This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BRUSSELS 000014 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/P - DR. REISS 
STATE FOR EUR/ERA, EUR/RPM, S/CT, NP, IO/UNP 
NSC FOR KURT VOLKER AND TRACY MCKIBBEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2013 
TAGS: PREL PTER PARM KNNP MARR MCAP EAID SOCI NATO OSCE UNSC EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY IN CONTEXT: ANALYSIS 
AND COMMENT 
 
REF: A. USEU TODAY 12/11/03 
 
     ¶B. USEU TODAY 12/05/03 
     ¶C. USEU TODAY 10/30/03 
     ¶D. USEU TODAY 10/24/03 
     ¶E. USEU TODAY 10/09/03 
     ¶F. 03 BRUSSELS 5594 
     ¶G. 03 BRUSSELS 5520 
     ¶H. 03 BRUSSELS 4424 
     ¶I. 03 BRUSSELS 4143 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: USEU Poloff Van Reidhead for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d) 
 
------------------ 
Summary and Comment 
------------------- 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The final draft of EU HiRep Javier Solana's 
European Security Strategy (ESS) -- adopted by EU heads of 
state at their December 12-13 Brussels Summit -- envisages a 
world of dangerous but preventable threats, multilateral 
solutions, and stabilizing partnerships.  The ESS identifies 
five (up from the earlier draft's three) primary threats: 
terrorism, WMD proliferation, regional conflicts, state 
failure, and organized crime.  The strategy highlights 
"effective multilateralism" as the key to dealing with these 
challenges, and recommends that the EU become more active, 
more capable and more coherent in its approach to new 
security challenges, and that it work more with key partners, 
especially the U.S.  The revised ESS -- formally titled "A 
Secure Europe in a Better World" -- also recognizes the 
central role of NATO in European security, and highlights 
Berlin Plus as a valuable framework for NATO-EU strategic 
relations.  As Secretary Powell said at the December 4 
NATO-EU Ministerial, the ESS is a good basis for future 
cooperation. 
 
¶2. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED:  The revised ESS leaves unanswered 
the tough question of what to do when international rules are 
broken and multilateral efforts fail.  It avoids, as did the 
earlier text, any discussion of when and under what 
conditions the EU would resort to the use of force (ref. I). 
Rather than address the issue head on, the EU hopes to avoid 
it altogether through "preventive engagement" and by 
strengthening the international system so that rules either 
will not or cannot be broken.  But the EU still recognizes 
that this is only a partial, stopgap response.  The ESS hints 
at what will surely be a contentious future debate by saying 
that Europe "must be ready to act" when the rules are broken. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
¶3. (C) COMMENT:  This is the first time the EU has tried to 
develop an over-arching security concept, and reflects the 
sense after the Iraq crisis that the EU needed a better 
strategic framework for developing common positions to 
emerging crises.  But the Iraq crisis only accelerated a 
process that was probably inevitable.  The EU, while far from 
supranational, is considerably more than an international 
organization or a customs union.  It is a union of states 
which, having already pooled sovereignty on a wide range of 
vital economic and commercial interests, now wants to speak 
with unity and credibility on security affairs.  EU 
interlocutors, including Political and Security Committee 
Ambassadors and Council DG Robert Cooper, have told us time 
and again that among its other hats, the EU is fast becoming 
a security organization. 
 
¶4. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED:  The ESS represents the current, if 
not ultimate, limit of European consensus on security. 
Wiggle room remains in the details, but for now, the EU has 
found its strategic voice: The EU is not yet ready to commit 
to pre-emptive use of force; the EU will renew its commitment 
to multilateral solutions, while recognizing the need to make 
them more effective; the EU will continue in partnership with 
the U.S., and honor its arrangement with NATO.  We expect the 
EU to be increasingly assertive with its newfound strategic 
vision, and less nervous about its disagreements with the 
U.S. 
 
¶5. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED:  If a crisis like Iraq were to 
erupt again now, Europe would be no less divided than it was 
last year.  But in five, ten or twenty years' time, the ESS 
and the common ground it represents can provide a foundation 
for a more united Europe -- even in a crisis like Iraq. 
Whether a united EU would agree with our position or not is 
unclear.  We have an opportunity, however, to influence the 
outcome.  A strategic security dialogue with EU policy 
planners, as offered by Secretary Powell at the November 18 
U.S.-EU Ministerial, represents a valuable opportunity to 
influence the development of an increasingly assertive EU 
role in the world.  While forcefully arguing our own 
positions -- on NATO, on responses to terrorism, 
proliferation, and regional crises -- we should also accept 
that the EU now has the elements of a distinctly European 
strategic worldview -- one that will usually if not always 
agree with our own, and one that will only strengthen over 
time.  END COMMENT. 
 
Note: The revised ESS is now available at 
http://ue.eu.int/pressdata/en/reports/78367.p df 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Threats: Remembering the Old with the New 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) The revised ESS retains the original text's 
description of terrorism and WMD proliferation as 
unprecedented and qualitatively different sorts of threats 
than the world has henceforth known.  But it departs from the 
original by discussing in more depth the continuing danger 
posed by three conventional threats: state failure, organized 
crime, and regional conflict.  The revised ESS underscores 
the role of the conventional threats in facilitating the new 
ones (terrorism and proliferation thrive on organized crime 
and failed states; regional conflict breeds extremism; and so 
forth).  Senior Solana Advisor Niall Burgess tells us that 
the coming year will see further work to break down the 
concept of state failure into a taxonomy of failure -- i.e. 
weak, failing, failed -- that the EU can use to create 
targeted approaches for each stage (ref. E). 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Confronting the Threats and the Use of Force 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) The international press has made much in recent days 
of the ESS' substitute of the term "pre-emptive engagement," 
used in the first draft, for "preventive engagement," favored 
in the final (ref. B).  Pundits lined up to claim the EU has 
watered down its security strategy by backing away from the 
more forceful word.  Not wanting to sound too soft, the EU 
maintains that this semantic variation means nothing (an EU 
Troika told EUR/DAS Bradtke December 10 that it helps with 
translation into some EU languages).  This is a debate over 
the lightest shades of gray.  The widely variant defense 
doctrines and strategic traditions of EU member states 
ensured that both drafts of the ESS would be "soft." 
Possibly not until Europe faces an existential peril -- such 
as a devastating terrorist attack, or a WMD-armed rogue state 
in its neighborhood -- will the EU be able to join consensus 
on the tough questions surrounding justified use of military 
force. 
 
¶8. (C) But having for the time being ruled out serious 
consideration of conditions for the use of force, what then 
is left for a security doctrine to discuss?  What does the 
ESS mean when it says that the EU "needs to develop a 
strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when 
necessary, robust intervention?"  How can the EU convince 
rule-breaking states that their actions will have serious 
consequences?  How can Europe deter would-be proliferators 
and combat terrorism so that the devastating attack never 
happens? 
 
¶9. (C) For the Europeans, the answer lies in "effective 
multilateralism" and assertive, full-spectrum engagement -- 
an approach for which the ESS says "the EU is particularly 
well equipped."  To combat terrorism, the ESS calls for a 
"mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, military and 
other means" (the earlier draft said "intelligence, 
political, military and other means").  To counter 
proliferation, the EU should focus on export controls and 
political and economic pressures, while also tackling "the 
underlying political causes" of proliferation.  (Note: The 
insistence on export controls and external pressures 
generally tracks with our own views, but the latter element 
problematically implies that proliferation is a justifiable 
response to regional insecurity.)  Reflecting recent EU 
developments in nonproliferation policy, the revised ESS also 
says the EU is committed to universalizing and strengthening 
multilateral nonproliferation regimes. 
 
¶10. (U) The ESS calls for political solutions to regional 
conflicts, but recognizes that military and police assets, as 
well as economic instruments and civilian reconstruction 
expertise, may be needed in the post-conflict stage.  Failed 
states require a similar mix of instruments.  On organized 
crime, the revised strategy picks up where the earlier draft 
left off by acknowledging the special problem of criminal 
networks originating in the Balkans.  The solution, it says, 
is democracy, good governance, and cooperation with local 
authorities. 
 
---------------------------- 
More Multilateralism, Please 
---------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) The strategy makes a bold pitch for the EU to take a 
larger role in world affairs (commensurate with its role in 
economic and trade matters), and lays claim to the EU's 
self-ascribed comparative advantage in combined 
civil-military and post-conflict operations.  Most 
importantly, it calls for threats to European security, new 
and old alike, to be addressed through "effective 
multilateralism" whenever possible. 
 
¶12. (C) For the EU, the United Nations is the embodiment of 
legitimate multilateralism, so it comes as no surprise that 
the ESS calls the UN Charter "the fundamental framework for 
international relations."  At the December 12-13 EU Summit, 
which adopted the ESS, European leaders went further by 
reaffirming "the deeply rooted commitment of the EU to make 
effective multilateralism a central element of its external 
actions, with at its heart a strong UN."  The EU can be 
expected to enhance its collective position in the UN by 
leveraging the combined influence, and votes, of EU member 
states.  Much of this effort is likely to arise from 
recommendations put forth in a European Commission paper 
released in September (and welcomed by heads of state at the 
December 12-13 EU Summit).  That paper, titled "The European 
Union and the United Nations: The Choice of Multilateralism," 
calls on the EU to work for a more effective and efficient 
UN, to deepen the EU-UN relationship, including on peace and 
security issues, and to promote the EU's values and interests 
in UN debates (ref. H).  The September EU-UN Joint 
Declaration on cooperation in crisis management provides 
early evidence of this rapidly deepening partnership. 
 
¶13. (C) Unfortunately, the ESS fails to address adequately 
the question of what the EU should do if multilateral efforts 
fail.  The Europeans still find it difficult to answer the 
question of how to deal with states or non-state actors that 
defy the international community, or seek to circumvent 
accepted rules of behavior.  As we saw in their approach in 
Iraq, and are seeing again in Iran, the Europeans advocate 
carrot-and-stick diplomacy that is heavy on the carrot but 
extremely reluctant to use the stick. 
 
¶14. (C) Nevertheless, the ESS stands firm where it can by 
declaring that the EU "must be ready to act when the rules 
are broken... Those who are unwilling (to play by the rules) 
should understand that there is a price to be paid, including 
in their relationship with the European Union."  This is a 
small step, but one in the right direction.  And for a union 
ruled by consensus, which has sometimes seemed to view 
multilateralism as both a means and an end, the assertion, no 
matter how mild, that forceful measures may sometimes be 
needed represents an evolving worldview that would have been 
all but unthinkable just a year or two ago. 
 
------------------------- 
What About the Neighbors? 
------------------------- 
¶15. (U) As with the earlier draft, the revised ESS devotes 
considerable attention to the problems of Europe's neighbors. 
 Along with countering the new threats through effective 
multilateralism and preventive engagement, building a ring of 
security around the enlarged EU stands as a key European 
strategic objective.  This is not new.  For some years the EU 
has recognized that its expansion would bring it closer to 
the troubled areas of Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the 
Mediterranean rim.  In response, the EU created mechanisms to 
promote stabilization, reform and development in these 
regions (the Wider Europe Initiative for Eastern and 
Southeastern Europe, the Stability and Association Process 
for the Balkans, and the Barcelona Process for the 
Mediterranean). 
 
¶16. (C) The ESS broadens Europe's definition of neighborhood 
to include the Southern Caucasus and possibly even the 
Greater Middle East.  New language in the revised ESS calls 
on the EU to "take a stronger and more active interest in the 
problems of the Southern Caucasus."  Interlocutors in 
Solana's Policy Planning Unit and on the Council 
Secretariat's Southern Caucasus desk speak of a new EU 
 
SIPDIS 
willingness to consider near-term inclusion of the Southern 
Caucasus in the EU's Wider Europe Initiative (long a U.S. 
objective for EU action) (ref. A). 
 
¶17. (C) On the Middle East, the EU's first priority is to 
resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, then to wrestle 
with other regional problems.  Reflecting growing European 
frustrations over the stalled Roadmap, the revised ESS adds 
new language committing the EU to "remain engaged and ready 
to commit resources to the problem until it is solved."  At 
the same time, the EU is developing a regional strategy for 
the Middle East that recognizes, much like our own, the need 
to promote reform throughout the Greater Middle East (ref. 
F).  EU leaders welcomed this effort at the December 12-13 
Summit, and asked HiRep Solana, along with the Council and 
Commission, to present a "joint report, within the 
implementation of the European Security Strategy," by March 
¶2004.  We expect this to be a high priority for the EU in the 
coming months. 
 
------------------------------- 
More Active, Capable, Coherent? 
------------------------------- 
 
¶18. (C) The ESS section on policy implications for Europe 
represents a call to action for European governments.  The 
ESS argues that to address the threats the EU must become 
"more active, more coherent and more capable."  EU 
governments need to act before situations deteriorate, and 
develop the will to increase defense spending and procurement 
coordination to ensure interoperability and avoid 
duplication.  The ESS highlights planning for the EU 
armaments agency -- slated to begin work in 2004 -- as a good 
first step.  This will have a positive impact as long as it 
is coordinated well with NATO and doesn't lead to a "Fortress 
Europe" procurement approach.  The ESS also calls for greater 
civilian capacity to address the needs of crisis and 
post-crisis situations, and to increase intelligence sharing 
and diplomatic coordination among member states. 
 
¶19. (C) There is also positive potential in the strategy's 
call for greater coherence.  The EU's CFSP (foreign) and ESDP 
(defense) policies have thus far grown in awkward, disjointed 
ways.  "The challenge now," the ESS argues, "is to bring 
together the different instruments and capabilities: 
European assistance programs, military and civilian 
capabilities from Member States and other instruments such as 
the European Development Fund."  To the extent that this 
represents a willingness to link political, aid and trade 
relations to security concerns, it is positive.  This is 
already underway with regard to nonproliferation: on November 
17, the Council adopted a position requiring that all EU 
relations with third countries be linked to progress on 
upholding international nonproliferation norms (septel). 
Commission officials tell us that Syria, with which the 
Commission initialed an Association Agreement in December, 
will be the first country to sign the EU's new 
"nonproliferation clause" (ref. G). 
----------------------------------------- 
Transatlantic Relations, NATO, and Russia 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶20. (C) The ESS acknowledges that the U.S. remains Europe's 
greatest ally and most valuable partner.  The revised text 
calls the transatlantic relationship "irreplaceable," and 
says that "(the EU's) aim should be an effective and balanced 
partnership with the U.S.A."  The call for an effective and 
balanced partnership, new to the revised ESS, reflects the 
European desire to enhance credibility by boosting (mostly 
military) capabilities; in so doing, the Europeans hope to 
earn a stronger voice in Washington. 
 
¶21. (C) The revised ESS also adds positive new language on 
NATO: "The EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular 
Berlin Plus, enhance the operational capability of the EU and 
provide the framework for the strategic partnership between 
the two organizations in crisis management.  This reflects 
our common determination to tackle the challenges of the new 
century."  The positive decision to clarify NATO's role in 
European security, and to highlight Berlin Plus in 
particular, reflects what Solana Advisor Burgess described as 
a "widespread view that we got it wrong" in the first draft 
(ref. D).  In that text, NATO was characterized as a 
reflection of the transatlantic relationship.  In the final 
version, the Alliance is afforded an independent identity, 
reflected in the language above. 
 
¶22. (C) The ESS paints a three-tier picture of the EU's 
strategic partnerships -- with the U.S. on top; Russia, 
China, India, Japan and Canada in the middle; and everybody 
else on the bottom.  The revised ESS differs from the draft 
by separating the EU's relations with Russia from the rest of 
the middle tier.  According to Burgess, member states agreed 
that the first draft failed to recognize the qualitative 
differences between the EU's relations with Russia and its 
relations with the other four (ref. C).  Thus the revised ESS 
says of Russia: "We should continue to work for closer 
relations with Russia, a major factor in our security and 
prosperity.  Respect for common values will reinforce 
progress towards a strategic partnership." 
 
Foster