This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000047 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR S. DELISI, L. AROIAN, M. RAYNOR 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER, D. TEITELBAUM 
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY 
PARIS FOR C. NEARY 
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2009 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ECON ZI MDC
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION LEADER UPBEAT ON 2004 
 
REF: (A) 03 HARARE 2455 (B) 03 HARARE 2443 (C) 03 
 
     HARARE 2412 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Win Dayton under Section 1.5(b)(d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: With qualified optimism, MDC President 
Morgan Tsvangirai offered an assessment of Zimbabwe's 
political landscape to Ambassador Sullivan during lunch on 
January 7 at the Residence.  Tsvangirai identified 
mobilization of membership, coordination with civil society, 
and improving the election environment as tactical party 
priorities in the coming year.  He was non-committal about 
mass action and held out the possibility that the MDC would 
not participate in elections if election atmospherics and 
mechanics did not improve.  While still skeptical of South 
African President Mbeki's motives, Tsvangirai surmised that 
Mbeki had pressed Mugabe meaningfully during his December 
visit and predicted that the GOZ would be more susceptible to 
foreign pressure in coming months.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Party Mobilization, Election Preparations 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Accompanied by MDC Secretary for Presidential Affairs 
Gandi Mudzingwa, Tsvangirai expressed appreciation for 
Secretary Powell's response to his letter last month.  He 
 
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said he was pleased with the results of last month's MDC 
national conference (ref A), which fostered grassroots 
momentum among middle class and rural constituencies. 
Further mobilization of those constituencies would absorb 
substantial party energy in coming months, in part with a 
view to mass action.  Tsvangirai did not say when mass action 
might commence but indicated that it would require close 
coordination with civil society groups. 
 
¶3.  (C) Tsvangirai indicated that the party's preoccupation 
with training, building, and reinforcing party structures and 
motivating the membership would be geared in large party to 
election preparations.  He expected that parliamentary 
elections would be conducted within six to 18 months, 
depending on when ZANU-PF perceived it had the strongest 
advantage.  The intimidating environment and GOZ control of 
election administration continued to offer the ruling party a 
prohibitive advantage.  The MDC would consider boycotting 
elections altogether if the situation did not improve, 
although he conceded that the party risked sliding into 
irrelevance if it walked away.  In that vein, MDC 
participation in elections would depend largely on 
international posture toward the election environment and the 
ruling party. 
 
Change in Ruling Party Posture? 
------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Tsvangirai asserted that ZANU-PF may be more 
attentive to international opinion in coming months.  For 
example, the ruling party may be reluctant to manipulate 
elections to yield itself the two thirds parliamentary 
majority it would like in order to engineer controversial 
constitutional changes.  He noted that the GOZ had signalled 
interest in re-engaging with the Bretton Woods institutions, 
which would likely entail enhancing the credibility of both 
economic policy and the political situation.  Indeed, the 
country's dire economic straits -- of late manifested in the 
precarious financial sector -- left the ruling party little 
choice but to work on its international credibility in 
economic and political spheres.  New Reserve Bank Chairman 
Gideon Gono's rise to prominence gave the regime a confident 
voice for re-engagement.  Tsvangirai concluded that the 
ruling party would not sacrifice these longer term interests 
for the short-term expedience of getting a two thirds 
majority. 
 
¶5.  (C) According to Tsvangirai, Mbeki's visit (ref B) helped 
to drive home to Mugabe the imperative of political progress. 
 Mbeki would have had to impress on Mugabe the length to 
which he had gone for Mugabe and the extent to which Mbeki's 
own credibility was on the line domestically, regionally, and 
internationally.  Tsvangirai trusted that Mbeki had elicited 
from Mugabe a commitment to dialogue, and hoped that Mugabe's 
exit was "part and parcel" of the commitment.  Tsvangirai 
added that the CHOGM affair further underscored South 
Africa's importance to Zimbabwe, and Mugabe would have to 
deliver something.  Nonetheless, ZANU-PF still appeared to be 
playing for time a month, a week, a day at a time -- a 
situation that effectively diluted the impact of outside 
pressure. 
 
¶6.  (C) Tsvangirai confirmed that there was no progress since 
Mbeki's visit toward recommencement of interparty talks. 
Mbeki's assignment to the parties was to work out a program 
for talks, which would require more work by MDC negotiating 
team and additional engagement between party Secretary 
General Welshman Ncube and Minister of Justice Patrick 
Chinamasa.  He concluded that substantive progress would be 
impossible while Mugabe was out of the country.  (NOTE: The 
GOZ reports that Mugabe is "on leave" until the end of 
January.  He reportedly plans to be in Asia much of that 
time, beginning with Indonesia and Malaysia.  South African 
Ambassador Ndou advised Ambassador (septel) that SAG expected 
progress toward talks to continue regardless of Mugabe's 
absence.  END NOTE.) 
 
Land Reform 
----------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Commenting on the MDC land reform policy articulated 
at the national conference, Tsvangirai asserted that it was 
an approach that should benefit and appeal to the masses, 
including the poor.  He confirmed that there was no going 
back to Zimbabwe's status quo ante.  Imparting value to the 
land, including the communal areas, was a central priority. 
Considerable attention would be required to establish a model 
for allocation of titles.  A rationalization exercise -- 
grounded on consistent plot sizes, one farm per family, 
productive capacity -- would weed out many but not all of the 
current beneficiaries of GOZ land reform.  Beneficiaries with 
alternative viable occupations, such as civil servants and 
military personnel, would likely be given a choice between 
land and position.  The new system would significantly alter 
traditional patronage relationships and means of social 
control in rural areas.  A transparent, widely consultative 
process would be key in assuring the program's success. 
Tsvangirai conceded that the party would have difficulty 
 
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overcoming official obstacles in publicizing the program to 
rural areas, and would have to rely on the party's growing 
personally based networks. 
 
Harare Hassles 
-------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Tsvangirai confirmed newspaper reports that the 
investigative report into alleged corruption and 
mismanagement by Harare's City Council and Mayor Mudzuri (ref 
C) was complete but had yet to be released.  He predicted 
that the report would be relatively objective and would 
identify legitimate shortcomings that would fall short of 
justifying dismissal.  At the same time, Mudzuri's 
uncooperative interaction with the investigating commission 
would likely reflect poorly on him in the report.  The 
Council suffered from inexperience and susceptibility to 
corruption but seemed to be gaining competence with the 
passage of time, in part because of MDC efforts to organize 
and discipline wayward members.  He noted that Christopher 
Mushonga was one of the more experienced councillors but 
suffered flaws such as unseemly patronage arrangements. 
 
¶9.  (C) According to Tsvangirai, municipal administration put 
ZANU-PF in a quandary.  Local Government Minister Chombo was 
working hard to hamstring MDC-controlled municipalities, 
especially Harare, but dismissing the Harare Mayor and 
Council outright would undercut efforts to burnish the 
government's image internationally.  In the end, he expected 
the process to serve as a "verbal warning" to Harare's MDC 
administration.  If personnel were dismissed, new elections 
would yield a new or rejuvenated MDC-dominated council in any 
event.  Tsvangirai underscored the value of USAID assistance 
that would help MDC municipal administration and urged that 
we explore opportunities in this area. 
 
Regional Outreach 
----------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Tsvangirai expressed satisfaction with continuing MDC 
efforts to engage regional leaders and parties.  The party 
planned following up soon with Nigeria, Senegal, and Kenya, 
and was interested in tapping Ghanaian experiences in 
election organization.  Tsvangirai acknowledged with the 
appreciation the "courage" of Botswana's supportive efforts. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Tsvangirai was surprisingly upbeat in his new year's 
tour d'horizon.  We remain skeptical.  The insecurity, lack 
of meaningful debate, and combustible rhetoric associated 
with the ZANU-PF national conference and CHOGM fall-out 
suggest a hardened ruling party posture, notwithstanding 
Gono's refreshing voice and Mbeki's efforts.  Early litmus 
tests of GOZ sincerity likely will include progress in the 
Ncube-Chinamasa engagement, disposition of the Harare 
Council/Mayor controversy, Tsvangirai's treason trial (due to 
recommence January 19), and adjudication of the MDC's 
election petition (also likely to resume this month). 
SULLIVAN