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Viewing cable 04ISTANBUL1484, A MARINER'S VIEW OF THE TURKISH STRAITS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
04ISTANBUL1484 2004-09-29 10:43 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Istanbul
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 001484 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR E, EB, EB/TRA/MA, CBED AND EUR/SE 
USDOE FOR CHARLES WASHINGTON 
USDOC FOR 4212/ITA/MAC/OEURA/CPD/DDEFALCO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EWWT ENRG ECON SENV TU
SUBJECT: A MARINER'S VIEW OF THE TURKISH STRAITS 
 
REF: ISTANBUL 262 
 
Sensitive but Unclassified - not for internet distribution. 
 
1. (U)  In meetings with Consulate and Embassy officers last 
week, British Petroleum maritime consultant Vice Admiral Sir 
Christopher Morgan provided a mariner's view of the issues 
the Turkish straits pose for transiting oil tankers.  Morgan, 
who accompanied a BP Suezmax tanker through the straits at 
the height of last winter's storms, spoke highly of the newly 
installed Vessel Traffic System (VTS) and sees few risks in 
the actual transit of either the Dardanelles or the 
Bosphorus, provided that there is no oncoming traffic on the 
latter.  Rather, he argues that the key safety issue centers 
on the anchorages at the entrances to the Dardanelles, 
particularly at the northern end where loaded tankers can 
back up.  At one point during his transit, nearly 60 loaded 
tankers were jostling for position in a narrow anchorage. 
During the fierce storms that buffeted the area at the end of 
January, several of these ships dragged anchor and nearly 
collided with their neighbors.  In Morgan's view, this 
anchorage policy "is more risky than the combined risk of 
each and every individual tanker transit through the Turkish 
Straits."  End Summary. 
 
2. (U) Vice Admiral Morgan, accompanied by Mike Bilbo from 
BP's Istanbul office, met with us on September 16 to discuss 
his experience transiting the straits at the height of last 
winter's storms.  He accompanied a BP chartered Suezmax 
tanker, the MT Max Jacob, which loaded at the Georgian port 
of Supsa on January 10 and then proceeded west across the 
Black Sea towards the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, entering the 
northern strait on January 15.  Morgan, who recently retired 
after five years as Director General of Britain's Chamber of 
Shipping, prepared a report on his experience in March that 
assessed the risks the Turkish straits pose for transiting 
ships and the operations of Turkey's Vessel Traffic 
Management system and other maritime safety measures.  Aside 
from one unfortunate incident, and a number of technical 
critiques, including the need for pilots to join the ship 
before they are actually committed to entering the straits 
and the relative inadequacy of the tugs used by Turkish 
coastal authorities, he was largely complimentary of the 
professionalism and knowledge of the Turkish maritime 
authorities with whom he worked.  In particular, he had high 
praise for the new VTS, saying it provided ship captains with 
useful, accurate information. 
 
3. (SBU) Anchorage Risks: Morgan's major safety concerns 
centered on the risks posed by the "cramming" of large 
numbers of tankers into inadequate anchorages as backups 
built up during this winter's storms.  By chance, he found 
himself at the Gelibolu anchorage at the northern end of the 
Dardanelles at the very height of this winter's delays, when 
average waits reached nearly 30 days and 66 ships were 
waiting to transit, both northbound and southbound.  The MT 
Max Jacob reached Gelibolu on January 17, after an uneventful 
run through the Bosphorus, a transit that Morgan describes as 
posing "few problems for a well run Suezmax," provided that 
(as Turkish regulations require) there is no oncoming 
traffic.  The voyage swiftly became more arduous, however, as 
at Gelibolu the ship joined a queue of vessels containing 
some 26 million barrels of crude oil that were waiting to 
transit the Dardanelles. 
 
4. (SBU) Morgan characterized the most stressful period of 
the voyage as the time when the ship was maneuvering among 
these anchored vessels to find its own mooring area.  The 
ship was subsequently stuck for ten days in the anchorage by 
fierce winter storms with winds of over 50 knots that ravaged 
the area, and led to closure of the straits.  During that 
period, several ships dragged anchor and came within little 
more than a ship's length of their neighbors before being 
able to get underway.  Morgan noted that in meetings with 
government officials in Ankara he will argue that a new 
designated anchorage south of the separation zone is urgently 
needed at Gelibolu to ease this congestion.  In addition, 
given the dangers the anchorages pose, he argued that Turkey 
should reduce the vessel buildup by more efficiently using 
daylight hours in good weather and by easing its "excessive" 
requirement of an hour and a half separation between tankers 
during their transit.  An hour, he suggested, would be 
sufficient, though he noted that this is an argument that the 
industry does not expect to win.  More likely to win official 
sanction, he added, is a recommendation that when traffic 
builds up the straits operate in one direction for an entire 
day, rather than half a day.  The latter procedure costs 
several hours from the shortened winter day, as ships wait 
for vessels moving in the opposite direction to clear the 
channel. 
 
5. (SBU) Comment: Given his relationship with the industry, 
Morgan's recommendation that transit separation spacing be 
reduced so that more vessels can make the passage in a day is 
not surprising.  However, his point about the risks posed by 
the anchorages seems difficult to refute, and is dramatically 
illustrated by radar printouts from January which depict 
dozens of ships, many nearly on top of each other.  Morgan 
indicated he will push the anchorage issue in particular in 
his meetings in Ankara.  Given Turkish concerns about 
straits' safety and congestion, he does not expect his 
argument regarding separation times to win much traction. 
Suggestions by the press and some observers that the GOT may 
be excessively regulating traffic to purposefully delay 
shipping to further make the point on congestion show that 
this could induce a dangerous outcome.  End Comment. 
 
ARNETT