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Viewing cable 05AMMAN4296, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MAY 20 MEETING WITH IRAQI

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05AMMAN4296 2005-06-01 12:39 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Amman
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 AMMAN 004296 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KISL ECON IZ SY IR
SUBJECT: THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MAY 20 MEETING WITH IRAQI 
FOREIGN MINISTER ZEBARI 
 
Classified By: CDA David Hale for Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 1.  (U) The Deputy Secretary met with Iraqi Foreign 
Minister Hoshyar Zebari on May 20, 2005, at 9:30 am, at the 
Dead Sea Movenpick Hotel, Jordan, on the margins of the 
World Economic Forum conference. 
 
2.  (C) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
The Deputy Secretary 
Ambassador Jones 
Ambassador Wilson 
Deputy Spokesman Ereli 
NEA DAS Carpenter 
NSC Director Pandith 
Embassy Baghdad EconCouns Derse 
D Special Assistant Waller 
Notetaker Schedlbauer 
 
Iraq 
 
Foreign Minister Zebari 
Iraqi Ambassador to Jordan Abdul Wahab 
Assistant to Minister Robson 
Prime Minister's Office Assistant Sherwan 
 
3.  (C) Summary: Iraqi Foreign Minister Zebari told the 
Deputy Secretary May 20 that the Iraqi government had 
received the Secretary's message on increasing Sunni 
participation in the constitutional drafting process and 
would likely add 12-14 new members.  Zebari noted that 
Transitional National Assembly (TNA) Speaker Hasani was 
seeking international technical support for the 
Constitutional Commission and not just Americans or 
British.  Zebari acknowledged that the constitutional 
drafting process was the "cornerstone of our success or 
failure" and that there were clear timelines in place that 
had to be met or they would risk serious ruptures.  Zebari 
stressed that while the increase in sectarian violence, 
including the assassinations of religious leaders, was 
frightening, he did not believe it would lead to civil war. 
The Deputy Secretary said he would like to see religious 
leaders condemn Zarqawi's recent statement that it was 
acceptable to kill women and children. 
 
4.  (C) Summary cont'd On the review of UN Security Council 
Resolution 1546, Zebari said he would send a letter to the 
Council and was also willing to appear before the Council, 
as early as the last week in May.  Zebari noted the Iranian 
Foreign Minister's recent visit to Iraq and said that the 
Iranians wanted to play an influential role in Iraq but 
were mindful that it be a nonviolent role.  Zebari 
contrasted this with the Syrian agenda, stressing that 
"this insurgency, believe me, is originating in Syria." 
The Deputy Secretary said that both he and the Secretary 
during each of their visits to Baghdad had urged the Iraqi 
leadership to press Syria hard since Assad is already under 
united international pressure.  The Deputy Secretary said 
it would be useful for Zebari to call Javier Solana and 
explain why the Syrian government should not be invited to 
the US-EU conference on Iraq in Brussels.  End summary. 
 
Malaysia willing to train Iraqis 
-------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) The Deputy Secretary recalled his visit the 
previous day to Iraq, only five weeks after his last visit 
and on the heels of the Secretary's visit, in order to meet 
with the new government and convey the USG's strong support 
of ongoing efforts.  He told Zebari that during his visit 
the previous week to Malaysia, Malaysian Prime Minister 
Badawi expressed a desire to be supportive of the new Iraqi 
government, perhaps by providing training.  The Deputy 
Secretary told Zebari he had found this encouraging because 
 
SIPDIS 
Badawi is both the leader of the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC) and has solid Islamic credentials. 
 
Constitutional Commission: 
Need to add Sunnis 
-------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) The Deputy Secretary highlighted the need for an 
integrated strategy (political, economic, security) to 
defeat the insurgency.  He voiced concern over 
constitutional developments and underscored the need to get 
broader Sunni participation in the constitutional drafting 
process.  He also said he was concerned by the increase in 
sectarian violence. 
 
7.  (C) Zebari expressed his pleasure at meeting with the 
Deputy Secretary in Jordan.  He noted that the current 
Constitutional Commission was a product of the Transitional 
National Assembly (TNA), a body from which Sunni Arabs "are 
absent."  He said that the government is now proposing to 
include Sunnis in the Constitutional Commission pursuant to 
the message it received from the Secretary earlier in the 
week.  (Note: The Foreign Minister stressed twice during 
the meeting that the Secretary's visit had a strong impact. 
End note.)  He said that 12-14 new members would likely be 
added to the current 55 members.  Zebari agreed this needed 
to happen to prevent a rift; on a positive note, he said 
the Sunnis are beginning to organize themselves and should 
participate in the next election.  The idea of including 
Sunni Arabs in the Commission had not met with any 
resistance from Iraqi Prime Minister Jafari, President 
Talabani, or Barzani.  The only resistance, he said, was 
coming from SCIRI (Supreme Council for the Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq) leader Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim.  Zebari 
said that he and others were stressing that such opposition 
sent the wrong message.  He asked for the Deputy 
Secretary's assistance in persuading al-Hakim and others of 
 
SIPDIS 
the need to be inclusive. 
8.  (C) The Deputy Secretary said that inclusiveness was 
his core message.  The USG was ready to help as needed. 
The Deputy Secretary noted that in his meeting May 19 with 
Deputy Prime Minister Ahmad Chalabi, Chalabi said he was on 
board with increasing Sunni participation on the 
Constitutional Commission.  Zebari said he thought the 
issue was manageable. 
 
Technical Support for the Constitutional Commission 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
9.  (C) The Deputy Secretary then noted that Transitional 
National Assembly Speaker Hasani wanted technical support 
for the Constitutional Commission.  Zebari said he was not 
sure Hasani had formally asked for UN assistance. 
Ambassador Jones said that the USG was told that Hasani had 
sent a letter the day he had met with the Secretary but 
agreed to follow-up with Hasani and press him for more 
specifics on the assistance request.  Zebari said that the 
government "would prefer a more international face" if 
technical experts are sent, and not just Americans or 
British.  The Deputy Secretary asked Ambassador Jones to 
follow-up with Hasani and noted that the USG would be happy 
to support the request. 
 
10.  (C) Zebari stressed that Iraq cannot squander this 
last stage of the process.  Drafting the constitution would 
be the cornerstone of the new governments success or 
failure.  The Deputy Secretary responded that the 
insurgents had failed to stop the elections, failed to stop 
the government from forming, and, so, were now targeting 
the constitutional drafting process. 
 
11.  (C) Zebari noted that there are clear deadlines in 
place: August for drafting and October for a referendum. 
He stressed that the deadlines must be met in order for the 
government to retain its credibility.  The Deputy Secretary 
said that everyone said they wanted to abide by the August 
15 deadline, but there was considerable wobbliness behind 
those statements.  Noting that the constitutional drafters 
are people of courage and conviction who face an 
extraordinary task, he observed that the opposition will 
resort to whatever means it can, including murder, to try 
to delay the process.  If there are delays, he said, they 
would take advantage of those delays. 
 
Sectarian violence frightening but will not stop us 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
12. (C) Zebari stressed that he believes they will manage 
to complete the transition process, despite recent attempts 
to foment sectarian violence.  Zebari complained bitterly 
about Arab League SYG Amr Musa, who has kept silent about 
victims of the insurgency but who has made headlines in 
recent days by talking about Iraq's sectarian violence.  He 
noted that in the past there had been assassinations of 
local Baathists who were accused of having harmed people; 
however, assassinations of religious leaders, whether Sunni 
or Shia, with the possible collaboration of members of the 
security forces, was a very frightening matter.  Zebari 
asked the Deputy Secretary for USG support in opposing 
sectarian killings. 
 
13.  (C) The Deputy Secretary agreed that there were great 
risks and dangers and many who did not want democracy to 
succeed.  He stressed that he would like to see the Iraqi 
leaders speak as a group and note the total unacceptability 
of sectarian violence.  He also urged that Iraqi religious 
leaders, as well as those in the broader Muslim community, 
issue the same message.  The Deputy Secretary pointed to 
Zarqawi's recent statement on the acceptability of murder, 
even of women and children.  Religious leaders should 
condemn such statements as outrageous and contrary to 
Islam.  He noted that he would emphasize this point in his 
speech before the WEF plenary that night. 
Violence will not lead to civil war 
----------------------------------- 
 
14.  (C) Zebari stressed that he did not think that the 
sectarian violence would lead to civil war.  The Deputy 
Secretary replied that if the Iraqi government is able to 
 
SIPDIS 
move forward with the drafting of the Constitution, it can 
beat the bombs with the continuation of the political 
process.  He stressed that as constitutional discussions 
proceed, the commission needs to engage the public.  He 
suggested that the European Union example could serve as a 
case study of what not to do -- only engaging the 
intellectuals and elites on the constitution, not the 
public.  He noted that political support could be built by 
opening up the process. 
15.  (C) The Deputy Secretary said he had told Speaker 
Hassani that the government needs to continue to prepare 
for the upcoming elections and that the International 
Election Commission for Iraq (IECI) is a real asset with 
which the ITG should continue to work. 
 
Ready for UNSCR 1546 review at the end of May 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
16.  (C) Zebari said that UN Security Council resolution 
(UNSCR) 1546 is up for review in June and the Iraqi 
government is ready to cooperate.  Ambassador Jones noted 
that the Development Fund for Iraq is also up for review as 
part of 1546.  Zebari said that he would send a letter to 
the UN Security Council and was also ready to give an oral 
statement in New York before the Council.  Ambassador Jones 
said that the USG hoped to complete the review by the end 
of May since both the US and French governments had agreed 
that it was better if it was completed before the French 
assume the Council presidency in June.  Zebari said he was 
ready to go to New York before the end of the month.  The 
Deputy Secretary stressed that it was important for the 
UNSC to hear directly from a member of the Iraqi 
government. 
 
Brussels Conference: Iraqi delegation urged to come with 
economic priorities 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
17.  (C) Zebari raised the June 22 US-EU conference on Iraq 
in Brussels, noting that he had received a good response to 
it during the recent Latin American-Middle East summit in 
Brazil, especially from Egypt.  He confirmed the Iraqi 
Foreign Ministry would take the lead in organizing it, per 
Ambassador Jones' earlier suggestion.  He said he would set 
up a small unit in the Foreign Ministry to coordinate the 
Iraqi delegation.  He stressed that the Iraqi delegation 
would include both government and TNA political leaders of 
different stripes so that it would appear "truly 
representational." 
 
18.  (C) The Deputy Secretary said he had noticed the 
international community's change in attitude since the 
elections and the Iraqi government's formation.  He 
stressed that now was the time to move forward and get more 
support for reconstruction.  He urged Zebari to have his 
economic team come to the conference with a clear plan with 
sharp targets on agriculture, employment, rebuilding the 
private sector, etc., and priorities (perhaps packaged as a 
100-day plan) to create a sense of momentum. 
 
19.  (C) The Deputy Secretary noted that it was a good 
decision to have Barham Salih take a lead role with the 
donor community.  He said he knew that Salih and Finance 
Minister Allawi could work together and urged Zebari to 
have the Foreign Ministry in the lead to keep driving the 
process forward. 
 
Iran - clever approach 
---------------------- 
 
20.  (C) Zebari noted that Iranian Foreign Minister 
Kharrazi's May 17 visit to Baghdad was intended to send a 
political message: Iran, like the US, has a presence in 
Iraq and expects to enjoy some influence.  Zebari observed 
that the Iranians have been clever to cultivate support 
without directly sponsoring violence.  During Kharrazi's 
visit, the Iranians expressed interest in reviving a joint 
Prime-ministerial committee and the Iraqis agreed.  The two 
sides also agreed to establish reciprocal consulates (with 
the Iranian consulates being located in Najaf and Karbala 
to facilitate Iranian pilgrimages). 
 
Syria - Insurgency is originating there 
--------------------------------------- 
21.  (C) Zebari contrasted the Iranian role with the Syrian 
agenda that continued to be destructive despite the 
continuous contacts and meetings between the two 
governments and despite what happened in Lebanon.  Zebari 
said that some in the Syrian government (SARG) are sending 
the message that it wants to change and take a new approach 
with the Iraqi government.  Zebari said he had passed a 
list of wanted people active in Damascus to the SARG. 
Nevertheless, the recent car bomb attacks, according to 
Iraqi information, originated in Syria, Zebari said. 
According to intelligence he had seen, Zebari said that 
some are organizing a terror network in Saudi Arabia and 
Jordan to recruit and move people.  He said that his 
government's consistent request to the SARG has been that 
"we know you, we dealt with you in the past.  We expect you 
not to send arms.  We know you know every person who enters 
(Syria) since when we were there you helped us with 
smuggling."  Zebari noted that the best assurance to the 
SARG is a government in place in Iraq that is friendly to 
it.  Again, Zebari stressed, "This insurgency, believe me, 
is originating in Syria.  Ramadi, Falluja . . . it's all 
coming from Syria." 
 
Now is the time to press Syria hard 
----------------------------------- 
 
22.  (C) The Deputy Secretary said the Secretary had 
pressed the issue of Syria.  He noted that Assad is feeling 
under pressure after having totally miscalculated in 
Lebanon.  As the Deputy Secretary told PM Jafari May 19, 
now is the time to press hard on Syria while the 
international community is united.  The Deputy Secretary 
posited that "geography is reality," suggesting Zebari 
remind his Syrian interlocutors that Iraq is not going 
anywhere, it will eventually be stronger than Syria again, 
and its leadership has very long memories.  The SARG should 
start acting appropriately. 
 
Syria should not be invited to Brussels conference 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
23.  (C) The Deputy Secretary said the USG does not feel it 
would be appropriate for the SARG to participate in the 
Brussels conference.  The Deputy Secretary pointed out to 
Zebari that it would be very useful for Zebari to call 
Solana and explain why the SARG should not be invited.  The 
Deputy Secretary asked rhetorically why the SARG should be 
given additional legitimacy by being at the conference when 
it is trying to undermine the Iraqi government.  Again, the 
Deputy Secretary urged Zebari to speak with Solana who 
would likely be impressed by the facts. 
 
24.  (U) This cable has been cleared by the Deputy Secretary. 
 
HALE