This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001535 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2014 
TAGS: MARR PGOV CASC CG MONUC
SUBJECT: NKUNDA STALEMATE ENTERS THIRD MONTH 
 
 
Classified By: Poloff Meghan Moore for Reasons 1.5 B and D 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  As of August 13, despite several weeks of 
low-level skirmishes, the FARDC had not launched a 
large-scale offensive against rebel commander Laurent Nkunda. 
Much of the FARDC command structure, including N. Kivu 
military commander General Obedi, descended on Bukavu August 
10 for consultations with the military field commander, 
General Mabe. On August 11, General Obedi returned to Goma, 
and the others returned to Kisangani. On August 7, VP Ruberwa 
arrived in Bukavu for what was to be a week-long visit to the 
Kivus. The government seems to be inching closer to the 
'military solution' to the Nkunda dilemma, while still 
pursuing negotiated settlements. It is unlikely, however, 
that the FARDC would launch a large-scale military offensive 
until after President Kabila returns from his scheduled trip 
to the SADC summit the week of August 16. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) There have been sustained rumors of an imminent 
large-scale FARDC attack on rebel positions in N. and S. Kivu 
for the past two months, but so far only low-level clashes 
have occurred. On July 31, S. Kivu Military Regional 
Commander General Mabe told polcouns he had received 
instructions from Kinshasa to launch an attack against 
Nkunda's positions, but was waiting to execute this order 
because he cannot control Lake Kivu and fears that Rwanda 
will send reinforcements. (Comment:  Monuc reports 
substantiate an ongoing traffic through Dutu of supplies and 
personnel from Rwanda to Nkunda's positions.  End Comment.) 
Low-level skirmishes have occurred for several weeks outside 
Kalehe between unidentified elements nominally loyal to 
Nkunda or Serufuli and Mai Mai elements and/or FARDC troops 
loyal to Mabe.  On July 31, the UN Office for Humanitarian 
Coordination estimated that these skirmishes had caused 
31,000 people to flee southwards towards Kalehe and at least 
5,000 IDPs (mostly Rwandaphone) to flee north. On August 12, 
MONUC Bukavu Child Protection Officer told poloff that a vast 
majority of these IDPs were of the BaHavu ethnic group, and 
not Rwandaphone. 
 
¶3. (C) On August 10, a large group of senior military 
officials, including armed forces chief Lt. Gen. Kisempia, 
intelligence chief BG Didier Etumba, ground forces commander 
Major General Sylvain Mbuki, air force and naval deputy 
commanders, and N. Kivu regional commander BG Obedi arrived 
in Bukavu for meetings with General Mabe. While in Bukavu, 
the group held strategy sessions and toured FARDC front-line 
positions in Kalehe. (Note: It appears that Obedi 
participated in all meetings, after Mbuki issued him an 
ultimatum---Obedi must report to Kinshasa by August 15 with a 
detailed report of the status of his forces, including who is 
likely to be loyal to the FARDC or face the consequences. On 
August 12, Obedi told poloff that he plans to come to 
Kinshasa--he's just waiting for Mbuki to set the date. He 
also said he plans to go to Masisi on August 13 to 
investigate Interahamwe activity. End note.)  On August 11, 
General Obedi returned to Goma, and the others returned to 
Kisangani. 
 
Opposing Forces 
--------------- 
 
¶4. (C) As of early August, MONUC reported that FARDC troops 
were located in central Kalehe and some locations along the 
Kalehe-Minova road (which runs along Lake Kivu). DATT 
estimates total FARDC forces in the area as roughly 15,000 
troops. As of early August, MONUC reported that Nkunda's 
troops occupied Minova on Lake Kivu and locations to the 
north of Kalehe, along Lake Kivu, such as Nyabibwe, Dutu, 
Mukwija, Lushebere and Nyamasasa, as well as villages north 
of Bushaku on the High Plateau. DATT estimates that Nkunda 
has access to about 5,000 troop, comprised of about 3,000 
troops in and around Minova (2,000 who came from Bukavu in 
June and about 1,000 who either deserted from the FARDC, were 
forcibly recruited, or were paid to fight), and an additional 
2,000 would probably answer Nkunda's call. 
 
Diplomatic Moves 
---------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Diplomatic initiatives to negotiate Nkunda out of the 
Kivus and into exile have not worked thus far, in part 
because Nkunda does not appear willing to accept exile unless 
it would be to someplace 'nice,' i.e., Europe or America. 
Developed countries are not interested in offering the 
'Butcher of Kisangani' exile. Over time, Nkunda has 
demonstrated that he is an untrustworthy negotiator, which 
makes potential interlocutors even more unwilling to talk to 
him. Although it is possible that either N. Kivu Governor 
Serufuli and/or VP Ruberwa may be attempting to find a 
political solution, they are unlikely to succeed. 
 
¶6. (C) In response to a recent CIAT letter expressing concern 
about Nkunda, President Kabila told the new British 
Ambassador this week during his credentials ceremony that 
Kabila would be happy to meet with the CIAT following his 
return from the SADC summit next week, but only to discuss 
elections, not Nkunda. (Comment: The subject of Nkunda will 
almost certainly arise in any CIAT meeting with Kabila, if 
only in the guise of an impediment to progress towards 
elections. End comment.) Meanwhile, Monuc SRSG Bill Swing 
reports that Kabila has been in regular contact with 
Serufuli. Serufuli is the wildcard of the local situation, in 
control of a militia that could be a decisive factor in any 
military confrontation. It is unclear what Serufuli is after, 
and entirely conceivable that he is presently unwilling to 
commit to either Kabila or Nkunda, seeking to preserve all 
options until and if a sufficiently attractive option is 
available to him. For now, the uncertain status quo may be 
his preferred choice. 
 
Ruberwa's Mission 
------------------ 
 
¶7. (C) On August 7, VP Ruberwa arrived in Bukavu for what was 
planned to be a week-long visit to the Kivus. (Note: Initial 
reports that an August 7 gun-battle on the Kavumu 
Airport-Bukavu road were between Ruberwa's bodyguards and the 
FARDC were untrue. Rather, Ruberwa's entourage encountered an 
ongoing scuffle between a renegade Mai Mai commander and 
FARDC troops. End note.) Ruberwa flew August 10 to Kigali, 
and then continued on to Cyangugu where he met with 
Banyamulenge refugees August 11 before returning to Bukavu. 
MONUC Bukavu reported that Ruberwa asked MONUC to join him in 
Cyangugu, but the GOR refused permission for MONUC to cross 
the border. (Note. This travel prohibition continued August 
¶12. End note.) As of August 12, it appears the Ruberwa will 
not go to Goma as planned due to concerns about his security, 
but will continue on to Burundi to meet with Banyamulenge 
refugees. (Comment: Ruberwa met with President Kabila before 
leaving Kinshasa, and may be on a wider government mission to 
speak to the Rwandans about moving the Joint Verification 
Mechanism forward and conceivably Nkunda. He may also be 
meeting with Burundians to discuss purported Rwanda-Burundi 
military cooperation to hunt the FDLR. End comment.) 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶8. (C) As this stalemate has dragged on, the transitional 
government forces have become weaker and less focused. The 
failure to negotiate Nkunda out of his position, coupled with 
the FARDC's inability to resupply its troops and maintain 
discipline, is fueling the likelihood of an eventual military 
offensive. The risk remains that relatively large-scale 
fighting could be triggered unintentionally due to 
miscalculations or 'accidents' arising from large numbers of 
ill-disciplined troops in close proximity who regularly 
engage in low-level clashes. Any planned offensive, however, 
is unlikely to take place until after President Kabila 
returns from his scheduled trip to the SADC summit next week. 
 
¶9. (C) On paper, neither side appears to have a decisive 
military advantage, and it is unclear whether FARDC efforts 
to bring Obedi back into the fold are either sincere or 
likely to work. Serufuli appears to enjoy his wildcard role, 
but Kabila may be negotiating with him to pre-position 
Serufuli's militia members in positions that appear innocuous 
but could be beneficial for the FARDC--althgouh it remains 
unclear what Serufuli might demand in exchange for such 
service. In addition, Kigali continues to fuel uncertainty by 
reiterating its previously expressed 'right' to reenter the 
DRC, this time in self-defense against an alleged build-up of 
FDLR forces -- although Monuc has seen no evidence of any 
such gathering of FDLR elements.  Absent the all-out 
offensive, we expect to see continued, intermittent low-level 
fighting between combatants in northern S. Kivu. We will 
continue to monitor closely the fluid situation. 
MEECE