This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

022104Z Apr 04

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 001157 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR CBARTON 
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD 
STATE PASS USAID FOR DCHA/OTI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2014 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: CHAVISTAS SEE REGIONAL ELECTIONS AS DE FACTO 
REFERENDUM 
 
REF: A. CARACAS 1083 
     ¶B. CARACAS 1054 
 
Classified By: Abelardo A. Arias, Political Counselor, 
for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (C) Pro-Chavez political parties registered their 
candidates in March in anticipation of the August 1 elections 
for governors and mayors.  As with the opposition, the 
Chavistas see the regional elections as a referendum of sorts 
on President Hugo Chavez.  They also see the elections as an 
opportunity to extend the Bolivarian Revolution further into 
the state and local level.  Chavez's campaign committee 
imposed discipline over the candidate selection process, 
which resulted in consensus candidates in most races. 
Chavez's personal selection of many gubernatorial candidates, 
many of whom are ex-military officers, rankled some 
supporters.  Chavistas, wanting to distract from the 
presidential recall referendum, have already accused the USG 
of meddling in the regional elections.  End Summary. 
 
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The De Facto Referendum 
----------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Pro-Chavez political parties, under the leadership of 
a campaign committee called the "Comando Ayacucho," finished 
registering their candidates in March for regional elections 
for governors, mayors, and other state and municipal 
officials (ref a).  For Chavez supporters, the regional 
elections represent the political battleground of 2004. 
Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) National Director of Ideology 
Elias Jaua told DCM and poloff March 30 that the elections 
will serve as a type of referendum on President Chavez, in 
which races will be decided by candidates' devotion to 
Chavez's so-called Bolivarian Revolution.  The elections are 
a more stable vehicle for expressing popular will, Jaua 
argued, than the proposed presidential recall referendum. 
Jaua asserted that Chavez would win such a vote, but that the 
opposition, unable to accept the bitter truth of defeat, 
would plunge Venezuela into a Colombia-like conflict. 
 
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Elections Strengthen the Revolution 
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¶3. (U) A propaganda booklet on the elections written by Jaua 
in February emphasizes the importance of the regional 
elections to the revolutionary process.  The booklet says the 
fate of the revolution will be determined by the elections. 
"Hegemony in macro-social spaces" is not enough, says the 
booklet, for ensuring the revolution succeeds.  State and 
local positions are closer to the daily life of "the people" 
and are vital to "decentralizing democracy," the literature 
says.  Surrendering even one of these spaces to the 
opposition, claims the propaganda, will permit them to plan 
"coups, regicides, and sabotage" against the revolution.  The 
booklet also points out that a Chavista electoral win will 
demonstrate to the world that the GOV has the support of the 
majority of Venezuelans, which will help the revolutionary 
government in its international efforts to alleviate poverty, 
achieve regional integration, and defeat the Free Trade Area 
of the Americas. 
 
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Strategy:  Gains and Punishment 
------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (U) Comando Ayacucho leader Willian Lara (MVR) told 
reporters March 26 the principal objective of the pro-Chavez 
parties is to hold on to and add to the 16 of 23 
governorships and 126 of 335 mayoralties already held by 
Chavistas.  Lara highlighted the need to "recapture" the 
positions lost to "traitors," those who have defected from 
 
 
Chavismo, specifically, the governors of Anzoategui and 
Bolivar, and the metropolitan mayor of Caracas.  The MVR 
electoral booklet discusses important issues for the 
campaign.  Most emphasized are Chavez's social programs aimed 
at the poor, such as Mission Robinson (literacy), Barrio 
Adentro (health), and Mission Ribas (education).  On the 
"tough issues" of unemployment, crime, corruption, and 
political violence, members are encouraged to remind voters 
that the Bolivarian movement is best equipped to deal with 
these problems, but has been hindered thus far by "sabotage" 
from the opposition. 
 
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Candidate Selection: Chavez's Big Finger 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Jaua said the Comando Ayacucho had succeeded in single 
candidates in every state except Trujillo, where a rogue MVR 
candidate registered against the consensus candidate (Note: 
The press reported several conflicts among pro-Chavez 
candidates, most of which were resolved by the time the 
candidate registration period closed on March 25).  Jaua said 
this was much improved over the last elections, when multiple 
pro-Chavez candidates faced off in several key contests.  The 
Comando Ayacucho's technique included public warnings to any 
maverick candidates that they would be "automatically 
excluded" from their respective party if they went against 
the decision of the Comando. 
 
¶6. (C) MVR National Assembly Deputy Ibrain Velazquez shared 
his frustration over candidate selection with poloff on March 
¶26.  Velazquez, who was reportedly snubbed by Chavez for the 
candidacy of his state of Nueva Esparta, predicted that the 
Comando's heavy hand would result in unexpected electoral 
upsets (see para 7).  Velazquez said bluntly that there was 
no candidate selection process, saying that "Chavez is the 
only one who decides."  Chavez, in fact, has announced many 
of the candidacies personally, often surprising those not 
selected -- and some who are.  Chavez picks are often 
ex-military officials.  One columnist pointed out that, if 
the GOV candidates sweep the elections, ten states would be 
governed by former military officials. 
 
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Critical Races 
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¶7. (C) The disgruntled Velazquez asserted that opposition 
strength is growing.  He thought it possible the Chavistas 
could lose the races in the states of Nueva Esparta, , 
Cojedes, Zulia, Bolivar, and Vargas.  He was more sure of 
victories in the states of Aragua and Carabobo.  Jaua 
admitted the Chavistas would face an uphill battle in 
Miranda, where former Minister of Infrastructure Diosdado 
Cabello is running against Governor Enrique Mendoza, the head 
of the opposition's Coordinadora Democratica.  Jaua believes 
Acosta Carles stands a better than even chance at beating 
Henrique Salas Feo in Carabobo.  Both Jaua and Velazquez were 
confident of a win in Caracas, where a three-cornered contest 
may give the win to MVR's Juan Barreto.  Jaua said the 
opposition was favored in the states of Zulia, Apure, and 
Yaracuy. 
 
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Running Against the U.S. 
------------------------ 
 
¶8. (U) Jorge Albornoz, Secretary General of the pro-Chavez 
Patria Para Todos (PPT) told reporters March 26 that the USG 
is coordinating the opposition's electoral strategy. 
Albornoz accused the USG of imposing the candidacies of 
Enrique Mendoza and Henrique Salas Feo on the opposition. 
The MVR electoral booklet also claims that the opposition, 
having lost the fight domestically, has gone to its 
international "masters" to beg for intervention in the 
country. 
 
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Comment 
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¶9. (C) As Chavez is apparently convinced that the nationalist 
card has some value, we expect Chavez and his followers to 
step up the anti-U.S. rhetoric to divert attention from the 
dreary Venezuelan political and social conditions, hardly 
improved after five years of Chavez rule. (In fact, recent 
polling shared with the Ambassador indicates that Chavez 
supporters do not approve of the anti-U.S. posture.) 
Regional elections also distract the public and political 
parties from the presidential recall vote, which poses 
significantly greater political risk to the revolution.  The 
elections, as both sides have suggested to us, may size up to 
be a referendum on President Chavez. 
 
SHAPIRO 
 
 
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      2004CARACA01157 - CONFIDENTIAL