This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS  ROME 000764 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
FROM U.S. MISSION IN ROME 
 
STATE FOR IO/EDA, AF/W, NEA/ENA 
USAID FOR DCHA, OFDA GOTTLIEB AND AFR LAVELLE 
USDA FOR FAS HUGHES 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH/USAID 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID EAGR PREF SENV XI XY UN FAO
SUBJECT: FAO AND THE NEXT DESERT LOCUST INVASION 
 
REF: 04 ROME 0722, 04 ROME 3979, AND 04 ROME 3581 
 
¶1. Summary.  USUN Rome has been actively engaging the 
United Nations (UN) Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) on the desert locust emergency in Sahelian West 
Africa and the Maghreb to determine FAO's preparedness 
for the next spring and summer 2005 locust control 
campaign. It has learned that FAO's funding situation for 
desert locust control is in a reasonably healthy state; 
locust breeding and maturation have been inhibited by 
cold weather and targeted control operations; country 
pesticides stocks are deemed adequate; equipment has been 
and is being pre-positioned; field data and communication 
are being improved; a corps of national desert locust 
control trainers is being trained and mobilized; country 
contingency plans are being finalized; and more 
transparent communications to donors, affected countries 
and other partners are being made.  FAO appears to be on 
good footing as it prepares for the spring-summer 2005 
desert locust campaign. Comments are invited from posts 
in affected countries relating to any problems with or 
shortcomings of FAO's locust control operations. 
 
¶2. FAO is and will be carrying out the following steps 
from the present until June 2005 to ensure a timely and 
effective response to the upcoming invasions: 
A) Continued survey, control operations and technical 
assistance; 
B) Conducting an internal evaluation to review progress 
and target weaknesses; 
C) Re-examining the deployment of aircraft through a 
"lessons learned" workshop; 
D) Establishment of a pesticides monitoring system; 
E) Intensive regional training on desert locust control; 
F) Operationalizing Emergency Prevention System for 
Transboundary Animal and Plant Pests and Diseases 
(EMPRES) in the Western Region; 
G) Pre-positioning resources including equipment and 
materials; 
H) Improving the roster of locust experts and deploying 
more experts to the field; and 
I) Improving outreach to donors.  End Summary. 
 
¶3.  Background. The summer 2004 locust upsurge, which 
affected Sahelian West Africa and the Maghreb, was 
characterized by locust experts as the worst invasion in 
15 years.  The last plague of this magnitude occurred 
1986-89. FAO's lagged response during the 2003/2004 
crisis was criticized highly by donors and affected 
countries.  In 2004, the USG identified the following 
weaknesses within the FAO system as areas that needed a 
great deal of improvement: 1) insufficient transparency 
and delays in use of donated funds; 2) delays in 
establishing a coordination structure/process; 3) 
inadequate staffing in the field; 4) lack of quick 
response mechanisms; and 5) absence of a comprehensive 
and up-to-date information system on donor contributions 
and project expenditures. 
 
------------------------ 
Locust Funding Situation 
------------------------ 
 
¶4. According to FAO's Project Management Information 
System (FPMIS), which was launched in September 2004 
following the USG's recommendations, this is the funding 
picture as of February 25: 
 
¶A. FAO Appeal$100,000,000 
------------------------------------- 
¶B. Received from donors$ 65,052,291 
291 
¶C. FAO contribution$  6,209,598 
¶D. Committed$  8,842,279 
¶E. Under Negotiation$  2,068,750 
------------ 
TOTAL (B-E)$ 82,172,198 
 
¶5. To date, $39,673,987 has been spent or committed on 
purchasing 2,641,871 liters of pesticides; 2,530 
sprayers; 5,685 units of protective clothing; 1,803 units 
of communication equipment such as radios; and 
contracting 3,704 flying hours. 
 
¶6. Of the remaining $42,498,931, FAO is revising spending 
plans currently, but has tentatively earmarked funds as 
follows: $18.4 million for the 2005 Sahelian summer 
campaign for pesticides, equipment, flying hours, 
training and technical expertise; $7.3 million for 
ongoing field operations in Algeria, Mauritania, Libya, 
Morocco, and Tunisia; $9.2 million for technical support; 
and $4.8 million for project implementation. 
 
¶7. During the 2004/2005 campaign, five Sahelian countries 
(Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal) and Morocco 
have benefited the most from donor support: 
$15.5 million to Mauritania 
to Mauritania 
$ 7.8 million to Senegal 
$ 3.9 million to Niger 
$ 3.5 million to Morocco 
$ 2.9 million to Mali 
$ 1.3 million to Chad 
 
In addition, FAO spent $1.6 million on its Regional 
Office for Africa. The remaining $3.2 million was spent 
on other countries (Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, 
Egypt, Eritrea, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Sudan, 
Tunisia and Yemen) and inter-regional support. 
 
¶8. Funding by Donor: 
European Commission $30.31 million 
France $ 5.85 million 
The Netherlands $ 5.66 million 
Canada $ 5.03 million 
Italy $ 3.44 million 
United States $ 3.40 million 
Saudi Arabia$ 3.00 million 
Japan$ 2.98 million 
 
¶9. USG Bilateral Funding for Locusts: Total USG 
humanitarian assistance to combat desert locusts in 
fiscal years 2004/2005 is $17,714,388.  An additional 
$2,500,000 is being processed to support Mali and non- 
presence countries in western Africa.  This will bring 
the USG's total contribution to the locust operations to 
 
$20,214,388 ($16,814,388 bilateral and $3,400,000 
l and $3,400,000 
multilateral/FAO), making it the highest contribution by 
a single country. 
 
¶10. FAO's Emergency Center for Locusts Operations (ECLO) 
and senior FAO management have been holding a series of 
meetings recently to review the current desert locust 
situation. They have concluded that current funding is 
sufficient and that FAO is in a tremendously better 
position at present compared to last year when it only 
had several hundred thousand dollars from USAID to kick- 
start the 2004 campaign. 
 
¶11. Should the situation require less money than 
currently available, the excess donor funds could be 
moved to an emergency (contingency) fund for locust 
control.  FAO is drafting a document on the establishment 
and operation of the fund for tabling at the joint 
FAO/World Bank Donors' meeting to be held in Niamey, 
Niger, from May 2-4, 2005. 
 
------------------------- 
Locust Breeding Situation 
------------------------- 
 
¶12. FAO reviewed the current situation in countries where 
outbreaks occur. Although major locust breeding from 
February to June 2004 produced lots of swarms, no large- 
scale second-generation breeding has occurred, due to 
unfavorable weather. Swarms were further diminished by 
targeted control operations since September 2004. 
Considering these factors, FAO concluded that: 1) there 
will be fewer swarms in the Maghreb in the spring 
breeding season, and 2) the intensity of the swarms 
migrating south into the Sahel may be less than in 2004. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
FAO Preparation for Summer 2005 Campaign 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. To prepare for the upcoming summer locust campaign, 
FAO is undertaking the following measures: 
A) Continued survey, control operations and technical 
assistance; 
B) Conducting an internal evaluation to review progress 
and target weaknesses; 
C) Re-examining the deployment of aircraft through a 
"lessons learned" workshop; 
D) Establishment of a pesticides monitoring system; 
E) Intensive regional training on desert locust control; 
F) Operationalizing Emergency Prevention System for 
Transboundary Animal and Plant Pests and Diseases 
(EMPRES) in the Western Region; 
G) Pre-positioning resources including equipment and 
materials; 
H) Improving the roster of locust experts and installing 
experts in field; and 
I) Improving outreach to donors, each of which is briefly 
described below. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
Continued Survey, Control Operations and Technical 
 
Assistance 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶14. Major control activities continued well into February 
in Algeria and limited control activities were seen 
elsewhere in the region, but no spray operations were 
launched in Mauritania, Mali and Niger over the past 
several weeks. During the second dekad (10 days) of 
February, Algeria sprayed 11,000 hectares.  The 
Government of Algeria (GoA) requested FAO's assistance to 
improve technology.  Correspondingly, FAO's presence 
there is assisting to improve the quality of information 
coming out of Algeria. FAO has sent consultants to 
install 50 high-frequency (HF) radios and global 
positioning systems (GPS), a satellite specialist to 
install the Reconnaissance and Management System of the 
Environment of the Schistocerca (RAMSES) database, and 
other experts to provide machine maintenance and 
calibrate sprayers. Algeria has designated 40 aircraft 
for locust control operations, an increase of 28 over 
last fall's spraying. 
 
¶15. FAO reports there is a targeting program in place 
among nations affected. A group from Algeria went to 
Mauritania to review the ground situation and found very 
few swarms left. Morocco has been very good in spraying. 
Libya and Tunisia are also undertaking some control 
measures.  Senegal is still spraying residual populations 
in the southern part of the country. Some locust activity 
has been noted in the Red Sea area, with patchy breeding 
in Sudan and limited activities in northwestern Somalia. 
 
¶16. In Egypt, FAO is conducting field trials on bio- 
pesticides, similar to the mycopesticide Green Muscle." 
Two trials originally conducted on 400 hectares each 
produced mixed results, but further trials were halted 
due to lack of second-generation hopper bands. 
 
¶17. In addition, FAO is collaborating closely with the 
World Bank, which has made $60 million available to seven 
Sahelian countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Senegal and The Gambia) as a loan to combat 
locusts.  Several of these countries have opted that 
World Bank funds go through FAO to avoid their own 
bureaucratic hurdles and take advantage of FAO's 
procurement networks.  FAO is ensuring that the use of 
these funds is technologically appropriate.   In April, 
FAO locust experts and the World Bank will conduct a 
joint regional workshop on developing contingency plans 
for the Sahelian countries. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Internal and External Evaluations 
--------------------------------- 
 
 
¶18. FAO will conduct an internal evaluation, which will 
be moderated by an independent person and held on March 
21-22, with the aim of improving ECLO operations in 2005. 
(The experience and success of ECLO is being drawn upon 
to assist FAO in setting up a similar center for its 
tsunami rehabilitation campaign.) In addition, the 
 
SIPDIS 
Permanent Representation of the Netherlands, through its 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is formally requesting an 
independent evaluation to be headed by Dutchman Lucas 
Brader, ex-FAO staff member and former Director General 
of International Institute of Tropical Agriculture, with 
the participation of other donors. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Re-examining the Deployment of Aircraft 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶19. Recognizing mistakes were made in deploying aircraft 
last year, during the first week of March FAO is 
conducting a "lessons learned" workshop to review last 
season's aerial spraying efforts. Participants include 
FAO procurement and technical officers; international 
consultants involved in implementing contracts; pilots, 
who expressed concern over spraying distances covered; 
aircraft companies contracted by FAO; and a 
representative from the World Food Programme (WFP), whose 
air services were used when there was a critical lack of 
pesticides in affected countries. FAO hopes to fine-tune 
its aerial contracting mechanisms and issue special 
recommendations on the efficient use of aircraft for 
aerial spraying. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Pesticides Situation and a Monitoring System 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶20. FAO at one time considered establishing a pesticides 
bank. However, FAO concluded that, as current country 
stocks are now adequate, or more than adequate as in the 
case of Senegal, a pesticides bank may not be necessary. 
Instead, FAO developed a pesticides monitoring system 
whereby each country is expected to produce a daily table 
of how much pesticide has been produced, used, and 
received bilaterally and/or multilaterally for an up-to- 
date look at where each country stands on pesticides. FAO 
will monitor to ensure that no country goes below its 
respective minimum level (e.g., Mauritania will have to 
maintain a stock of 200,000 liters). Senegal reports more 
than 480,000 liters as a strategic stock available in the 
country.  It has so far sprayed close to 760,000 hectares 
with almost the same quantity of pesticides since the 
beginning of the 2004 campaign.  If the locust situation 
in 2005 is far less severe than the 2004, then Senegal 
may not need large stocks of pesticides and will have to 
find a way to avoid unnecessary overstocking. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Intensive/Coordinated Regional Training 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶21. Since control activities have slowed down in the 
Maghreb, FAO is concentrating on gearing up the Sahelian 
countries.  To strengthen national capacities, an 
intensive "Train-the-Trainer" workshop for mainly Sahel 
field teams will be held in Niamey, Niger, from March 14- 
April 5. In addition to planning a national locust 
control program, upon return to their countries the 21 
participants [three from each of the frontline countries 
of Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, and Senegal; one from 
Cape Verde, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Burkina Faso, and 
 
Gambia; and, by special request, one from Djibouti 
(Central Region) to take advantage of the training 
offered in French will be expected to train a total of 
600 persons by June. 
 
¶22.  FAO also is coordinating a "Train-the-Trainer" 
workshop on human health and environmental issues to be 
held in Nouakchott, Mauritania, from April 13-23.  The 
workshop will cover quality control of desert locust 
control operations, human safety monitoring, and 
environmental pollution monitoring.  Trainers and experts 
together will formulate a quality and safety control work 
plan for each country. 
 
¶23. From April 25-29 in Niamey, Niger, FAO's ECLO and 
Commission de Lutte Contre le Criquet Pelerin dans la 
Region Occidentale  (CLCPRO) will host a joint workshop 
with the World Bank to work on contingency planning for 
affected countries in the Sahel. Locust control 
authorities from each country will attend. Expected 
outputs include finalizing 2005 national plans, 
consolidating needs by country, detailing procurement and 
execution plans, and providing guidance for cross- 
regional coordination. The workshop will be followed by 
the May 2-4 donor coordination meeting. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Policy on Training Village Brigades 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶24. Village brigades: One area in which FAO and donors 
hold divergent views is the use of village brigades (VBs) 
FAO's view is that VBs make very little meaningful impact 
considering the alarming health risks posed to farmers. 
FAO contends that training and properly equipping VBs 
does not guarantee the farmers' protection, illustrating 
the example of Niger, where 900 villages had local 
farmers trained for VB duty.  The VBs were provided with 
new protective gear, which they subsequently put away to 
be used for "special occasions," according to FAO. 
Instead, the VBs sprayed in their ragged clothes and 
sandals, unknowingly contaminating themselves from head 
to toe. 
 
¶25. The view of donors like the U.S. is that VBs form 
part of a larger organized effort overseen by crop 
protection officers.  VBs are useful to collect ground 
information, mobilize equipment and materials, and be 
involved in carefully crafted control interventions. 
Despite this, the overwhelming consensus at FAO is that 
VBs are not part of a preventive control strategy and FAO 
does not want to be in the business of providing 
pesticides to local farmers. At present, a FAO 
subcommittee is drafting a policy on the use of VBs as 
follows: FAO will assist in providing information to 
villagers to protect themselves; FAO will use Farmer 
Field School (FFS) training; and FAO will continue to 
investigate quicker acting bio-pesticides that do not 
pose health risks to humans. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
EMPRES Being Launched in the Western Region 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶26. Because information coming out of the Sahel is still 
highly variable, FAO is launching its Emergency 
Prevention System for Transboundary Animal and Plant 
Pests and Diseases (EMPRES) in the Western Region to 
cover Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania, Mali, 
Niger, Chad and Senegal. EMPRES, which is partially 
funded by USAID/OFDA's Assistance for Emergency 
Locust/Grasshopper Abatement (AELGA) Project, will help 
to improve the collection and exchange of information on 
local conditions and locusts, leading to better 
coordinated control measures through early warning, early 
reaction and applied research. (For more on EMPRES, visit 
http://www.fao.org/ag/AGP/AGPP/EMPRES/Default .htm.) 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Pre-positioning and Maintenance of Equipment 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶27. FAO has sent consultants to various countries to 
ensure that the cleaning and maintenance of vehicles, 
sprayers, and related equipment is being readied for the 
next phase. It is also ensuring that aircraft it will 
contract will be properly equipped and functioning for 
spraying activities. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Developing Roster of Desert Locust Experts and 
Strengthening Field Capacity 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶28. FAO has established an international roster of desert 
locust experts, and is refining it based on specific 
qualifications, including language proficiency. The major 
problem encountered is the lack of French language 
skills. FAO plans to expand this roster in early March. 
 
¶29. At FAO's Regional Emergency Locust Coordination Unit 
(ECU) in Dakar, which was established with funding from 
USAID/ODFA, two experts are in place: an aerial spraying 
expert, whose contract is due to expire in March, and an 
eco-toxicologist, whose contract is due to expire in 
June. If there is no reinvasion, FAO most likely will 
close down the ECU as there is no justification for 
maintaining the unit in Dakar.  Because locusts are a 
migratory problem, FAO believes it is more practical to 
detail experts from Rome or Algiers (CLCPRO) to maintain 
the information link with an affected country instead of 
maintaining one person in Dakar all the time. FAO states 
the donor community is well aware of this. However, if 
the situation erupts and a reinvasion is possible, FAO 
will expand the office and may wind up posting a staff 
member in Dakar long-term. 
 
---------------------------- 
Improving Outreach to Donors 
---------------------------- 
 
¶30. FAO reports that pilot testing of the donor- 
restricted section of FAO's Project Management 
Information System (FPMIS) Web site was completed 
successfully in January.  The donor-restricted FPMIS 
provides real-time information on programs such as desert 
 
locusts. Donors will be able to access progress reports, 
financial information, and review program implementation 
activities on their respectively funded projects.  Also 
in January, to improve external relations, FAO hired 
Stephen Jones as the ECLO Public Information Officer. 
 
-------------------------- 
Constraints or Weaknesses? 
-------------------------- 
 
¶31. When asked about constraints or weaknesses to its 
locust operations, FAO staff evaded the questions 
respectfully.  FAO is ensuring that the resources needed 
for locusts survey are in place well in advance. If 
resources are there then FAO has no foreseeable 
constraints.  FAO's aim is to deploy survey ground teams 
right away in areas of green vegetation.  However, there 
are not enough resources in some countries and quite 
enough in others. Thus, weaknesses are in a sense topical 
to the affected country. At present, FAO lists the 
weakest country in terms of teams and resources as Chad, 
followed by Niger (support of the locust program is 
through the Ministry of Agriculture in Niamey, but the 
field office covering locusts is in Agadez, and the two 
offices do not communicate well).  Next is Mali, which is 
not well organized.  However, there is a state of 
evolution in Mali where the government is taking decisive 
action to establish an autonomous locust control unit, 
which FAO encourages. FAO believes Mali will get in as 
good shape as possible.  FAO has the most confidence in 
Mauritania, as it has received the most FAO training and 
technical assistance, and has used its funds correctly. 
 
¶32. FAO states it is still difficult to obtain accurate 
information from certain countries because the countries 
simply are not providing it.  The case of Tunisia was 
illustrated. There are some locusts swarms in Algeria 
close to the border with Tunisia.  The Government of 
Tunisia (GoT) is not providing information to FAO on 
whether it has sent teams to the area to check the status 
of swarms. To assuage the situation, FAO sent an expert 
from the ECU in Dakar to work with the GoT.  However, as 
of February 25, there has been no improvement in the 
information link. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Final Thoughts on FAO and the Locust Campaign 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶33. Conclusion:  The unusually cold weather and 
aggressive control operations launched over the past 
several months prevented further breeding and 
significantly reduced locust populations in the winter/ 
spring breeding areas.  Hence, it is very likely that the 
next spring/summer invasions could be less intense than 
last year. If that proves to be the case, existing funds, 
equipment and materials and other resources will enable 
FAO and affected counties to better prepare and launch 
control operations in time during the upcoming spring- 
summer campaign and avert any potential major crisis. It 
is worth noting that, as part of its preparatory process, 
FAO is reviewing last year's efforts to determine where 
improvements are needed, and it is making a concerted 
 
effort to ameliorate various components by holding 
internal and external evaluations in areas such as 
deploying aircraft, improving information, regional and 
field level coordination, etc. It is engaging in an 
aggressive training program and improving the quality of 
information and technology in the field, thereby 
strengthening national and regional capacities. In the 
fight against desert locusts, FAO's strengths include 
tapping into the collective intelligence of technical 
experts, providing tailored technical assistance and 
education to affected countries, and procuring and 
delivering necessary materials and equipment. FAO appears 
to be on good footing as it prepares for the spring- 
summer 2005 desert locust campaign. 
 
¶34. Comments from posts in affected countries on any 
shortcomings on the part of FAO are invited.  USUN Rome 
would like to raise concerns with FAO's senior management 
very early on in the locust control campaign. USUN Rome 
will continue to engage FAO further on mechanisms and 
measures to prepare the organization for efficient and 
effective responses to emergencies such as desert 
locusts. 
 
¶35. Khartoum, Tripoli minimize considered. 
HALL 
 
 
NNNN 
	2005ROME00764 - Classification: UNCLASSIFIED