Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 05BANGKOK1454, THAILAND: NGO HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ASIA HIGHLIGHTS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05BANGKOK1454.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05BANGKOK1454 2005-02-28 12:29 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Bangkok
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001454 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/BCLTV, DRL; HQ USPACOM FOR FPA HUSO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM TH HUMAN RIGHTS
SUBJECT: THAILAND: NGO HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ASIA HIGHLIGHTS 
NEGATIVE TREND 
 
REF: A) BANGKOK 1280 B) 04 BANGKOK 5360 C) BANGKOK 1375 
 
Classified By: Classified by Political Counselor Robert J. Clarke, Reas 
on: 1.4 (d) 
 
 1. (C) SUMMARY:  At a hard hitting press conference on 
February 24, Brad Adams, executive director of the 
non-government organization Human Rights Watch Asia 
(HRW-Asia), described the trend for human rights in Thailand 
as "unambiguously negative."  Poloff attended the press 
conference, as did the international and Thai media, many of 
which reported prominently on his comments.  Adams urged the 
Royal Thai Government (RTG) to rebuild trust by revealing the 
classified contents of official investigations into the Krue 
Se and Tak Bai incidents in the deep South, events in 2004 
where evidence is strong of human rights abuses by security 
forces against Thai Muslims.  He also called for the RTG to 
bring to justice those responsible for the death of Somchai 
Neelapaijit, a noted Muslim human rights lawyer whom he 
described as a "folk hero" in the South.  Adams separately 
told the Ambassador that the President of the Privy Council 
has initiated a discreet dialogue with prominent academics 
critical of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's approach to 
the South.  PM Thaksin responded sharply to criticism by the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) of on-going 
violence in the South.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (U)  On February 24, 2005, Brad Adams, executive director 
of the Asia Division of Human Rights Watch (HRW), gave a 
press conference at the Foreign Correspondents Club of 
Thailand (FCCT).  Adams pulled no punches and summarized the 
trend in human rights in Thailand as "clearly and 
unambiguously negative."  He noted this as a particular 
disappointment after the optimism generated following 
Thailand's adoption of the 1997 Constitution, which contained 
many provisions for improved civil and democratic rights for 
the Thai people.  He said the first four-year Thaksin 
administration had seen a gradual erosion of democratic gains 
from the previous Chuan Leekpai administration.  Adams, 
commenting negatively on a recently announced security zoning 
plan for the three Muslim majority provinces in Thailand's 
deep South (Ref A), stated that PM Thaksin needs to move from 
"CEO mode to listening mode." 
 
NEVER FORGET: FOUR AREAS THE RTG COULD ADDRESS TO BUILD TRUST 
 
3. (U) Adams outlined four issues that he said, if addressed 
squarely by the RTG, might lower tensions in Southern 
Thailand.  First, he urged public release of the complete 
report form the Independent Commission (IC) that investigated 
the attack on Krue Se Mosque on April 28, 2004 in which 32 
separatist militants were killed.  Adams said that, while it 
is no mystery who was in command and what happened on the 
ground that day, the question is open whether those 
responsible be held criminally responsible for their actions. 
 (Note: Although not mentioned by name, Adams was referring 
to General Phanlop Pinmani, Deputy Directory of the Internal 
Security Operations Command (ISOC) (Ref B) End Note.) 
 
TAK BAI SHOOTINGS 
 
4. (U) Second, Adams recommended as a confidence building 
measure release of the entire report of another Independent 
Commission that investigated the October 28, 2004 incident at 
Tak Bai, Narathiwat.  While Adams deemed the work of this 
commission as "a reasonably good job", he said that the 
callous treatment of prisoners (80 of whom died by 
suffocation while being transported) and the blatant firing 
by security forces into the crowd, resulting in 6 known 
deaths, must be addressed.  He stated that the IC's 
description of the use of force at Tak Bai as "reasonable" 
cannot be accepted under UN or even Thai criminal procedures 
for the use of force if one views the video of the 
demonstrations, widely available in Thailand. 
 
2003 DRUG WAR REPORTED EJKs 
 
5. (U) Third, Adams warned that the issue of extra-judicial 
killings (EJKs) in the 2003 war on drugs must not be allowed 
to slip from the public conscience and debate on human 
rights.  He recalled that many international observers, when 
first hearing estimates as high as 3,000 deaths during the 
height of the anti-narcotics campaign, felt a sense of 
cognitive dissonance--how could such a peaceful and 
relatively developed country as Thailand have such a high 
death toll?  Adams noted that what is more alarming is the 
absence of any real official investigation.  He emphasized 
that this permissive environment cannot be allowed to 
continue.  (Note: Embassy estimates of drug-related EJK 
killings in the 2003 drug war are approximately 1,300.  The 
RTG claims to have the files open for investigating these 
cases, but there is no evidence of follow up.  End note.) 
Adams said that, while many pointed out that PM Thaksin's 
re-election was in part a vote of confidence in his ability 
to deal with the drug problem and the popularity of the war 
on drugs, there were no excuses for the government to ignore 
the rule of law in order to expeditiously solve the drug 
problem. 
 
SOMCHAI: JUSTICE FOR A SOUTHERN FOLK HERO 
 
6.  (U) Lastly, Adams stated that Somchai Neelapaijit, the 
missing Muslim lawyer and human rights activist (now presumed 
dead), has become "something of a folk hero" in southern 
Thailand.  If the RTG wants to build trust in the southern 
people, particularly southern Muslims, it must be able to 
reveal the identity of and charge those responsible for his 
kidnapping and death, he said.  Five policemen are currently 
charged with robbery and kidnapping and are free while 
awaiting trial (scheduled for August 2005).  Adams claimed 
that clearly the RTG knows who killed Somchai, and they must 
reveal this and bring them to justice. 
 
7.  (C) On the margins of the press conference, HRW staffers 
told Poloff of their plans to issue a more revealing report 
about the situation in southern Thailand in late March or 
early April 2005.  They estimated that "hundreds" are being 
held as suspects in violence against civilians and government 
officials, and that many are subject to mistreatment they 
characterized as "torture".  Asked if HRW had names of people 
who may have been "disappeared", the HRW staff expressed 
frustration over the difficulties of persuading victims of 
abuses and their relatives to talk at that level of detail. 
Adams publicly reiterated a similar feeling during the press 
conference, describing a sense in affected communities that 
"If they can just be quiet, then this will pass."  Adams 
opined that RTG security plans for the south that rely on 
more military deployments and higher profile government 
presence are not allowing the situation to pass and would not 
work.  Reflecting further on the general silence of Muslim 
villagers, Adams noted,  "I wonder if the government realizes 
what's being offered to them" (i.e., as an low-cost 
opportunity for an end to violence). 
 
PRESIDENT OF PRIVY COUNCIL REACHES OUT DISCREETLY TO THAKSIN 
CRITICS 
 
8. (C)  In a separate meeting with the Ambassador on February 
23, Adams reported that some academics and human rights 
activists had been approached by General Prem Tinsulanond, 
former prime minister and current President of the Privy 
Council, to engage in dialogue and consultations on southern 
Thailand.  Embassy Poloff confirmed that Professor Suricahi 
Wankaew, political science professor at Chulalonkorn 
University, had been approached by Prem to discuss issues in 
the south confidentially, along with other members of the 
Peace and Reconciliation Network.  (Comment:  This 
development, as well as public statements by other members of 
the Privy Council last week, (Ref C), are unusual for members 
of this secretive royal council. End Comment.) 
 
THAI REACTION TO OIC STATEMENT CRITICAL OF VIOLENCE IN DEEP 
SOUTH 
 
9.  (U) During his weekly radio address on Saturday, February 
26, Thaksin had tough remarks seemingly directed at foreign 
critics of his policies.  In an apparent reference to 
HRW-Asia's Adams press conference and to concerns raised by 
the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) following a 
meeting between Malaysian Prime Minister Abdulla Badawi and 
OIC Secretary General Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, Thaksin said, "I 
didn't ask them for rice to eat" and "these people are more 
sympathetic towards the insurgents than the innocent 
victims."  The OIC Secretary General had issued a press 
statement on February 21 expressing "serious dissatisfaction 
at the persisting bloody acts of violence perpetrated against 
Muslims in Southern Thailand."  Thai Foreign Minister 
Surakiart Sathirathai separately replied to the OIC statement 
that Thailand would never use force to resolve problems in 
the South.  He was quoted as saying that the RTG would send a 
copy of the Tak Bai IC report to the OIC. 
 
10. (C) COMMENT:  A team chosen by PM Thaksin has a chance to 
test some of the recommendations of critics of the RTG 
security approach to the deep South.  On February 28, 25 
members of parliament (MP) from the Thai Rak Thai (TRT) 
party, led by Deputy Prime Minister Suwat Liptaphanlop, will 
make a one-day fact-finding trip to Pattani, Yala and 
Narathiwat provinces.  According to press reports, they will 
divide into three separate groups and meet with villagers 
without the participation of local government and security 
officials. This trip is part of a three-month "survey" of 
Southern Muslim sentiments that is supposed to influence RTG 
policies.  It remains to be seen whether these MPs will take 
Adams' advice and really shift to listening mode.  They would 
do a great service to Thailand if they return to the PM with 
an honest assessment of villagers' concerns and persuade him 
to open a meaningful dialogue with Muslims in the South, most 
of whom are deeply angry over recent events stemming from 
Thaksin's policies, but probably not yet radicalized.  END 
COMMENT. 
BOYCE