This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002455 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PINS PINR IZ
SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR 
MUAFFAQ AL-RUBAIE 
 
Classified By: Political-Military Counselor Ronald E. Neumann 
for reason 1.4 (b) 
 
 ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The ITG is disorganized and ineffective 
according to Rubaie.  He characterized the government as in 
crisis with the Kurds provoked especially by the absence of 
any mention of federalism in the Prime Ministers State of the 
Union message.  Additionally, Talabani is angry about the 
responsibilities of Finance Minister Allawi, which have 
included subjects he and Barham Salih wanted in the Ministry 
of Planning with Salih. Rubaie also doubts that the Prime 
Minister understands the political nature of the insurgency. 
Therefore his political strategy for dealing with it is 
inadequate.  Rubaie may have failed to cement his personal 
relationship with Ja'afari and that could be underlying his 
analysis but he is clearly much less happy with the Ja'afari 
government than he was a month ago.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) A month ago Rubaie was full of optimism for the new 
government.  Now he is pessimistic.  In a meeting with 
PolMilCons Neumann June 8, Rubaie characterized Ja'afari as 
disorganized and particularly condemned his lack of any 
approach to building institutions, something Rubaie is keen 
on.  He said the lack of meetings of the Ministerial Council 
for National Security (MCNS) is simply because the Prime 
Minister does not understand its value or who needs to be 
involved in national security issues.  Among the cabinet 
committees recently composed is one on defense and security 
(unlike the MCNS the cabinet committees do not involve the 
coalition or principal allies).  However the cabinet security 
committee did not include the Chief of Intelligence or the 
Foreign Minister.  Rubaie caustically asked how the Foreign 
Minister could accurately represent policy if he was not 
involved in it when security was so fundamental to relations 
with the neighbors.  Rubaie also condemned Ja'afari for not 
listening, that he gives lengthy explanations, is difficult 
to talk to and does not respond to argument. 
 
¶3. (C) Rubaie characterized the relations with the Kurds as a 
crisis (we have reported this in more detail septels).  He 
said both Talabani and Barzani were furious that Rubaie's 
State of the Union message had no mention of federalism. 
Additionally, Talabani is angry that Finance Minister Allawi 
rather than Planning Minister Barham Salih has the lead for 
planning for Brussels.  Rubaie knew about Talabani's meeting 
on the same day with Abdul Aziz Hakim to figure out how to 
deal with Ja'afari. 
 
¶4. (C) Ja'afari said the Prime Minister is making no use of 
the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) director. 
Contrary to what Chalabi said last week, Rubaie said that 
INIS Director Sharwani is making frequent attempts to be in 
touch with the Prime Minister and to offer him briefings. 
However the Prime Minister does not respond.  Rubaie said 
that he is in regular touch with Sharwani who is very 
frustrated.  Rubaie went on to say that none of the Deputy 
Prime Ministers or members of the Presidency Council receive 
any regular flow of information.  Rubaie has offered to 
provide a weekly intelligence briefing to each of the Deputy 
Prime Ministers and is now making the same offer to the two 
Vice Presidents and President Talabani.  Rubaie said that he 
has regular conversations with a SCIRI senior advisor and 
Iraqi Vice President Adil Abdel-Mahdi who is frustrated at 
the incoherence of the government.  (COMMENT:  As an 
alternative candidate for Prime Minister Abdel-Mahdi is not 
quite a disinterested observer.  END COMMENT)  Rubaie 
questioned whether Ja'afari really understands the nature of 
the insurgency.  He quoted Ja'afari and a separate 
conversation with Minister of State for National Security 
Al-Anzi.  Each one of them apparently said that given a free 
hand they could clean up the insurgency in two or three 
months.  Rubaie explained that what they meant was that the 
insurgency was based solely on die-hard Ba'athists and 
criminals who would give up or run away if faced with 
sufficient force.  Rubaie does not accept this 
characterization of the insurgency.  He thinks it is far more 
complex and more political.  The Jihadists won't give up and 
there is an element within the insurgency that sincerely 
believes it is fighting to rid the country of a foreign 
occupier.  Rubaie said that without the proper understanding 
of the nature of the insurgency it is extremely difficult or 
impossible for Ja'afari to build an adequate political 
strategy to deal with it. 
 
¶5. (C) COMMENT: It is possible that Rubaie has failed to get 
some position or policy he wants adopted and that his 
analysis is affected with sourness as a result.  However it 
is also true that Rubaie has an abiding and sometimes 
unrealistic desire to build institutions and go beyond 
personal politics.  He is therefore all the more frustrated 
that Ja'afari is uninterested in building systems and is 
constructing instead a government centralized completely on 
himself with chaotic staffing procedures.  END COMMENT. 
Jeffrey