This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000117 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, NEA, NEA/ 
ARP, NEA/EX, NEA/P, CA, CENTCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/18/2015 
TAGS: AMGT ASEC PREL PTER YM EAC COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING 01/16/2004 
 
Classified By: RSO Tim Laas, for reasons 1.4 (b) (c) and 
(d). 
 
¶1.  (S/NF)  Begin Summary:  The Ambassador convened an 
EAC meeting on January 17, 2005, to review post policy for 
private or official events at Embassy Officer housing 
following a recent attempted attack against Embassy personnel 
at an Employee residence during the Christmas holidays.  The 
COM noted the possibility that the possible assailant might 
have committed an overt act had his bodyguard team not been 
at the residence - a team which was beefed up in the past two 
years with a RSO directed Embassy hired advance and follow 
team of LES security officers.  The Ambassador concluded the 
discussion with EAC members by directing the RSO to write 
down a post policy for RSO/COM review and approval involving 
any event American Embassy related that would result in the 
clustering of westerners at difficult to defend/soft-target 
sites i.e. private residences or public restaurants.  EAC 
members noted no additional threats against Embassy Sanaa or 
Americans in Yemen and discussed make up and execution of the 
EAC core and expanded meetings.  Key offices and personnel 
represented included:  CDA, FPD, OMC, RMAS, POL/ECON ,MO, 
CCE, DAO, AID, PD, and RSO. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (S/NF) The Ambassador with the assistance of RMAS, began 
the discussion with an update regarding details concerning 
the recent attempt by a man with two fragmentary grenades and 
a handgun who attempted to scale the wall of an Embassy 
residence in what may have resulted in an attack against 
Embassy personnel attending a private Christmas Eve dinner. 
The RSO briefed EAC members on recent requests to hold 
representational events at private residences since the 
incident.  RSO further noted with the EAC the difficulty in 
protecting such residences despite Yemen government officials 
assurances from a vehicle born improvised explosive device or 
intrusion by armed assailants. 
 
¶3.  (S/NF) Under the direction of the COM, EAC members 
reviewed current policies and practices regarding the 
coordination of such events with the RSO.  Finally, based on 
EAC input, the COM directed the RSO to write down a policy, 
making the sponsoring of large soft target events the 
exception rather than the rule for the foreseeable future. 
EAC provided three categories for the RSO to consider in 
refining post soft-target events to include:  1.  Private 
Dinner Parties with 15 or fewer invitees;  2. Large Open 
Parties/Celebrations at residences or public places and 3. 
Medium to Large Official Functions at private residences or 
public places.  The COM noted that in a critical threat 
security environment medium to large gatherings that cluster 
westerners in an undefended or inadequately defended location 
should not occur.  EAC members also noted that all events 
both private and official must be carefully coordinated with 
the RSO to ensure perimeter security commensurate with the 
nature and size of the event and proper access control. 
Events that leave a footprint and significantly raise a 
location's threat profile should not occur according to EAC 
members if the RSO is unable to ensure standoff on the 
perimeter and proper access control into the event. 
 
¶4.  (S/NF) RMAS provided no new insights into recent threat 
reporting regarding Yemen. 
The EAC noted the fact that the British Embassy re-opened 
Saturday 15 January 2004, but little information regarding 
why British officials concluded it was safe to re-open was 
known by EAC members, other than the lack of threat specifics 
or imminent threat information. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) EAC members also discussed the warden messages to 
date and considered who should receive distribution of warden 
messages as well as how to notify unofficial Americans 
staying in twelve hotels throughout Yemen. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The DCM prodded EAC members and their staff to take 
their personal security very seriously and keep the RSO 
informed about security concerns in light of what appears to 
be an increase in threat reporting regarding Yemen and the 
region.  The EAC meeting ended with a review by the DCM of 
the make-up of the Core EAC and recognition that core EAC 
meetings must be called and reported immediately after threat 
related incidents or threat related reporting involving 
Yemen. 
 
 
KRAJESKI