P 281047Z NOV 03
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2225

UNCLAS  JAKARTA 013041 
 
 
S/CT FOR REAP 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL KJUS ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: 2003 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT 
 
REF: A. STATE 301352 
     ¶B. 02 JAKARTA 6779 
 
A) Significant Action in Support of the Global Coalition 
Against Terrorism 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶1. Indonesia significantly increased its support for the 
global coalition against terrorism during this period.  The 
October 12, 2002 bombing in Bali that killed 202 - including 
88 Australians, 38 Indonesians, 28 Britons, and seven 
Americans galvanized the Indonesian Government into action, 
and the August 5 bombing of the JW Marriott Hotel in Jakarta 
that killed 12, including 11 Indonesians, further cemented 
Jakarta's new resolve.  Since then, the Government, led by 
the Indonesian National Police, has taken effective steps to 
counter the threat posed by the regional terror group that 
calls itself Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and has ties to Al Qaeda. 
The Indonesian police have reported the arrest of 109 
suspected JI members as of late November, including suspects 
in the Bali attacks, the Marriott attack and other criminal 
acts linked to terrorism.  Almost all of those arrests 
occurred during 2003, and included numerous senior leaders, 
most of the masterminds of the Bali bombing, several key 
planners of the Marriott bombing and a number of JI cell 
members, sub-regional (wakalah) and regional (mantiqi) 
commanders, former instructors at JI training camps in the 
southern Philippines and in Afghanistan, and financiers of 
attacks. 
 
¶2. Indonesia's weak rule of law, poorly regulated financial 
system and serious internal coordination problems have 
impeded progress uncovering and freezing terrorist assets. 
Indonesia has not yet frozen any terrorist assets, 
notwithstanding Jakarta's continued statements of willingness 
to freeze terrorist assets, consistent with the requirements 
of UNSCR 1267, 1373, 1390, and 1455.  Indonesia did, however, 
enhance its legal framework, passing amendments to its 
Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Law in September 2003.  The 
amendments not only brought Indonesia's legislation up to 
international standards, but also strengthened the GOI's 
legal authority to combat terrorist finance.  A financial 
intelligence unit is now up and running with considerable USG 
assistance.  Continued assistance will be required to improve 
operational effectiveness. 
 
¶3. The Indonesian military cooperated to a large extent with 
flight clearance requests from the U.S. and other countries 
related to the war against terrorism last year.  The 
Indonesian military also has cooperated in the protection 
from terrorists of high value shipping in the Malacca 
Straits.  Other than limited military intelligence support, 
the Indonesian armed forces have not played a major role in 
the investigation of the Bali or JW Marriott bombings. 
 
¶4. In March, parliament adopted into law two presidential 
decrees on terrorism from 2002, now laws 15/2003 and 16/2003. 
 Law 15/2003 is a comprehensive anti-terrorism law, defining 
various acts of terror, and providing police and prosecutors 
with broader powers to combat terrorism such as extended 
pre-trial detention periods and the use of electronic 
evidence in court.  Law 16/2003 makes law 15/2003 retroactive 
to the date of the Bali bombings.  As of December 1, the 
Department of Justice and Human Rights was preparing a 
revision of Law 15/2003 to present to parliament.  The 
revision would slightly broaden powers given to police and 
prosecutors, and would reportedly give the Indonesian 
military (TNI) a larger role in counter-terrorism efforts. 
In November, the newly formed Constitutional Court agreed to 
conduct a judicial review of Law 16/2003 which the Bali 
bombers' defense attorneys had claimed was unconstitutional, 
violating article 28(i) of the amended 1945 Constitution 
which prohibits "laws with retroactive effect." 
 
B) Response of the Judicial System to Acts of Terrorism 
Including Prosecutions 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶5. The Indonesian judicial system undertook the trials of 
approximately 63 terror suspects during the year, including 
17 members of the radical Laskar Jundullah organization for 
involvement in the bombing of a McDonalds restaurant and a 
car showroom in Makassar, South Sulawesi in December 2002, 
and 46 members of JI for involvement in the Christmas Eve 
2000 church bombings, the bombing of the Philippine 
Ambassador's residence in Jakarta in August 2000, and the 
Bali and Marriott hotel bombings.  As of December 1, 
Indonesian courts had convicted 50 terror suspects, and 
acquitted two.  Fifteen trials remained underway, and many 
more JI suspects were said to be awaiting trial. 
 
¶6. On September 2, the Central Jakarta District Court 
convicted the leader, or "Emir" of JI, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, on 
treason and immigration charges.  The panel of judges stated 
in its decision that prosecutors had presented sufficient 
evidence so as to convince them of JI's existence, its goal 
of overthrowing the government of Indonesia, and Ba'asyir's 
involvement with the group.  However, despite 
video-conference testimony from JI detainees in Singapore and 
Malaysia as well as testimony from Bali bombers naming 
Ba'asyir as head of the JI, judges were not convinced of his 
leadership role, and sentenced him to only four years in 
prison.  Both Ba'asyir and the prosecution appealed the 
decision, and the Jakarta High Court is expected to rule on 
the appeal in December. 
 
¶7. Indonesian courts have convicted 39 suspects for 
involvement in planning and carrying out the October 12, 2002 
Bali bombings or for aiding and abetting those responsible 
for the attacks.  The Denpasar District Court handed down 29 
of those convictions, and sentenced key Bali bombers Amrozi 
bin Nurhasyim, Abdul Ghoni (a.k.a. Mukhlas) and Abdul Aziz 
(a.k.a. Imam Samudra) to death.  Other suspects standing 
trial in Denpasar and Lamongan received sentences ranging 
from three years to life in prison.  Four trials remained 
underway in Denpasar at year's end, with four more underway 
in Palu, Central Sulawesi and two still underway in Lamongan, 
East Java.  At least 15 of those convicted filed appeals.  As 
of December 1, the Bali High Court had quashed 12 of the 
appeals, including those by Amrozi and Imam Samudra, both of 
whom subsequently filed appeals with the Supreme Court.  The 
numerous convictions and tough sentences handed down by the 
Bali courts are a reflection of the Government's seriousness 
in combating terrorism, and its commitment to bringing to 
justice those implicated in terrorist attacks in Indonesia. 
 
¶8. The Makassar District Court held the trials of 17 suspects 
in connection to the December 5, 2002 bombing of a McDonalds 
restaurant and a car showroom in the South Sulawesi 
provincial capital.  Many of the suspects were believed to be 
members of the radical Laskar Jundullah organization, and 
admitted to having trained at camps in the Southern 
Philippines.  Some were friends or acquaintances of Bali 
bombers.  As of December 1, the court had reportedly 
convicted ten suspects and acquitted one.  Several trials 
remained underway, and two suspects were awaiting trial. 
 
¶9. The first trial in connection to the August 5 bombing of 
the JW Marriott Hotel in Jakarta began on November 12 in 
Bengkulu, Sumatra.  The suspect, Sardona Siliwangi, stood 
accused of storing explosives used in the attack, which 
killed 12 people and injured 150 others.  At least ten 
additional Marriott bombing suspects are expected to stand 
trial beginning in December or early 2004, including Bali and 
Marriott bombing suspects Mohamed Rais and Idris (a.k.a. 
Jhoni Hendrawan). 
 
¶10. Other JI figures stood trial during the year, including 
Abdul Jabar bin Ahmad Kandai, who a Jakarta court convicted 
of planning and carrying out the August 2000 bombing of the 
Philippine Ambassador's residence in Jakarta as well as 
participating in the Christmas Eve bombing of a number of 
Jakarta churches that same year.  The Central Jakarta 
District Court sentenced Jabar to 20 years in prison after he 
admitted his involvement in the attacks. 
 
¶11. Indonesian police conducted a credible first phase of 
investigation into the August 31, 2002 ambush of an 
international mining company's contract employees near 
Tembagapura and Timika in Papua province, which killed two 
Americans and one Indonesian and wounded ten others.  The 
investigation uncovered indications of possible involvement 
by Indonesian military members.  Due to limits on its legal 
jurisdiction, the police handed the investigation over to 
military authorities.  Since January, the Indonesian police 
and military have been cooperating with the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation to solve the case. 
 
 
C) Extraditions or Requested Extraditions of Suspected 
Terrorists 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶12. Jakarta did not extradite or request the extradition of 
suspected terrorists for prosecution during the year, but did 
request the United States provide access to and eventually 
render JI operations chief and Indonesian citizen Riduan 
Isamuddin (a.k.a. Hambali). 
 
 
D) Significant Impediments to Prosecution/Extradition of 
Suspected Terrorists 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶13. There are no significant legal barriers to prosecuting 
domestic terror acts under the existing criminal code, and 
Parliament's adoption into law of two anti-terrorism decrees 
in March further strengthened the legal framework in place 
for bringing terrorists to justice. 
 
¶14. However, the Government has been unwilling to ban JI, 
saying the organization never formally applied for 
recognition and thus cannot be prohibited.  The absence of 
such a prohibition has impeded police and prosecutors in 
arresting and trying suspected terrorists.  Police have had 
to release a number of known JI members for lack of evidence 
tying them to specific criminal or terrorist acts.  As JI's 
intellectual leaders begin to stand trial, the apparent 
non-status of JI in Indonesia will likely further hamper 
prosecutors' efforts to put the organization's leaders behind 
bars. 
 
¶15. Although Indonesian courts have convicted 50 people on 
charges of terrorism, a dearth of prosecutors familiar with 
the structure and inner workings of JI has hampered efforts 
to successfully prosecute suspected terrorists.  Senior 
officials at the Attorney General's Office are aware of the 
challenges they face, and are coordinating with police to 
educate prosecutors handling terrorism trials and ensure 
solid cases are made against terror suspects. 
 
¶16. The Constitution does not prohibit the extradition of 
suspected terrorists.  Indonesia has extradition treaties 
with only five countries (Australia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
South Korea and Thailand) and an agreement for "surrender of 
fugitive offenders" with the Special Administrative Region 
(SAR) of Hong Kong.  Indonesia does not have an extradition 
treaty with the United States. 
 
 
E) Responses Other than Prosecution, and Efforts to 
Investigate Terror Incidents or Assist With International 
Terror Investigations 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶17. Senior officials, starting with the President, 
strengthened their public statements on terrorism during 
¶2003.  Before the Bali bombings in 2002, only a small cadre 
of government officials spoke publicly about the need to 
confront terrorism in Indonesia, while most senior officials 
remained reluctant. As a democratic country with almost 200 
million Muslims, most senior politicians shied away from even 
acknowledging the existence of domestic Islamic terrorists 
for fear of angering a large constituency.  The suicide car 
bombing in Bali that killed 202, mostly foreigners, in two 
nightclubs on the night of October 12, 2002, was a watershed. 
 The bloody attack forced the Indonesians to confront this 
long-denied problem.  Two months later, terrorists bombed a 
McDonald's restaurant and a Toyota showroom in Makassar, the 
largest city on the island of Sulawesi.  JI's bombing of the 
JW Marriott hotel in Jakarta in August 2003 again shocked 
Indonesians, both because of the mostly Indonesian 
casualties, and because the attack occurred in the capital 
city. 
 
¶18. The public comments of senior officials have, for the 
most part, reflected the government's shift to a tougher 
attitude on terrorism.  In late September, for example, 
Indonesian President Megawati said that despite public 
protests, her government would continue to take preemptive 
measures against terrorism in Indonesia and keep hard-line 
groups under surveillance.  The Indonesian National Police 
have been by far the most active in trying to convince the 
public of the need to resist the JI and countering public 
statements from various religious leaders denying the 
existence of the JI terror group and who attribute bombings 
in Indonesia to outsiders.  In late September, police 
organized meetings with religious leaders both in Jakarta and 
outside the capital in which detained JI suspects described 
how JI carried out its bombing plans.  In October, police put 
newly arrested terror suspects on national television where 
they admitted their involvement with JI, bomb plots, and 
asked forgiveness. 
 
¶19. The Indonesians have also participated in a number of 
international investigations, mostly with neighboring 
countries.  JI is a terror group that operates on a regional 
scale, and thus opportunities for cross-border investigations 
are numerous.  For example, the Philippines government on 
October 2 arrested a key Indonesian figure in JI, Taufiq 
Rifke, and within days gave Indonesian police access to him. 
Rifke, was scheduled as of late-November to be sent back to 
Indonesia to stand trial.  In addition, after the Bali 
bombings, the Indonesian police allowed the Australian 
Federal Police, the FBI and other police agencies to 
participate in that investigation.  The U.S. Government, 
since spring 2003, has helped train and equip a CT unit 
within the Indonesian police force. 
 
 
F) Major CT Efforts Taken in 2003 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶20. Indonesia has been hit by a series of terror bombings 
carried out by JI stretching back to the bombing of the 
Philippines Ambassador's residence in Jakarta on August 1, 
¶2000.  But it was only after the October 2002 Bali bombing 
that Jakarta admitted it had a problem and moved to confront 
JI.  In the wake of the Bali bombing, the Government 
permitted an unprecedented joint investigation with Australia 
(many of whose nationals died in the attack), assisted by the 
United States and other countries.  These efforts, led by the 
police, have netted more than 100 JI suspects, including 
senior leaders, operatives, trainers, financiers and 
accomplices.  Their subsequent testimony in open court helped 
identify the perpetrators of previously unsolved bombings 
dating back several years. 
 
¶21. At the 9th ASEAN summit in Bali October 7-9, Indonesia 
joined other member states in endorsing creation of an ASEAN 
Security Community (ASC).  The Community will strengthen 
national and regional capacity to counter terrorism and other 
transnational crimes.  The Government of Indonesia, as ASEAN 
Chairman, will draft a "road map" to implement the ASC.  This 
will be presented to other ASEAN member states at its next 
summit, to be held in Vientiane, Laos in 2004.  The 
Indonesian government had previously signed MOUs on CT 
cooperation with Thailand and the Philippines as well as 
leading the effort to adopt an ASEAN Police Chiefs agreement 
to cooperate and share information. 
 
 
G) Support for Terrorism 
------------------------ 
 
¶22. While the administration of President Megawati has 
generally performed well in the fight against terrorism, 
certain members of her senior cabinet from other political 
parties have, at times, undermined the government's resolve 
on this issue.  The Vice President Hamzah Haz called 
President Bush the "King of Terrorists" and met with JI 
leader Abu Bakar Ba'ashir, prior to Ba'asyir's arrest. 
 
 
H) Public Statements in Support of a Terror-Supporting 
Country on a Terrorism Issue 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶23. There has been no reported GOI support or public 
statements in support of countries that sponsor terrorism on 
a terrorism-related issue. 
 
 
I) Change in Attitude 
--------------------- 
 
¶24. Jakarta dramatically changed its approach toward 
terrorism at the end of 2002, and that new approach was 
reinforced during 2003.  Only after the October 2002 Bali 
bombings did Jakarta admit the existence of and threat posed 
by JI.  Subsequent bombings, including in Makassar, and 
several in Jakarta, including against the JW Marriott hotel 
in August 2003, demonstrated time and again to Indonesians 
their vulnerability to terrorism and its negative effects on 
the economy, the national image, and stability.  This open 
acknowledgement of terrorism as a national problem, the 
Government's aggressive steps to arrest terrorists linked to 
a small Muslim fringe group, and past history of the 
Government's suppression of Muslim organizations, prompted 
some concern and suspicion over government actions among 
Indonesia's mainstream Islamic community.  By and large, 
however, 2003 witnessed increasing public awareness of the 
dangers of terrorism and a strengthening public resolve to 
combat terrorist groups. 
 
 
Boyce