This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 005753 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR P, WHA, WHA/AND 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2015 
TAGS: PHUM PREL PTER CO KJUS AUC
SUBJECT: EMBASSY DELIVERS STERN MESSAGE TO GOC ON DON BERNA 
 
Classified By: Charge Milton K. Drucker for reasons: 1.4 (b) & (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  Charge delivered message to President Uribe 
on June 13 and Uribe advisers on June 14 that AUC commander 
Diego Murillo ("Don Berba") should not be released into the 
concentration zone for demobilized AUC leaders (as press 
reports were suggesting), should no longer participate in the 
peace process, and ought to be tried for his alleged 
involvement in the murder of a Cordoba Department official. 
Anything short of that would damage the credibility of the 
peace process and jeopardize U.S. support for demobilization. 
 Charge also insisted that the GOC do a better and more 
thorough job of processing the demobilized than it had done 
in earlier rounds.  Uribe assured Charge that Don Berna would 
not go free.  Advisers Juan Lozano and Jaime Bermudez said 
the GOC's arrangement with Don Berna, made public on June 13 
(septel), assured his detention, his submission to Colombian 
justice, and the demobilization of his troops.  They also 
asserted the President's toughness going after Don Berna put 
other paras on notice.  Director of Communications for the 
Presidency Bermudez also reported that the total number of 
those to be demobilized from Don Berna blocs was less than 
the 4000 reported.  The GOC would publish the correct number 
when it was confirmed.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Following news reports over the weekend suggesting 
that AUC commander Diego Murillo ("Don Berna") could be 
released back into the concentration zone of demobilized AUC 
leaders in Santa Fe de Ralito, Charge spoke to President 
Uribe during a June 13 Colombian-American Chamber of Commerce 
luncheon about the need to ensure Don Berna was no longer a 
part of the peace process nor would he be allowed to leave 
his "finca of detention."  Uribe noted that Don Berna had 
promised to demobilize 4000 men.  Charge responded that Don 
Berna was accused of murdering a local Cordoba Department 
official and countless other crimes, and had to face justice. 
 At the end of the lunch, Uribe approached Charge to assure 
him that Don Berna would not go free.  Charge said he would 
be meeting the following day with the President's chief of 
staff, Juan Lozano, to emphasize in more detail U.S. 
concerns. 
 
¶3. (C) Several hours later, the Prosecutor General issued a 
custodial measure against Don Berna formally detaining him, 
and the High Peace Commissioner announced that Don Berna's 
status as a demobilized combatant would be maintained to 
conclude the demobilization of his blocs. 
 
¶4. (C) On July 14, Charge and polcouns met with Juan Lozano 
to clarify Don Berna's status.  Presidential Communications 
Director Jaime Bermudez joined the meeting.  Charge stressed 
that the credibility of the entire process was at stake.  If 
Don Berna could murder a deputy and return to Santa Fe de 
Ralito unsanctioned, the peace process was doomed and U.S. 
efforts to support demobilization would be jeopardized.  Don 
Berna needed to be tried, and tried in a fair court 
expeditiously.  And while this was happening, he could not be 
part of the peace process.  Also, the executive branch had to 
do what it could to ensure this did not become another 
endless, multi-year, court case.  The GOC's credibility would 
be damaged beyond repair abroad with respect to the peace 
process if it did not ensure Don Berna's treatment was 
consistent with the rule of law. 
 
¶5. (C) Lozano said he took the point but stressed that it had 
been Uribe who made the tough call to go after Don Berna in 
the first place, to make him subject to a legal process 
regarding the incident in Cordoba.  Now, Don Berna was in the 
custody of the GOC (albeit in a house instead of a jail), 
under the control of GOC public forces, and at the 
disposition of the judicial branch.  The legal process would 
go forward and he could not avoid it.  And, said Lozano, Don 
Berna is still going to demobilize his troops.  Charge 
underscored how important it was to signal to the Colombian 
public, the political opposition and the other paramilitaries 
that things had changed in Colombia and Don Berna would have 
to pay for his crime if he ordered the deputy killed. 
 
¶6. (C) Charge also insisted that the GOC had to do a better 
job of processing the demobilized than earlier rounds.  The 
process had to be credible and the GOC was not ready. 
Without additional effort and resources, the demobilization 
of 4000 men would overwhelm the system.  Then Senator Pardo's 
charge that the demobilizations were not dismantling the 
networks would stick, he said.  In addition, the Fiscalia had 
to be more engaged in greater numbers to move the 
ex-combatants through the process.  Both Lozano and Bermudez 
agreed that ought to happen and said they would work on it. 
 
¶7. (C) Bermudez admitted that the President had taken a big 
risk in leaving Don Berna where he was.  In GOC internal 
deliberations, two choices emerged: either keep Don Berna 
under GOC control and confront charges of special treatment 
while significant demobilizations proceeded, or put him in 
jail and risk derailing the demobilization of his blocs. 
They decided on the former, believing it not only salvaged 
additional demobilizations, but also sent the right message 
to other paramilitaries.  According to Bermudez, High Peace 
Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo visited with demobilized 
AUC leaders in Ralito to discuss Don Berna's case, and found 
them acknowledging the President's "guts" in going after him, 
and making it clear that they did not want the same thing 
happening to them. 
 
¶8. (C) Bermudez said Don Berna would be brought to Medellin 
later in the week to attend a public hearing related to his 
case.  We understand that the process will be scrutinized 
carefully both here and abroad, he stressed, and intend to 
make sure it comes out right.  He also said the GOC intended 
to be as transparent about the process as possible.  For 
example, the number of those demobilizing from Don Berna's 
blocs turns out to be lower than 4,000.  He intended to 
release the new figure as soon as he could confirm it. 
 
¶9. (C) Comment: Lozano and Bermudez understood that they were 
in a high stakes game and the political space for this sort 
of maneuver was closing fast.  A failure with Don Berna would 
leave the President exposed in domestic politics as never 
before in his presidency. 
DRUCKER