This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 BRUSSELS 001734 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF, EUR/ERA, PRM/AFR; DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS 
USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/03/2015 
TAGS: PREL PREF PGOV MOPS PHUM EAID XA EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: TRANSATLANTIC CONSULTATIONS ON AFRICA 
 
Classified By: PRMOFF MARC J. MEZNAR.  REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶1. (U) Summary.  The April 20 transatlantic consultations on 
Africa (COAFR) addressed priorities in the Great Lakes 
(ensuring democratic governance, supporting security sector 
reform and fostering regional stability), Somalia 
(consolidating the peace process), Sudan (Darfur and 
North-South); West Africa (Liberia, including funding 
issues); and options for highlighting Africa at the upcoming 
U.S.-EU Summit.  The Luxembourg presidency underscored the 
broad range of agreement and multilateral cooperation the 
U.S. and EU share with regard to Africa. 
 
¶2. (C) The U.S. delegation asked the EU to consider more aid 
for the Liberian elections and urgent food aid to Darfur. 
Both delegations agreed to support the recommendations of the 
joint assessment mission regarding AU involvement in Sudan, 
and the expansion of that mission.  The EU promised to 
provide the USG with a list of areas where the EU hopes to 
cooperate with ECOWAS, and the U.S. agreed to provide EU 
experts with unclassified documents outlining USG 
counter-terrorism efforts in Africa. End Summary. 
 
------------------------ 
Participants 
------------------------ 
 
¶3. (U) EU participants included: Alain de Muyser, Director 
for African Affairs (MFA) and Nadia Ernzer, Senior Advisor 
for Africa and CIS Affairs (MFA) for the Luxembourg 
Presidency; Ambassador Aldo Ajello, EU Special Envoy for the 
Great Lakes; Koen Vervaeke, Head of the EU Council 
Secretariat Africa Task Force, and desk officers Peter 
 
SIPDIS 
Clausen, Jesper Tvevad, Genoveva Hernandez, Christian Manahl 
and Van Reedt Dortland Ran; Anders Henriksson, Director for 
the Horn, East and Southern Africa (DG DEV), Elizabeth Pizon, 
Unit Head for Central Africa (DG DEV), Miriam Brewka, ACP 
Issues Unit (DG RELEX) for the European Commission (EC); and 
Tim Hitchens, Head of the Africa Department (Equatorial), 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ruth Bradley-Jones, 
Permanent Representation, for the incoming UK Presidency. 
USDEL consisted of Ambassador Michael Ranneberger (Principal 
Deputy Assistant Secretary, AF), Donald Heflin (Deputy 
Director, AF/Regional and Security Affairs), Patricia Lerner 
(Development Counselor, USEU/USAID) and Marc Meznar 
(Political Officer, USEU/PRM). 
 
-------------------------------- 
U.S.-EU Summit 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Echoing a call by the Belgian Foreign Minister during 
President Bush,s February 22 visit to Brussels, De Muyser 
said that our cooperative efforts in Africa, particularly as 
they relate to development assistance and crisis management, 
should be publicized at the June U.S.-EU Summit.  A half hour 
of brainstorming resulted in a few preliminary ideas to 
recommend for consideration by summit organizers.  One 
suggestion that gained broad support was to highlight the 
range of multilateral cooperation the U.S. and EU have 
jointly undertaken during the year in Africa, along with a 
few proposed areas for future transatlantic efforts. 
Examples of what has been accomplished include: 
strengthening the AU, consolidating the peace in Sudan and 
Liberia, accelerating the return and reintegration of 
refugees and IDPs, sponsoring the tripartite agreements in 
the Great Lakes and responding to the HIV/AIDs pandemic. 
Examples of what might be achieved in the coming year: 
preventing the spread of terrorist activities, promoting good 
governance in Zimbabwe and developing effective early warning 
mechanisms in conflictive areas. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Great Lakes 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) The Great Lakes region remains the EU's top priority 
in Africa.  Vervaeke reported that the EU,s High 
Representative Javier Solana and Development Commissioner 
Louis Michel will visit Kinshasa on April 29 to press forward 
its agenda.  It will be the first time these two senior EU 
officials have undertaken a joint mission. 
 
¶6. (C) Regarding DRC, Ajello expressed concern over the 
status of the draft constitution.  He said the current plan 
does not contain a sufficient balance of powers to ensure 
democratic governance.  The planned "winner takes all" system 
could be a catalyst for post-election violence since losers 
will have no incentive to support the new government.  One 
group likely to be in this category is the RCD Goma, a 
military force with a powerful ally next door.  Ajello 
recommended the U.S. and EU intervene jointly to assure that 
sufficient guarantees are incorporated in the new 
constitution to prevent the creation of another autocratic 
regime on the continent.  He noted that it was unclear at 
this point whether the president would be elected by the 
Parliament or by popular vote.  Ajello said the international 
community should not be so focused on holding quick elections 
that it ignores flaws in the draft constitution. 
 
¶7. (C) Ajello said that the cost of the elections was 
estimated at $430 million, with $110 million of that for 
logistics.  He said that logistics could be covered by MONUC 
if there is agreement in New York to expand the mandate. 
Such an agreement would necessarily include payment for the 
expansion from assessed contributions.  Ranneberger 
emphasized U.S. support for a credible election process and 
said the U.S. would provide some limited funding.  The 
proposed UN resolution on election funding has serious 
implications for the U.S., given that the U.S. obligation is 
28 percent.  Ajello stressed that without MONUC, the 
elections cannot happen.  Vervaeke said that the EU is not 
willing to pinpoint a date for elections as too many of the 
legislative and logistic details need to be resolved.  Given 
the current situation, Vervaeke said the EU fears the 
elections could slip to the spring of 2006. 
 
¶8. (C) Another area of concern is the slow pace of the DRC's 
security sector reform (SSR), as well as the disarmament, 
demobilization, return and reintegration (DDRR) of 
ex-combatants.  Ranneberger stressed the critical role EU and 
Belgian support for SSR and DDRR plays in stabilizing the 
region.  He said the continuing presence of armed groups and 
militias with varying ethnic composition, territory, and 
objectives is the principal problem in Eastern Congo and 
pointed out the need also to address the problem of disarming 
militias in the North and South Kivus.  Ajello said that DDRR 
is not working well enough and that higher-ranking officers 
are not interested in the "orientation centers" being set up. 
 Vervaeke characterized the SSR as "chaotic" despite the 
efforts of the Belgians, South Africans and others, but said 
that it was crucial for the transition.  Troika participants 
indicated that the EU is sending eight EU military advisers 
to the DRC as an advisory mission to work closely with MONUC. 
 They would also like to link up with the U.S.-sponsored 
fusion cell. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Ajello indicated that EU High Representative Javier 
Solana and Commissioner Louis Michel would be making an 
unprecedented joint mission to the DRC to highlight EU 
support of the Great Lakes process and to press on the need 
to follow through with security sector reform. 
 
¶10. (C) The EU is pleased with developments relating to MONUC 
and feels that AU peacekeepers will not be necessary if an 
integrated Congolese force can help MONUC ensure stability. 
Ajello said that in his meeting earlier on April 20 with 
President Museveni, the Ugandan leader praised the Pakistani 
and Indian brigades for bringing order to the Ituri region. 
 
¶11. (C) Vervaeke provided some details about the EU police 
mission (EUPOL) in Kinshasa to support the political reform 
process.  He said that roughly 30 experts from a variety of 
EU Member States are assisting with the establishment of an 
integrated police unit whose mission will be to protect 
governmental institutions.  Having experts on the ground in 
Kinshasa will also provide needed analysis. 
 
¶12. (C) Ranneberger gave a readout of President Kagame's 
recent visit to Washington and said that U.S.-EU cooperation 
in the region had been highlighted.  Kagame welcomed the 
U.S.-facilitated tripartite talks, whose objective is to 
develop confidence and coordinated action to reduce the 
threat posed by armed groups in eastern Congo.  Ranneberger 
also noted the recently-announced FDLR-DRC talks brokered by 
Sant' Egidio are a positive development.  He said that the 
U.S. is calling on the Rwandans, as well as the other 
parties, to work with the DRC and MONUC to help make the 
voluntary repatriation of FDLR forces and their families a 
success.  Ranneberger said that although the Rwandans were 
willing to provide security guarantees, the FDLR would not be 
welcomed as a political force. 
 
¶13. (C) All three components of the EU gave a strong 
endorsement for Ambassador Swing to continue in his current 
role as special UN envoy.  Ajello said that the EU has been 
approached by the UNSYG for candidates to replace Swing, but 
"changing horses in mid-stream, or more precisely, near the 
end" would be counterproductive.  Vervaeke said that having 
an American in this position was important to keep the U.S. 
engaged in the Great Lakes. 
 
¶14. (C) Ajello gave a relatively positive assessment of the 
political situation in Burundi, but cautioned against 
allowing elections to be postponed.  He said that those in 
power had no incentive to hold elections as they probably 
would not be returned to government.  In the meantime, public 
services in Burundi are collapsing, no unpopular decisions 
are being taken, and the communities are stressing their 
differences instead of their commonalities.  Ajello said that 
the FNL needed to be integrated into the process and 
highlighted the successful intervention of Tanzania.  Both 
Ajello and Pizon expressed concern about the deteriorating 
economic situation in Burundi.  Pizon urged the U.S. to 
participate in a technical meeting to be held on May 12 to 
discuss Burundi's budget situation. 
 
------------------------ 
Liberia/Mano River Basin 
------------------------ 
 
¶15. (C) Ranneberger noted good cooperation between the U.S. 
and the EU in West Africa and stated that we were looking 
forward to DAS Woods' May 11 meetings in Brussels.  He said 
the USG has developed an action plan to press the Liberians 
on corruption issues and will share it with the EU before May 
¶11.  Furthermore, the USG will also share a 
State/AID/Treasury discussion paper on funding issues with 
the EU in Washington on April 22.  Ranneberger said the U.S. 
looks forward to seeing the results of the EU audit and hopes 
to develop a consensus on these issues between the USG, the 
EU and the IFIs. 
 
¶16. (C) Regarding rehabilitation and reintegration, 
Ranneberger mentioned the USG's additional contribution of 
$15 million to the Trust Fund and thanked the EU for matching 
funds, while noting that there was still a $6 million funding 
gap.  Turning to elections, Ranneberger stated that they must 
take place as scheduled October 11 and asked that the EC 
consider contributing more than their currently-planned $1 
million in election support. 
 
¶17. (C) Ranneberger concluded by asking the EU what they 
thought about Charles Taylor.  How big a threat is he?  What, 
if anything, should be done about turning him over to the 
Special Court?  De Muyser said that he had been in Liberia 
last month and thought several main clusters needed to be 
addressed, including Charles Taylor.  The Troika indicated 
that the EU would likely support actions to intensify 
pressure on Taylor, including perhaps through a UNSC 
resolution giving UNMIL arrest authority should Taylor appear 
in Liberia.  Regarding elections, de Muyser agreed that there 
must be no delays.  He also expressed EU concern about 
accelerating IDP returns and reintegration.  On corruption 
and audits, De Muyser said pressure on Bryant was needed. 
 
¶18. (C) Turning to the Mano River Basin, De Muyser noted that 
the EU was worried about a Togo-like situation developing in 
other countries.  Hitchens stated that West Africa is seen as 
an area of problems, but noted that the Sierra Leone PKO is 
winding up at the end of 2005 and urged that we consider 
other bright spots in the sub-region.  Ranneberger noted that 
ECOWAS is a bright spot, that he was somewhat encouraged by 
the efforts of the AU in Cote d,Ivoire, but that the Togo 
elections may not go well.  On Guinea, Ranneberger noted 
there was some potential for peaceful change centered on a 
group of young technocrats in the government and the prime 
minister, but that a key question was where the military 
stood.  He suggested that support for ECOWAS might be cited 
in the U.S.-EU Summit communique.  Ranneberger reviewed USG 
support to ECOWAS; De Muyser said that the EU was working 
with ECOWAS on a list of areas where they could cooperate, 
which they would share with the U.S. 
¶19. (C) Vervaeke said that the EU was planning early warning 
exercises with Guinea-Bissau and Guinea scenarios and 
suggested that they might share methodologies and approaches 
with the U.S.  He also asked about the next SRSG for Liberia, 
and Ranneberger replied that names were being vetted. 
 
------------------------ 
Somalia 
------------------------ 
 
¶20. (C) Henriksson and De Muyser welcomed U.S. re-engagement 
in Somalia, but urged a more proactive approach.  Henriksson 
noted that the EC had remained in Somalia through the 1990,s 
when other major donors had left and that it had "heavily 
invested" in the country as the largest donor. 
 
¶21. (C) Hitchens underscored EU belief that a peace-support 
mission is necessary to consolidate the peace process in 
Somalia and requested clarification of the U.S. view on IGAD. 
 Ranneberger said that the U.S. opposes the involvement of 
frontline states and would only support a mission if the 
conditions were right.  He said that although there were no 
specific criteria, we are looking at various benchmarks. 
Most importantly, the transitional government needed to 
demonstrate relative stability and reach out to various 
groups within Somalia in order to pave the way for relocation 
to Mogadishu.  Other obstacles to the IGAD plan, Ranneberger 
noted, included costs and fears of over-extending the AU and 
regional organizations in peace operations.  He asked whether 
there was unanimity among IGAD members for the operation 
(suggesting some IGAD countries privately did not support the 
plan).  Ranneberger said that Konare was lukewarm, at best, 
to the IGAD plan.  Henriksson acknowledged this plan was not 
a popular idea in Addis.  However, he said it was an EU 
priority, that certain Member States were extremely 
interested, and that it was the best hope for peace in 
Somalia. 
 
¶22. (C) Hitchens noted that the EU was clearly more positive 
on IGAD involvement in Somalia than the U.S.  Ranneberger 
emphasized that the U.S. has consistently supported IGAD 
efforts to promote Somali reconciliation and wants to see the 
Transitional Government succeed.  To summarize the 
differences, Hitchens characterized the EU approach as "yes, 
but..." and the U.S. approach as "no, unless...".  He 
cautioned against U.S. pronouncements that seemed to indicate 
that absolutely no external forces could be involved, noting 
that only Islamic extremists in Somalia held those views. 
While acknowledging that the U.S. statement had put pressure 
on the Ethiopians to step back, Hitchens suggested that it 
had also interrupted the internal dialogue.  Henriksson said 
that a way had to be found to keep Ethiopia involved in the 
process without sending Ethiopian troops into Somalia. 
Manahl proposed decentralizing the AU involvement by setting 
up a military planning unit in Nairobi for a support mission. 
 He noted that Somalis were only likely to hand weapons over 
to external forces in a disarmament initiative. 
 
¶23. (C) Hitchens said Ugandan cooperation with the AU might 
be a possible formula for a support mission.  (Note.  Later 
in the day, Javier Solana met with President Museveni. 
According to a press release, Museveni "reconfirmed Uganda's 
intention to provide troops for a peace-support operation in 
Somalia under the auspices of IGAD.  Mr. Solana underlined 
the EU's readiness to consider support for an African 
peace-support mission that has the consent of the 
Transitional Government and Parliament of Somalia and is 
welcomed by the Somali public."  End Note.) 
 
¶24. (C) Regarding the transitional government, Manahl agreed 
with Ranneberger that imposing it on the Somali people would 
not work.  He also agreed that the split between the 
President and Parliament needed to be addressed.  Hitchens 
said that if the transitional government stayed much longer 
in Kenya the peace process would be jeopardized.  Henriksson 
suggested a "two phase rocket" with relocation into Somalia 
first and then later on to Mogadishu. 
 
¶25. (SBU) Ranneberger proposed that U.S. experts hold a video 
teleconference with EU experts to review the situation on 
Somalia with a view to exploring any differences of 
perspective and ensuring closer coordination.  The Troika 
team agreed.   (Note.  The teleconference took place on May 
¶2.  End Note.) 
 
--------------------------------- 
Sudan 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶26. (C) Ranneberger noted excellent cooperation between the 
U.S., EU and Member States and said that the U.S. wants to 
use the opportunity provided by the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) to leverage positive movement in Darfur.  He 
said the CPA was always seen as applying to the whole 
country, that it links Taha and Garang in partnership.  Since 
violence in Darfur can destroy the peace process, the CPA and 
Darfur are interrelated.  Ranneberger reviewed the results of 
the Deputy Secretary's participation at the Oslo donors' 
conference and visit to Sudan.  He said the Deputy Secretary 
stressed to VP Taha and SPLM Chairman Garang the 
interrelationship.  Furthermore, he urged both to move 
forward with implementation of the CPA, particularly by 
completing the constitutional revision process.  The Deputy 
Secretary laid out specific steps that the GOS should take on 
 
SIPDIS 
Darfur and urged Garang to be helpful with the Darfur rebels. 
 
¶27. (C) Ranneberger said that he thought that the deadlines 
could be met to have the Government of National Unity in 
place by the end of the pre-interim period on July 9.  There 
has been some positive movement on Darfur -- violence has 
significantly diminished, as a result of pressure by U.S. and 
EU, and the presence of the AU.  Both sides agreed on the 
need to continue reaching out to get Garang energized and 
work the AU piece.  Ranneberger reported on his recent trip 
to Darfur and said that he had visited six or seven AU bases. 
 He came away impressed by the commanders and the sense that 
the AU is a strong presence, doing an effective job.  He said 
USG supports an expansion of the AU force and is planning to 
dedicate $50 to 60 million to this purpose. 
 
¶28. (C) Ranneberger added that the AU-sponsored political 
talks are important and that NGOs will work with the rebels 
to prepare them for negotiations.  However, he stressed that 
there are real problems on the humanitarian side.  The WFP 
will be cutting back rations within weeks.  Work needs to be 
done to bring the NDA, the Egyptians, and Eritrea in. 
 
¶29. (U) Lerner gave an update on the Darfur food pipeline and 
noted the WFP announced it would have to cut back to 
half-rations in May due to a break in the pipeline.  She 
observed that the USG has given $234 million in food aid and 
asked for more robust EU assistance.  (Note.  On April 21, 
WFP advised it had received assurances for the EC to proceed 
with pre-financing against expected CY-2005 contributions in 
order to avoid having to go to half-rations.  End Note.) 
 
¶30. (C) De Muyser said that he thought the Pronk report was 
pessimistic and that he appreciated the U.S. stance on UNSC 
¶1593.  Manahl said that he also thought the AU force was 
good, should be expanded, and should receive additional EU 
support.  He said the shortcomings of AU organization, as 
identified in the joint assessment mission report, need to be 
addressed.  According to Manahl, EU military experts believe 
the efficiency of the mission will be decreased if 
shortcomings are not addressed.  He also emphasized the need 
to address root causes of the conflict and that tribal 
reconciliation should be addressed by a third party, 
preferably the AU.  Manahl was less optimistic than the USG 
that the CPA can provide the framework to address Darfur in 
practice. 
 
¶31. (C) Henrikkson said that he thought the problems of the 
South are as much from a lack of capacity as from a lack of 
political will.  "Is there a South-South dialogue?" he asked. 
 The oil fields are controlled by non-SPLM forces, there are 
transparency and governance issues, and the EU is concerned 
by what they see.  Henrikkson said he would like to dialogue 
with USAID.  He also asked how the U.S. saw the consequences 
of the ICC on peace prospects in Darfur and for views on the 
CPA implementation.  How do we see adjusting policy-sharing 
aspects of the CPA to include Darfur, the East, etc.? 
 
¶32. (C) Ranneberger replied that we agree with the 
recommendations of the joint assessment mission.  He said 
that in his follow-up visit to Addis he had pushed Konare and 
Djinnit on implementation, including the establishment of a 
planning cell in Khartoum.  Ranneberger noted that the 
Secretary signaled strong support for the AU when she met 
 
SIPDIS 
with Konare on April 15. In response to EU questions, he 
reviewed the status of South-South dialogue and steps the 
U.S. is taking to encourage inclusiveness in the 
implementation of the CPA. 
 
¶33. (C) Ranneberger noted that the involvement of the ICC 
does not preclude credible accountability mechanisms by the 
GOS.  The AU could be helpful in this regard.  He said the 
U.S. is also pushing Darfur rebels to stop the violence and 
to participate in political talks, noting that they are also 
subject to accountability. 
 
¶34. (C) Ranneberger asked if the EU could announce soon a 
pledge to support AU expansion.  Henrikkson replied that the 
EU has not yet receiveed a request from the AU for additional 
assistance.  The EU would have to make sure that it is an 
operation they feel confident in.  He asked that the U.S. 
push the AU on implementation of the joint assessment 
recommendations.  Henrikkson thought the AU will issue a 
formal request just after its Peace and Security Council 
meets at the end of April.  EU planners are ready to go to 
Addis, but it depends on cooperation from the AU.  He sees 
them facing two challenges:  stabilizing the security 
situation and creating conditions for safe and sustainable 
return of IDPs and refugees. 
 
----------------- 
African Union 
----------------- 
 
¶35. (C) Ranneberger noted that the AU is a very important 
institution, which the two sides had covered throughout the 
day.  He added that while much of the focus is on the AU's 
conflict mitigation role, we should not lose sight of NEPAD, 
peer review, and all other AU programs.  Ranneberger said 
that he was impressed by the EU's assistance figures for the 
AU.  The U.S. is looking at establishing a modest fund for 
capacity and institution building, in addition to increases 
in ACOTA and GPOI funding for peacekeeping training efforts. 
The PDAS also reported on Chairman Konare's recent successful 
visit to Washington. 
 
¶36. (C) De Muyser agreed that the June U.S.-EU summit 
declaration must mention the AU.  The EU had extensive talks 
with the AU at last week's ministerial.  They seek a 
strategic partnership with Africa, with the AU being their 
main, but not only, interlocutor.  The EU will provide a 
non-paper to the USG.  A Commission official noted the EU,s 
support for the African Peace Facility, saying that the EU 
has "put their bet" on the AU. 
 
-------------------- 
Counter-Terrorism 
-------------------- 
 
¶37. (C) Ranneberger reviewed U.S. efforts on 
counter-terrorism, noting that Africa presents an opportunity 
to deal decisively with an incipient terrorist threat in some 
areas while preventing the region from becoming an operating 
platform for terrorists.  He said there is a North African 
element that affects the Sahel, including GSPC, as well as an 
East African aspect that affects Somalia and Eastern Kenya. 
Ranneberger said the U.S. is keeping an eye on Nigeria, as is 
al-Qaeda.    Cooperation across the continent is quite good, 
a success story, including Sudan.  The PDAS outlined the 
holistic nature of EACTI and TSCTI, and he and Heflin 
provided some funding numbers. 
 
¶38. (C) Ranneberger also noted that there is a worldwide 
Muslim outreach effort, with substantial funding.  De Muyser 
said that CT is one of the EU,s 2005 priorities, and asked 
how we can achieve US-EU cooperation in Africa CT.  Van Reedt 
Dortland said that the EU has only started to cooperate with 
Africa in terms of counterterrorism with Kenya being their 
venue for their first initiatives.  He saw value in 
cooperating with the USG.  Heflin promised to provide him 
with unclassified papers on USG CT efforts in Africa. 
 
------------------------ 
Closing and Comment 
------------------------ 
 
¶39. (C) De Muyser noted that the previous transatlantic 
consultations on Africa focused on country-specific issues, 
whereas the April 20 meeting concentrated on broader-based 
discussion, which he saw as positive.  Ranneberger said the 
discussions had been very constructive, and he emphasized 
that both sides should follow-up on the action items 
identified in the talks. 
 
¶40. (C) The emergence of Somalia as an issue of concern for 
the EU is one we will have to follow closely.  Furthermore, 
the EU's nuances on expanding the AU mission in Darfur need 
to be closely monitored in order to keep the transatlantic 
cooperation in the region on track.  The EU also seems to 
have taken a cue from our style of passing the tin cup by 
encouraging the U.S. to provide more generous funding for 
elections in the DRC. 
 
(PDAS Ranneberger has cleared this cable.) 
 
Khartoum minimize considered. 
 
MCKINLEY 
.