This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 002125 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2015 
TAGS: PINR PREL PTER OREP IS IZ GOI EXTERNAL MILITARY RELATIONS
SUBJECT: (S) DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER TO CODEL LEVIN: 
OUR PRE-WAR ESTIMATES OF IRAQI WMD WERE NEARLY AS WRONG AS 
YOURS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
. 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (S) A senior defense intelligence (DMI) officer told 
Senator Levin March 31 that pre-OIF Israeli intelligence 
estimates of Iraqi WMD were nearly as wrong as those of the 
USG.  GOI analysts, prior to the war, "knew" that Saddam's 
regime would never support al-Qaeda or any other terrorist 
organization fomenting "jihad."  While the Israeli 
intelligence community placed events in Iraq at the center of 
their 2003 national security estimate for the region, it now 
sees Iraq as just one of several influential factors.  The 
GOI sees no evidence of Iranian support for terrorism in 
Iraq, and assesses that the top priority for the Iranian 
regime in Iraq at present is stability, which Iranian leaders 
understand is the surest path to a U.S. departure from the 
region.  Iran, meanwhile, with an eye toward long-term 
influence in Iraq, is building its ties with all the Iraqi 
ethnic groups.  A DMI analyst assessed that the recent 
decrease in terrorism in Iraq could be only cyclical, 
although he thought that terrorism in Iraq could fade away 
for good if Iraqi Shi'ites and Kurds allow the Sunnis to play 
a meaningful role in national political life.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
¶2. (C) Senator Carl Levin discussed Israel's pre-OIF 
intelligence-gathering on Iraq, and current GOI assessments 
of Iraq, in a March 31 meeting with Col. Itai Brun, the 
deputy chief of Production for Israeli military intelligence 
(DMI).  LTC Avi Zaroni and LTC Aviad Sela of DMI's Gulf 
States office also participated in the meeting.  Senate 
staff, Embassy Army Attache and poloff accompanied Sen. Levin. 
 
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Pre-War Israeli Intelligence on Iraq 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (S) Pointing to findings in the just-released 
Robb-Silberman report of what he called a "90 percent 
failure" in U.S. pre-war assessments of Iraq's WMD 
capabilities, Sen. Levin asked Brun whether pre-war Israeli 
intelligence assessments were as wrong as those of the USG. 
"We were very close" to the U.S. estimate, Brun acknowledged 
in response.  He said that DMI -- which compiles national 
estimates from all-source GOI intelligence -- assessed prior 
to OIF that Iraq had "residual" launchers and 
surface-to-surface missiles, and chemical and biological 
weapons that could be delivered either by missiles or bombs. 
 
¶4. (S) DMI reached its assessment, Brun continued, fully 
aware that it had no direct evidence of the existence of 
Iraqi missiles or WMD.  Its ultimate conclusion that Iraq 
possessed missiles and WMD concealed underground came from 
its "strategic assessment," based on Saddam's behavior 
throughout the 1990s, that Saddam would never give up his 
former missile or WMD capabilities.  Brun noted that the only 
major GOI decision related to the assessment was the order to 
distribute gas masks to the Israeli population just prior to 
OIF.  The GOI, he commented, made the decision mainly for 
political reasons, and not based on any judgment about the 
certainty of the DMI estimate.  The only aspect of the 
estimate that mattered to the GOI in making the gas-mask 
decision, he said, was that DMI could not rule out the 
possibility that Iraq would launch WMD-bearing missiles 
against Israel. 
 
¶5. (S) Sen. Levin asked whether Israeli intelligence had 
perceived, prior to OIF, any relationship between Saddam's 
regime and al-Qaeda.  Brun said Israeli assessments did not 
address the issue.  LTC Zaroni added that the GOI had 
information about contacts between "second- and third-level" 
al-Qaeda operatives and the Iraqi regime, but "knew" that the 
secular Ba'athist regime in Iraq would not support "jihad." 
 
¶6. (S) Sen. Levin asked whether the GOI had received any 
information about purported Iraqi purchases of yellowcake 
from Niger.  Brun said Israeli intelligence had not looked at 
the issue because it did not believe that Iraq had a nuclear 
program of concern. 
 
------------------------------- 
The Impact of OIF on the Region 
------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (S) As background to his points on how the GOI sees the 
impact of events in Iraq, Col. Brun summarized key trends 
that the GOI has perceived throughout the region over the 
past four years.  The events of September 11, and the Bush 
Administration reaction to them, have shaken up the region, 
he said.  The precedent of an Arab regime toppled, the 
presence of U.S. forces in the center of region and on two 
sides of Iran, and the message that WMD are illegitimate, 
placed regional leaders on the defensive. 
¶8. (S) The "shock" that Brun said regional leaders 
experienced in 2002-2003 turned into what he termed a 
wait-and-see posture in 2004, as the leaders awaited the 
outcome of U.S. difficulties in Iraq and the U.S. 
presidential election.  President Bush's reelection, Arafat's 
death and other "dramatic events" have now shaken regional 
leaders out of their waiting mode, he said.  The GOI sees 
these regional leaders now following one of three paths: 
 
-- "Active resistance."  Regimes and groups pursuing this 
path are fighting against the influence of the United States, 
Israel and the West.  Examples: Iran, "Global Jihad," 
Hizballah, Zarqawi, Palestinian rejectionist groups. 
 
-- "Change and Modification."  States following this path 
understand the need for change.  Examples: Egypt, Jordan, PA 
President Abbas and some other new PA leaders.  Brun 
commented that Abbas' electoral victory was a hopeful sign 
because it implied popular endorsement of Abbas' opposition 
to the use of violence throughout the Intifada. 
 
-- "Indecision."  This is the path of groups and regimes, 
such as Hamas and Syria, that have traditional ties to 
terrorism, but are considering shifts in behavior based on 
changes in the region.  Hamas, for example, has taken the 
"historic strategic decision" to enter the PA political 
system.  Syria, whose support for terrorism has always been 
based on "pragmatic" instead of ideological considerations, 
is looking for ways to change, but has few "assets" with 
which to work.  President Assad, in fact, is about to lose 
one of his major assets, the Syrian occupation of Lebanon, 
with a possible impact on the ultimate survivability of his 
regime. 
 
¶9. (S) Iraq, Brun continued, was at the center of DMI's 
annual national security estimate in 2004.  DMI assessed then 
that all actors in the region understood that Iraq was the 
"decisive battlefield."  Iraq remains important in DMI's 2005 
assessment, Brun said, but less so from a regional 
perspective.  The key intervening event, in DMI's analysis, 
was President Bush's reelection, which, he said, demonstrated 
to the region that the United States would remain in the 
region for the next several years.  Iraq, moreover, is no 
longer the only prospective model of democratization in the 
region, given successful elections in the PA, Afghanistan, 
and perhaps soon in Lebanon. 
 
------------------------ 
Iran's Influence on Iraq 
------------------------ 
 
¶10. (S) LTC Zaroni assessed Iranian designs on Iraq at Sen. 
Levin's request.  Iran, he said, appears to be reaching out 
to all groups in Iraq, and not just to the Shi'ites, with 
whom, in any case, its influence is limited by religious 
differences and clerical rivalries.  The GOI has seen no 
clear evidence that Iran is supporting terrorism in Iraq, he 
said.  Iran's outreach appears motivated by an interest in 
building connections for the long term.  It wants to see Iraq 
"oriented" toward Iran in the long-term.  The issue is not 
religion, but balance of power.  Iran's top priority in the 
interim is to see the United States leave the region, a goal 
it understands will require a stable Iraq.  Democratic change 
in Iraq does not threaten Iran, he said, commenting that the 
Iraqi political system appears to be evolving toward 
something roughly similar to the Iranian system. 
 
¶11. (S) Sen. Levin asked why Iran would not try to push the 
U.S. out of Iraq by supporting the insurgency.  Zaroni 
replied that the Iranians are smarter than President Assad. 
They realize that support for the insurgency could harden 
U.S. positions against Iran, e.g., on Iran's nuclear program. 
 
---------------- 
Stabilizing Iraq 
---------------- 
 
¶12. (S) LTC Zaroni identified three main forces working more 
or less together in the insurgency in Iraq: Sunni 
ex-Ba'athists, the Zarqawi organization, and common 
criminals.  The use of terrorism could fade away, he said, 
should the Shi'ites and Kurds allow the Sunnis to play a 
meaningful role in the national political process.  He 
cautioned that a recent decrease in terrorism in Iraq could 
be only cyclical, noting that attacks have tended to peak 
around the time of significant events, such as religious 
holidays and the U.S. elections. 
 
¶13. (S) Zaroni personally assessed the chances for a 
political solution in Iraq as "probable," but acknowledged 
that no consensus exists on the point within DMI.  Brun noted 
that Israeli experts on Iraq tend to assert that the ethnic 
rivalries inscribed in "Iraqi DNA" preclude the possibility 
that Iraqis will ever establish a workable democratic 
process.  This view does not necessarily imply that Iraqis 
are doomed to civil war, he said, although Zaroni then added 
that a civil war, and ensuing national break-up, is a real 
possibility given the conflicting interests of the three main 
ethnic groups. 
 
¶14. (S) Sen. Levin asked Zaroni to assess U.S. training of 
the Iraqi security forces.  Zaroni said the training appeared 
unsuccessful until a few months ago, when a new U.S. attitude 
emerged.  LTC Sela described the perceived U.S. change as one 
that allows for more self-reliance for the Iraqi security 
forces.  Zaroni pointed to concerns that some members of the 
security forces are passing information to the insurgents. 
 
¶15. (S) Sen. Levin asked whether GOI and U.S. assessments 
about the future of Iraq differ in any significant ways. 
Zaroni commented that differences exist within both analytic 
communities, but allowed that members of both communities 
generally concur that short-term prospects in Iraq are "very 
complex."  The debate within the GOI community, Brun added, 
focuses on whether democracy can succeed in Iraq -- and 
indeed anywhere in the region -- in the long term. 
 
¶16. (S) Sen. Levin asked for an assessment of the impact of 
the war in Iraq on the global struggle against terrorism. 
Brun said GOI analysts see change only in Iraq, where 
terrorism has clearly increased. 
 
¶17. (U) Codel Levin did not clear this message, but requested 
that H forward a copy. 
 
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