This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 003811 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PASS TO NRC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2015 
TAGS: PREL MASS KSTC KNNP KOMC ETTC IN GOI
SUBJECT: INDIA PREPARED TO ENGAGE INTERNATIONAL 
NON-PROLIFERATION REGIMES 
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 3653 
     ¶B. NEW DELHI 3652 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Geoffrey Pyatt, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1.  (U) Summary:  In an important May 17 address at the 
Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), India's 
premier military R&D facility, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 
declared that with the passage of the new WMD law, India is 
prepared for "the broadest form of engagement with the 
international non-proliferation regime," as long as this 
engagement does not endanger its indigenous strategic 
programs.  He argued that India has a "double imperative" to 
pursue opportunities for greater high-tech trade from foreign 
sources while maintaining its own development of critical 
strategic technology.  Stressing that indigenous development 
of strategic technology would remain a priority to maintain 
India's autonomy, the PM encouraged greater collaboration 
between DRDO and the Indian private sector and more 
interaction with foreign R&D institutions as means to improve 
the effectiveness of India's defense research industry. 
 
¶2.  (C) We believe the GOI is committed to fulfilling NSSP 
conditions regarding the Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines.  The 
PM's speech, however, highlights the thin line he must walk 
between the Indian political elite's dislike of these control 
regimes and GOI commitment to non-proliferation to achieve 
its larger objectives, i.e., nuclear fuel for its growing 
energy needs, greater access to high-tech goods, and most 
importantly, acceptance as an emerging global power.  End 
Summary. 
 
Maintaining Strategic Autonomy 
------------------------------ 
 
¶3.  (U) Throughout his address to the defense scientists, 
Manmohan Singh returned to the theme of maintaining and 
maximizing GOI strategic programs and autonomy.  With the 
recent passage of the WMD law (Ref B), the PM boldly declared 
that "India is prepared for the broadest form of engagement 
with the international non-proliferation regime."  He also 
highlighted an important nuance that such engagement was 
evidence of GOI commitment to stop outward proliferation, but 
would not curb the country's indigenous strategic programs. 
"In the defense and nuclear fields, our strategic programs 
are indigenous and not dependent on external sources of 
support.  Nor can they be the subject of externally imposed 
constraints."  He went on to emphasize the need to continue 
strategic self-reliance so that India's defense options are 
not constrained by "bilateral and multilateral technology 
denial regimes."  He added pointedly that "such regimes are 
contrary to the logic of globalization, and are increasingly 
an anachronism from the past." 
 
¶4.  (U) The PM also spoke about finding the right balance 
between indigenous development and acquiring critical 
technology from foreign sources.  "We must concentrate our 
indigenous efforts on critical technologies of strategic 
value, for which, in most cases we have no option but to rely 
on our own resources.  At the same time, we must explore 
fully what is available through external sourcing, be it 
through technology transfer or co-production, both for use in 
the Indian market or for third country exports."  He cited 
the Indian-Russian BrahMos cruise missile joint venture as a 
successful example of the benefits of defense co-production 
and as an answer to the persistent problem of reliability of 
spares and product support. 
 
Indigenous Development a Priority 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (U) While pursuing opportunities for greater high tech 
trade and collaboration, the PM stressed that indigenous 
development of strategic technology would continue to be a 
priority to maintain India's autonomy.  "The higher the 
indigenous content of our weapon systems, the greater our 
confidence that the autonomy of national decision-making will 
not be affected in a crisis." 
 
Need to Improve Defense Research Effectiveness 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶6.  (U) Praising DRDO's wide-ranging contributions to both 
defense and civilian objectives, the PM also cautioned 
against delays and cost overruns, outlining opportunities to 
make the organization more effective.  Addressing DRDO's 
notoriously sluggish production times, the PM outlined the 
economic, tactical, and strategic consequences of such 
delays, "Delays not only affect the national exchequer, they 
can also seriously undermine the confidence of the defense 
services if a weapon system is practically obsolete by the 
time of its induction.  Most importantly, delays also limit 
our strategic options." 
¶7.  (U) The PM went on to encourage initiatives to make DRDO 
more efficient: greater collaboration with India's private 
sector and leveraging the country's human resources to 
attract more foreign R&D opportunities.  In this context, he 
lauded DRDO's efforts to set up Research and Development 
Boards in areas such as aeronautics, armament research, naval 
research and life sciences research, to promote collaborative 
arrangements with academic institutions and other national 
R&D laboratories. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶8.  (C) To complete Phase II of the NSSP, the GOI must agree 
to adhere to MTCR and NSG guidelines, two primary examples of 
the "multilateral technology denial regimes" which the PM 
seemed to rebuke in his address to the defense scientists. 
However, senior GOI officials such as FS Saran have assured 
us that the GOI will fulfill its NSSP obligations by 
Executive Decree. 
 
¶9.  (C) The PM's statement highlights the fine line he must 
walk: On one side, assuring the defense industry that the GOI 
will not accede to external controls on its legitimate 
defensive programs, while on the other, associating India 
with domestically unpopular regimes in order to demonstrate 
GOI commitment to non-proliferation and achieve India's 
larger objectives, i.e., nuclear fuel for its burgeoning 
energy needs, greater access to high-tech goods, and most 
importantly, acceptance of India as an emerging global power. 
 Considering the profound distaste for "discriminatory" 
control regimes among the influential Indian scientific 
establishment and many of the political elite, the GOI will 
have to boost its efforts to explain the nuances of its 
policy regarding MTCR and NSG as it moves ahead with our NSSP 
partnership. 
BLAKE