This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 001549 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2015 
TAGS: PINR PGOV PREL IS GOI INTERNAL
SUBJECT: ISRAEL'S CONSTRUCTIVE NO-CONFIDENCE MECHANISM: 
MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING? (C-NE4-01236) 
 
REF: 2004 STATE 268778 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Norman Olsen for reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: The 2003 revision of Israel's no-confidence 
vote mechanism to require that all Knesset members voting 
no-confidence pre-designate a single candidate to form a new 
government was designed to keep government opponents from 
resorting too frequently to time-consuming no-confidence 
motions.  In practice, however, opposition parties often file 
multiple no-confidence motions each week on various and 
sundry issues -- from closure of a hospital to withdrawal 
from Gaza -- to grumble about their pet issues, even with no 
hope of toppling the government.  So why, then, do they 
bother?  This cable examines the Knesset's use of the 
no-confidence vote and the understanding by the media, 
academia, and Knesset members of this political tool.  End 
summary. 
 
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Constructive No-Confidence: Alternative Leader Named 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶2.  (C) The constructive no-confidence mechanism has been in 
effect under Israel's revised Basic Laws since January 2003, 
and requires that sponsors of any no-confidence motion name 
-- in the motion -- a Knesset member who, in the event the 
motion passes, will be charged by the president "with the 
task of forming a new Government."  Passage of a constructive 
no-confidence motion requires an absolute Knesset majority of 
61 out of 120 members, as with the previous law.  In the 
event that the constructive no-confidence vote passes, the 
government "shall be deemed to have resigned on the day of 
the expression of no confidence," and the designated MK, know 
as the replacement prime minister, is given up to 42 days to 
form a new government.  If that Knesset member cannot do so, 
elections are mandated. 
 
¶3.  (C) According to the Knesset's Rules of Procedure, only 
parties represented in the Knesset can sponsor no-confidence 
motions, and parties with fewer than 10 MKs are limited to 
three no-confidence motions in a parliamentary year.  Each 
no-confidence motion must include "the written consent of the 
Knesset member" who would serve as replacement prime minister 
in the event the motion carries.  Therefore, if the secular 
Shinui party, for example, were to sponsor a constructive 
no-confidence motion on the GOI's failure to promote civil 
marriage legislation, attached to that motion would be the 
written consent of an individual MK, most likely Shinui 
leader Tommy Lapid, to serve as replacement prime minister. 
All MKs voting for that motion would knowingly also be voting 
for Tommy Lapid to be tasked with forming a new government in 
the event the motion passes. 
 
¶4.  (C) Eli Hazan, legislative assistant in the office of the 
coalition whip, told poloff that in all such no-confidence 
motions to date, the replacement prime minister has 
invariably been the leader of the party sponsoring the 
motion, although he or she could be any member of the 
Knesset.  The mechanism by which Likud rebels, or members of 
any other party, would actually decide to submit a 
no-confidence motion against their own leader and list 
someone other than the current party leader as replacement 
prime minister is far from clear.  Since the Knesset rules 
require that such motions can be submitted only by parties -- 
not individuals -- the Knesset leadership would need to make 
a determination that such a motion was actually submitted on 
behalf of a party, not just on behalf of some members of a 
party.  Complicating that determination is the fact that each 
party's decision-making process is different.  Likud, for 
instance, has a strong, vocal Central Committee that party 
leader and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has nonetheless 
sometimes ignored.  Thus, would a motion submitted by 13 
Likud rebels with Central Committee endorsement and listing 
someone other than Sharon as replacement prime minister 
constitute a legitimate no-confidence motion in the eyes of 
the Knesset leadership and lawyers?  Shas, on the other hand, 
relies solely on the word of its spiritual leader, Rabbi 
Ovadia Yosef for decisions of this magnitude.  Equally 
important are the political costs that a replacement prime 
minister such as Bibi Netanyahu would face by allowing his 
name to be put forward.  Justice Ministry Liaison and Likud 
MK Paz Barnett noted to poloff that Netanyahu earlier 
declined to allow right-wing MKs to submit his name as a 
replacement prime minister.  He also said that the chances 
are very unlikely of Likud submitting a no-confidence motion 
against Sharon. 
 
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Number of No-Confidence Motions Increases 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) According to Israel Democracy Institute Senior Fellow 
Asher Arian, politicians who originally pressed for the 
constructive no-confidence provision intended it to limit the 
use of no-confidence votes and thereby ensure greater 
governmental stability.  They reasoned, according to Arian, 
that requiring that a replacement prime minister be named in 
the motion would reduce the number of motions since it would 
be more difficult to achieve consensus on a replacement. 
Arian pointed out that the number of no-confidence motions 
has in fact increased since the introduction of the 
constructive no-confidence motion.  He provided poloff with 
data showing that the average monthly number of no-confidence 
votes has increased from 2.9 votes in the last Knesset, 
before the constructive no-confidence provision took effect, 
to 3.5 votes in the current Knesset. 
 
¶6.  (C) Likud MK Uzi Landau, who characterizes himself as the 
father of the "constructive no-confidence motion," told 
poloff that his intention was to reduce the number of 
no-confidence motions by making success of the motion more 
difficult.  Landau lamented that his brainchild has not had 
that effect.  MOJ advisor Barnett commented that the 
requirement for a replacement prime minister hardly 
constrains those filing no-confidence motions.  MKs, he said, 
are concerned about who is listed on the no-confidence motion 
as replacement leader only when there is a chance the motion 
will receive 61 votes.  So far, the highest vote total in 
favor of any constructive no-confidence motion has been a 
56-56 tie.  Even then, Barnett commented, MKs may support 
another party's no-confidence motion having calculated that 
the replacement prime minister is incapable of forming a new 
coalition.  The no-confidence vote thus becomes a de facto 
vote for new elections. 
 
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MKs Use No-Confidence Vote as Soapbox 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) The constructive no-confidence vote is -- regardless 
of its authors' intent -- mostly used by MKs as a public 
vehicle to make political brownie points with their 
constituencies without seriously threatening the government. 
The ultra-Orthodox Shas party, for example, might sponsor a 
no-confidence motion against the Sharon government to protest 
cuts in child allowances.  Shas knows, however, that it will 
not obtain 61 votes in favor of the motion, and that the 
Shinui party, which leads the opposition, will not only 
oppose the resolution in substance, but would never agree to 
Shas leader Eli Yishai as replacement prime minister.  Shas, 
however, sponsors the motion regardless, in part for the 
opportunity to raise the issue in the televised Knesset 
session.  Shas MK Amnon Cohen told Poloff that his colleagues 
understand the no-confidence mechanism well and that they use 
it to debate issues, but that "they don't treat it 
seriously."  Cohen assessed that the no-confidence votes 
every Monday "are a good use of time" for the purpose of 
discussion. 
 
¶8.  (U) National Union MK Zvi Hendel echoed Cohen's 
reasoning.  According to a January 31 Ha'aretz article, 
Hendel said that his faction submits the motions because "the 
discussion of the no-confidence motion provides a platform 
for voicing political positions in detail, expressing 
feelings and shaping public opinion."  The Ha'aretz article 
also maintained that no-confidence motions have presented 
less of a threat and nuisance to the Sharon government since 
Shinui departed the coalition and subsequently became the 
lead opposition party in January.  The author of the article 
"Fractured Factions of the Opposition," Gideon Alon, pointed 
out that several parties in the opposition, such as the 
religious Shas party, do not even recognize the arch-secular 
Lapid as leading the opposition and that, because of the 
opposition's divisions, no-confidence motions cannot gain the 
necessary 61 votes to topple the government.  "The main 
beneficiary to (sic) this situation," he wrote, "is the 
coalition, which needs no effort to vote down the 
no-confidence motions one after another." 
 
¶9.  (C) According to Alon, the current situation contrasts 
greatly to the situation before Shinui became the lead 
opposition party.  At that time, Likud MK and coalition 
chairman Gideon Sa'ar could not be absent from no-confidence 
votes as he was needed to rally majorities against them. 
Sharon's senior advisor, Dov Weissglas, once complained to 
emboffs before Shinui took over as leader of the opposition 
that the weekly no-confidence votes were time-consuming for 
Prime Minister Sharon, since he often had to attend the votes 
to ensure that they were defeated. 
 
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No-Confidence: Public Entertainment 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶10.  (C) While academics and political commentators for the 
most part understand the mechanics of the constructive 
no-confidence vote, journalists for the major Israeli media 
reporting on Israel's fast-moving political scene often 
exaggerate the importance of no-confidence votes, perhaps 
partly to sell papers.  Major Israeli newspapers, for 
example, often use headlines claiming that Sharon "narrowly 
survives" a no-confidence vote when the tally of yeas and 
nays is close, even if the motion received far fewer than the 
61 votes necessary to topple the government.  The media 
"doesn't understand (the no-confidence vote)," Alon 
commented, "and the public certainly doesn't understand it." 
For the opposition parties, Arian commented, it is "Monday's 
show."  Arian compared the public's interest in the outcome 
of no-confidence votes to its interest in sports events.  It 
is entertainment, according to Arian, "an escape from 
reality."  The public, he said, "just cares about who comes 
out on top." 
 
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