This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

022005Z Aug 04

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 001938 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA, INL, AND L 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2014 
TAGS: SNAR PREL MOPS BR POL MIL
SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY DELEGATION DISCUSSES 
INFORMATION-SHARING REGARDING BRAZIL'S SHOOTDOWN PROGRAM 
(CORRECTED COPY) 
 
 
Classified By: Pol Consul Dennis W. Hearne for Reasons 1.5a 
 
¶1.     (C)  Summary and Introduction.  On July 30, a 
State/DoD delegation, led by WHA PDAS James Derham, met with 
Brazilian Ministry of Defense interlocutors to discuss 
mechanisms through which the GOB would provide information to 
the USG about the status of Brazil,s  shootdown program once 
that program begins.  The two sides generated a working text 
that would provide the USG timely access to GOB data (i.e., 
reports and video/audio tape) in cases where Brazilian 
interceptors employed lethal force.  In addition, the GOB 
committed to providing the USG with: a) notification of any 
substantial changes to program procedures and training 
requirements, and b) the opportunity for periodic 
consultations that might address the number of events that 
stop short of lethal force and the date and location of such 
events. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Both sides agreed to take the working text back to 
their respective interagency processes for a more complete 
review.   The GOB will produce, in Portuguese, the official 
version of the working text, by the middle of the week of 
August 2.  State will generate an English version of that 
document shortly thereafter.  The USG delegation proposed 
that, when finalized, the document and two annexes that 
detailed the GOB's procedures, would serve as attachments to 
an exchange of diplomatic notes, that would be initiated by 
the GOB.  In its current form, the exchange would represent a 
political commitment on the part of the GOB, as opposed to a 
binding international agreement. End Summary and Introduction. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Fernando Abreu, Chief of Staff of Defense Minister 
Viegas, led the Brazilian delegation, which consisted of 
Orlando Almeida (Special Advisor to Viegas), Air Force 
Brigadier General Machado (Sub-Chief of Operations of the MOD 
Joint Staff), and Air Force Colonel Servan (Vice-Chief of the 
GOB Air Defense Command).  After welcoming remarks, Abreu 
noted that the GOB planned to initiate its shootdown program 
on October 17, with great emphasis being placed on 
transparency for both the Brazilian public and foreign 
governments.  He then turned the floor over to General 
Machado, who launched into an extended description of 
Brazil,s air defense infrastructure and the procedural 
safeguards associated with the GOB,s implementation of 
shootdown.  In particular, Machado noted that: 
--  Since 1979, the GOB had been safely conducting air 
interceptions (i.e., approaches short of lethal force), and 
was well aware of the need to scrupulously observe ICAO 
requirements during the course of aerial interception.  The 
use of lethal force, he emphasized, was merely an extension 
of the GOB,s current interception efforts. 
--  Brazil,s operational norms for its airspace defense 
system were contained in a large classified document known as 
the NOSDA (the Portuguese acronym).   Though the Air Force 
was not able to provide the USG with a copy of the NOSDA, he 
emphasized that the documents that were passed to the 
delegation representatives during the course of the July 29 
talks, in addition to the GOB's two sets of responses to the 
USG's questions about GOB shootdown procedures, were accurate 
summaries of the contents of the NOSDA.  (In brief, these 
summaries describe a process of detection, monitoring, 
identification, interrogation, investigation, and warnings 
prior to the use of lethal force, as well as the procedures 
and circumstances under which the GOB would use lethal 
force). 
--  The use of both warning shots and lethal force would only 
be authorized by the Commander of Brazil,s central air 
defense center.  Lethal force would only be employed in cases 
where intel information indicated that the suspect air track 
was tied to narco-trafficking. 
--  The co-location of civil aviation facilities with 
military controllers, along with reliance on a common Air 
Force radar feed, facilitates the identification of routine 
civil aviation traffic. 
--  The GOB plans to conduct an extensive media campaign, 
using television and radio spots, sporting events, and 
notices to airmen (NOTAMs) to publicize the contemplated 
October 17 initiation of its shootdown program.  A parallel 
effort would be aimed at the international public as well. 
--  The training regime for program personnel includes 
training for pilots, air controllers, and communications 
personnel.  In particular, he noted, those pilots who conduct 
air interceptions receive more extensive and specialized 
training than their non-interception counterparts. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Subsequent discussion then refined the mechanism 
through which the USG would receive information about program 
events.  Abreu noted that the GOB was open to passing 
comprehensive information to the USG on an informal basis, 
but that any arrangement that smacked of USG intrusion into 
Brazilian sovereignty was a non-starter, given the 
potentially negative reaction by the Brazil congress and 
public.  Still, Abreu pledged that the GOB would: 
--  provide, on an urgent basis, the AmEmbassy Brasilia Air 
Force Attache with information regarding any shootdown 
incident.  Such information would be provided to the general 
public as well. 
--  At the USG,s request, meet with USG representatives to 
provide background information about the program,s progress 
(i.e., the number of suspect tracks detected, interceptions, 
and warning shots as well as other similar data), and 
--  notify the USG of any changes in security procedures, 
non-classified checklists, flight plan requirements, and 
training regimen. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Begin Comment.  As a result of these discussions, it 
is clear that -- other than for information on shootdown 
events -- the USG will have to initiate contacts with the GOB 
when securing information on the shootdown program.  It may 
be worthwhile for USG agencies to: a) establish a checklist 
of information that they would like the AmEmbassy Brasilia 
Air Force Attache to obtain, b) and provide guidance on the 
frequency with which the Attache should seek consultations 
with the GOB.  End Comment. 
 
¶6.  (C)  PDAS Derham proposed that the two sides ultimately 
document the understanding reached regarding information 
sharing through an exchange of diplomatic notes.  The 
diplomatic notes would expressly reference three attachments: 
 the GOP responses to the first and second set of questions 
from the USG regarding GOB operational procedures and the 
working text that was the subject of this round of 
discussions.  The diplomatic note would also reflect the 
GOB's assurances that the shootdown program would only be 
directed at aircraft reasonably suspected to be primarily 
engaged in illicit drug trafficking.  The GOB clarified that 
this meant that aircraft carrying drugs or aircraft carrying 
money, weapons, or precursor chemicals to exchange for drugs 
could be subject to lethal force.  (The scope of the GOB's 
program thus falls within the scope of the 22 U.S.C. 2291-4, 
i.e., the immunity statute, as further articulated by DOJ in 
the context of the Colombia ABD program.) 
 
¶7.  (C)  Abreu was open to the idea of an exchange of 
diplomatic notes, though he indicated that he would need to 
check with others (in particular, Minister of Defense Viegas) 
prior to providing us with the GOB,s formal answer.  Both 
sides then explored possible language for inclusion in the 
exchange of diplomatic notes (which would be initiated by the 
GOB).  For Abreu, a red-line was any language which indicated 
that the exchange of diplomatic notes would be a binding 
international agreement, as that would mean that the text 
would need to be approved by the Brazilian congress. 
 
WHA PDAS Derham cleared message. 
 
DANILOVICH