This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 002026 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2014 
TAGS: CY PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S CYPRUS ENDGAME 
 
U) Classified by A/DCM Scot Marciel, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Assuming an April 24 approval by both 
Turkish and Greek Cypriots, Turkey's AKP government is poised 
to play out its Cyprus endgame with the military, President 
Sezer, and the Parliament.  In a stormy April 5 meeting of 
Turkey's National Security Council (NSC), the military and 
President Sezer expressed deep concern about whether the EU 
will follow through on Verheugen's promises to make a Cyprus 
agreement primary law.  The UK is working with the EU to 
prepare a concrete response to Turkish concerns.  If primary 
law concerns are met, the AKP government parliamentary 
majority appears sufficient to approve the agreement despite 
possible defections among nationalistic deputies.  President 
Sezer must approve the agreement; there is a danger he may 
not approve absent further guarantees on making the agreement 
primary law.  The GOT hopes for a clear message of financial 
support from the April 15 pre-donors conference to answer 
concerns about displaced Turkish Cypriots.  Turkish public 
opinion on the agreement is generally positive, but there is 
a reservoir of permanent opposition.  End Summary. 
 
 
¶2. (C) Despite AKP's big win in the March 28 municipal 
elections, Erdogan faces the tough political challenge of 
gaining Turkish acceptance of the draft Cyprus settlement. 
This is a challenge with immediate ramifications for the 
strength of his prime ministership and leadership of the 
party.  He has undertaken -- and was unambiguously stuck with 
full responsibility by the military in the April 5 NSC 
meeting -- to sell the settlement to his AKP parliamentary 
group and to work for acceptance by the Turkish Cypriots. 
 
 
NSC Stormy Over Primary Law 
 
 
¶3. (C) After Burgenstock, Turkey's National Security Council 
(NSC) discussed Cyprus on April 1 and again on April 5.  The 
NSC statement following the April 5 meeting was pointed, 
declaring that the agreement does not meet all Turkey's 
demands, "although it has some positive points."  The 
statement laid responsibility for implementing the agreement, 
including making it primary law, squarely on the AKP 
government. 
 
 
¶4. (C) On April 6, MFA U/S Ziyal told UK Ambassador 
Westmacott that the April 5 meeting was difficult and stormy, 
according to what Westmacott relayed to Ambassador Edelman. 
Although the military's earlier redlines had been met and 
they could not point to deficiencies in the agreement, 
military reps on the NSC expressed deep concern over whether 
the EU would follow through on Verheugen's promises to make 
the agreement primary law.  Westmacott told Ambassador 
Edelman that London is working with the EU to prepare 
something more concrete to meet Turkish concerns; Westmacott 
sees no need for specific USG action at this point. 
 
 
¶5.  (C) MFA Northeastern Mediterranean Affairs DDG Eguz 
corroborated Ziyal's account of the April 5 meeting.  Eguz 
said both President Sezer and the military focused on the 
primary law issue, and also the fate of TCs who will be 
displaced by the agreement.  Like Ziyal, Eguz expressed 
serious concern about the primary law issue.  Eguz thinks it 
"self-evident" that the Greek Parliament will approve making 
the agreement primary law if the GCs have passed the 
referendum.  However, he emphasized that some in the NSC 
deeply mistrust Verheugen's guarantees and want to see an 
"irreversible" act toward making the agreement primary law. 
 
 
¶6.  (C) On the issue of displaced TCs, Eguz said the GOT 
needs a clear message of financial support from the April 15 
pre-donors' conference. 
 
 
Parliament 
 
 
¶7.  (C) If the agreement passes both referenda and primary 
law concerns are met, AKP's solid parliamentary majority (367 
of 550 deputies) currently appears sufficient to approve the 
agreement.  Approval will require a simple majority of those 
present.  Abstentions will in effect count as votes against. 
DDG Eguz expects the agreement to go to Parliament April 25 
or 26. 
 
 
¶8.  (C) AKP vice chairman for policy Dengir Firat told us 
April 2 that AKP will not adopt a group decision requiring 
parliamentarians to vote in favor.  PM Erdogan remains 
personally opposed to that approach and will instead seek to 
"convince" parliamentarians.  In this regard Erdogan is in 
firm control of the party and is willing to expend enormous 
political capital to secure a settlement.  Most AKP 
parliamentarians know little about the details of the 
agreement and look to Erdogan for leadership.  According to 
Firat, AKP will prevent deputies opposed to the agreement 
from speaking out against it or campaigning against it either 
in Turkey or on the island.  Main opposition CHP, drubbed in 
Turkey's March 28 municipal elections, is unlikely to mount 
an effective opposition campaign outside of its own 175 
deputies. 
¶9.  (C) Nevertheless, Firat conceded there may well be 
defections from AKP, mostly among parliamentarians with roots 
in the ultra-nationalist MHP.  Firat professes not to be 
worried that this will cut significantly into AKP's majority. 
 Ex-parliamentarian Hasim Hasimi and prominent anti-Cyprus 
solution columnist and professor Hasan Unal both estimate the 
number of MHP-origin AKP deputies at more than 50. 
 
 
¶10.  (C) Hasimi doubts that many will defect in the face of 
strong leadership from Erdogan. If Erdogan requires an open 
vote similar to the October 7 vote on Turkish troop 
deployment to Iraq, AKP parliamentarians will have to look 
the PM in the eye and openly oppose one of the biggest 
efforts of his political career.  Still, Unal points out that 
MHP's ten-plus percent showing in the March 28 elections 
shows MHP might again enter Parliament in a future general 
election.  He speculated, with some wishful thinking, that 
MHP-oriented deputies might seek to defect and form an MHP 
parliamentary group if they want to defy Erdogan. 
 
 
Sezer Might Not Approve Absent Steps on Primary Law 
 
 
¶11.  (C) If Parliament approves, President Sezer has to sign 
or reject the agreement by April 29.  Sezer's focus thus far 
has been the primary law issue.  DDG Eguz worries there is a 
"real danger" Sezer may not approve the agreement absent some 
further "irreversible" step from the Council on the primary 
law issue. 
 
 
¶12.  (C) If Sezer approves the agreement, prospects for a 
successful court challenge appear weak:  under Article 90 of 
Turkey's Constitution, "international agreements" cannot be 
challenged on a constitutional basis. 
 
 
Public Opinion 
 
 
¶13.  (U) In the immediate aftermath of Burgenstock, most 
Turkish media portrayed the agreement as meeting Turkey's 
essential demands.  Some media went even further, gloating 
about a Turkish "victory" over the Greek Cypriots.  Even 
nationalist Turkiye newspaper's April 2 headline trumpeted 
"The World Sees Cyprus Talks in Switzerland as a Victory for 
the Turks."  Subsequent media coverage has been more sober, 
pointing out both pluses and minuses of the plan for Turkey. 
 
 
¶14.  (U) Turkish public opinion, which a few weeks ago was 
negative on the Annan Plan, was swinging around in favor of 
an Annan Plan-based solution before the agreement.  Poll 
numbers on an Annan Plan-based solution have climbed steadily 
over the last four months.  A November 2003 poll showed 16% 
for, 53% against, 30% undecided; by January, the numbers were 
up to 23% for, 39% against, 38% undecided.  By March, polls 
showed 47% of the public in favor of an Annan Plan-based 
solution, 38% against, 14% undecided.  However, the same 
March poll yielded a contradictory result when respondents 
were asked about the GOT handling of Cyprus policy:  while 
57% of AK's supporters approved, only 38% of the overall 
public approved, versus 49% disapproval and 13% undecided. 
 
 
¶15.  (C) AKP is currently Turkey's best-organized party, and 
the rank and file, like its parliamentarians, will follow 
Erdogan's lead.  However, Firat estimates that AKP's Cyprus 
stance cost it 5%-6% in the municipal elections.  Unal 
attributes MHP's increased voting percentage (10.47% in 
March, compared to 8.36% in November 2003 general elections) 
to AKP's MHP-origin voters defecting over displeasure about 
Cyprus. 
 
 
Denktash's "No" Campaign 
 
 
¶16.  (C) Rauf Denktash is in the middle of a "no" campaign in 
Turkey, including a vintage stem-winder speech to a friendly 
audience in Bursa and meetings with President Sezer and PM 
Erdogan.  The campaign has aroused those already opposed to 
any agreement, but we see no evidence thus far that Denktash 
has made inroads beyond that.  Our MFA contacts are not 
worried the Denktash campaign will undo Ankara's internal 
consensus. 
 
 
Comment 
 
 
¶17.  (C) EU action along the lines of the April 2 paper Ziyal 
passed to Ambassador Edelman (e-mailed to the Department and 
Embassy Nicosia April 7) is now more important than ever to 
keeping Ankara's internal consensus together.  The April 5 
NSC meeting reveals the fissure that could develop -- the AK 
government on one side, the military and President on the 
other -- if this concern goes unmet. 
 
 
¶18. (C) In this regard, Erdogan must (1) manage the 
calculated public ambivalence of the Turkish military; (2) 
blunt the effect of Denktash's anti-settlement media 
campaign; (3) keep careful tabs on the thinking of narrowly 
legalistic President Sezer; and (4) control the temptation 
for major AK figures like Parliamentary Speaker Arinc and 
Deputy PM Sener to use the Cyprus issue for their own 
political ambitions.  However, sharing Erdogan's 
self-confidence, AKP contacts, from Firat to various other 
deputies, are convinced Erdogan will have no trouble 
convincing his parliamentary group to support ratification of 
an affirmative TC referendum; we will be making the rounds of 
our party contacts to gauge the effectiveness of Erdogan's 
forcefully delivered April 6 parliamentary group speech and 
the pro-settlement booklet AKP circulated to its deputies. 
EDELMAN