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Viewing cable 04LJUBLJANA981, SLOVENIAN MOD GIVES DAS CONLEY DEFENSE REFORM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04LJUBLJANA981 2004-10-26 11:26 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ljubljana
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L  LJUBLJANA 000981 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/NCE AND EUR/RPM 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2014 
TAGS: PREL MARR MCAP MOPS SI NATO
SUBJECT: SLOVENIAN MOD GIVES DAS CONLEY DEFENSE REFORM 
SNAPSHOT ON THE EVE OF A NEW GOVERNMENT 
 
 
Classified By: Chief of Mission Thomas B. Robertson for reasons 1.5(b) 
and (d). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  DAS Heather Conley engaged high level MoD 
officials in a productive dialogue about the current status 
and future of Slovenian defense reforms during meetings on 21 
October.  Both State Secretary Milan Jazbec and State 
Undersecretary Uros Krek described the Slovenian commitment 
to spend two percent of GDP on defense by 2008 as firm.  They 
also provided a detailed outline of plans to use those funds 
to pursue NATO Force Goals.  Krek highlighted the challenge 
of training Slovenia's future civilian and military leaders, 
but he characterized MoD and SAF morale positively.  Krek 
also outlined Slovenia's out-of-area troop commitments, 
highlighting a Force Goal-focused budgeting process and a 
policy not to place national caveats on troops.  He 
underscored Slovenia's commitment to NATO-led missions by 
emphasizing that Slovenia ranks fourth among the Allies in 
percentage of active troops deployed abroad.  Krek reiterated 
the Slovenian policy of participating in a NATO Iraq training 
mission only in a third country.  Jazbec and Krek provided a 
comprehensive snapshot of bilateral defense issues that 
describe a baseline for the new Slovenian Government to build 
upon when it is formed.  END SUMMARY 
 
2.  (C) On 21 October, DAS Heather Conley met with MoD State 
Secretary Milan Jazbec and State Undersecretary Uros Krek, 
 
SIPDIS 
who serves as Director of the Office for Defense Policy. 
Jazbec and Krek were accompanied by Mr. Jursa, Head of the 
Department of Analysis; Tadej Burger, Head of the NATO 
Department; and Aljosa Selan, U.S. Desk Officer.  COM, DATT, 
and Pol-Miloff joined Conley, who commended Slovenia for its 
contributions to ISAF; acknowledged Slovenia's strong 
interest in playing a peacekeeping role in its 
"neighborhood"; and urged the Slovenes to focus on 
complementarity - not competition - as they pursue defense 
reforms with an eye to contributing to both NATO and EU-led 
operations.  Conley then launched what the DATT called one of 
the best dialogues he has seen with MoD officials by asking 
pointed questions about Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) 
capabilities, the future of Slovenian defense spending, and 
the most significant challenges facing the MoD moving forward. 
 
JAZBEC'S OVERVIEW: TWO PERCENT GOAL FIRM UNDER NEW GOV'T 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
3.  (C) After introductory remarks highlighting Slovenia's 
future as a security player in the Western Balkans and a 
positive assessment of SAF professionalization over the past 
two years, Jazbec agreed with Conley about the importance of 
complementarity.  Jazbec also made the point that NATO 
membership for Slovenia actually increases the importance of 
bilateral relations with the U.S.  He said Slovenia will now 
have an opportunity to live up to expectations that it will 
become a regional leader.  With respect to Slovenia's 
upcoming Chairmanship of the OSCE in 2005, Jazbec said the 
MoD is looking for ways to contribute, particularly in 
Southeastern Europe but also possibly in the Caucasus. 
 
4.  (C) In response to Conley's question about future defense 
spending, in light of the Slovenian commitment to NATO to 
devote two percent of GDP to defense by 2008, Jazbec said 
Slovenia's "strong commitment" is "firm."  He noted that the 
commitment would likely be bolstered in the coming weeks when 
the strongly pro-NATO center-right parties form a new 
Government on the heels of the 03 October national elections. 
 In response to a question about niche capabilities for use 
in the NATO Response Force (NRF) and elsewhere, Jazbec noted 
Slovenia's plans to contribute an NBC Battalion for NATO's 
High Readiness Forces by the end of the decade, with an NBC 
platoon to be in place by January 2005 for the NRF.  He 
mentioned the further development of the Mountain School in 
Pokljuka, highlighted Slovenia's PfP language center, and 
identified "communications" as an area of development. 
 
5.  (C) When asked about the most significant challenges 
facing the MoD, Jazbec responded that "individuals need to 
cope on an institutional basis with the challenges NATO 
membership brings to Slovenia."  (NOTE: Jazbec's comment 
probably refers to an on-going dynamic within MoD concerning 
the reorganization of the bureaucracy to deal with NATO 
integration, as well as the continuing effort to change 
 
 
individuals' mindsets from a focus on national defense to a 
focus on collective security.  While the change in mindset 
has been mostly successful, MoD still suffers from a shortage 
of people to deal with the increased workload brought on by 
NATO and EU memberhsip.  END NOTE)  Jazbec also highlighted 
the public diplomacy challenge of translating the day-to-day 
support of NATO operations by the GoS into policies supported 
by public opinion.  He said the GoS learned to work as an 
institution to accomplish a similar goal during the March 
2003 NATO referendum, but he stressed the need to continue 
such work now that Slovenia is a member of the Alliance. 
Optimistically, Jazbec noted that - for the first time in its 
history - Slovenia will soon have a Prime Minister with a 
background in Defense Studies.  "Jansa has a very sensitive 
ear for these issues... I know this well," he said, inferring 
that he is close to Jansa himself.  (NOTE:  Jazbec said that 
he would soon return to the MFA; however, he did not mention 
in what capacity. END NOTE) 
 
CONLEY/KREK DIALOGUE: PLANS IN PLACE FOR CONTINUED REFORMS 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
6.  (C) Thanking Conley for more than a decade of USG 
support, Krek drew attention to what he deemed the most 
important component of that support:  the training and 
education of Slovenia's civilian and military personnel. 
Emphasizing the success of the Slovenian defense 
establishment in changing the prevailing mindset from one of 
territorial defense to a collective defense model, Krek gave 
the following rundown of facts and figures before responding 
to a series of probing questions by Conley: 
 
--  reduction in the SAF reserves from 71,000 in 1999 to a 
projected 5,500 in 2010; 
--  obligations of the last conscripted reservists will end 
in 2010; and 
--  numbers for active duty soldiers as a result of 
professionalization:  4,500 in 1999; approximately 7,000 
today; and a projected 8,500 in 2010. 
 
He mentioned that Slovenia's new "voluntary conscription 
service program" is more successful than the MoD anticipated, 
providing three months of paid survival and basic skills 
training to young Slovenes considering a career in the SAF or 
the reserves.  Noting that the MoD finalized its Strategic 
Defense Review last February, he said Parliament has approved 
a Defense Plan through 2015, to be amended every four years. 
MoD has approved a six-year Defense Program, to be amended 
every two years.  The six-year Program will be submitted for 
approval when a new Government is formed. 
 
GOOD MORALE: A "GREEN LIGHT" FOR FURTHER REFORMS 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
7.  (C) Conley asked how the MoD and SAF are handling all of 
the recent changes, and Krek replied that a critical mass in 
the MoD supports the defense reforms, saying "there is a big 
green light" to move forward.  He then shifted focus to the 
soldiers on the ground in international operations.  Having 
just visited SAF troops in Bosnia, Krek said the "motivation 
is there" for the units to accomplish their missions.  (NOTE: 
 Krek conspicuously failed to mention the morale of the 
General Staff and the SAF military leadership, perhaps 
reflecting the frustrations of DefMin Anton Grizold with a 
CHOD, Major General Ladislav Lipic, whom he has sometimes 
characterized to DATT as slow-moving.  DATT has observed 
other indications that the MoD civilian staff and the General 
Staff are not always "in synch" with respect to the pace of 
reforms.  END NOTE) 
 
OUT-OF-AREA OPERATIONS: NO CAPS AND NO CAVEATS 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
8.  (C) Conley asked about troops abroad, generally, with 
specific follow-up questions about the budgeting process for 
out-of-area operations, caps on troop contributions, and 
national caveats.  Krek said that a budget consistent with 
NATO Force Goals, encompassing out-of-area operations, has 
been proposed as part of the six-year Defense Program.  If 
future events necessitate sending a unit out-of-area earlier 
than expected, he said the interim two-year review would have 
to be adjusted to reflect that reality.  Krek said the GoS 
 
 
had discussed setting a limit on the number of troops they 
would send abroad under a "Framework Plan."  Current 
limitations are budgetary, though, and he said there are no 
legislated caps on the number of deployable troops.  The GoS 
can decide to commit troops for international missions, but 
it cannot commit reservists. 
 
9.  (C) Krek said he is personally pleased with "a purposeful 
policy not to place national caveats" on troop commitments. 
There are no caveats on SFOR troops.  Certain restrictions 
have been placed on SAF troops in KFOR, though, in response 
to an earlier situation in which uniformed soldiers in a 
Slovenian Multilateral Service Unit (MSU) were used for riot 
control procedures that had been proscribed for other 
countries' troops.  (Conley noted that the KFOR dynamic was a 
perfect example of why national caveats are 
counter-productive.) 
 
10.  (C) Slovenia currently has 237 troops stationed abroad, 
according to Krek.  That figure will rise to approximately 
300 by May 2005.  Krek noted the reconnaissance unit and two 
firefighters currently deployed with ISAF.  He said a 
veterinary attachment would be sent to Afghanistan soon and 
that the GoS is discussing the possibility of sending two PRT 
liaison officers.  Slvenia plans to maintain its 
participation in ISAF with increases through the end of 
2007, he said, noting that the firefighters are committed 
through the end of 2006.  The SAF platoon of military police 
in Kosovo is committed to KFOR through 2006.  Slovenia has 
contributed a company, two MP platoons and a medical unit to 
SFOR.  Their contributions in Bosnia will increase with the 
EU takeover of SFOR later this year.  Starting in early 2007, 
Krek said the Slovenes will have a battalion prepared for 
deployment within the Balkans. 
 
HOST NATION SUPPORT: DEVELOPING CERKLJE AIRFIELD 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
11.  (C) Conley asked if Slovenia already has its Host Nation 
Support requirements in place, particularly the requirement 
for a NATO-designated airfield.  Krek responded that "most of 
the basics are in place."  He also stated that Slovenia will 
participate in NATO's "core airfield study" with the focus on 
the military airfield at Cerklje.  Ceklje requires 
improvements before it can be designated a NATO-capable 
airfield.  Brnik International Airport will, therefore, 
remain Slovenia's NATO-designated airfield until 2007. 
 
AIR POLICING: SATISFIED WITH ITALIAN COVERAGE 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
12.  (C) Krek told Conley that Slovenia is "satisfied with 
what is currently in place" with regard to Italian 
air-policing.  He said the Italians have committed to police 
Slovenian airspace for three more rotations and that they 
have expressed a willingness to continue even further into 
the future.  Slovenia has no plans to procure aircraft for 
its own air policing missions, said Krek, adding that NATO 
had advised them against this because it would endanger 
Slovenia's ability to fulfill its Force Goals.  Conley said, 
emphatically, "Well done!  I second that." 
 
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: NO BUYERS REMORSE 
----------------------------------- 
 
13.  (C) Conley asked Krek to elaborate on the public 
diplomacy aspects of being a NATO member and whether Slovenes 
had experienced any residual "buyers remorse."  Krek framed 
his answer in a parliamentary context, noting that the 
Defense Plans he mentioned earlier had the political support 
of a majority of parties from the outgoing Parliament (which 
had its last session on 22 October).  Generally, he said he 
expects no changes with the new Parliament, emphasizing that 
budget figures certainly will not change.  Nonetheless, he 
said that reaching two percent of GDP for defense spending by 
2008 will require "firm discipline" by politicians, 
parliamentarians, and the public.  He noted that two percent 
of GDP today translates into approximately 400 million euros. 
 By 2010, that figure should equal about 700 million euros, 
he said. 
 
TWO PERCENT: A FIRM GOAL 
 
 
------------------------ 
 
14.  (C) When pushed by Conley on the strength of Slovenia's 
commitment to reach the two percent goal by 2008, Krek said 
he is "fully confident" it will be met.  Within that figure, 
though, he stressed the importance of allocating funds 
sensibly.  For example, he mentioned the goal of reaching a 
50/30/20 formula for defense expenditures, with 50 percent of 
the budget going for personnel costs, 30 percent for 
operations and maintenance, and 20 percent for modernization. 
 When Conley mentioned that 50 percent for personnel seemed 
high, Krek pointed out that current personnel costs consume 
64 percent of the Slovenian defense budget.  Over the next 
six years, Krek said Slovenia would spend around 600 million 
euros on modernization, with a focus on achieving NATO Force 
Goals, including the development of infantry and NBC 
battalions; intelligence gathering capabilities; command and 
control; and strategic lift capabilities (both air and sea). 
 
STRATEGIC LIFT THROUGH NATO CONTRACT POOLS 
------------------------------------------ 
 
15.  (C) Questioned later by DATT about air and sea lift 
capabilities, Krek said that Slovenia already has in place 
two strategic lift agreements within NATO.  These agreements 
are to participate in the NATO contract pools for strategic 
air- and sealift.  In the event Slovenia were to require 
strategic lift, the Slovenes would identify their air or sea 
requirements to NATO, where available resources would be 
identified and contracted. 
 
TRAINING: THE MOST IMPORTANT CHALLENGE 
-------------------------------------- 
 
16.  (C) Krek told Conley that the most important challenge 
facing the MoD and the SAF is training personnel, 
particularly increasing the number of staff officers who can 
operate in an international context and educating both 
civilian officials and politicians about defense matters. 
Krek, an ICAF alum himself, praised the IMET program in this 
regard.  He did mention, though, that it is sometimes a 
difficult balancing act for the MoD to release its best and 
brightest for long-term training when they are needed 
desperately in the Ministry. 
 
A SLOVENIAN ROLE IN IRAQ: TRAINING OK IN A THIRD COUNTRY 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
17.  (C) Krek steered the conversation toward Iraq, noting 
that Conley had not mentioned the issue earlier.  He said 
Slovenia intends to support a NATO training mission by 
providing instructors and/or equipment.  Echoing what other 
GoS officials have said before, he stressed that Slovenian 
instructors would train Iraqis only in a third country, i.e. 
neither in Iraq nor in Slovenia.  He said the GoS supports 
deputing SAF officers to NATO Headquarters.  Krek said that 
Slovenia is now "completely stretched" with its current 
overseas troop commitments.  That said, he called attention 
to the fact that Slovenia ranks fourth among NATO Allies in 
the percentage (approximately three percent) of its troops 
committed to out-of-area NATO missions.  Canada, Norway, and 
Germany outrank Slovenia, he said. 
 
18.  (C) Conley said she understands the sensitivities in 
Slovenia about Iraq and that the USG would like its allies to 
participate.  She said the Iraqis have great appreciation for 
Slovenian contributions to the reconstruction of Iraq in the 
fields of demining, police training, and psychological 
assistance to children. 
 
KREK'S QUESTIONS: U.S. BALKANS POLICY AND ISAF/OEF MERGER 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
19.  (C) Krek ventured two questions toward the end of the 
conversation:  he asked for Conley's views on the future 
activities of the USG in the Balkans and on the merger of 
ISAF and OEF.  Conley said the U.S. will remain "very engaged 
politically" in the transition process but that it is 
"appropriate to allow the EU to assume greater 
responsibilities in the Balkans."  She expressed optimism 
that the transition will be successful despite the withdrawal 
of NATO in Bosnia.  On the ISAF/OEF merger, Conley said the 
 
 
Military Committee at NATO would have to look at this and 
predicted it would involve a long-term process.  She 
stressed, though, that efforts are underway to make PRTs in 
Afghanistan more robust and to tackle the counter-narcotics 
issue. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
20.  (C) Conley's knowledge of the issues and incisive 
questioning ensured that the meetings at MoD - indeed, the 
first meetings in the MoD building for COM - provided one of 
the most insightful and comprehensive assessments we have 
received to date of where Slovenia stands on defense reforms 
and where it intends to go in the future.  At the same time, 
she delivered the well-received message that the U.S. wishes 
to continue strengthening and expanding its bilateral 
relationship with Slovenia.  The dialogue with Jazbec was 
fruitful in providing a general overview of recent reforms. 
His comments on the new center-right Government were also of 
interest, particularly the suggestion that he has close ties 
to Janez Jansa, whom we assume will be the next Prime 
Minister.  We will watch with interest to see where Jazbec 
lands upon his return to the MFA.  Krek lived up to his 
reputation as the Embassy's most engaged contact in the MoD. 
His insight and influence as an analyst of defense policy 
have been a direct result of the trust and confidence placed 
in him by DefMin Grizold and the IMET training he received at 
the National Defense University.  Despite imminent changes in 
the political leadership of the MoD, we expect Krek to 
provide the continuity and working-level leadership that will 
be needed at MoD in the coming months.  END COMMENT 
ROBERTSON 
 
 
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