This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 002945 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2015 
TAGS: PREL IZ FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH CONFIRM BROAD SUPPORT FOR U.S. GOALS ON 
U.S.-EU IRAQ CONFERENCE TO S/I JONES 
 
REF: PARIS 2793 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 1.4 (b) and 
 (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary and comment: Senior French MFA and Presidency 
officials confirmed broad support for U.S. goals for the 
planned U.S.-EU conference on Iraq, during April 25 
discussions with Senior Coordinator on Iraq Ambassador 
Richard Jones.  French officials echoed U.S. views on the 
need for inclusiveness in Iraq's political process and the 
need to respect the calendar towards election of a permanent 
government by year-end.  The French raised familiar concerns 
on delays in ITG formation and the threats of Kurdish 
separatism and sectarianism to Iraqi unity, and appeared 
reassured by Ambassador Jones' points on these issues.  MFA 
officials, in passing, described the Iraqi government 
presence in Green Zone as problematic and hinted that an MNF 
withdrawal date could be helpful, but were careful not to 
press these points. There was general agreement on the need 
for an Iraqi lead and prominent UN role on donor 
coordination, with the French suggesting creation of a new 
donor coordination mechanism and "lead nation" roles in 
assisting specific sectors of Iraqi institutions.  On the 
international conference, the most significant difference 
between the U.S. and French approach was the GoF preference 
for limiting invitees to the P-5, EU, G-8, UN and Iraq's 
neighbors -- a smaller grouping than that envisioned by the 
U.S.  As reported reftel, MFA and Presidency officials also 
raised in passing continued security concerns over access to 
the Baghdad airport road.  End summary and comment. 
 
¶2. (C) Senior Advisor and Coordinator for Iraq Policy (S/I) 
Ambassador Richard Jones met with senior French MFA and 
Presidency officials April 25 to review his recent travel to 
Iraq and neighboring countries, U.S. priorities on Iraq in 
the coming year, and exchange views on the planned U.S.-EU 
conference on Iraq.  MFA A/S-equivalent for North 
Africa/Middle East Jean-Francois Thibault hosted Ambassador 
Jones for a 90-minute discussion followed by a working lunch, 
which variously included MFA IO A/S-equivalent Jean-Maurice 
Ripert, MFA Cabinet Advisor for Middle East/UN issues 
Christophe Guilhou, GoF Interministerial Coordinator for Iraq 
Reconstruction Philippe Coste, MFA DAS-equivalent for 
Iraq/Iran/Arabian Gulf Affairs Antoine Sivan, MFA 
DAS-equivalent for EU Common Security and Foreign Policy 
Pascal Le Deunff, and desk officers for Iraq and UN affairs. 
Jones later met separately with Presidential Technical 
Advisor on the Middle East/Americas Dominique Boche.  Also 
attending S/I Jones' meetings on the U.S. side were Political 
M/C, EUR/ERA Deputy Director Jeffrey Rathke, and poloff 
(notetaker).  The tone of S/I Jones' discussions was 
uniformly cordial and constructive, with French officials 
eager to solicit his views and general consensus emerging on 
issues of concern and the way forward for the coming year. 
 
MFA DISCUSSIONS: POLITICAL PROCESS, KURDISH SEPARATISM 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶3. (C) Ambassador Jones opened his MFA discussions by 
reviewing his recent travel to Baghdad and the region and 
U.S. priorities for the coming year, namely maintain momentum 
from January elections and complete Iraq's political 
transition to an elected government under a permanent 
constitution by the end of 2005.  In the meantime, the U.S. 
would continue efforts to strengthen rule of law in Iraq, 
which included aid to police and civil security authorities 
as well as the judiciary and correctional system; continue 
efforts to provide essential services; promote economic 
security via job creation and conclusion of a new IMF 
agreement by year-end; and develop grassroots democracy, 
particularly through support for Iraq's provincial 
governments.  On the security front, U.S. forces would 
continue to fight the insurgency and work to transfer 
responsibilities to Iraqis, who now numbered some 150,000 in 
trained, equipped security forces, but were in need of more 
training to boost numbers and better function as units. 
 
¶4. (C) Responding to Ambassador Jones' points on U.S. 
priorities, Thibault affirmed that the designation of the 
Presidency Council had been a positive sign, despite delays 
in formation of the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG), 
which the GoF hoped would be resolved in coming days.  In the 
GOF view, each of the three presidency council members were 
moderates, inclined towards consensus.  Talabani's accession 
to the presidency was important to the GoF, in that it 
confirmed the Kurds' inscription into Iraqi political 
institutions.  The GoF remained very worried about the 
potential threat of sectarianism, especially Kurdish 
separatism, to Iraqi unity; Thibault cited the Kirkuk 
dispute, Kurdish claims to oil revenues, and Kurdish efforts 
to have veto-authority over the entry of the Iraqi army into 
Kurdish territory as troubling examples.  Thibault observed 
that Iraq's Shi'a community had shown commendable restraint 
in resisting attempts to sow sectarian strife, such as the 
killings of Iraqi Shi'a civilians at Mada'in.  Thibault also 
raised familiar French concerns on the need to include Sunnis 
in Iraq's political process, especially drafting the 
constitution.  In passing, Thibault noted concern that the 
Iraqi government's credibility was undermined by its 
remaining in the Green Zone.  When pressed by Ambassador 
Jones on this point, Thibault conceded that the GoF was not 
making a recommendation, but merely observing that a negative 
image of the Iraqi government persisted in certain quarters 
of Iraq, due to its appearing "under the protection of 
foreign forces."  MFA DAS-equivalent Sivan added that it was 
important that the new ITG not be seen as a continuation of 
the defunct Governing Council. 
 
¶5. (C) Ambassador Jones observed that he saw near-total 
agreement between USG and GoF views, and confirmed U.S. 
regard for the Presidency Council and U.S. concerns about 
potential Kurdish overreach.  Jones pointed out that Kurdish 
leaders had accepted the TAL principles that Kirkuk would not 
be settled until after the constitution, and that the process 
for settling the issue must be acceptable to the Iraqi 
people.  The U.S. consistently maintained that oil revenues 
were the property of the national government, and, similarly, 
the U.S. did not support Kurdish efforts to block national 
army access to Kurdish territory.  Jones stressed that the 
USG was pressing for a rapid breakthrough on ITG formation, 
but noted that there was an inherent tension between the need 
for inclusivity -- a shared U.S. and French priority -- and 
speed with which a compromise could be reached.  To achieve 
better Sunni representation in the Transitional Government, 
either the United Iraqi Alliance (itself a coalition of some 
20 parties), the Kurdish list (another coalition of parties) 
and/or Allawi's list would have to accept a ministerial 
apportionment lower than their share of the Transitional 
Assembly.  Other reasons for the ITG delay were more 
procedural, such as the fact that negotiations for a new 
government could not begin until election results were 
certified, some 3 weeks after voting took place.  Thibault 
appeared reassured by Jones' clarifications on Kurdish 
separatism and ITG formation, and asked whether Vice 
President-designate Ghazi al-Yawer had legitimacy, in the 
U.S. view.  Jones responded that it was difficult to assess 
who represented the Sunni community because of their low 
turnout in the election. 
 
MFA ON IRAQ ASSISTANCE, DONOR COORDINATION 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) MFA IO A/S-equivalent Ripert briefed Ambassador Jones 
on French views on a new international donor mechanism for 
assistance to Iraq institutions, which the GoF had begun to 
explore with European counterparts.  He stressed that the GoF 
has not seeking to build a complicated new mechanism, and 
wanted to keep the Iraqi government in the lead role, with 
the UN functioning as a sort of "clearinghouse."  At the same 
time, Ripert cautioned that we should not put too much 
emphasis on the UN or give it an impossible mandate.  That 
said, the UN appeared committed to taking a more active role 
and increasing its presence in Iraq, despite security 
concerns.  The GoF also supported the idea of having specific 
countries or institutions (like the EU) take a lead role in 
specific sectors of institutional support, like the EU 
"JUSTLEX" program to offer rule of law training to Iraqi 
police and judges.  Having such lead roles could improve 
donor coordination and burdensharing, and help channel 
assistance from countries which did not have a presence on 
the ground in Iraq.  MFA DAS-equivalent for ESDP Le Deunff, 
providing further detail on the JUSTLEX program, confirmed 
that France had topped the list of training pledges, offering 
to train some 200 Iraqis (175 police and 30 judges) in 
France, out of a total 700 Iraqi trainees covered by the 
program.  Le Deunff added that the estimated 10 million euro 
budget for the JUSTLEX program was for EU expenses only and 
did not include the costs for the bilateral training offers, 
such as that from France. 
 
¶7. (C) Ambassador Jones noted that the U.S. agreed totally on 
the need for an Iraqi lead on international assistance.  We 
similarly supported the UN playing a coordinating role, even 
though in many other countries this role was filled by the 
World Bank.   We also agreed on the need for better 
coordination with Iraqis and among donors to avoid 
duplication and better meet Iraq's needs.  Ambassador Jones 
stressed U.S. readiness to be helpful on donor coordination, 
such as sharing lessons learned; for instance, in U.S. 
experience, we had found that reconstruction projects in Iraq 
were generally more costly than initially planned, not just 
due to security costs, but due to other factors, such as 
shortages in building supplies.  Jones also noted that a lead 
nation framework in institutional assistance was acceptable, 
as long as this did not suggest a monopoly.  The French 
readily concurred. 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 
------------------------ 
¶8. (C) On the planned U.S.-EU conference on Iraq, Ambassador 
Jones emphasized that his discussions in Baghdad, regional 
capitals, and Brussels had been marked by consensus that the 
conference should be primarily political in nature, and give 
the international community the chance to show unity behind 
the democratically elected Iraqi government as it presents 
its program to the world.  The conference agenda should focus 
on the three major areas of UNSCR 1546: the political, 
security, and economic fronts.  The political aspect should 
focus on the need to preserve established deadlines, support 
the constitutional drafting process, and encourage all 
communities to take part in government.  On security, the 
conference should focus on rule of law efforts, while on the 
economic front, it should concentrate on coordination to 
mobilize existing offers of assistance, vice new pledges.  At 
the same time, any offers conference participants, especially 
non-Paris club members, could make on Iraqi debt forgiveness 
would be important, to help Iraq meet its IMF commitments by 
year-end.  Jones stressed the U.S. view that the Paris Club 
Iraqi debt compromise was a floor, not ceiling, for debt 
reduction, and cited the U.S. decision to forgive 100 percent 
of Iraq's debt. 
 
¶9. (C) Thibault concurred with U.S. views on the conference 
agenda, and agreed that the main purpose of the conference 
was clearly political, to assist the new Iraqi government and 
"put them at the center."  On the economic front, Thibault 
said the GoF would advocate a new mechanism for coordinating 
assistance, as outlined by Ripert, with an Iraqi lead and 
important UN role.  On security, Thibault endorsed the 
U.S.-proposed focus on rule of law, and cautioned that 
straying into military issues could lead discussion to more 
problematic issues, such as the duration of the MNF-1 
presence in Iraq.  (Note: In a later comment over lunch, 
Thibault remarked to Jones that "giving a perspective" on the 
ending of the MNF-1 mission could help undermine the 
insurgency, but he stressed that he was making the point in 
the "softest way" possible.  End note.)   Further on the 
conference agenda, Ripert asked what the U.S. thought of 
adding a fourth pillar to the conference agenda, to focus on 
human rights.  (Note: The MFA Iraq desk later told us that 
the UK had floated the idea of a human rights agenda item 
during a UK-GoF brainstorming session on Iraq issues in 
London 4/22.  End note.)  Jones noted that human rights 
issues could be covered in the political or rule of 
law-related agenda items for the conference, as well as the 
conference communique, without adding fourth agenda item. 
 
¶10. (C) Over lunch, Thibault and his colleagues sought 
details on U.S. views on the potential scope of invitees to 
the conference, stressing the GoF preference to keep the 
gathering pragmatic and effective, and avoid an unwieldy 
participant list.  The GoF preference was for a "Sharm 
al-Sheikh-type" gathering, with the P-5, G-8, EU, UN, and 
Iraq's neighbors represented.  S/I Jones described the U.S. 
as in between the Iraqi preference (expressed by FM Zebari) 
for as large gathering as possible and the EU preference for 
a smaller event.  A large show of international support was 
important, but it was also clear that not all participants 
could speak at the one-day event.  S/I Jones noted that the 
U.S. and EU had decided to exchange notional participation 
lists to reach agreement on the issue, and offered to share 
the finalized, U.S. draft list with the GoF; the current, 
draft U.S. list numbered about 80 potential invitees, of 
which 50 were EU and Coalition members -- "must do's" for the 
U.S.  In response to questions from Thibault and others, 
Jones clarified that the U.S. did not envision inviting every 
Arab League member, that we wanted to see India and Pakistan 
on the list, and that no decision had been made on inviting 
the NATO Secretary-General, though it might make sense.  On 
timing for the conference, Thibault commented that the 
proposed June 22 date could be problematic for FM Barnier as 
it corresponded with the weekly GoF Council of Ministers 
meeting, though other French participants, including Boche in 
the separate meeting with him, were not insistent on this 
point.  Thibault and his MFA counterparts also stressed hope 
that ample time would be given prior to the conference to 
negotiating the communique, which could not be resolved in 
the one-day planned senior officials' meeting to precede the 
conference.  Other questions posed by Thibault and his MFA 
colleagues over lunch focused on U.S. views on Syrian and 
Iranian interference in Iraq, as well as the relative roles 
of foreign versus Iraqi fighters in the insurgency. 
 
PRESIDENCY RESPONSE 
------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) In a separate meeting, Presidential Middle East 
advisor Boche offered strong support for U.S. objectives on 
the conference, particularly the emphasis on the political 
dimension.  Boche echoed Thibault's comment on the need for 
inclusivity in the constitutional process, but quipped that 
Sunni lack of representation in the Transitional Assembly was 
the fault of Sunnis for not participating in elections. 
Boche also concurred with the U.S. emphasis on maintaining 
the calendar for Iraq's political transition, noting that we 
had been wise to resist calls late last year to postpone 
Iraq's January elections.  On security-related discussions at 
the conference, Boche said the U.S. emphasis on rule of law 
was "totally compatible" with French views.  Boche reaffirmed 
that the GoF was reflecting on a new coordination mechanism 
for institutional development aid, with Iraq in the lead and 
the UN in a "clearing house" role.  He repeated the concept, 
earlier raised by MFA officials, of having "lead nations" in 
certain sectors of institutional assistance, adding that the 
EU should take advantage of the conference to increase its 
visibility on assisting Iraq, which had not been possible up 
to now.  Boche also repeated GoF concerns on the scope of 
invitees to the conference, noting that the GoF preferred a 
smaller grouping (P-5, G-8, neighbors) than the 60 or so 
invitees proposed by the UK. 
¶12. (C)  Boche also sought U.S. views on federalism in Iraq 
and the problem of Kurdish separatism, with Amb. Jones 
repeating points made earlier to MFA officials.  Further on 
federalism, Jones stressed that media coverage of the January 
30 elections had missed the story that 20 elections took 
place that day, including for provincial councils in all 18 
of Iraq's governorates.  Federalism was not a divisive factor 
so much as a way to bring the Iraqi government closer to the 
people and help keep Iraq together, by giving a sense of 
local ownership and control after one of the most brutal and 
centralized dictatorships in modern history.  Boche also 
asked for U.S. views on Syrian and Iranian interference in 
Iraq, and in closing, raised continued GoF security concerns 
on access to the Baghdad airport road, emphasizing the 
sensitivity of the issue to the GoF (reftel). 
 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶13. (C) S/I Jones' visit served a very useful purpose in that 
it gave the French the all-important sense of being consulted 
on Iraq, when in fact they were by and large in listening 
mode and seeking U.S. views on the way forward and current 
state of play.  The degree to which the French side expressed 
overwhelming agreement with U.S. objectives marks a 
sea-change from Iraq discussions of last year, when the 
French were focused on criticizing U.S. efforts for falling 
short or questioning the legitimacy of the Governing Council 
and IIG, without bringing anything to the table in terms of 
concrete assistance.  Another shift in GoF thinking appears 
to have taken place, with concerns about Kurdish separatism 
taking precedence over the GoF's earlier emphasis on Sunni 
inclusivity, with the Kurdish issue viewed here as the more 
serious potential threat to Iraq's territorial integrity. 
End comment. 
 
¶14. (U) Ambassador Jones cleared this message. Baghdad 
minimize considered. 
ROSENBLATT