This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000894 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2015 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MASS KPAO YM COUNTER TERRORISM DEMOCRATIC REFORM
SUBJECT: SALEH DISCUSSES SECURITY CONCERNS WITH AMBASSADOR 
 
REF: A. IIR 6 906 0115 05 
     ¶B. IIR 6 906 0112 15 
     ¶C. IIR 6 906 0111 05 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski for reasons 1.5 b and d. 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  President Saleh convoked Ambassador the 
morning of April 9 to discuss renewed fighting in Saada. 
Saleh immediately launched into requests for USG political 
and military support for ROYG efforts to defeat al-Houthi 
rebels in the north.  Reiterating an argument he used during 
last summer's fighting, Saleh said, "This is your fight we 
are fighting."  Ambassador turned the focus to the current 
threat against Americans.  They discussed ways the U.S. could 
help improve the situation in Saada, as well as timing for a 
potential Saleh visit to Washington to meet President Bush. 
End Summary. 
 
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Saleh in the Dark on Ansar as-Sunna Cell 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (S) Saleh opened the meeting with a complaint that travel 
advisories, warden messages, and Embassy closures were not 
helpful to ROYG efforts to quell renewed fighting between 
security forces and al-Houthi's "Believing Youth." 
Ambassador quickly explained that while we were indeed 
concerned about continued fighting and the potential spread 
of the insurgency, the Embassy is closed today because of a 
specific and dangerous threat unrelated to events in Saada. 
 
¶3. (S) Ambassador remarked that there was very specific 
information about a Yemeni Ansar as-Sunna member Kanaan, who 
returned from Iraq with clear intentions to attack U.S. as 
well as ROYG interests.  Shaking his head, Saleh asked for 
clarification on this individual and the threat he posed.  We 
are working closely with the Ministry of Interior, the 
Political Security Organization (PSO) and the National 
Security Board (NSB) on this threat, Ambassador replied, and 
find them to be extremely cooperative and responsive. 
Ambassador suggested the President request a brief from his 
nephew, NSB Chief Ammar.  Saleh said he would, and emphasized 
his commitment to cooperate closely and do whatever necessary 
to remove the threat.  "Be careful, by all means, for a week 
or so," he said, "but don't worry all is under control." 
 
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"We are Fighting Your Fight" 
---------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Returning to the crisis in Saada, Saleh asked 
Ambassador for a strong message of political support from the 
U.S.  DCM noted his statement to independent Arabic daily 
"al-Ayam," condemning violence against the state and calling 
for calm and dialogue.  "Forget about al-Ayam," said Saleh 
with a wave of his hand, "I want it printed in (state-run) 
al-Thawra and reported on the wires."  Ambassador said we 
would explore the possibility of issuing a strong statement 
to a wider audience.  Saleh nodded, saying USG moral support 
was required, "please get your European friends to also 
express their support and stress the link between al-Houthi 
and international terrorism."  Saleh accused his opposition 
of exploiting the Sadaa crises to weaken the regime.  "They 
call me an American agent," he exclaimed. 
 
¶5. (C) Saleh said he had offered to end the fighting if the 
rebels stopped chanting "death to the U.S and death to 
Israel."  Repeating his theme from last summer's conflict, 
Saleh said "we are fighting your fight, they are anti-U.S., 
anti-Israel, and pro-Iranian, whereas we are your friend." 
 
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"They Continue to Fight like Donkeys" 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) Describing the situation in Saada, Saleh exclaimed, 
"They are surrounded but continue to fight like donkeys 
(hameer)!"  Saleh assured Ambassador, that despite stubborn 
rebel fighting, "everything will be fine" in a matter of 
weeks.  Saleh reported that 49 security forces and 100 rebels 
had been killed in fighting.  He characterized rebel forces 
as 700 strong.  (Note:  Interior Minister Alimi agreed the 
situation was "under control and reported that 150 rebels 
were "taken care of" (ref A).  Reports on the situation in 
Saada from CSF-CTU soldiers in the field are less are 
optimistic (ref B).  Throughout last summer's June-September 
fighting, the President and ROYG officials routinely claimed 
they would win the battle in a matter of days or weeks.  The 
number of 700 may be high, given the attrition of al-Houthi 
forces due to death or capture from last summers engagement. 
End Note). 
 
¶7. (C) Saleh asked the Ambassador to expedite ROYG requests 
for M113 APCs and HMWWVS, saying, "they are needed urgently." 
 Ambassador replied that we are anxious to help; materiel 
assistance, however, even on an expedited basis would take 
time.  He assured the President that we would make every 
effort to speed up delivery.  The USG can provide other 
assistance, such as intelligence sharing, on a faster basis, 
if asked, Ambassador added. 
 
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Spread of Saada Related Violence 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Ambassador shared USG concerns that al-Houthi related 
violence is spreading, noting the recent string of grenade 
attacks targeting military leaders in downtown Sanaa.  Saleh 
confirmed these events were connected with Saada, and told 
Ambassador that seven to eight individuals involved in these 
terrorist acts against the ROYG had been arrested.  He also 
said he hard learned that the captured individuals were 
planning attacks against the children of military commanders 
and possibly Americans.  "The al-Houthi movement has 
connections across the country -- this is a sectarian fight," 
he said.  (Note: Recent, likely Saada related, grenade 
attacks against MOD officials in Sanaa reported septel.  ROYG 
efforts to deploy regular forces to Ma'rib and al-Jawf to 
preempt the unrest from spreading beyond Saada reported ref 
¶C.  End Note). 
 
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Saleh Prefers Fall Visit to Washington 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Saleh told Ambassador his preference is to visit 
Washington in the Fall, waving off a short June visit as an 
option.  Preferring a longer visit with opportunities to meet 
with Secretary Rice, the Pentagon, and other agency heads, 
Saleh raised the issue of visiting the last week of September 
vice October, to avoid the beginning of Ramadan.  Ambassador 
said the White House was cognizant of the Ramadan conflict, 
and would pass on his request. 
Krajeski