This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000612 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV; PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV BM NLD
SUBJECT: NATIONAL CONVENTION RECONVENES WITHOUT NLD AND 
ETHNIC PARTIES 
 
REF: A. RANGOON 611 
     ¶B. RANGOON 600 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  The Burmese regime's National Convention 
reconvened on May 17 with over 1,000 hand-picked delegates in 
attendance, but without the participation of the NLD and the 
UNA nor the presence of the U.S. and EU missions.  The NLD, 
on the basis that its existing demands are reasonable and 
that SPDC Chairman Than Shwe shows no signs of relenting on 
the release of ASSK, sees little room for a late compromise 
that would allow NLD participation in the Convention.  The UN 
Special Envoy has not abandoned hope, however, and we should 
continue to support UN efforts aimed at a compromise. 
However, if by the end of this week the SPDC continues to 
charge ahead without the democratic opposition, we should 
call a spade a spade and denounce the Convention process. 
End Summary. 
 
¶2. (U) On May 17, the SPDC reconvened the National Convention 
for the purpose of drafting, as attempted without success in 
1993-1996, a "firm and enduring Constitution."  Noticeably 
absent from opening ceremonies at the isolated "Nyaunghnapin" 
(Two Banyon Trees) Camp north of Rangoon were the NLD and 
members of the United Nationalities Alliance (UNA) ethnic 
party coalition (ref B).  The GOB also invited diplomatic 
missions to participate in the opening ceremonies; those who 
declined the invitation included the U.S., EU members, and 
Israel missions. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The opening day of the Convention was devoid of 
substantive discussions and invited dignitaries were 
shepherded around the Convention site, a tightly-controlled 
USDA training center, to view the recently refurbished 
facilities, including gift shops and a golf driving range. 
According to several participants, 1,076 registered delegates 
were present to kick off the Convention.  Military 
intelligence transported most delegates by bus on May 13-14 
and authorities advised delegates that they would stay at the 
Convention site for at least two months and would only be 
allowed to depart on weekends with "special permission." 
 
¶4. (U) In an unusual statement issued on May 14, the GOB 
acknowledged the NLD non-participation and observed that the 
party had decided not to attend because the NLD "has no faith 
in the National Convention" and because "U Tin Oo and Daw 
Aung San Suu Kyi are not able to travel freely and the NLD is 
still unable to reopen its offices."  In that same statement, 
the GOB said it had asked the NLD leaders to "wait patiently" 
(under house arrest) while the government gave "priority to 
stability and peace." 
 
¶5. (C) We met with NLD spokesman U Lwin on May 17 at NLD 
headquarters, where authorities had apparently cut the 
party's phone lines earlier in the day.  U Lwin affirmed that 
UN Special Envoy Razali, through his Rangoon-based 
intermediary Leon de Riedmatten, had approached NLD leaders 
with a view to helping continue negotiations between the SPDC 
and the NLD (ref A).  U Lwin said that there was little to 
discuss, given: a) that the NLD had already demonstrated 
great flexibility, even to the point of being willing to 
begin the Convention on the basis of promised dates from the 
regime for the future release of ASSK and U Tin Oo and for 
the future reopening of NLD offices; and b) that SPDC envoys 
had indicated Senior General Than Shwe was dead set against 
releasing ASSK (ref A). 
 
¶6. (C) U Lwin welcomed the Department's May 14 statement, and 
noted the party's ire over the regime's desire to accommodate 
the cease-fire groups, "who used to shoot at the Burmese 
army," but not negotiate with the peaceful NLD.  U Lwin said 
that the real focus should now be on the United Nations and 
Kofi Annan.  The UNSYG, U Lwin said, "is the man for the 
moment and he has the responsibility to follow through on his 
pronouncements (that Burma should be democratic by 2006)."  U 
Lwin said that the UNSYG needed an effective envoy for the 
job, observing that "Razali, like (senior UN official and 
former envoy) de Soto before him, has failed." 
 
¶7. (C) The NLD and others must now contend with a possible 
regime crack down on parties which are boycotting the 
Convention by invoking "Law Number 5/96," a decree issued by 
SPDC Chairman Than Shwe in 1996 following the departure of 
the NLD from the first Convention.  Under that draconian law, 
individuals and organizations are prohibited from delivering 
unauthorized speeches or statements about the National 
Convention or the draft Constitution.  Violators, including 
those who refuse an invitation to attend the Convention, are 
subject to up to 20 years imprisonment and their 
organizations can be declared unlawful.  SNLD leader Hkun 
Htun Oo declined to speak with Emboffs on May 17 and an 
intermediary said the UNA chairman was "laying low" over fear 
of arrest. 
 
Comment:  What Next? 
-------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) The Department's statement of May 14 effectively 
brought attention to the NLD's (and the UNA's) decision to 
boycott the Convention, the regime's failure to improve the 
political environment, and the need for substantive 
discussions.  We note that UNSYG Kofi Annan took a similar 
approach and also allowed that there may be additional time 
for the parties concerned to reach an agreement.  As of May 
17, the opportunity for further negotiations appears to be 
very slim, although the next few days will likely be reserved 
for little more than logistical housekeeping at the 
Convention.  Given that the UN has not yet abandoned hope for 
a compromise, the most helpful role for the U.S. may be to 
protect what little space exists by continuing to draw 
attention to the regime's long-standing promise to release 
all original Depeyin detainees (only ASSK and U Tin Oo remain 
in detention) and to reopen NLD party offices (returning to 
the status quo prior to May 30, 2003). 
 
¶9. (C) However, if by the end of this week there are no signs 
that the SPDC intends to budge, we would advise a 
hard-hitting statement that dismisses the utility of a 
constitutional-drafting process that excludes representatives 
who have a legitimate claim to represent the majority of the 
Burmese people (the NLD and the UNA member parties won a 
combined 89% of the seats in the 1990 legislative elections). 
 Without an open, deliberative, and participatory National 
Constitution, the regime's road map lacks any credibility as 
a plan for a transition to democracy.  End Comment. 
Martinez