This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 004133 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2014 
TAGS: PREL OTRA TU CY IZ EU
SUBJECT: DAS KENNEDY: DISCUSSIONS ON IRAQ, CYPRUS, AND EU 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 152647 
 
     ¶B. ANKARA 3946 
 
(U) Classified by CDA Robert S. Deutsch for Reasons 1.4 b,d. 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  In July 20/21 Ankara meetings at the Turkish 
MFA and General Secretariat for EU Affairs, EUR/DAS Laura 
Kennedy solicited evaluations of 1) Turkey's prospects for a 
definite date to begin EU accession negotiations; 2) steps 
forward in the wake of the Greek Cypriot rejection of the 
Annan Plan; and 3) Iraq and the Greater Middle East. 
 
 
SECRETARY GENERAL FOR EU AFFAIRS MURAT SUNGAR 
 
SIPDIS 
 
¶2. (SBU) Ambassador Murat Sungar, Head of Turkey's 
Secretariat General for EU Affairs, the GOT's EU 
 
SIPDIS 
harmonization and reform coordination agency, outlined his 
evaluation of Turkey's chances to obtain a definite EU 
accession negotiation date.  Kennedy reiterated strong U.S. 
support for Turkish accession while cautioning the GOT not to 
slacken its reform program. 
 
¶3. (C) Sungar underscored the "critical importance" to the 
GOT of winning a definite starting date for EU accession 
negotiations.  He asserted Turkey accepts that EU accession 
will be a long process easily lasting a decade.   While 
official hopes center on a March 2005 date, a start date by 
the third quarter 2005 would be acceptable.  A degree of 
conditionality would be acceptable if it referred to 
completion of reforms already in train.  What would not be 
acceptable would be lack of a start date and/or setting out 
new criteria as a condition. Recent legislative and 
constitutional reforms undertaken by the GOT, Sungar 
asserted, have already brought Turkey in-line with Copenhagen 
criteria.   The key remaining element, according to Sungar, 
is a "very progressive penal code revamp" that will be taken 
up during an extraordinary meeting of Parliament in 
September. Sungar also referred to the foundation law, which 
he said would be passed by October.  He stressed that old 
laws on religion had been intended to curb extremism of Islam 
but of course covered all religious organizations.  Kennedy 
raised the issue of the Greek Orthodox Halki Seminary noting 
that it would have enormous resonance if Turkey reopened the 
institution.  Sungar confirmed that the decision was in 
train; bureaucratic oversight of the institution should soon 
be resolved.  "We have done what we can, now we have to 
depend on EU capitals to produce for us," he noted. 
 
¶4. (C) Like his colleagues at the MFA, Sungar expressed 
disappointment with what he characterized as insufficient 
efforts to ease the isolation of Turkish Cypriots.  Sungar 
also took the opportunity to push for U.S. assistance in 
opening direct flights to the North. 
 
 
DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY BAKI ILKIN 
 
¶5. (SBU) MFA Deputy U/S for Northeast Mediterranean Affairs 
Baki Ilkin outlined the GOT's road ahead for Cyprus and 
disputes in the Aegean. 
 
 
Cyprus 
------ 
 
¶6. (C) In a lengthy discussion with DAS Kennedy, Ilkin 
repeatedly underscored that Turkey has done all it can to 
achieve a lasting solution on Cyprus.  The Greek Cypriots, he 
argued, do not want to compromise and are only seeking to 
integrate the Turkish Cypriots as a minority within the 
existing institutional structure.  This is unacceptable to 
Turkey, he said.  If there is no change in the Greek Cypriot 
mindset, which he defined as recognition of a "new 
partnership" on the island, there will be no progress. 
 
¶7. (C) Ilkin expressed some exasperation with the slow pace 
of measures designed to ease the Turkish Cypriots, economic 
isolation.  Although he said he appreciated the bureaucratic 
difficulties involved in preparing the way for direct air 
flights with trade, Ilkin added that if nothing concrete 
emerges, Turkey will have no choice but to support the 
Turkish Cypriots indefinitely.  "No Turkish government," he 
said, "will ever be able to abandon the Turkish Cypriots." 
Ilkin said the GOT was encouraged by the EU Commission,s 
Assistance and Trade proposals but was concerned with G/C 
influence on council lawyers.  Kennedy and CDA stressed that 
the USG shares the view that there must be change in the 
attitude of Greek Cypriot leadership for an Annan plan based 
process to restart.  The job of the international community, 
he said, is to recognize the constructive role of Turkey and 
the Turkish Cypriots and to reduce the isolation of northern 
Cyprus, which the USG is in the process of taking steps to 
achieve.  Ilkin also pressed on the need for direct flights 
and expressed the hope that the U.S. trade and air transport 
measures would move ahead soon.  DAS Kennedy assured him that 
the U.S. is working on these complex issues, which in some 
cases must accord with relevant international covenants.  We 
are also coordinating closely with the EU on these matters, 
since the significant markets and connections for Northern 
Cyprus are there. 
¶8. (C) Ilkin explained that the MFA realizes that it must 
work with the Greek Cypriots as EU members.  On the customs 
union, Ilkin said, the MFA has formed a team to look into the 
modalities of how that might work, adding that what emerges 
will be a "model of cohabitation."  Turkey knows it will be 
sitting at the EU table with Cyprus and must reach an 
accommodation.  Ilkin further asserted that the EU will have 
no "Cyprus pretext" in considering whether to give Turkey a 
date to begin formal negotiations at the next summit in 
December. 
 
 
Greek-Turkish Relations 
----------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Ilkin briefly touched on the exploratory talks with 
the Greek government on solving Aegean disputes, noting that 
the most recent round of talks took place July 16.  Ilkin 
said the MFA will brief the U.S. "at some point" on progress, 
for our information only but that it was not yet ready to do 
so.  While he provided no details, he clearly intimated the 
importance of this issue.  (Comment: Turkey is presumably 
hoping that positive Greek-Turkish momentum might also 
translate into Greek help on the Cyprus front.) 
 
 
DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY ALI TUYGAN 
 
¶10. (SBU) MFA Deputy Undersecretary for Middle East, Africa, 
Caucasus, Asia and Pacific Affairs Ali Tuygan focused on GOT 
concerns regarding Iraq. 
 
 
Greater Middle East 
------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Deputy U/S Tuygan noted that support for the Broader 
Middle East and North Africa initiative has increased across 
the region over the last several months.  Regional 
governments are beginning to perceive that the initiative 
will not be imposed from above and will take into account the 
unique characteristics of each country and culture.  The 
process is at a "much more favorable stage now," he claimed. 
Tuygan emphasized that long-term U.S. support is necessary 
for success, as the project is likely to take years to bear 
fruit.  Repeating the MFA mantra, Tuygan maintained that 
Turkey does not intend to serve as a model for the rest of 
the region, but would be happy to relate its experience to 
those interested.  "Each country should create its own 
model," he said. 
 
 
Iraq 
---- 
 
¶12. (C) DAS Kennedy and Charge Deutsch began the Iraq 
discussion by stressing the USG,s commitment to ending the 
PKK threat from Iraq. Tuygan noted that the USG had 
officially reiterated its long-standing policy against any 
official contact with the PKK or its derivatives. 
 
¶13. (C) After quickly acknowledging that Turkey and the U.S. 
share the same goal with regard to the PKK, Tuygan turned to 
the broader Iraq issue.  After reciting standard Turkish 
concerns about stability and territorial integrity, Tuygan 
argued, Turkey has a fundamental interest in Iraq,s success. 
 Turning to Kirkuk, Tuygan expressed concern that the Kurds 
are trying to shift the demographic balance in such a way 
that they will be able to dominate local politics.  This 
risks undermining the security situation in northern Iraq. 
An upswing in violence there, he claimed, could spill over 
into the rest of the country.  CDA noted that the picture 
Turkish officials paint for Embassy Ankara differs greatly 
from what we hear from U.S. officials on the ground in 
Kirkuk, where they say there is tension but no deliberate 
Kurdish campaign to marginalize other ethnic groups. 
 
Armenia 
------- 
 
¶14. (C) Kennedy briefed Tuygan on SNEC Mann,s latest round 
of talks with the Armenians and Azeris and our cautiously 
optimistic assessment of where the parties are.  She 
suggested that the Turks could help quicken momentum by such 
moves as opening the border with Armenia and helping generate 
realistic expectations among the Azeris.  Tuygan broke no new 
ground in discussing the state of Turkish-Armenian relations. 
 He said that as long as Armenia continues to occupy Azeri 
territory, it will be very difficult for any Turkish 
government to open the border.  "If Armenia does not leave 
Azeri territory, it would be impossible to explain opening 
the border to the Turkish public."  Tuygan noted that there 
is some discussion of an Armenian withdrawal from occupied 
territories, a move that he says would be a definite CBM.  In 
such a case, Turkey would immediately begin to work on 
improving the bilateral relations.  Tuygan reiterated, 
however, that Armenia must make the first step: "Encourage 
Armenia to make a move, and Turkey will reciprocate." 
(Subsequently, Caucasus chief Adali gave a far more positive 
and dynamic account of GOT-Armenia talks.  He said he and his 
bosses would meet FM Oskanian in Vienna next week.  He 
considered new steps, such as opening the border were in 
sight if progress continued. 
DEUTSCH