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Viewing cable 03SANAA2753, INTERIOR MINISTER ALIMI: NO DETAINEES RELEASED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03SANAA2753 2003-11-19 20:46 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Sanaa
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 002753 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, S/CT, CA. DS/DSS, 
CENTCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2013 
TAGS: PTER PREL YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: INTERIOR MINISTER ALIMI: NO DETAINEES RELEASED 
YET; MOAYED REACTION STILL CALM; NO TIMELINE FOR USS COLE 
TRIALS 
 
REF: A. SANAA 2743 
 
     B. SANAA 2700 
     C. SANAA 2701 
     D. SANAA 2454 
 
Classified By: CDA Alan G. Misenheimer for Reasons 1.5 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: Charge called on Interior Minister Alimi 
11/19 to express concern over Yemen's reported release of 92 
security detainees (refs).  Alimi said that U.S. concerns had 
not been ignored, because no/no detainees had yet been 
released.  None slated for release had committed acts of 
violence inside or outside Yemen.  Each of the 92 must 
provide sworn, written assurances of good conduct, and 
parallel guarantees from family members, before release can 
occur.  PSO Chief Gamish will decide when the required 
standard of assurances has been met.  Alimi said Embassy 
Sanaa will &immediately8 receive name and biodata on any 
detainee actually released, and agreed to discuss with Gamish 
possible sharing of such data prior to release.  He offered 
no estimate of when releases might occur, but indicated none 
was imminent.  On numbers, Alimi confirmed that 54 of the 
&candidates8 for release are from the Hattat/Abyan 
engagement, and 38 are detained on suspicion of affiliation 
with al-Qaeda or other extremist groups.  Alimi, the ROYG,s 
polished &good cop,8 was at pains to put an upbeat spin on 
the announced release of detainees, but important questions 
remain unanswered.  Local reaction to the Moayed extradition 
(minimal) and pending prosecution of Cole suspects (timetable 
uncertain) were also discussed.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) On 11/19 Charge, joined by Acting LEGATT and Pol/Econ 
Deputy, called on Interior Minister Dr. Rashad al-Alimi to 
press U.S. concerns over the ROYG,s 11/17 announcement that 
92 security detainees had been released (ref xx).  Charge 
reminded Alimi that the USG had repeatedly requested 
consultation prior to any detainee release (refs b and c), 
including in FBI Director Mueller,s 11/5 meeting with 
President Saleh, and Yemen,s failure to consult prior to 
announcing releases had caused disappointment and concern in 
Washington. 
 
3. (C) Alimi said he was briefed on Charge,s meeting with FM 
Qirbi the previous day, and welcomed the chance to &correct 
misperceptions8 caused by ROYG media releases.  He said 
Saleh and Yemen,s security services took seriously their 
responsibility for security in Yemen, and also recognized 
that the USG shared in responsibility for security and CT 
efforts regionally and globally.  Thus, he said, there must 
be complete coordination and transparency between the two 
sides. 
 
DETAINEES MUST MEET CONDITIONS FOR RELEASE; NONE INVOLVED IN 
VIOLENCE INSIDE OR OUTSIDE YEMEN WILL BE RELEASED 
 
4. (C) Alimi stressed repeatedly that no/no detainees have 
yet been released, so U.S. concerns have not been ignored. 
Rather than an instant mass release, the ROYG had initiated a 
process whereby each of 92 detainess could win release by 
meeting conditions set by Saleh.  Those who failed to do so 
would remain in jail.  None of the detainees slated for 
release had committed acts of violence inside or outside 
Yemen.  &This is a red line we will not cross,8 said Alimi. 
 He emphasized that any detainee who had committed a violent 
act would be referred to the Attorney General for prosecution. 
 
NUMBERS 
 
5. (C) In response to questioning by Charge and Acting 
LEGATT, Alimi summarized the breakdown of numbers as follows. 
 Under Yemen,s dialogue program, teams of religious scholars 
(ulema) engaged 150 detainees over the past year.  PSO Chief 
Gamish had eliminated 58 of those from consideration from 
release.  Of the remaining 92 ) all now candidates for 
release ) 54 had surrendered themselves with Khalid Abdul 
Nabi following the Hattat/Abyan engagement.  Alimi described 
these as non-ideological men in need of jobs, and noted that 
Abdul Nabi himself "was never arrested."  The other 38 were 
arrested in various places on suspicion of al-Qaeda 
membership or other extremist affiliation. 
 
PROCESS 
 
6. (C) The Minister explained that the announcement of 
detainees slated for release began a process whereby each 
individual must to provide written, sworn assurance (a) that 
he will follow the law and avoid extremist contacts, (b) that 
he will not attempt to travel outside Yemen without ROYG 
permission, and (c) that he will report to police when/if 
called.  Each detainee must also obtain parallel 
guarantees/assurances from family, friends, tribe and 
business/social associates, who must all: (a) attest to their 
own belief that the detainee has reformed, (b) agree to 
inform the police should he misbehave, and (c) tell police 
where he is when/if asked. 
 
7. (C) Political Security Organization Chief Ghaleb al-Gamish 
will assess when the required standard of assurances is met, 
and any detainee fails to meet that standard will remain in 
jail.  Alimi noted that the release process was based on 
positive experience from the release of a smaller number of 
detainees during Ramadan 2002, including creation of a 
network of informers who had exposed terrorist sleeper cells. 
 Moreover, the requirement of assurances from family members 
and other associates turned Yemen,s tight-knit tribal/family 
structure to the advantage of the security services ) 
particularly because relatives would be reluctant to offer 
assurances unless sincerely convinced the detainee will keep 
his promises.  The 11/17 public announcement of releases was 
calculated, in part, to spur detainees and their relatives to 
provide the assurances. 
 
8. (C) Once a detainee obtains the necessary assurances, and 
is approved for release, the PSO will inform the Ministry of 
Interior, which places him on the ROYG,s security 
&blacklist8 as a person forbidden to travel out of Yemen. 
When asked, Alimi said that the "blacklist" entails the entry 
of each name into the Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) 
system. 
 
9. (C) Alimi repeatedly declined to offer any timeline for 
when actual releases might begin.  While noting that the 
process of obtaining assurances could take as little as a few 
days if a detainee,s family were committed to supporting 
him, Alimi insisted that the &comprehensive" and 
"time-consuming" nature of the process would mean that no 
release is imminent. 
 
USG WILL RECEIVE NAMES OF ALL RELEASED DETAINEES 
 
10. (C) Dr. Alimi said that the PSO would &immediately8 
provide to Embassy Sanaa the name and full biodata of any 
detainee released.  Acting LEGATT said names should be 
provided now, before release.  Failing that, the explanations 
provided by Alimi were inconsistent with the 11/5 
Mueller-Saleh conversation and insufficient to address U.S. 
concerns.  Moreover, U.S. authorities should not have first 
learned of ROYG detainee release plans via press reports. 
Alimi said he understood the misunderstanding stemmed from 
press reports that said detainees were already released when 
they were not.  He offered to discuss the matter further with 
PSO Chief Gamish to explore whether names could be provided 
prior to actual release. 
 
11. (C) When asked about obtaining the names of detainees 
released during Ramadan last year, Alimi expressed surprise 
that the PSO had not provided them.  Charge confirmed that 
the Embassy had not received them.  Alimi said he would 
discuss this meeting with PSO Chief Gamish in "complete 
detail" and also raise the question of last year,s detainee 
releases.  Above all, concluded Alimi, the United States and 
Yemen need not worry about detainee releases, and should 
focus on apprehending terrorists who remained at large ) 
particularly Abu Asim al-Makki, Jamal al-Badawi and Fadl 
al-Quso ) because they are the ones who can pose an active 
threat. 
 
USS COLE SUSPECTS TO TRIAL SOON? 
 
12. (C) Charge asked about press reports that more than 60 
detainees, including suspects in the USS Cole case, would 
move to trial in December.  Alimi was uncertain.  He said he 
would like to see prosecution move quickly, but expressed 
concern that the Moayed extradition and instability in Iraq 
could negatively affect public reaction.  He noted that 
escaped Cole suspects Jamal al-Badawi and Fadl al-Quso could 
potentially be tried in absentia.  (Note: Post will pursue 
the question with the Attorney General,s office.) 
 
MOAYED REACTION CALM; ROYG REMAINS VIGILANT 
 
13. (C) Charge thanked Alimi for heightened security 
preparations in conjunction with the extradition of Sheikh 
Mohamed al-Moayed from Germany to the United States, and 
observed that public reaction had been muted.  The Minister 
agreed, noting that the MOI had no indication of 
demonstrations or disturbances planned for the impending 
weekend.  The ROYG is nonetheless taking precautionary 
security measures, said Alimi, and will pay close attention 
to Friday mosque sermons that could inflame reaction.  He 
added that the ROYG was making "widespread efforts," 
including media outreach, to keep the situation calm and 
avert repercussions.  He noted that Yemen,s Embassy in 
Washington is working with Moayed,s family and supporters to 
arrange his defense, concluding that the ROYG will now depend 
on the "justice and fairness" of the American judicial system. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
14. (C) Alimi, the ROYG,s polished &good cop,8 was calm 
and conciliatory throughout the meeting.  He was aware of 
U.S. concerns (from Charge,s meeting with FM Qirbi the 
previous day), and was at pains to deemphasize the issue and 
emphasize Yemen,s intention to provide notification when a 
release does occur.  Unfortunately he could provide no idea 
of when that might be, nor any promise that biodata will be 
provided prior/prior to any release.  This may be in part 
because the process resides with the PSO rather than the MOI, 
but we will continue working all channels with the ROYG to 
seek further answers. 
MISENHEIMER