radio Brakkos for the third time and regulations against 
political advertisements and debates concerning the 
referendum limited discussion of the government's performance 
on the country's airwaves, the most effective means of mass 
communication in Chad.  The ANS's arrest and two-day 
imprisonment of the editor of Observator for publishing an 
open letter from the Kreda, an ethnic group previously allied 
with the President, complaining about mistreatment at the 
hands of the Zaghawa was widely interpreted as a sign of the 
government's intention to crackdown on its critics.  In 
addition, the independent media has now dubbed the ANS as the 
regime's "political police".  The Minister of Communications 
also is cracking down on the press, including charging "Le 
Temps" with libel for publishing what he claims are false 
photographs of a massacre carried out by Zaghawa in eastern 
Chad.  The independent press is more cohesive than the 
political opposition and could find itself increasingly 
targeted and intimidated. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - 
FOR CHADIAN REBELS 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
8.  (C) Chadian rebel groups based in western Sudan and 
eastern Chad reportedly view the low-turn out as a sign of 
Deby's unpopularity.  As a result, these groups may feel 
increasingly empowered and possibly reach out to make 
political connections in N'Djamena to coordinate their 
activities.  While this is still speculation among our 
contacts, it bears watching and may be a factor in future 
actions by the government. 
 
- - - - - - - 
 
 
FOR CHADIANS 
- - - - - - - 
 
9.  (SBU) Average Chadians refused to participate as a sign 
of their frustration with lack of social services and 
infrastructure, security, salaries, and the prevailing social 
discrimination and culture of impunity.  Given a pervasive 
feeling of powerlessness among Chadians, the one way that 
they could be heard was not to show up at the polls.  In 
effect, most view the low turn-out as a vote of no-confidence 
in the government.  The average Chadian felt that if they 
went to the polls and voted "no" that their vote would be 
changed to a "yes".  Therefore, by not voting at all, a 
stronger signal was sent, preventing the government from 
claiming a high turn-out and thus a strong mandate to 
continue in power.  Some may believe that this public display 
of widespread dissent could lead to some policy changes. 
However, most only hope that President and the ruling party 
heard the message. 
 
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COMMENT 
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10.  (C) The next steps for Chad's political players will be 
determined by the results of the referendum, which will be 
released on June 21.  The extent to which the government 
tries to hide what everyone plainly saw on June 6 will have 
implications for the course of the next elections.  We look 
forward to the results and knowing if denial really is a 
river in N'Djamena. 
WALL 
 
 
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