This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000297 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPT. FOR: DS/IP/ITA, DS/IP/NEA, NEA/ARPI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X1 
TAGS: ASEC PTER MU EAC
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE 
QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ) 
 
REF: SECSTATE 23078 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard L. Baltimore III, U.S. Embassy Muscat 
, Oman. 
Reason: 1.5(b)(c)(g). 
 
The responses listed below are keyed to the Security 
Environment Profile Questionnaire, dated 02/08/2005 (reftel). 
 
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POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
------------------ 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  DEMONSTRATIONS: 
 
¶A.  (SBU)  Yes, there are ethnic and religious communities in 
Oman that are capable of carrying out significant 
anti-American demonstrations.  However, as noted below, the 
Omani government exercises significant control over all 
polities in the country. 
¶B.  (SBU)  No, there have been no/no anti-American 
demonstrations in Oman within the last 12 months. 
¶C.  (SBU)  No, in previous years, Royal Oman Police (ROP) 
forces successfully kept any demonstrations away from the 
Embassy. 
¶D.  (SBU)  In previous years, the average size of any 
anti-war demonstration has been 50 to 100 demonstrators. 
¶E.  (SBU)  Yes, the most recent demonstrations (in February 
and March 2003) were directly related to military action in 
Iraq. 
¶F.  (SBU)  Demonstrations have been peaceful, with no reports 
of property damage or harassment of bystanders. 
¶G.  (U)  N/A 
¶H.  (U)  N/A 
¶I.  (SBU)  Yes, there was a peaceful organized gathering by 
teachers to protest the lack of promotions.  This peaceful 
protest took place near one of the Sultan's rural palaces 
while he was present. 
¶J.  (U)  N/A 
¶K.  (U)  N/A 
¶L.  (U)  Peaceful 
¶M.  (U)  N/A 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  MACRO CONFLICT CONDITIONS: 
 
¶A.  (SBU)  No, Oman is not/not currently engaged in an 
interstate or intrastate conflict. 
¶B.  (U)  N/A 
¶C.  (U)  N/A 
¶D.  (U)  N/A 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  HOST COUNTRY CAPABILITIES: 
 
¶A.  (SBU)  Yes, Omani law enforcement agencies are 
professional and well-trained. 
¶B.  (SBU)  Yes, Omani law enforcement agencies have been 
trained by U.S. agencies.  For example, the Bureau of 
Diplomatic Security's Office of Anti-Terrorism Assistance and 
the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) continue to sponsor a 
number of training opportunities for the ROP and other Omani 
security services.  The training has been effective in 
operations related to forensic DNA analysis, border security, 
interdiction of terrorists, and mass casualty/weapons of mass 
destruction response. 
¶C.  (SBU)  No, Omani law enforcement agencies are not 
confronted with serious, widespread corruption inside their 
agencies. 
¶D.  (SBU)  Yes, Omani intelligence services are professional 
and capable of deterring terrorist actions. 
¶E.  (C)  Yes, Omani intelligence services have been 
cooperative with Embassy requests for information and support. 
¶F.  (U)  See Section 6. 
¶G.  (SBU)  Yes, the Omani government has been very responsive 
to Embassy requests for protective security. 
¶H.  (SBU)  The Embassy assesses the overall security at major 
airports in Oman as "very good." 
¶I.  (SBU)  The Embassy assesses the effectiveness of customs 
and immigration control agencies as "effective." 
¶J.  (SBU)  The Embassy assesses the effectiveness of border 
patrol forces as "effective."  However, Oman's porous 
borders, as well as its extensive coastline, present a 
significant challenge for the ROP to control with the limited 
resources available to them. 
 
-------------------- 
INDIGENOUS TERRORISM 
-------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORISM GROUPS: 
¶A.  (SBU)  The Embassy has no/no information indicating that 
indigenous, anti-American terrorist groups are present in 
Oman. 
¶B.  (U)  N/A 
¶C.  (U)  N/A 
¶D.  (U)  N/A 
¶E.  (U)  N/A 
¶F.  (U)  N/A 
¶G.  (U)  N/A 
¶H.  (U)  N/A 
¶5.  (SBU)  OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS: 
¶A.  (SBU)  The Embassy has no/no information indicating that 
other (not anti-American) indigenous terrorist groups are 
present in Oman. 
¶B.  (U)  N/A 
¶C.  (U)  N/A 
¶D.  (U)  N/A 
¶E.  (U)  N/A 
 
----------------------- 
TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM 
----------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST INDICATORS: 
 
¶A.  (S/NF)  The Embassy has no/no information indicating that 
foreign terrorist groups maintain an active presence in Oman. 
 However, given the level of al-Qa'ida activity in the 
Arabian Peninsula, the existence of some individuals or small 
cells cannot be ruled out.  This is especially true due to 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) rules which facilitate the 
movement of GCC nationals among member states.  In 2004, two 
separate - and previously unknown - al-Qa'ida-associated 
terrorist cells were taken down in Oman.  The arrests are 
believed to have derailed the cells' ongoing plots, one of 
which was aimed at U.S. interests in Oman, to include the 
U.S. Embassy. 
¶B.  (U)  N/A 
¶C.  (U)  No, the Omani government actively pursues all threat 
information. 
¶D.  (U)  N/A 
¶E.  (U)  N/A 
¶F.  (S/NF)  The EAC assesses the level, intent, and scope of 
hostile intelligence services in Oman, relative to potential 
anti-American terrorist acts, as low.  Moreover, the few 
hostile intelligence agencies that are represented in country 
are closely monitored by the Omani intelligence services. 
¶G.  (S/NF)  Explosives are not generally available in Oman. 
Weapons are difficult to obtain, but it is common and 
traditional for many people living in the interior to own 
firearms (mostly long rifles with some AK-47's).  The porous 
borders, as well as the extensive coastline, present 
vulnerabilities for the importation of weapons and explosives 
into Oman. 
BALTIMORE