This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 001548 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR JOECK 
WINPAC FOR LIEPMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC):  WEEKLY WRAP-UP 
FOR 18 JUNE 2004 
 
 
This is CWC-79-04. 
 
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P-5 AMBASSADORS MEETING ON UNIVERSALITY 
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¶1.  (U)  The Russian Federation hosted a June 15 meeting of 
P-5 Ambassadors in The Hague, noting that the idea originated 
in Moscow with Universality suggested as the first topic for 
discussion.  Russia also noted the connection between the CWC 
and UNSC Resolution 1540 that increases the importance of CWC 
Universality.  The UK suggested that attendees carefully 
consider whether a P-5 demarche to selected States not Party 
to the CWC might bring additional pressure for them to join 
the Convention.  France noted that it thought the P-5 format 
useful and asked whether delegations could expand the 
discussion to challenge inspections and Libya conversion 
requests.  Amb. Javits (U.S. Perm Rep) and the UK Ambassador 
replied that our first effort should be Universality. 
 
¶2.  (U)  The Ambassadors discussed the Middle East and North 
Korea, and agreed that the situation in these areas is 
complex.  Amb. Javits noted that he had sponsored a lunch for 
Arab ambassadors, from both States Party and States not 
Party, saying that not much of substance had been 
accomplished, but that the atmosphere was very positive. 
China noted that it had recently seen a positive change in 
Arab feelings regarding the CWC, and that confidence building 
efforts such as the U.S. lunch was a key first step. 
 
¶3.  (U)  Russia then raised the workshops in Malta and Addis 
Ababa, noting that Moscow had lobbied heavily in Cairo and 
Damascus to get them to send reps to Malta.  All delegations 
expressed concern regarding the lack of appropriate TS 
efforts in support of the Malta conference.  Russian then 
relayed Syria's response to Moscow that CW could not be 
eliminated from the Middle East because of its direct link to 
the Israeli nuclear program.  Moscow also reported that at an 
Arab League Foreign Ministers meeting, attendees agreed that 
they should move away from the CWC until Israel is ready to 
join the NPT.  China said that if this report were true, it 
would significantly increase the challenge to the P-5 of 
promoting universality in that particular region. 
 
¶4.  (U)  Attendees agreed to send to capitols the UK 
suggestion of P-5 demarches to determine if this was 
acceptable in principle.  If so, then P-5 ambassadors could 
begin debate in a future meeting (date to be determined) 
regarding which states to be approached. 
 
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INDUSTRY CONSULTATIONS - SUMMARY 
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¶5.  (U)  The following is a summary of the outcome of the 
June 14-18 industry consultations.  The full report will be 
provided septel: 
 
-- Schedule 1 captive use remains under consideration due to 
differences in opinion over whether or not a decision 
clarifying the declarability of Schedule 1 'captive use' 
production is necessary.  On one hand, since there is no 
evidence that such production exists, a decision seems 
ceremonial.  On the other hand, even if there exists no such 
production, the knowledge and technology to produce such 
chemicals in captive use situations is widely available, 
particularly in the case of pharmaceutical manufacturing 
(e.g., pethidine). 
 
-- Discussions on low concentrations for Amiton, PFIB and BZ 
whittled down the proposed decision text to two open items: 
specific concentration percentages and whether States Parties 
should apply one percentage to all three chemicals or 
disparate percentages for each. 
 
-- With regard to discussions on Schedule 2 Facility 
Agreements, proposed EC-37 report language encouraging the TS 
to adopt more flexible criteria in determining not to 
conclude such agreements appears to have consensus.  The 
discussions also produced agreed EC-37 report language for 
marking of Schedule 1 chemicals in the Handbook on Chemicals 
to indicate chemicals which have been declared in amounts 
greater than 100 grams by States Parties to the TS since 
entry into force. 
 
-- Discussions on other chemical production facilities (OCPF) 
site selection made progress in terms of a path forward for 
discussions, but made little progress on minimizing 
substantive differences regarding accommodation of State 
Parties' proposals or enhance transparency and/or 
accountability in the allocation of TS nomination points. 
 
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ARTICLE XI 
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¶6.  (U)  Del rep and Iranian delegate Gholamhossein Dehghani 
met on the margins of the Article X consultation on June 14 
to discuss the current status of the Article XI 
consultations.  Dehghani noted the importance of fully 
implementing Article XI and regretted the long impasse that 
prevented delegations from moving forward on this issue, one 
of the four pillars of the CWC.  Dehghani also wondered why 
no delegations had commented on the Iranian chemical 
transfers paper. 
 
¶7.  (U)  Del rep replied that two issues might have hindered 
comment on the paper: first, not all states have fully 
implemented their Article VII obligations, which includes the 
issue of chemical transfers and export controls.  This needed 
to be done by CSP-10.  Once all states were in compliance 
with their obligations, states may be more confidant that 
transferred chemicals and equipment are being used for 
peaceful, legitimate enterprises.  Second, the Iranian paper 
proposed that all transfers of toxic chemicals be declared as 
a confidence-building measure.  Even if a government favored 
such a measure, states with large chemical industries would 
find the requirement too burdensome. 
 
¶8.  (U)  Dehghani suggested that restricting Iran's proposal 
to declarations of transfers of scheduled toxic chemicals 
might make it more practical.  Delrep noted that delegations 
would not support creation of a clearinghouse whose charter 
was to match up worldwide chemical transfers; the TS needed 
to be a cost-effective, lean, and efficient organization. 
Dehghani acknowledged that the Iranian suggestion of having a 
Global Cooperation Committee review transfer declarations had 
not received any support and asked if Washington perhaps had 
come ideas on how to build confidence regarding peaceful uses 
of chemicals.  Delrep agreed to discuss the concept with 
Washington and would get back to Dehghani with ideas at a 
later date. 
 
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OCPF SITE SELECTION 
------------------- 
 
¶9.  (U)  Del requested comments on the Swiss/U.S. OCPF site 
selection proposal during the June 16 WEOG meeting.  New 
Zealand supports it unconditionally; Germany and the UK 
reported that the issue remains under discussion in capitols, 
with it being viewed favorable but requiring some minor 
changes.  Canada likes the method, and reported that the only 
issue that remains under consideration is whether the TS 
should provide States Parties with information regarding how 
it used its nomination points. 
 
¶10.  (U)  Javits sends. 
SOBEL