This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

061227Z Apr 05

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 001981 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2025 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS ELTN ETRD TU IZ
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR RICHARD JONES' VISIT TO 
ANKARA 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 1484 
 
     ¶B. ANKARA 242 
     ¶C. ANKARA 47 
     ¶D. BAGHDAD 1173 
     ¶E. ANKARA 1230 
     ¶F. ANKARA 1263 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) Turkey's leadership is trying to take a more positive 
attitude toward both the United States and Iraq.  This has 
resulted both from policymakers' understanding that they need 
to stand up more for the relationship and from the 
realization that Turkey has more to gain by supporting Iraq's 
democratization process than by its previous negative 
approach.  Your visit is therefore an opportunity to push the 
Turks to support the new Iraq in both the political and 
economic arenas.  End summary. 
 
Turks Take a Fresh Look at Iraq Policy 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) You will be visiting Ankara at a time when the Turkish 
leadership is trying to forge a more positive policy toward 
Iraq.  We are now observing a change in Turkey's current 
attitude toward Iraq and toward our policy there.  One reason 
for this is that the Iraqi election results convinced the 
Turks that they have pursued a losing strategy.  They have 
realized that their hyper-critical approach to events in Iraq 
has not been effective.  Turkey spent the weeks leading up to 
the election fuming about mass movements of Kurds into 
Kirkuk, alleged intimidation and disenfranchisement of the 
Iraqi Turkmen, and low Sunni Arab turnout.  This culminated 
with PM Erdogan characterizing the elections as 
"undemocratic," and official GOT statements about the 
elections were lukewarm at best, prominently highlighting 
Turkish concerns while failing to praise the Iraqi people for 
taking their country back after so many years of dictatorship. 
 
¶3. (C) Another reason for this change in approach was a 
series of senior U.S. visitors to Turkey, culminating with 
the Secretary Feb. 5-6.  The Secretary and the other visitors 
sought Turkish support on Iraq, but also sent the message 
that Turkey's leaders need to stand up for the relationship 
with the U.S.  (For further analysis of the Turkish policy 
shift, please see ref a).  These visits helped the Turks 
start to believe one of their own talking points: "Your 
success in Iraq is our success." 
 
¶4. (C) Despite their unhappiness with the poor showing of the 
Ankara-supported Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF), the Turks are 
trying to support Iraq's nascent democracy and to approach 
the country as a whole, not just as a series of northern 
Iraq-related problems, such as federalism-cum-Kurdish 
independence, Kirkuk, PKK/Kongra-Gel, or the fate of the 
Turkmen.  Ankara has offered courses in Turkey for military 
leaders under NTM-I, permits sustainment and humanitarian 
goods to flow across the border, allows the use of Incirlik 
Air Base to stage tanker aircraft that support OIF, will 
continue to offer expertise to Iraq's political parties, and 
is seeking a broad dialogue with leaders from across Iraq's 
political spectrum. 
 
Election Helps Turn the Turks Around 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (C) The election results served as a bucket of cold water 
for Turkish policymakers.  Those who confidently asserted 
that the Turkmen make up 20 or even 30 percent of the Iraqi 
population (and mysteriously still assert this) were stunned 
by the ITF's poor performance: 93,000 votes nationwide (or 
about one percent); 73,000 votes in Kirkuk province, good for 
control of only eight of the 41 governorate council seats. 
In a striking shift, both PM Erdogan and FonMin Gul quickly 
turned on the ITF, accusing its leaders of running a poor 
campaign.  Your counterpart, GOT Special Envoy for Iraq Osman 
Koruturk (who strongly influences the civilians' policy on 
Iraq), told the Ambassador March 21 that Turkey is sending a 
new message to the ITF and other Turkmen (though Ankara's 
influence on non-ITF Turkmen is questionable): You must work 
within the Iraqi political process, and do not rely on Ankara 
for support.  However, with resurgent nationalist sentiment 
in Turkey and ten years of public statements decrying the lot 
of Iraqi Turkmen (at the hands of the Kurds) this will remain 
a political hot button issue. 
 
¶6. (S) The Turkmen and Kirkuk have been contentious since 
before March 2003.  The ITF resisted joining the opposition 
squarely.  There were repeated accusations at the 
collaboration with Saddam against our cooperation with the 
opposition.  When no ITF member was included in the IGC, 
there were exaggerated reports of Turks handing out weapons 
and plotting destabilization, culminating in our July 4, 2004 
arrest of Turkish soldiers in Suleimaniyah--an event that 
continues to weigh on the Turkish consciousness.  The ITF has 
not played comfortably in the new Iraq, and the reports of 
Turks arming Turkmen continue to flow--mostly from Kurdish 
sources.  Given Turkish behavior, and particularly military 
Special Forces attitudes, such reports could be credible.  A 
respected role for Turkmen in the new Iraqi government will 
be important for some parts of the Turkish government and 
public.  Despite the policy shift, you can still expect to 
hear moans if the ITG doesn't have any Turkmen ministers or 
only one in an inconsequential position. 
 
Hope for Kurdish-Shia Balance 
----------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Turkey has a long, complex, and usually negative 
relationship with Iraq's Kurds.  For the past several years, 
the GOT has generally preferred PUK leader Jalal Talabani 
over the KDP's Masoud Barzani; the latter's statements on 
Kirkuk and Kurdish aspirations for independence tend to 
infuriate the Turks, and GOT officials consistently tell us 
that KDP/KRG border officials harass Turkish truck drivers 
coming over the Habur Gate and extract extra fees and fines 
from them.  Indeed, the Turks privately, but explicitly, tell 
us that the KDP is the main reason they insist that a second 
border gate be placed at Ovakoy, on the far western side of 
the border that would allow Turkish truckers to largely avoid 
KDP-land.  (NOTE: The new road that would be required from 
Ovakoy on the Iraqi side would almost have to lead to 
Talafar, a town in Ninewah province with a considerable 
Turkmen population: this also a large factor in the Turks' 
thinking.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶8. (C) While the Turks have occasionally expressed concern 
that the Kurds may have too much influence in the new ITG, 
they are generally pleased that--at least in the current 
stage of ITG negotiations--Talabani looks to be the likely 
candidate for President of Iraq.  The Turks have calculated 
that a major Kurdish role in the new government will temper 
calls for Kurdish independence.  At the same time, Turkey 
hopes that the Iraqi Shia will push back hard on Kurdish 
aspirations for Kirkuk, including pulling the province into 
the KRA.  The Turks are concerned that the Kurds could 
eventually use oil-rich Kirkuk as the political and economic 
center for an independent Kurdish state.  Turkish concern for 
Kirkuk's Turkmen population is a secondary consideration, but 
useful for appealing to Turkish public opinion. 
 
¶9. (C) While Turkey is counting on the Iraqi Shia to 
counterbalance Kurdish aspirations, the Turks are also 
counting on the Kurds to limit possible List 169 intentions 
for an Islamist regime in Baghdad that might also be too 
close to Tehran.  Turks have told us that one of their 
greatest concerns for Iraq is not Kurdish independence but a 
second Islamist theocracy which would disturb the 
long-standing balance of power between Turkey and Iran.  The 
moderate Islamist leanings of Turkey's ruling AK Party aside, 
the Turks back Kurdish desires to keep Sharia out of the 
Iraqi constitution and for the Iraqi state to be chiefly 
secular.  (NOTE: Turkish anti-Shia bias--especially prominent 
in some elements of the ruling AK Party--also plays a role. 
END NOTE.) 
 
Old Issues Never Die: 
--------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) While we believe Turkey is seeking to look at Iraq as 
a real country and not just a collection of problems, some 
specific issues will likely still dominate the Turks' agenda 
with you.   In addition, negative developments in 
Iraq--injudicious statements by the Kurds on Kirkuk or 
Kurdish independence, new allegations of oppression of the 
Turkmen, an uptick in PKK attacks in Turkey (a normal 
occurrence in the spring), or a major CF anti-insurgent 
operation a la al-Fajr--could each by themselves stir up 
negative press in Turkey and challenge Turkey's leaders to 
depart from their current, wiser course and instead pander to 
public opinion. 
 
PKK... 
------ 
 
¶11. (S) Aside from Kirkuk and the Kurdish independence issue, 
the Turks are still upset by PKK/Kongra-Gel's continued 
presence in northern Iraq.  Turkish government and military 
leaders understand that responsibility for dealing with 
terrorists within Iraq's borders will increasingly pass to 
the Iraqis, and their agreement to host the January 2005 
trilateral PKK talks was a positive sign that they will work 
together with the Iraqis on this shared problem.  Still, 
they, and the public at large, remain bitter over their 
perception that the US has taken no steps in Iraq to fulfill 
President Bush's pledge that that country will no longer be a 
base for terrorist operations against Turkey and they expect 
the US to remain engaged in the effort.  Some in the Turkish 
military harbor the belief that the US acquiesces to (or 
supports) the PKK's presence in Iraq, continually citing 
unsubstantiated reports of US/PKK meetings.  (NOTE:  We also 
know that the military uses our lack of action against 
PKK/Kongra-Gel to needle the current AKP Government.  END 
NOTE.) 
 
¶12. (S) If confronted with this issue, you should remind the 
Turks about our long-standing efforts that make us Turkey's 
number one ally against the PKK: Our listing of the PKK and 
all successor groups as terrorist organizations; our 
successful campaign to get the EU to do the same; and our 
assistance in rendering PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan.  You 
should refer back to the trilateral talks where, with the US 
role in Iraq more one of facilitator, the Turks and Iraqis 
focused on concrete steps to pave the way for actions against 
the PKK, including establishing an intelligence-sharing 
mechanism and holding a legal experts meeting after the ITG 
is in place to discuss issues related to closure of PKK front 
offices and media outlets in northern Iraq and the 
extradition of known PKK terrorists who are arrested (ref b). 
 MNF-I is in the process of posting a Tier I list of PKK 
terrorists on CENTCOM's CENTRIX system (to which all 
coalition countries, including the Turks, have access) which 
will facilitate CG's holding PKK leaders who come into their 
custody. This is a small but an important step by MNF-I and, 
once executed, should be appreciated by the Turks. 
 
... and Trucker Security 
------------------------ 
 
¶13. (C) While the security situation continues to improve, 
the safety of Turkish truck drivers and other workers in Iraq 
remains a concern for the GOT.  Insurgents have murdered at 
least 80 Turks; about 25 others have been kidnapped but most 
of these have been released.  On Dec. 17 of last year, Iraqi 
insurgents murdered five Turkish police officers as they were 
driving to Baghdad to provide security for the Turkish 
embassy there.  This incident shocked the nation; President 
Sezer, PM Erdogan, the CHOD, and many other notables attended 
the officers' funeral.  U.S., Iraqi, and Turkish officials 
participated in a trilateral discussion on trucker security 
on Nov. 30 that helped us demonstrate the significant steps 
we have taken to protect Turks delivering supplies for the 
MNF-I and clarify that almost all of the truck drivers killed 
were not/not in CF-protected convoys.  The meeting also 
initiated productive Turkish-Iraqi cooperation on security, 
including a bilateral follow-up meeting Dec. 29-30 (ref c). 
We expect to convene another trilateral trucker security 
meeting once the ITG has formed. 
 
What the Turks Can Do: Political Support... 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) You should engage the Turks to make their inclination 
to be helpful on Iraq more concrete.  On the political side, 
the Turks should continue to work with parties all along the 
political and communal spectrum, as they have committed to us 
they will do as Iraqis prepare for another round of elections 
during 2005.  In particular, the Turks can engage Sunni Arabs 
as a complement to our own outreach efforts.  The Turks have 
told us that Sunnis have pointed to the continuing detention 
of certain clerics and other notables as a continuing 
irritant in their own effort to breach the divide between us. 
 
¶15. (C) In addition, the Turks should be flexible and open in 
providing training opportunities for Iraqi Security Forces, 
Iraqi police, and civilians.  The Turks have provided 
training for some Iraqi diplomats, and they have offered 
training courses for officers and NCOs under NTM-I (though 
the Iraqis have yet to avail this offer).  A Turkish plan to 
provide police training to Iraqis in Jordan was never funded, 
and now the Turks have said they would prefer to provide this 
training in Turkey, not in Jordan.  We are mindful of Embassy 
Baghdad's reporting (ref d) that, for budgetary and timing 
reasons, the Iraqis would prefer to get such training in Iraq 
or failing this, in Jordan or the Gulf States (this might 
become less cumbersome should commercial air traffic open up 
between Iraq and Turkey).  The Turks have a small presence in 
Iraq on the NTM-I staff (two, soon to become five), but they 
are providing logistical and administrative support only; 
they are not trainers.  It might be worth sounding out the 
Turks to see if they would consider sending additional 
personnel--trainers--to Iraq under NTM-I or even bilaterally. 
 
...Second Border Gate... 
------------------------ 
 
¶16. (C) You should remind Turkish officials of our support 
for a second border crossing with Iraq, emphasizing that the 
decision on the border is a bilateral decision for Turkey and 
Iraq.  We offered to fund a TDA study to help the two sides 
reach agreement.  However, the U.S. is not involved in the 
negotiations. 
 
¶17. (C) The single border crossing with Iraq is a bottleneck 
for coalition supplies.  The long lines at the border are a 
political irritant for the GOT and threaten to limit what 
Turkish officials expect will be a very profitable trade with 
Iraq.  The GOT has so far not accepted our offer to fund a 
TDA study of the border options, insisting that the second 
border gate must be constructed according to the Turkish 
proposal, which would include building roads from the border 
and near Talafar.  That said, MFA Under Secretary Tuygan 
recently told the Ambassador that he will "look into" the 
Turks' restrictive approach to the TDA study.  The Foreign 
Ministry considers KDP leader Masoud Barzani the principle 
obstacle to agreement and told us that they might offer him 
compensation in return for agreement on Turkish proposal for 
the second border crossing.  Some Turkish officials think 
that the U.S. could compel Iraq and/or Barzani to accept the 
Turkish proposal. 
 
¶18. (C) In an effort to reduce the effect of the border 
bottleneck on MNF-I sustainment operations, EUCOM is 
considering placing a temporary pipeline for JP-8 across the 
Habur river, thus eliminating the long delay for trucks 
crossing the Turkey-Iraq border.  We advised EUCOM that the 
proposal would require approval from the Turkish government 
and recommended that a commercial arrangement (using DESC's 
Turkish contractor Petrol Ofisi) might help expedite 
approval.  We have not heard back from EUCOM. 
 
...and Support for the Economic Relationship 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶19. (SBU) You could also encourage Turkish leadership to 
promote dialogue on the sensitive issue of the 
Tigris-Euphrates Basin.  Foreign Ministry officials are 
sensitive about this issue after decades of angry rhetoric 
from Iraq and Syria, but tell us they are ready to begin 
confidence-building measures that could lead to future 
cooperation.  The U.S. could facilitate cooperation with 
projects to train experts or help create a shared database 
(ref e). 
 
¶20. (SBU) Turkey has spent only a small amount of its U.S.$ 
50 million pledge to Iraqi reconstruction, citing the 
security situation there.  On March 7, Turkey's Coordinator 
for Iraq Reconstruction told us Turkey hoped to begin 
reconstruction projects in Iraq after the new Iraqi 
Government is working, though it still remains concerned 
about the security situation (ref f).  With MNF-I statistics 
showing a clear decline in insurgent attacks, you could 
encourage the Turks to begin some useful projects, while 
recognizing that terrorists continue to kill Turkish truckers 
(albeit at a slower pace than mid-to-late 2004), and the Dec. 
17 murders in Mosul are still fresh in the Turks' minds. 
 
Incirlik?  Don't Ask 
-------------------- 
 
¶21. (S) We have used Incirlik Air Base (IAB) to base tanker 
aircraft that support both OIF and OEF.  In 2004, we also 
rotated troops out of Iraq via the base.  Since then, 
however, the GOT has been reluctant to approve Iraq-related 
operations at IAB, such as a long-standing request to 
establish a logistics hub there.  It has become clear that 
the AK Party Government believes it can utilize our increased 
use at Incirlik as leverage on other issues.  We aren't 
playing that game and we recommend, therefore, that you not 
raise the use of the base in your discussions here. 
 
¶22. (U) Iraq posts minimize considered. 
EDELMAN