This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 001482 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2015 
TAGS: PREL MASS PREF IN NP BT UK
SUBJECT: FOREIGN SECRETARY SARAN PESSIMISTIC ON NEPAL'S KING 
 
 
Classified By: Acting DCM Geoffrey Pyatt. Reasons 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: King Gyanendra's actions are "exactly 
opposite of what is required," Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam 
Saran told visiting Ambassador to Nepal James Moriarty on 
February 25.  Ambassador Moriarty and Saran agreed on the 
need for concerted pressure on the King from India, the US, 
and the UK.  Saran did not object to Ambassador Moriarty's 
comment that although the US plans to withhold the delivery 
of weapons until there is improvement in the political 
situation, non-lethal aid and military training would likely 
continue.  Saran took a very tough line on the King, 
expressing pessimism about Gyanendra's ability to make the 
right moves, and agreed on the need for milestones that would 
demonstrate that the King is moving in the right direction. 
Saran also agreed to re-engage the government of Bhutan 
regarding the ongoing effort to repatriate Bhutanese refugees 
in camps in Nepal.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) Stopping in New Delhi en route to Kathmandu following 
consultations in Washington, Ambassador Moriarty, accompanied 
by PolCouns and Poloff, called on Foreign Secretary Shyam 
Saran to discuss Indian and US views on the re-establishment 
of democracy in Nepal.  Throughout the meeting, Saran 
expressed great suspicion of King Gyanendra's motives and the 
King's willingness to take steps that would lead to 
restoration of democracy in Nepal.  Saran stated that while 
the King may "say the right things" in his statements, it was 
clear from his actions (e.g., his appointment of convinced 
monarchist Tulsi Giri as vice-chairman of the council of 
ministers) that he does not believe in multi-party democracy. 
 
Maoists and Military Aid 
------------------------ 
 
¶3.  (C) Saran expressed his belief that the King seeks to 
restore an absolute monarchy and does not understand how to 
defeat the Maoist insurgency.  He said that the US, India and 
the King have a strong interest in preventing a Maoist 
takeover in Nepal, but the King's actions undermine that 
goal.  If the King's actions ultimately led to stability and 
a Maoist defeat, the setbacks to democracy might be palatable 
to India, he opined.  However, the February 1 dismissal of 
the government was "exactly opposite of what is required." 
Saran reiterated that the King had restrained the RNA from 
taking the fight to the Maoists prior to February 1 and that 
the dismissal of the government had not reversed that.  In 
fact, stated Saran, the King's actions had necessitated 
further retrenchment of the RNA into the Kathmandu Valley, 
abandoning the field to the Maoists elsewhere.  (Note: 
Embassy Kathmandu will coordinate with the Indian Embassy to 
check on this allegation.  End note.)  Much of Nepal outside 
the Valley was now "on autopilot," with no government 
presence, he asserted. 
 
¶4.  (C) Saran referred to the suspension of military aid by 
the UK and India as a much-needed "jolt" to bring the King 
back on the right track.  He admitted that suspension was the 
only lever available, and hoped that the US and UK would be 
supportive.  He noted that the announced suspensions left a 
gap in RNA supplies, but if the King felt there was even a 
"hint" that the RNA could fill that gap from other sources, 
then pressure would dissipate.  Saran did not see a risk of 
imminent military collapse.  Ambassador Moriarty informed 
Saran that the next anticipated US provision of lethal 
assistance would be the expected May delivery of 3,000 M-16 
rifles, adding that if the King does not take steps to 
restore democracy by then, this consignment would be unlikely 
to proceed.  However, non-lethal military aid and training 
(in particular JCETS training of the RNA Ranger units) are 
scheduled for March and April, and would probably be provided 
as planned.  Ambassador Moriarty underlined that no final US 
decision has been taken in this regard.  Saran did not 
respond to the news that US military training, like India's, 
would probably continue. 
 
Working with the King and the Parties 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) In response to Ambassador Moriarty's presentation of 
the steps that the King must take to show seriousness about 
restoring democracy (release of political detainees; 
restoration of most if not all of the constitutional 
freedoms; reaching out to the political parties to 
participate in the government), Saran agreed that the US and 
India should press the King.  However, the Foreign Secretary 
remained convinced that the King's goal was to consolidate 
his position as an absolute monarch.  Saran noted that the 
King's situation had become "very bad," with even the initial 
popular support for his moves fading as production, food 
supplies, and even government customs revenues have been 
curtailed as a result of Maoist-initiated road closures. 
 
¶6.  (C) Saran agreed that the King realizes that his seizure 
of power was not as easy as he had initially thought, and he 
might respond to pressure.  The Foreign Secretary noted signs 
of "desperation" in the King's latest statements, and 
speculated that this might, if true, allow India and the US 
to work with him.  He highlighted the importance of leaving a 
way out for the King that would not humiliate him, adding 
that India had been careful not to attack the King personally 
for this reason. 
 
¶7.  (C) Ambassador Moriarty cautioned the GOI that creating a 
"democracy movement in exile" from the second-tier party 
activists who have moved to New Delhi could backfire: these 
individuals had relatively little clout inside Nepal and any 
assistance to them by the GOI would make most Nepalis suspect 
their motives.  Acknowledging that the MEA has been in 
contact with these politicians, Saran stated that there was 
little danger of allowing them too much influence, as it was 
clear that the party leaders in Nepal would resume their 
roles upon being released.  He speculated that continued 
shutting out the parties from political life would cause them 
to give up on a compromise with the King and fall in with the 
Maoists.  He agreed on the necessity to maintain pressure on 
the Maoists to force them to realize that they will not 
achieve a Maoist state, and asserted that a united front of 
the parties with the monarchy is essential to maintaining 
that pressure. 
 
Bhutanese Refugees 
------------------ 
 
¶8.  (C) Saran agreed that the signs of progress on 
repatriation of Bhutanese refugees achieved during the 
October 2004 visit of PRM A/S Dewey were frozen due to the 
crisis in Nepal.  He suggested that the GOI could speak to 
the Bhutanese about their willingness to continue identifying 
and repatriating the refugees.  Saran worried that if the 
Bhutanese heard about a concrete proposal to resettle 
refugees abroad, the RGOB would refuse to take any back.  He 
felt it was most important to focus on repatriation of 
Category 1 refugees to get momentum going. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9.  (C) We were struck by Saran's deep pessimism about the 
King's willingness to make good-faith efforts to restore 
democracy, which may reflect a sense of betrayal by the 
Palace.  His exasperation may result to a considerable extent 
from India's multiple unheeded warnings to the King not to 
take this step.  That said, when pressed, Saran was willing 
to acknowledge that continued concerted efforts by the GOI 
and USG might help convince the King to move in the right 
direction. 
 
¶10.  (U) Notable also was the positive local media coverage 
of Ambassador Moriarty's visit, which focused on the close 
coordination between the USG and GOI, and Ambassador 
Mulford's comments to the press that India had a leading role 
in responding to the Nepal crisis. 
 
¶11.  (U) Ambassador Moriarty has cleared this message. 
MULFORD