This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 005115 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2029 
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV PARM IZ CY IR TU
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AND DCHOD BASBUG DISCUSS CYPRUS, EU 
 
REFORMS, AND BILATERAL RELATIONS 
 
REF: A. STATE 184340 
     ¶B. ADANA 104 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman.  Reason 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (S) TGS Deputy Chief GEN Basbug told the Ambassador 
September 8 that developments regarding Cyprus were 
"worrisome," pointing at the European Court of Human Rights 
consideration of Loizidou clone cases and the lack of EU 
action on ending the isolation of northern Cypriots.  He 
hinted that Ankara would be willing to cancel the Toros 
exercise on Cyprus scheduled for October.  Basbug was clearly 
bothered by the press conference that day by EC Enlargement 
Commissioner Verheugen in Diyarbakir.  While he had no 
problem with the implementation of enacted laws, including 
those on cultural rights, he suspected European calls for 
Turkey to implement these laws as an attempt to push the 
envelope on Kurdish rights to the point Turkey's unity would 
be threatened.  Basbug characterized the possibility of Iran 
possessing nuclear weapons as "unacceptable," although he did 
not indicate what Turkey could do to prevent that occurrence. 
 He refused to discuss the PKK in northern Iraq, noting 
simply, "you know our position; it has not changed."  Basbug 
asserted that TGS was awaiting a green light from the prime 
ministry before moving forward on our request for a logistics 
hub at Incirlik Air Base.  On other issues: 
 
-- The Ambassador registered concerns about changes to 
Turkey's military procurement/defense industry policy that 
could prejudice American firms; 
 
-- Basbug noted that, in response to a request, TGS was 
looking for an instructor to send to the Marshall Center; it 
might be a civilian; 
 
-- The Ambassador acknowledged that the US still owed Turkey 
an answer to its request for American staff for its Center of 
Excellence for the Combat Against Terrorism; 
 
-- Basbug confirmed that MFA has the lead on trucker security 
in Iraq for the GOT; and, 
 
-- Basbug will be happy to receive DASD Brzezinski when he 
visits later this month. 
 
End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) The Ambassador met with Turkish General Staff (TGS) 
Deputy CHOD GEN Ilker Basbug on Sept 8.  Basbug had requested 
the two get together for a post-summer tour d'horizon. 
 
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Cyprus 
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¶3. (C) The Ambassador recalled his raising with Basbug the 
planned fall exercises on Cyprus during a brief encounter the 
previous week.  He said he had also raised the issue with FM 
Gul.  Washington would help move the parties if Ankara was 
favorably disposed to continuing the tradition of canceling 
these exercises.  Basbug responded by saying Cyprus was at 
the top of Ankara's agenda.  TGS was following developments 
closely and had "great concerns" about the situation.  Yet, 
it was difficult to get a complete picture with developments 
at the UN, in the EU, with the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) and internal problems on the island.  Turkish public 
opinion had expected a bright future after the April 
referendum, but what has occurred has been disappointing, he 
said. 
 
¶4. (C) In response to a question, the Ambassador said he 
understood that a number of claims were being brought against 
Turkey for property Greek Cypriots lost with the division of 
the island.  Basbug recalled that in the original Loizidou 
case, Turkey was advised to pay the award to make the issue 
go away.  But this week, a number of similar cases had been 
opened at the ECHR.  Turkey was arguing that the referendum 
had changed the situation on the island, but the court's 
attitude now appears not to have changed.  This was 
"disappointing," Basbug stated, and could produce "terrible 
consequences."  The Ambassador suggested that it may still be 
a little early to be able to judge what the attitude of the 
court will be.  He undertook to look into the situation, 
understanding that the US was not a party to the European 
court. 
 
¶5. (C) Basbug said the entire situation was "worrisome."  The 
Ambassador understood Turkey's frustration at the lack of 
progress within the EU to end the isolation of the Turkish 
Cypriots.  However, strategically, Turkey's exemplary effort 
in the run-up to the referendum was recognized within the EU. 
 Basbug acknowledged this point, "but we need results," he 
said.  The Ambassador agreed that the slow pace of EU 
efforts, complicated by the GOC's attitude within EU 
councils, was disappointing.  He then went on to explain what 
steps the USG has taken (e.g., receiving "PM" Talat, visiting 
northern Cypriot officials in their offices, accelerating 
visa processing, $30 million in ESF, AID assistance) and 
others that the US is working on (code-share flight 
arrangements, port access for tourism, scholarships, 
agricultural trade).  He expected that the Secretary and FM 
Gul would discuss this issue further when the two encounter 
each other on the margins of the UNGA. 
 
¶6. (C) Returning to the fall exercises, Basbug said that TGS 
and MFA had discussed the issue and TGS was currently 
awaiting a formal paper laying out MFA's position.  Once that 
is received, TGS will consider the question.  Hinting that a 
cancellation was likely, he noted that perhaps Gul could 
discuss this issue with his Greek counterpart in New York 
later this month. 
 
¶7. (C) Turning to the UN, Basbug complained about "certain 
phrases" in the SYG's report following the referendum.  The 
Ambassador responded that on balance the report was positive 
toward Turkey and lamented that the Beslan tragedy had 
required Russia President Putin to cancel his visit to 
Turkey, depriving Ankara of an opportunity to press Moscow 
for a more constructive attitude toward Cyprus in the UN 
Security Council.  The Ambassador promised to stay in close 
contact as UNFICYP comes up for consideration in the UNSC. 
Basbug concluded the discussion of Cyprus by saying that the 
situation was "not hopeful."  "What is worrisome is that 
tomorrow someone will say that now Turkey must accept" some 
new concession. 
 
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Iraq: Truckers and Terrorists 
---------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Basbug acknowledged the Ambassador's observation that 
TGS was concerned about the safety of Turkish truckers in 
Iraq.  He said TGS representatives were participating in 
MFA-led meetings on this issue.  He thought the problem was 
mainly on the drive south of Mosul and the entire route going 
north.  He said Turkey was encouraging drivers not to go 
south of Mosul unless they are in a protected convoy, but not 
everyone is heeding this advice. 
 
¶9. (C) Regarding the PKK/Kongra Gel, Basbug said, "I don't 
want to discuss the PKK.  You know our position.  It has not 
changed." 
 
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Logistics Hub 
------------- 
 
¶10. (S) The Ambassador asked Basbug for the status of the US 
request to establish a logistics hub for OIF and OEF at 
Incirlik AB.  Basbug said TGS had sent a letter to the Prime 
Minister's office about a month ago and was now waiting for a 
response.  He said the recommendation was positive. 
(Comment:  When we checked with the Prime Ministry several 
weeks ago, they informed us that they need take no action on 
our request.  We will follow up.) 
 
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Turkish Procurement/Defense Industry Policy 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) The Ambassador noted that he was receiving numerous 
questions from American defense firms about doing business in 
Turkey.  With the cancellation of a number of tenders, 
difficult negotiations over AEW&C, and stalled negotiations 
over additional Sea Hawk purchases, it is difficult to know 
what to say.  Requirements such as full disclosure of source 
codes would make it extremely difficult for American firms to 
compete.  He said he would be seeing the Undersecretary for 
Defense Industry Murad Bayar soon to discuss these issues. 
The Ambassador explained that he was concerned not only 
because of his commercial interest in selling more American 
products, but also about the corrosive effects on 
interoperability if Turkey moved away from American military 
equipment.  Basbug said Bayar was the right person to talk to 
about this.  He then asked whether the Marine Corps or the 
Department of the Navy had canceled the AH-1Z program.  The 
Ambassador said he hadn't heard and would be surprised if 
that were the case, but would check.  (Comment:  We confirmed 
to TGS later that day that the program continues.) 
 
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Iran's Nuclear Ambitions 
------------------------ 
 
¶12. (C) The Ambassador raised Iran's nuclear program, 
including Tehran's pattern of deception and concealment in 
dealing with the IAEA and others, and asked whether Basbug 
was concerned about the possibility of a nuclear armed 
neighbor.  Basbug responded by saying that such a possibility 
was "unacceptable."  He noted wryly that the intelligence 
must be concrete and that Ankara did not know for sure what 
the Iranians had already or would have in the future.  He 
acknowledged that he had had several discussions with 
Israelis about the situation, and repeated that the 
possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran was "unacceptable." 
However, that was a different question than what Turkey might 
be able to do about the possibility.  The Ambassador pushed 
back on Basbug's comment about intelligence, noting that the 
final word on what Iraq had was yet to be heard, and that the 
worrying information on Iran's program was not US 
intelligence but IAEA reports. 
 
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Concerns about EU Reforms 
------------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) Basbug raised without prompting the GOT's EU-related 
minority rights reform effort.  For the past two to three 
years, he said, parliament had passed many laws granting 
"cultural rights."  The changes were significant and he had 
no issue with what had been passed.  "There is nothing left 
to be done or to be requested," he opined.  Nonetheless, the 
EU keeps asking for more.  They keep calling for more follow 
up on implementation.  "What do they mean by this?  What are 
the deficiencies?" he asked. 
 
¶14. (C) He said that recent events in Turkey's southeast 
"exceed the law," citing Lela Zana's tour of the region after 
her release from jail.  Zana had spoken in Kurdish while 
participating in political activities, a clear violation of 
the Political Parties Law, he said.  On September 7, the 
Diyarbakir mayor reportedly asked EC Enlargement Commissioner 
Verheugen whether this element of the law needed to be 
changed to meet EU requirements.  The fact that the mayor 
asked the question demonstrated that he realized this was a 
violation when Zana was in his city. 
 
¶15. (C) Basbug also asserted that Turkish public opinion 
should not be neglected.  He did not oppose Verheugen's visit 
to Diyarbakir because he needed to write the report on 
Turkey's progress on the Copenhagen Criteria.  However, some 
other "unnecessary visits" are not well perceived by the 
Turkish public.  When asked, he said this applied to the US, 
Europeans, "everybody."  The Ambassador responded that if 
Basbug was concerned by Consulate Adana DPO's August 12 call 
on the Diyarbakir mayor (ref b), he should know that the DPO 
conveyed a clear message condemning terrorism and reiterating 
USG support for the political unity of Turkey. 
 
¶16. (C) Finally, Basbug noted that Zana had written to jailed 
PKK/Kongra Gel leader Abdullah Ocalan saying, "we will get 
our political, social and cultural rights through EU 
membership."  If the EU is a vehicle by which Zana's 
supporters can achieve their objectives, then what more are 
they looking for, he asked.  Two security forces members were 
killed in the southeast on September 7, he said.  Tomorrow 
another may lose his life.  Why are we asking these people to 
risk their lives, he asked.  (Comment: His implication being 
that Zana and her supporters see the EU as a tool to 
partition Turkey.)  "There is nothing else to give and we 
have given more than enough," he said. 
 
¶17. (C) Saying that he had just seen Verheugen's press 
conference in Diyarbakir, he complained that Verheugan 
referred to "Kurdish citizens."  "Is that proper?" he asked. 
While Turkey had many citizens of Kurdish origin, he termed 
the idea of Kurdish citizenship as "completely wrong." 
Similarly, he believed references to Turkey's approval of 
"Kurdish education" to be wrong, believing that phrase to 
imply using Kurdish for education instead of Turkish.  "The 
teaching of Kurdish" is what was approved.  The Ambassador 
agreed that cultural rights were a sensitive subject 
requiring precision in the words used to discuss it. 
 
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Other Issues 
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¶18. (U) Brzezinski Visit:  Basbug replied "no problem" when 
the Ambassador asked that he receive DASD Brzezinski when he 
visits later this month. 
 
¶19. (U) Marshall Center:  The Ambassador expressed 
appreciation for the increased number of Turkish participants 
in Marshall Center programs this year.  Basbug replied that, 
in response to a request, TGS was looking to identify an 
instructor to send to the Center; this person might be a 
civilian. 
 
¶20. (C) COE Staffing:  The Ambassador began by noting that he 
had spoken with VCJCS Gen Pace who had reported having had a 
productive telecon with Basbug recently.  He noted that Gen 
Pace knew that he still owed Basbug an answer to his request 
for American military members to staff the planned NATO 
Center of Excellence for the Combat Against Terrorism in 
Ankara. 
 
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Comment 
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¶21. (C) Of the lengthy agenda, Basbug had only two issues he 
wanted to register with us:  TGS is dissatisfied with the 
situation concerning Cyprus and concerned about a possible 
hidden agenda the EU has for Turkey.  On Cyprus, there is 
hope that Ankara will agree to cancel this year's Toros 
exercise, although there is decidedly less enthusiasm to 
continue to be helpful on Cyprus given the Turks' 
disappointment with the international response following the 
Turkish Cypriots' expression of support for a settlement in 
the April referendum.  On the EU, a sense that Brussels keeps 
shifting the goal posts has generated some obvious 
frustration within the military that feels it has already 
compromised a lot in the national effort to gain a date to 
begin accession negotiations.  We, nevertheless, perceive no 
waning of TGS's support for eventual Turkish membership in 
the EU.  End comment. 
 
¶22.  Baghdad minimize considered. 
EDELMAN