This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NASSAU 000487 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR TOM SHANNON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2014 
TAGS: PREL PGOV SMIG HA BF
SUBJECT: CARICOM SURPRISED, UPSET, BUT NOT ANGRY BEING LEFT 
OUT OF ARISTIDE'S DEPARTURE 
 
 
Classified By: CHARGE ROBERT M. WITAJEWSKI FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
SUMMARY 
- - - - 
 
¶1.  (C) Charge and Political Officer met with the Bahamian 
Ambassador to Haiti, Dr. Eugene Newry, and the Under 
Secretary in the Consular Section at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Bahamian-Haitian expert, Mr. Carlton Wright, on 
March 8, 2004 to discuss Bahamian views of the current 
situation in Haiti.  Ambassador Newry claimed that Caricom is 
not "angry" with the U.S. involvement in the departure of 
Aristide, but rather was "surprised" by the abrupt 
decision-making, and Caricom's lack of involvement.  Newry 
downplayed incendiary phrases in Caricom's statement on Haiti 
such as expressing "alarm and dismay" as matter-of-fact 
descriptions of members' disappointment, but on a positive 
note he was quick to say that Caricom will be satisfied as 
long as their 10-point action plan remains the basis for 
post-Aristide Haiti and is implemented "as quickly and 
painlessly as possible." Only history, declared Newry, can 
determine whether or not ex-President Aristide left 
voluntarily, because neither he (i.e., The Bahamas) nor his 
regional colleagues were involved in that process. Bahamian 
officials were extremely complimentary and positive about 
joint U.S.-Bahamian efforts to deter or interdict intending 
Haitian immigrants. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
 
"LIKE A RIVER, THINGS MUST MOVE ON" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (C) At a meeting with the Charge, Bahamian Ambassador to 
Haiti, Dr. Eugene Newry, characterized Caricom's harshly 
worded "Statement on the Situation in Haiti" as "frank," but 
was not a message of "anger."  In fact, he said he and fellow 
Bahamian officials were quite pleased that changes being 
implemented now in Haiti, such as the Tripartite Council and 
the Council of Eminent Persons, come straight from the 
10-Point Caricom Plan for Haiti.  In Newry's opinion, the 
only place in which Caricom has disagreed with the Opposition 
was in its desire for the Democratic Platform to be the only 
political group. 
 
¶3.  (C) Although Ambassador Newry suggested that Caricom's 
members were irritated with the lack of consultation and the 
abruptness by which Aristide left office, he also indicated 
that Caricom is pleased, nonetheless, that its plan is 
apparently still being implemented.  As he put it, "a rose by 
any other name is still a rose."  He said he will leave it to 
the historians to determine what exactly happened on the 
night Aristide fled Haiti.  However, he concluded, Caricom 
needs to get over its pique because "like a river, things 
must move on", and he understood that Haiti cannot advance 
without the help that only the United States with the 
ancillary support of other "major powers" such as Canada and 
France could deliver. 
 
 
WHEN WILL CARICOM RE-ENGAGE? 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4.  (C)  When asked at what The Bahamas would "re-engage" in 
Haiti, Ambassador Newry ardently argued that neither Caricom 
nor The Bahamas has ever "disengaged" from Haiti.  He 
stressed that he only left Haiti for "consultations" with the 
Bahamian Government, and that as the only Caricom ambassador 
actually resident in Haiti, he plans to return "shortly." 
When pressed, however, Ambassador Newry acknowledged that he 
couldn't define a time frame.  But, he hastened to add, from 
Nassau he was in "daily contact" with Ambassador Foley and 
both pro-Aristide and opposition figures in Haiti. 
 
¶5.  (C)  From a personnel standpoint, Ambassador Newry 
admitted that Caricom would not be involved in the initial 
multinational interim force in Haiti, but said that Caricom 
would be willing to participate -- if only symbolically -- in 
the follow-on stabilization UN presence.  He thinks that this 
stabilization phase could start as early as the next 60 days. 
 
INTERIM HAITIAN GOVERNMENT - NOT TOO SHABBY 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶6.  (C)  Ambassador Newry told Charge and political officer 
that he was pleasantly surprised with the transition now 
occurring.  He indicated that it was a good sign that the 
Haitian people overall had focused their mistrust and dislike 
on the ex-President.  He said that his contacts with the 
opposition has assured him that they would continue to work 
with the Lavalas party and that the party itself had not been 
tainted by the same image of corruption as was ex-President 
Aristide.  Newry also found to be positive the fact that the 
interim government retained some of the people closely 
associated with ex-President Aristide in positions of power. 
Ambassador Newry took this as a sign of good faith on the 
part of the opposition. 
 
¶7.  (C) Discussing the composition of the interim authority, 
Ambassador Newry was optimistic.  He knew personally and 
professionally many of the members of the Tripartite 
Committee as well as the Council of Eminent Persons and 
considered them of high calibre.  He also considered it an 
asset that these individuals were not predominantly 
attorneys, but rather surgeons, sociologists, and other 
professionals. 
 
¶8. (C)  The Bahamian representative in Haiti believed that it 
would be premature to try to hold elections in the near 
future.  In his view, he thought that it would take at least 
90 days for the interim government to re-establish itself. 
Newry did not believe that the country's political parties 
would be prepared to hold meaningful elections for at least 
twelve to eighteen months, at best. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Asked about the danger of the interim authority 
using the period until elections to consolidate its power and 
thereby arrange to win the forthcoming elections, Ambassador 
Newry said that this had been anticipated by Caricom in its 
action plan.  As a consequence, one of the key elements in 
Caricom's action plan was a stipulation that no one in the 
transitional government in Haiti can run for office once the 
permanent government is established.  Ambassador Newry saw 
this provision as a "sign of maturity" and a way to  prevent 
innumerable problems. 
 
 
U.S.- BAHAMIAN COOPERATION 
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¶10. (C)  Turning to U.S.-Bahamian cooperation to prevent an 
outflow of Haitian migrants to either The Bahamas or to the 
United States, the Bahamian Foreign Ministry officials were 
effusive in their praise of the current effort. The U.S., and 
Bahamian, presence in the Windward Passage had "never been so 
successful" in deterring an outflow of illegal migrants, 
Newry declared.  While noting the costs of such an on-going 
operation, both Newry and Wright acknowledged that it was 
still much less expensive for The Bahamas that would be the 
total costs of detaining, maintaining, and then re-patriating 
illegal Haitian migrants once they reached The Bahamas. 
 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
¶10.  (C)  Ambassador Newry was perhaps overreaching in trying 
to put a positive spin on Caricom's March 3 statement on 
Haiti and reflecting more of the real politik position that 
The Bahamas takes regarding Haitian migration than the more 
ideological position of some of the other, less affected, 
Caricom members. Newry has also briefed both the Prime 
Minister and the Cabinet en banc on the situation in Haiti 
and his effusive praise of U.S.-Bahamian cooperation in the 
Windward Passage reflects the realism of Prime Minister Perry 
Christie and Deputy Prime Minister Cynthia Pratt than Foreign 
Minister Fred Mitchell.  Surprisingly, Newry downplayed 
ex-President Aristide's attempt to remain engaged from afar. 
He did not think that Aristide's attempts to regain support 
via press encounters in the Central African Republic would 
impact on future Haiti developments.  His one caveat was that 
Aristide's Lavalas Party is still extremely organized, 
especially relative to the loose coalition of opposition 
"parties" united only by a negative...their opposition to 
Aristide.  His fear was that Aristide's support network would 
re-group in time for the next set of elections while the 
Opposition coalition would fall apart fall once the "negative 
force," i.e., Aristide, disappeared from the scene as an 
effective player. 
WITAJEWSKI