This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 002561 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2014 
TAGS: ASEC KCRM KJUS PGOV PTER CO AUC
SUBJECT: PARAMILITARY PEACE DIFFICULTIES 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood for reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d) 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (S) At the instruction of President Uribe, Peace 
Negotiator Restrepo met with the Ambassador to discuss 
difficulties in the GOC's negotiations with the AUC 
paramilitaries.  Restrepo said the AUC had called for written 
guarantees from the GOC that, during the concentration phase, 
AUC members facing arrest warrants would neither be jailed 
nor extradited to the United States.  The AUC also wanted a 
two-step system that gave demobilizing forces several months 
within concentration areas before judicial reviews began on 
individual criminal behavior.  The Ambassador opposed lifting 
arrest warrants on paramilitaries during the initial 
demobilization phase as this would reduce compliance 
incentives.  He also cautioned against delaying the judicial 
screening of concentrated paramilitary personnel.  He 
observed that the lack of transparency in the Medellin 
demobilization undermined support for the larger paramilitary 
peace process, and recommended that the GOC publicly 
highlight what had been achieved.  Restrepo noted that, as a 
result of GOC military pressure, the Central Bolivar Bloc had 
taken the potentially significant decision to pull out of key 
areas, including Barrancabermeja.  Carlos Castano still 
flirted with the idea of turning himself in to the United 
States.  The Ambassador urged Restrepo to develop a more 
integrated interagency approach to support the AUC process. 
End Summary. 
 
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Ambassador Meets with High Commissioner for Peace 
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¶2.  (C) High Commissioner for Peace Luis Carlos Restrepo 
called upon the Ambassador March 9 at President Uribe's 
instruction to provide an update on the paramilitary peace 
process.  Restrepo was concerned that discussions with 
paramilitaries were at a critical juncture. 
 
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Concentration Areas and Arrest Warrants 
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¶3.  (S) Restrepo said his main objective during his March 5 
negotiations with the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia 
(AUC) was to secure their commitment to concentrate their 
forces in specific geographic zones.  Concentrations were 
indispensable for the GOC to verify the paramilitaries' 
compliance with the cease-fire. 
 
¶4.  (S) Restrepo said AUC leaders vehemently opposed 
concentrating their combatants without a GOC written 
commitment that paramilitary members would neither be 
arrested nor extradited to the U.S. while involved in the 
troop concentration phase.  The AUC wanted U.S. endorsement 
of this agreement.  This stance appeared to be the result of 
mid-level paramilitary leaders seeking complete protection 
from jail or extradition.  AUC leaders also argued that the 
"security" they provided was necessary and would not be 
available if they concentrated in zones. 
 
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Overcoming the Impasse 
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¶5.  (S) Restrepo noted that the March 5 discussions would 
have broken off had it not been for an emotional plea by AUC 
leader Carlos Castano to agree in principle to geographic 
concentration, pending further consideration of shielding 
paramilitary members from jail during the concentration 
phase.  Restrepo had considered two solutions to the issue. 
One, lifting individual arrest orders for a limited time, had 
already been discarded.  Another approach was lifting arrest 
orders for individuals in specific geographic areas.  He also 
mused whether the GOC could broach the issue of extradition 
with the paramilitaries. 
 
¶6.  (S) Restrepo observed that it was difficult to see how 
paramilitary leaders could carry out their demobilization 
tasks if they could not be temporarily shielded from arrest. 
Nevertheless, President Uribe was concerned that the time was 
not yet ripe for the GOC to lift arrest orders on 
paramilitaries and had consistently opposed negotiating the 
extradition issue with the paramilitaries.  The USG also had 
been clear that it opposed lifting the arrest orders for 
specific individuals involved in peace talks and 
concentration/demobilization.  Restrepo requested USG views. 
 
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Ambassador's Response 
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¶7.  (S) The Ambassador observed that the paramilitary 
ceasefire, although imperfectly observed, already had saved 
many lives.  He endorsed the GOC's insistence that the 
paramilitaries concentrate their forces; a concentration 
would enable the GOC to verify paramilitary compliance with 
the ceasefire and agreement terms.  It would also separate 
paramilitaries that genuinely want to demobilize from those 
who do not.  Some paramilitary elements would remain heavily 
involved in narcotics trafficking.  The United States 
rejected the AUC's argument that they provided security in 
certain regions; they were terrorists.  Security was the job 
of the GOC. 
 
¶8.  (S) The Ambassador urged against formally lifting arrest 
warrants against paramilitaries, especially prior to their 
having complied with all the terms of any agreement.  Such a 
concession would reduce the GOC's leverage.  Regarding 
extradition, the Ambassador recalled that Uribe assured the 
United States that neither the "conditional parole" bill nor 
any agreement reached with the AUC would impair the 
extradition process.  The United States still relied on this 
position. 
 
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Restrepo Pushed for Temporary Mechanism 
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¶9.  (S) Restrepo said he accepted the Ambassador's rationale 
for not formally lifting arrest warrants on the 
paramilitaries to maintain GOC leverage during the 
demobilization/reintegration process.  However, he insisted 
that some kind of temporary, carefully-defined mechanism was 
needed to shield paramilitary leaders from arrest while they 
carried out accord commitments.  The paramilitaries would not 
enter into a concentration phase without some guarantee.  The 
Ambassador advised Restrepo to seek a practical solution, 
leaving arrest warrants in place.  AUC leaders could acquire 
the freedom to move within and between zones of 
concentration, solely in order to ensure that concentration 
was a success. 
 
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Judicial Screening 
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¶10.  (S) Restrepo said that the paramilitaries' wariness 
about being arrested after concentrating led them to refuse 
to have their personnel reviewed by the Prosecutor General's 
Office (Fiscalia) during the concentration phase.  The 
judicial screening approach used in the Medellin 
demobilization had led to the prosecution of a substantial 
number of Cacique Nutibara Bloc members.  Because a 
"conditional parole" law was not in effect, the Fiscalia was 
obligated to prosecute those wanted for serious crimes.  As a 
result, the paramilitaries wanted to wait three months after 
concentration, ostensibly to build confidence, before being 
interrogated by the Fiscalia. 
 
¶11.  (S) The Ambassador said that concentrating paramilitary 
forces would be a positive development.  Nevertheless, 
delaying judicial screening would create a break point in 
negotiations that the paramilitaries could exploit.  Restrepo 
conceded the Ambassador's point, but reiterated his doubt 
that he could persuade the paramilitaries to accept judicial 
screening soon after concentration. 
 
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Medellin Process 
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¶12. (S) The Ambassador observed that the public's limited 
understanding of the Medellin demobilization negatively 
affected the overall perception of the AUC peace process. 
The GOC should publicize details of the Medellin process to 
overcome the perception that it was synonymous with impunity. 
 Restrepo responded that the division of institutional 
responsibilities complicated projecting a unified message on 
the Medellin process.  (Note: The High Commissioner for Peace 
had a coordinating role, the mayor's office provided jobs and 
training, the Peace Commission of Antioquia and the Church 
helped verify compliance, and the Fiscalia conducted judicial 
screening.)  Restrepo acknowledged that releasing information 
on Medellin demobilization's judicial screening would correct 
the perception of immunity.  He noted that, of approximately 
870 demobilized in Medellin, 75 faced legal charges and 18 
were in prison awaiting prosecution.  To overcome AUC 
concerns, Restrepo wanted to downplay the judicial screening 
process until after the "conditional parole" bill was 
approved. 
 
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Central Bolivar Bloc 
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¶13.  (S) Restrepo said that the Central Bolivar Bloc (BCB), 
which had skittishly participated in demobilization 
discussions, had announced -- and appeared committed to 
carrying out -- a withdrawal from key points in the Middle 
Magdalena region, including the city of Barrancabermeja. 
Restrepo judged that a key factor behind the BCB's withdrawal 
had been increased GOC military pressure.  Another possible 
factor was that the BCB wanted to create a security vacuum. 
 
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Castano 
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¶14.  (S) Restrepo noted that Castano had played a decisive 
role in moving the AUC demobilization discussions forward. 
Of all the paramilitary leaders, he was the most committed to 
reaching an agreement.  As a result, many of the other 
paramilitary leaders viewed Castano as a potential traitor, 
and he was clearly apprehensive about his own security. 
Within the AUC, military power had decisively shifted to 
Salvatore Mancuso.  Restrepo characterized Castano as 
schizophrenic on the possibility of turning himself in to 
U.S. authorities.  At times Castano defiantly scorned the 
danger he faced, while at others he voiced the possibility of 
turning himself over to the U.S.  The GOC, said Restrepo, 
would welcome such a voluntary handover. 
 
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Greater GOC Coordination 
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¶15.  (SBU) The Ambassador urged Restrepo to work closely with 
Minister of Defense Uribe and Minister of Interior/Justice 
Pretelt to develop a coordinated interagency structure, with 
clearly defined responsibilities to support the AUC 
demobilization process.  U.S. assistance to the process could 
not be considered until the process was fully defined. 
Restrepo concurred, noting that the Ministries of Defense and 
Interior/Justice were finalizing their proposed division of 
labor. 
WOOD