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Viewing cable 04ROME3381, ITALIAN VIEWS ON GYMNICH ISSUES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04ROME3381 2004-09-03 04:35 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Rome
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L  ROME 003381 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2014 
TAGS: PREL IZ IR IT EUN
SUBJECT: ITALIAN VIEWS ON GYMNICH ISSUES 
 
REF: A. STATE 182534 
 
     B. THE HAGUE 2172 
     C. ROME 3285 
     D. STATE 8716 
 
Classified By: Charge Emil Skodon for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary. Charge, accompanied by PolOff, met with MFA 
Director General for Multilateral Political Affairs Giampiero 
Massolo and NATO Office Director Giovanni Brauzzi on 
September 1 to convey points from Ref A demarche.  Italy 
shares US views on most of the issues that EU Foreign 
Ministers will discuss at their informal meetings September 
3-4, but continues to take a softer approach on Iran and the 
EU arms embargo against China.  Italy also is seeking a 
greater EU profile in several areas, including Iraq, the war 
on terrorism, and Sudan.  Although not on the Gymnich agenda, 
Massolo again raised Italian concerns over enlargement of the 
UN Security Council, and suggested it was time for the 
Contact Group members to begin discussing options for Kosovo 
final status among themselves.  End summary. 
 
Iraq -- Seeking greater EU role 
 
2. (C) Thanking the Charge for his condolences regarding the 
recent killing of Italian journalist Enzo Baldoni, Massolo 
noted that the kidnapping and execution happened very 
rapidly, leaving the Italian government no time to open 
channels of communication with the kidnappers.  Massolo 
predicted that, although Iraq would not be a dominant feature 
of the Gymnich, France would insist on some sort of statement 
on the two kidnapped French journalists. 
 
3. (C) Massolo also said that Foreign Minister Frattini will 
call for increased EU action against terrorism.  In Italy's 
view, the French hostages demonstrate that no country is 
immune from terrorism, regardless of its national position on 
Iraq.  Frattini will outline a series of steps, including 
policy guidance for anti-terrorism efforts, intelligence 
sharing, capacity building, and a more active communications 
strategy.  This strategy will also be presented in an 
interview with the Foreign Minister that widely-read daily La 
Repubblica will publish later this week. 
 
4. (C) Commenting on Dutch Foreign Minister Bot's recent trip 
to Baghdad (Ref B), Massolo said Italy sees three possible 
roles for the EU in Iraq:  UN protection, assisting the 
political and electoral process, and police training.  What 
is currently lacking, he said, is the resolve to move forward 
-- many EU member states want more EU involvement, but are 
hesitant because of the security situation. 
 
5. (C) Massolo viewed as a "very pragmatic solution" the US 
proposal for a dual-hatted command for NATO training forces 
in Iraq and MNF-I.  Brauzzi agreed, adding that NATO's July 
declaration, calling for unity of command with the MNF, 
allowed for only a very "narrow interpretation." 
 
Afghanistan -- Cautious optimism 
 
6. (C) Massolo noted that the first phase of the US-provided 
airlift of the Italian NRF brigade to Afghanistan is going 
well, and should be completed by September 9.  The October 9 
elections will not be a model of transparency and fairness, 
he commented, but it is important to get the process off to a 
good start, especially in light of parliamentary elections 
next year.  He was encouraged by registration results and 
said that international efforts to reach UNAMA's election 
budget goals are proceeding "reasonably well."  While there 
are many unresolved questions in Afghanistan, overall the 
situation is better than in Iraq and we must continue our 
stabilization and capacity-building efforts. 
 
7. (C) Charge thanked Italy for its recent disbursement of 
funds for the Afghan election and asked its assistance to 
push others to speed disbursements.  Regarding PRTs, Massolo 
acknowledged that the process had been slowed because of 
supplemental efforts for the elections.  He was noncommittal 
about Italy's future plans regarding a PRT, stating that for 
now the priority had to be election support. 
 
Iran -- Emphasis on continued engagement 
 
8. (C) Massoo's first reaction to Charge's points on the 
Ira/IAEA issue was to inquire whether the USG's lobbyig 
efforts to refer the matter to the UNSC were already 
underway, to which the Charge replied in the affirmative. 
Italy, he said, maintains its tradition of dialogue and 
engagement with Iran.  While it recognizes Iran's obligations 
under the NPT, it believes the issue needs to be seen in the 
larger framework of regional stability, human rights, and 
terrorism.    It is better not to have an unpredictable Iran 
in the regional scenario, especially because of its 
importance as a factor of stability -- or instability -- in 
Iraq. 
9. (C) The EU3's efforts have shed some light on Iran's 
nuclear activities, Massolo continued.  Pushing harder, he 
warned, would make Tehran cut loose and go its own way. 
Italy prefers alternative options such as sanctions and 
strict access and verification agreements. Even if it is 
difficult to gauge how effective this approach would be, 
Italy believes it is worth considering.  Massolo cited a 
planned visit by Secretary of the Iranian Supreme National 
Security Council Rowani to Europe as a sign that the Iranians 
are thinking of making some overtures.  The Italians 
reportedly told Rowani not to come if he was going to repeat 
his usual arguments; on the other hand, if he were ready to 
make fresh commitments, Italy was ready to listen.  This 
approach, Massolo argued, is the most efficient way to get 
Iran to abide by its NPT obligations and suspend its 
enrichment activities. 
 
10. (C) Noting that the EU3 will report at the Gymnich on 
talks with Tehran, Massolo said that Italy had noticed a 
different of perception amongst the three regarding Iran's 
openness and availability.  Now that the EU3 exercise is near 
its end, FM Frattini will press the Dutch EU Presidency to 
put the Iran issue into a "normal" EU framework (at 25 rather 
than 3).  The Charge warned not to let Rowani's European tour 
become an effort to find fissures within the EU, and noted 
that real action and verification on the part of the Iranians 
needs to come first.  Massolo agreed that verification is the 
top priority.  He said that the Iranians are playing for time 
until after the US elections.  Europe, meanwhile, is playing 
the role of placeholder until Iran can have a direct dialogue 
with the US. 
 
China arms embargo -- Italy won't be the lone hold-out 
 
11. (C) According to Massolo, Italy is close to the US 
position on the China arms embargo; Rome is not pushing to 
lift the embargo and is pushing for a more effective Code of 
Conduct.  France, he said, is the major force behind the move 
to lift the embargo, insisting on inserting in the June EU 
Council declaration "a half sentence" saying the EU would 
revisit the issue.  Massolo noted that in May-June he had the 
impression that the EU was moving towards a more sympathetic 
view of China, but that now that impression had changed and 
the situation was relatively quiet.  Summing up, Massolo 
said, Italy was on the US' side, but "if there's a landslide, 
we can't stand alone."  He warned, however, of the need to 
handle the issue with care to avoid turning it into a 
contentious transatlantic topic. 
 
Sudan -- Ready to assist 
 
12. (C) Massolo said Italy would consider providing financial 
and logistical support to Sudan if the African Union mandate 
is increased, although resources are a tricky issue.  Italy 
also is waiting to see what EU High Representative for Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Solana will propose -- 
Massolo opined that this should be an opportunity for Solana 
to raise both his profile as the EU's "Foreign Minister" and 
the EU's presence in Africa. 
 
Turkey and Cyprus -- On the road to EU membership 
 
13. (C) Italy is very supportive of setting a date to begin 
negotiations on Turkey's accession to the EU, according to 
Massolo, and is "smoothing" the path to acceptance.  He was 
"fairly confident" that Turkey would eventually join the EU, 
but it wouldn't be easy.  Though the French present a 
problem, he felt there was a growing consensus -- maybe even 
a majority -- within the EU that a date should be set at the 
December EU Council.  Because Turkey increasingly appears as 
 
a moderate Muslim country, it could be a useful tool for 
combating problems with Islam in Europe, he opined, something 
the French should recognize.  Commenting on the "ideological 
barrier" of allowing a Muslim country into the EU, Massolo 
noted that there are already many Muslims in the EU and that 
they often play a constructive role -- just look at what's 
happening with the hostage situation in France, he said. 
 
14. (C) Massolo agreed with the Charge on the need to help 
Turkish Cypriots.  Italy is trying to help calm the situation 
by talking to the Greeks to enlist their support.  Meanwhile, 
he said, the EU should act as if the referendum had been 
successful and give the Turkish Cypriots the benefits of 
membership, creating a "snowball" effect that would increase 
the momentum toward EU membership.  Massolo said he was 
"pretty confident" that eventually this would happen. 
 
Kosovo -- Wedded to standards before status, but looking ahead 
 
15. (C) Italy is adopting a prudent and realistic attitude in 
Kosovo.  Massolo said preparation and prioritization of 
standards were important for success -- the Kosovars must 
know what is expected of them.  However, he said that it was 
time to start thinking about what comes next and to start 
talking about status -- albeit not publicly, lest the Contact 
Group lose the support and cooperation of the local 
population.  Massolo envisioned a state of "conditional 
independence" that could involve a strong international 
presence -- but no partitions.  He said that the Contact 
Group should work on decentralization and coexistence, and 
that meeting on the margins of the UNGA presents a good 
opportunity to take a focused look at the way forward.  We 
have to have a plan, Massolo emphasized, in order not to be 
taken by surprise, noting that the situation in Kosovo could 
still explode at any time with "nasty" consequences.  He gave 
Charge a paper on this subject that he had shared with other 
Contact Group members.  He looked forward to discussing 
Kosovo with A/S Jones on the margins of the UNGA. 
 
Albania -- Troubled waters 
 
16. (C) Touching briefly on the downing of an Italian 
helicopter in Albania (Ref B), Massolo noted that Rome's 
bilateral relationship with Tirana is not so pleasant at the 
moment.  Describing the Albanians as very proud and 
independent people, Massolo said Italy was trying to think of 
ways to improve the relationship. 
 
UNSC Reform -- Italy suggests means of pacifying Japan 
 
17. (C) Massolo raised the issue of UNSC reform, arguing that 
since the US has not publicly stated its opposition to new 
permanent members, "the kids are playing."  He argued that if 
the UN panel concludes that there should be more 
non-permanent seats, the US should tell Japan "behind closed 
doors" that this would be a fair outcome for Tokyo, which 
could be continuously reelected.  Massolo's implication was 
that the US could both satisfy Japan's long-standing request 
for UNSC membership and fend off Germany's quest for a 
permanent seat.  Italy also advocates rotations on the UNSC 
within regions.  Asia, he suggested, could be split into two 
regional groups, with Japan serving longer rotations in an 
East Asia regional group. 
 
BAGHDAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED 
 
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SKODON 
 
 
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 2004ROME03381 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL