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Viewing cable 04NEWDELHI7088, THE BJP HAS FEW OPTIONS TO RETURN TO POWER

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04NEWDELHI7088 2004-11-05 12:48 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy New Delhi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 007088 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2014 
TAGS: PGOV PINR IN
SUBJECT: THE BJP HAS FEW OPTIONS TO RETURN TO POWER 
 
REF: A. NEW DELHI 6998 
 
     B. NEW DELHI 6606 
     C. NEW DELHI 5339 
     D. NEW DELHI 4036 
     E. NEW DELHI 3333 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Geoffrey Pyatt, Reasons 1.4 (B,D). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Since losing the May elections, the BJP 
leadership has failed to resolve internal disputes between 
its moderate and Hindutva wings over the reasons for its 
defeat.  The Sangh (family of Hindu groups) is urging the 
party to return to its Hindutva roots, but the leadership is 
unwilling to endorse this course.  Party President and former 
DPM Advani is leaning towards "moderate Hindutva" as a means 
to placate the Sangh and keep secular parties in the National 
Democratic Alliance (NDA).  Although determined to confront 
the UPA both inside and outside of Parliament, the BJP cannot 
return to power over the medium term, and poses no serious 
threat to the ruling United Progressive Alliance (UPA) 
government.  Both the NDA and UPA are concentrating on three 
state elections slated for February 2005, which could 
consolidate Congress momentum according to early predictions. 
 Should the BJP do badly in these contests, the UPA could 
remain in power for years to come.  End Summary. 
 
Confusion Still Reigns 
---------------------- 
 
2.  (U) On October 18, the BJP sacked party President 
Venkaiah Naidu, and replaced him with former DPM L.K. Advani 
(Ref B).  Press reports indicate that the BJP hopes Advani 
will provide strong leadership, overcome deep rifts in the 
party leadership, and lead it back to power.  In an early 
indication as to which direction he wants to take the party, 
Advani committed the BJP to building a Ram temple in Ayodhya 
on October 26, met RSS leaders for two hours on October 31, 
and pledged to attend a hard-line RSS leadership conference 
on November 5 and 6 in Hardwar. 
 
3.  (U) Indications are that the party's internal rifts 
remain as deep as ever.  On November 1, Vishwa Hindu Parishad 
(VHP) leader Ashok Singal criticized Advani as a "stop-gap" 
president who lacked mass appeal, and the Sangh Parivar 
leadership said it would accept nothing less than a return to 
Hindutva ideology.  Despite its unhappiness with the BJP's 
failure to return to Hindutva, the Sangh Parivar gave no 
indication that it would follow through on earlier threats to 
form a purely Hindu party.  On October 31, a disaffected RSS 
activist revived the old Jan Sangh as a new Hindu nationalist 
grouping, but no BJP leaders joined him. 
 
Limited Options 
--------------- 
 
4.  (C) On November 4, well-connected television journalist 
Harish Gupta told Poloff that the RSS wants Advani to give up 
aspirations of a quick return to power, to allow the UPA 
government to complete a full five-year term, and to use that 
period to rebuild the party from the ground up.  According to 
Gupta, Advani is reluctant to accept this plan, as it would 
prevent him from becoming PM.  If the party adopted this 
approach, it would have to select an heir apparent from its 
second tier leadership.  The two most likely candidates are 
Murli Manohar Joshi and Sushma Swaraj, both of whom are 
hard-liners who enjoy the confidence of the Sangh Parivar 
 
5.  (C) Gupta claimed that Joshi was the Sangh Parivar's 
first choice to become party president and Advani was happy 
to remain leader of the parliamentary opposition, taking the 
job only to prevent Joshi's rise to power.  Gupta predicted 
that Advani would fare badly in the post, as the BJP's 
current options are extremely limited, and that he would take 
the blame for a situation in which there is little prospect 
for a positive outcome. 
 
6.  (C) Gupta pointed out that Bihar and Jharkhand go to the 
polls in February 2005, and because the BJP has no presence 
there, it must rely on its ally the Janata Dal(U), headed by 
former Defense Minister George Fernandes to carry the NDA's 
water.  The strongly secular Fernandes objected to Advani's 
pro Hindutva tilt and comments regarding the Ram temple, 
setting off speculation that his party could leave the NDA. 
This leaves Advani trapped between the Sangh Parivar and the 
NDA's secular allies, with no easy choice between the two. 
Deep Divisions 
-------------- 
 
7.  (C) The BJP itself remains deeply divided and in no shape 
to present a serious challenge to the UPA government. 
Advani's public stance indicates that he hopes to unite the 
party around a "moderate Hindutva" orientation aimed at 
pleasing the Sangh Parivar while not alienating moderates led 
by Arun Jaitley, Pramod Mahajan, and Mukthar Abbas Naqvi. 
Advani is counting on the help of Joshi and Sushma Swaraj, 
who are ascendant.  However, both Joshi and Swaraj want to 
become PM.  Until the party agrees on its next PM candidate, 
it will be plagued by continued distrust and rivalry within 
its top leadership. 
 
But Determined to Confront the UPA 
---------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) Despite its weaknesses and string of electoral 
defeats, the BJP remains determined to confront the UPA, even 
on economic reform where there is no substantive 
disagreement.  In a November 1 meeting with the Ambassador 
(Ref A), BJP Rajya Sabha leader Jaswant Singh bristled at the 
personal attacks by the UPA has been leveling against the BJP 
leadership and what it views as UPA efforts to purge the 
bureaucracy of civil servants with BJP sympathies.  Singh 
also disparaged PM Manmohan Singh's abilities and described 
the cabinet as a "disaster." 
 
9.  (SBU) Advani and other BJP parliamentary leaders 
confirmed this private stance, telling the press that the 
party will confront the UPA on the floor of parliament on a 
long laundry list of issues including:  "tainted ministers," 
the UPA's handling of terrorism in J&K, and the government's 
handling of domestic security, which Party spokesman Naqvi 
characterized as "the worst since Independence." 
 
10.  (U) Although the BJP will confront the UPA in 
Parliament, it is also planning to change its tactics. 
Advani told the party leadership that the previous 
disruptions were "counterproductive," and that the party was 
determined to conduct no more walkouts and boycotts.  Advani 
characterized these as "mistakes," saying "I don't think it 
will happen again."  However, speaking at a November 5 
conference, party leader and former Law Minister Arun Jaitley 
made clear that the BJP would not apologize for introducing 
parliamentary gridlock that makes it difficult for the UPA to 
pursue a substantive agenda. 
 
No Good Options 
--------------- 
 
11.  (C) Although the BJP will continue to lock horns with 
Congress, there is little to indicate that this will benefit 
the party, as there is no clear option under which the BJP 
could quickly return to power.  The BJP and its NDA allies do 
not currently have the numbers to bring down the government 
through defection, or a vote of no-confidence, and are not 
strong enough to defeat the UPA in an election. 
 
12.  (C) The Left/Communists can bring down the government by 
withdrawing their support, but this would not benefit the 
BJP, because it does not have enough allies to put together 
an alternative.  The Communists would only leave the UPA 
after forging a third front with other Left-oriented parties 
such as the Janata Dal(U) of Bihar and the Samajwadi 
Party(SP) of Uttar Pradesh (UP), led by Chief Minister 
Mulayam Singh Yadav.  As a sworn enemy of the Left, the BJP 
could never join or support such a grouping. 
 
13.  (C) The Sangh Parivar leadership argues that the BJP 
should stop attempting to strengthen the NDA by pandering to 
secular parties, and instead ally only with the Shiv Sena and 
those parties willing to accept its Hindutva agenda.  Should 
Advani accept this proposal, it would further weaken the NDA 
by causing most secular parties to leave the alliance, 
postponing the day when it can return to power.  Should he 
reject it, the increasingly disaffected Sangh Parivar could 
withdraw its support, which is crucial to the BJP's grass 
roots organization. 
 
The Importance of State Elections 
--------------------------------- 
 
14.  (C) The NDA and the UPA are now focused on the February 
elections in Jharkhand, Bihar, and Haryana, as they will be 
indicative of which grouping is generating political 
momentum.  Congress sees these state victories as a crucial 
step towards its goal of gaining sufficient strength to call 
new elections, win a Parliamentary majority and form a 
government without the Communists.  Most political observers 
agree that as soon as Congress is strong enough, it will call 
new elections. 
 
15.  (C) In order to blunt UPA momentum, the BJP/NDA needs to 
demonstrate to the Indian voter that it is gathering strength 
and can present a serious electoral challenge to Congress. 
Should the NDA fare badly in these state elections, it will 
lose momentum, leading to more divisions, increasing 
criticism of Advani and more calls by the Sangh Parivar to 
embrace a Hindu nationalist ideology and agenda. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
16.  (C) India's key political players -- the BJP/NDA, the 
Congress/UPA and the Communists -- are all vying for 
position, with trends favoring Congress.  However, none of 
the three groupings has sufficient strength to rule on its 
own, and the BJP cannot bring down the government or bring on 
a new election.  Although the BJP will engage in noisy 
disputes with the UPA on a number of issues in the coming 
months, they are unlikely to have much impact, aside from 
slowing legislation.  With the BJP distracted by deep 
divisions and immersed in its internal affairs, Congress has 
an opportunity to convince the electorate that it has the 
ability to rule effectively.  Facing no serious short-term 
political challenge from the BJP, Congress could only provide 
its BJP rivals an opening by failing to perform up to 
expectations. 
MULFORD