This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 003025 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, S/CT, CA, DS/DSS, 
DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, CENTCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2014 
TAGS: ASEC AMGT PREL PTER EAC
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING - DECEMBER 6, 2004 
 
REF: A. SANAA 3014 
     ¶B. SANAA 3013 
 
Classified By: RSO Tim Laas, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.1.  (S/NF) Begin Summary:  On December 6, 2004, the Chief 
Of Mission chaired a core Emergency Action Committee meeting 
with COM, DCM, POLMIL, DATT, FPD, LEGAT, SOC-Yemen, OMC, 
CONS, POLECON, PDO and RSO in attendance.  The topic of 
discussion was security conditions for the American community 
in Yemen following the attack on the American Consulate in 
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.  The Political Military Office briefed 
members on the incident and reported no specific threat 
against Americans in Yemen.  The RSO briefed the EAC on 
current security activities intended to thwart a similar 
attack in Sanaa.  After a review of security, EAC members 
recommended no change in current security policy and measures 
following regional incidents.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (S/NF)  EAC members reviewed current security conditions 
and measures as follows: 
 
-  The RSO briefed EAC members on security at the Chancery 
noting that American Embassy Sanaa: It was note that American 
Embassy Sanaa utilizes a vehicle trap and pedestrian trap at 
both compound gates and at the Embassy entrance; Both 
perimeter vehicle gates utilize a double Delta barrier system 
at each gate and two ram-resistant electric sliding 
vehicles/anti-personnel gates.  No perimeter gate, vehicle or 
pedestrian gate is open unless the other one is closed, 
insuring a trap to prevent intrusion.  Additionally perimeter 
gates are fortified by hardened bullet resistant guard 
booths; MSG,s standing guard orders require immediate lock 
down from Post 1 of any entrance that experiences an 
incident; For the Chancery building, RSO has had one entrance 
permanently locked down since 2002, operating only one 
entrance to concentrate access security screening at that 
point reducing the possibility of an intrusion; and finally 
the Chancery entrance utilizes a personnel trap. 
 
-  EAC reviewed the integrity of Embassy walls.  RSO advised 
EAC members that during past reviews of this wall it was 
determined that the structure utilized anti-ram knee walls 
and were of a design that would be very difficult to breach 
with even multiple attacks due to the collapse of debris. 
 
- The EAC reviewed procedures that will be followed by this 
community after any report of an incident regionally that may 
have ramifications for the security of the community in 
Sanaa.  The EAC noted that the COM had decided not to change 
the security profile following today's incident in SA, i.e. 
he did not call for a standfast of community members. 
However, EAC members with the COM concurrence agreed that in 
future incidents such as seen in SA, an EAC meeting would be 
convened immediately to gather all sources of information and 
make a determination as to whether to standfast, request 
additional Yemen government support or take other appropriate 
action. 
 
-  POLMIL advised EAC members that no specific information 
exists which would indicate a possible attack/specific threat 
against the American community in Sanaa.  POLMIL noted 
possible surveillance in Jeddah prior to this attack and also 
discussed the possibility that the attack was in retaliation 
for a recent success by SA forces against a terrorist 
safehouse. 
 
-  RSO noted one surveillance incident within the past ninety 
days against the Hadda Apartment Compound.  The MOI advised 
RSO that the vehicle use to conduct the possible incident was 
owned by a Tunisian diplomat who is believed to have left 
town as part of a permanent change of duty station, but left 
the vehicle with unknown persons to sell the car.  MOI found 
the current owner of the vehicle but assessed that the owner 
was not the surveillant and was not a threat to the American 
community. 
 
-  RSO informed EAC members about a security review conducted 
with all RSO program team leaders of their programs to 
include the Marine Security Guard Detachment, LGF, 
Surveillance Detection Team and RSO Investigators as well as 
ROYG perimeter security commanders.  Team chiefs reviewed 
lessons learned from the incident in Jeddah in an attempt to 
ensure proper conduct of policies and procedures as well as 
proper function of all physical security equipment.   The 
review mentally walked team chiefs through attack scenarios 
and should bolster perimeter security and internal defense 
reactions in the event of a serious incident. 
 
-  The EAC was advised by the COM that RSO would conduct an 
intruder drill within the Embassy compound this week during 
hours of operation.   It was noted that an intruder drill had 
not been conducted with Embassy personnel for several months. 
 
 
-  RSO advised EAC members that an internal warden meeting 
would be held on 7 December 2004 for Embassy wardens to 
review all emergency scenarios. 
 
-  EAC members discussed the likelihood that multiple attacks 
could occur in the region as has been seen in the past. 
 
-  COM mission asked RSO to pass lessons learned from the 
Jeddah incident to MOI during his weekly meeting with the 
Chief of Staff and the Embassy's ROYG security commanders 
from Central Security Organization as well as the Political 
Security Organization.   Lessons learned include the 
terrorists use of official uniforms and police vehicles to 
surreptitious enter security perimeters.  (RSO Comment:  ROYG 
vehicles are not allowed onto the Embassy compound and ROYG 
officials do not carry weapons onto the compound when 
entering the Embassy perimeter.) 
 
-  COM instructed section chiefs to allow their staff to 
stagger their arrival times to prevent bottle necking at the 
Embassy perimeter gate where vehicle inspections are held. 
In 2003 RSO moved the inspection point further from the 
public street with a lower profile, putting one layer of ROYG 
security personnel between the screened vehicle and the 
public and providing better concealment from the street. 
 
-  RSO agreed to pass the concerns of EAC members to MOI 
regarding a key choke point (traffic circle) down from the 
Embassy. 
 
-  The EAC directed the RSO to put out a security advisory 
reminding community members about best practices when 
commuting and a note on participating in the weekly radio 
check conducted by Post 1. 
 
-  EAC asked the RSO for an update on routes used by the 
community shuttle.  The RSO discussed vehicle with the EAC 
ensuring members that his last review of routes was as of the 
last week in November and that review showed a good variation 
of both COM motorcade routes and community shuttle routes. 
Additionally, EAC members were advised that RSO recently 
reconfirmed with the motorpool supervisor that armored 
vehicles must be utilized for transporting American Embassy 
officers in clusters.  (RSO Comment:  Locking devices are 
becoming problematic on Embassy armored vehicles and GSO has 
vehicle repair parts on order.) 
 
-  The COM directed the Management Office to update the 
Telephone Tree.   (RSO Note:  The Radio Emergency and 
Evacuation network, by far the best method of emergency 
communications has serious problems with transmissions within 
Sanaa's mountainous terrain, and has been extremely stilted 
due to ROYG unwillingness to cooperate with the Embassy in 
the upgrade of current networks, not allowing the Embassy to 
purchase additional frequencies and install new repeaters in 
strategic locations.) 
 
-  The GSO briefed EAC members on the status of the armored 
vehicle fleet. 
 
¶3.  (U) The EAC had no specific threat information regarding 
Yemen at the time of the meeting and no public warden message 
was recommended by EAC members. 
 
¶4.  (U) RSO advised the EAC that two cables, REFTELS Sanaa 
3013 and 3014, were sent as of 6 December 2004, requesting 
funding for upgrades in the amount of 150K for the Hadda 
Apartment Compound where the Embassy leases eleven apartments 
and for 225K for upgrades to the Embassy perimeter based on 
MOI recommendations/requests for specific upgrades and 
logistical support. 
 
¶5.  (U) RSO will meet with the MOI Chief of Staff Brigadier 
General Sunidar on 6 December 2004 to review security in 
Yemen for the American community following the incident in 
Jeddah.  RSO contacts have informed the RSO the MOI has 
stepped up their physical security presence in the Hadda 
western residential area for an unspecified time following 
the incident in Jedah. 
 
¶6.  (U) The Ambassador concluded the EAC meeting by directing 
the RSO to ensure appropriate information regarding best 
practices is shared with the community and the MOI. 
KRAJESKI