This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 002743 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, S/CT, CA. DS/DSS, 
CENTCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2013 
TAGS: PTER PREL YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: DETAINEE RELEASES AND CT COOPERATION: QIRBI CALLS 
FOR DIALOGUE 
 
REF: A. SANAA 2700 
     ¶B. SANAA 2701 
     ¶C. SANAA 2454 
 
Classified By: CDA Alan G. Misenheimer for Reasons 1.5 (B and D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: FM Qirbi called in Charge 11/18 to discuss 
Yemen,s 11/17 announcement of detainee releases and other 
subjects (septels).  Charge voiced U.S. concern over the ROYG 
decision to disregard repeated U.S. requests for consultation 
prior to any releases.  Qirbi called for dialogue, 
particularly with Interior Minister Alimi and PSO Chief 
Gamish, to address each side,s concerns over CT cooperation. 
 Qirbi stated that 54 &repentant8 detainees were to be 
released, that official statements citing 92 were in error, 
and that none had yet been freed.  Post is following up 
separately with the Interior Ministry and PSO to seek further 
information on those designated for release.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) FM Abubaker al-Qirbi called in Charge 11/18/03 to 
discuss CT cooperation ) including Yemen,s 11/17 
announcement that 92 &repentant8 security detainees were to 
be freed ) and other subjects (septels).  Pol/Econ Deputy 
also joined. 
 
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Qirbi: Need to Increase Dialogue on CT Issues 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Qirbi began by acknowledging concerns about CT 
cooperation aired by both sides in recent U.S.-Yemeni 
meetings ) including FBI Director Mueller,s meeting with 
President Saleh and follow-on meetings between AMB Hull and 
senior Yemeni officials.  Chief among ROYG complaints was a 
perceived U.S. tendency to accept erroneous intel on Yemeni 
CT actions without taking time to check the story with Yemeni 
authorities.  His proposed solution: "We have to initiate a 
process of dialogue on CT cooperation" to "get to the crux of 
the matter" and address "difficulties faced by both sides." 
He cited Minister of Interior Alimi and Political Security 
Organization (PSO) Chief Gamish as key figures with which the 
U.S. side must maintain ongoing dialogue. 
 
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Case in Point: Detainee Releases 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Charge agreed that CT cooperation needed to be put 
right, as there is no more important aspect of the current 
bilateral relationship.  He pointed out that Yemen,s 11/17 
announcement that 92 &repentant" security detainees were 
slated for release had raised serious U.S. concerns due to 
the lack of advance consultation by the ROYG.  Repeated U.S. 
requests for such consultation during the Mueller visit and 
in Ambassador,s subsequent meetings with Alimi and Gamish 
had not been taken into account, he said.  Charge underscored 
the need for Yemen to address U.S. concerns by sharing names 
and information on those slated for release. 
 
¶5. (C) Qirbi reviewed recent U.S.-ROYG CT exchanges, and 
appeared surprised that just the sort of dialogue he was now 
recommending had occurred, but had not prevented a serious 
disconnect on the release of detainees issue.  Qirbi noted 
that 54 persons were to be released, and that official 
statements referring to 92 were incorrect.  He said none had 
yet been freed. 
 
¶6. (C) Returning to his dialogue theme, Qirbi observed that 
the points raised at a recent meeting between Yemen,s 
Ambassador in Washington and Deputy National Security Advisor 
for Combating Terrorism Townsend were a virtual "repeat" of 
the points Mueller raised with Saleh (ref a).  He said the 
"stage is therefore set" for serious discussions and that "we 
cannot wait for incidents" to happen before increasing 
dialogue on CT matters. 
 
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Comment 
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¶7. (C) Comment: Qirbi,s citation of a new number ) 54 vice 
92 ) illustrates the obscurity surrounding virtually every 
aspect of the detainee release issue.  The Sanaa rumor mill 
is rife with conflicting accounts of numbers and criteria for 
release.  While &no blood on the hands8 is frequently heard 
as a key consideration, this could mean simply "no terrorist 
actions committed in/in Yemen."  Some Arab diplomats are even 
convinced that the entire issue is a smokescreen to deter 
terrorism in Yemen and/or constrain restive tribes, and that 
no/no detainees will actually be released.  Through the MOI 
and other channels, post will continue to seek clarification. 
 Qirbi,s call notwithstanding, post believes that channels 
of dialogue are adequate and active, but we are not hearing 
enough from the Yemeni side. 
MISENHEIMER