This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 000268 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA, NEA/ 
ARP, NEA/EX, NEA/P, CA, CENTCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2015 
TAGS: AMGT ASEC PREL PTER YM EAC
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING 02/06/2005 
 
REF: TD-314/07236-05 
 
Classified By: RSO Tim Laas, for reasons 1.4 (b) (c) and 
(d). 
 
1.(S/NF) Begin Summary - The DCM convened a core EAC meeting 
on February 6, 2005, to review current threat conditions. 
RMAS noted recent threat reporting (REFTD) focused on the 
Sheraton Hotel and Tourist City located adjacent to the U.S. 
Embassy and used by American TDY personnel and contractors. 
As part of the EAC discussion, members reviewed security 
arrangements at temporary lodging to include Tourist City and 
the Sheraton Hotel.  Based on available information, EAC 
members recommended that the RSO immediately review the 
security situation at Tourist City and the Sheraton Hotel 
with Ministry of Interior contacts to ascertain whether MOI 
has new threat related information and ensure a heightened 
focus on life safety at these facilities.  Key offices and 
personnel represented included:  DCM, FPD, CCE-Y, RMAS, 
POL/ECON, DAO, LEGATT and RSO. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (S/NF) RMAS briefed the EAC about current threat concerns 
in Sanaa, followed by EAC recommendations that the RSO seek 
further clarification regarding what MOI knows about possible 
threats to Tourist City, the Sheraton Hotel or any other 
location where Americans may cluster in soft-target sites. 
 
¶3.  (S/NF) The following issues were discussed or decided 
upon during the EAC meeting: 
 
- RSO will review with MOI and PSO, ROYG's current commitment 
to protect the Sheraton Hotel, where USG TDY personnel 
cluster.  RSO last visited security at the Sheraton with the 
hotel manager and his staff in December 2004, loaning the 
hotel a walk-through metal detector with training:  Hotel 
management now screens hotel staff when they report to work 
as they enter the hotel staff entrance.  EAC members also 
noted the relative hardness of the Sheraton Hotel, which has 
more then 100 feet of standoff, armed sentries on the 
perimeter and chemical explosive and walk-through metal 
detector screening of guests and employees.  RSO advised EAC 
members that he last met with MOI regarding the Sheraton,s 
perimeter security in October 2004, to discuss improvements 
in internal security and vigilance on the part of ROYG at the 
Sheraton Hotel.  Additionally, EAC members were made aware of 
recent upgrades to the perimeter wall to include 
re-stationing of a 10 man crew manning a Toyota truck mounted 
heavy machine gun on the perimeter and repairs that have been 
made to gaps in the hotel perimeter wall reducing the threat 
of intruders. 
 
- Based on RMAS and EAC concerns, RSO will emphasize the 
maintenance of alert and aggressive MOI elements on the 
Sheraton hotel's perimeter as well as ask for continued 
scrutiny by senior ROYG officials on the training, equipping 
and competence of PSO security personnel working within the 
interior of the hotel, to prevent unauthorized vehicles from 
approaching the hotel and intruders in the interior.  (RSO 
Comment:  The RSO currently works with the hotel management, 
Sheraton Guards and MOI elements to provide explosive 
detection screening of vehicles and packages approaching the 
hotel perimeter and augments spot patrols of the hotel 
grounds to detect security anomalies.  Additionally, RSO met 
with hotel management in November to discuss the hiring and 
screening practices of hotel staff focusing on long-term 
employees with good records as well as vetting of recent 
hires with the goal of preventing criminals, access to 
internal hotel operations). 
 
-  EAC members discussed Tourist City and noted that a 
non-governmental development program contracted by USAID 
operates out of office space on the compound and three 
individuals reside on the compound.  RSO briefed EAC members 
about problems with current perimeter security at Tourist 
City, created by property management's use of three gates 
from where numerous persons enter and exit throughout the day 
to include:  Residents, health club members, and person 
patronizing the bar and disco known as the Russian Club. 
(RSO Comment:  Tourist City is a Ministry of Defense property 
and gate guards are from the MOD not the MOI, limiting RSO's 
ability to conduct low level liaison with MOD officials 
responsible for the compound.  Post policy has prevented 
clusters of USG personnel from residing on Tourist City for 
the past year, requiring RSO concurrence to reside in Tourist 
City, due to the inability of the MOB to properly screen the 
public coming and going from the Tourist City compound. 
USAID contracted office space at Tourist City recently posted 
a guard and installed metal, locking doors at the entrance to 
reduce the possibility of an intruder - however, no stand-off 
currently exists on the office space perimeter). 
 
¶4. (SBU)  RSO briefed the Core EAC about a more formalized 
procedure, per COM guidance, that will be forthcoming 
requiring a written request, RSO survey and COM approval for 
anyone wishing to hold a large event at a soft-target site 
off of the Embassy compound. This procedure will ensure a 
carefully documented review and appropriate MOI participation 
of soft target events preventing haphazard clustering of 
Americans that could result in a mass casualty. 
 
¶5. (S/NF)  RSO briefed the EAC on a recent incident in which 
the Surveillance Detection Team spotted a suspicious vehicle 
using Saudi plates, following an Employee shuttle after the 
van departed the Embassy compound.  The suspicious vehicle 
followed the shuttle for a few miles down the road before 
dropping off.  EAC members were informed that RSO 
Surveillance Detection assets have focused on the Embassy 
shuttle van since November 2004, with only the above reported 
incident.  (RSO Comment:  The information was provided to MOI 
for investigative follow-up but RSO has received no results 
from the MOI.  RMAS has been informed.) 
 
¶6.  (S/NF) DCM inquired as to whether Hadda Compound used an 
itemizer chemical explosive detection system.  RSO informed 
the EAC that Hadda Compound did have an "itemizer" owned by 
an International Oil Company that was purchased for 
protecting Hadda Compound.  However, the system was not 
functional until last week when the Diplomatic Security 
Engineering Security Officer provided technical advice, which 
has made the system operational again.  RMAS suggested the 
post look into the possibility of using sniffing dogs as 
explosive detectors. 
 
¶7. (SBU) EAC members were informed that measurements were 
ongoing for the installation of heavy-duty safe haven doors 
in each house (bedroom or other designated internal area). 
Also, the RSO is surveying each residence to provide upgrades 
where necessary, in locking hardware on external doors as 
well as safe-haven doors.  EAC members discussed the fact 
that westerners that do not have a 24/7 guard presence, as do 
American Embassy officers, suffer a high degree of crimes to 
include breaking and entering against their residences.  The 
EAC expects crime to rise in Yemen as oil prices raise as a 
result of planned removal of subsidies on fuel prices and a 
continued decline in national oil revenues. 
 
¶8.  (S/NF) EAC members were advised that an Embassy committee 
was meeting on February 8th, to address ongoing concerns 
about the lack of operational radios for the LGF in Sanaa. 
(RSO Comment:  MO is pursuing with difficulty UHF radio 
frequencies for a LGF radio upgrade to support 117K USD in DS 
funded radio hardware.  Currently, the LGF radio program is 
on an unauthorized VHF system that is not functioning for 
most residents).  Radio operations in Sanaa are extremely 
difficult due to ROYG paranoia and harassment regarding the 
placement of repeaters within Sanaa. 
 
¶9. (S/NF) The DCM and EAC tabled, for an upcoming EAC 
meeting, a review of security surrounding the Russian Club, a 
bar and disco located at Tourist City and frequented by the 
international community; Also tabled for an expanded EAC 
meeting was a review of the use of diplomatic CD 7 tags by 
American Embassy officers.  Embassy policy had restricted use 
of diplomatic tags on American Embassy vehicles, but ongoing 
difficulty in getting private/local "blue" tags has put 
pressure on the Management Office to release cars to officers 
with diplomatic tags while waiting for ROYG to issue private 
plates.  EAC members noted that diplomatic license plates may 
have drawn the attention of Ali Hasan Al-Mas, the Yemeni man 
who attempted to carry out an attack at a residence where 
U.S. diplomats were gathered, during his casing activity. 
 
¶10.  (S/NF) Based on RMAS and EAC threat concerns, RSO will 
request a meeting with MOI and PSO officials over the next 
week to review security programs for the Embassy community 
focusing especially on the Sheraton Hotel, Tourist City, 
locations off the Embassy compound where large numbers of 
Americans gather as well as the employee shuttle. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Krajeski