This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 002527 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
ONDCP FOR DIRECTOR WALTERS, AGRESTI 
DEPT FOR G - U/S DOBRIANSKY, INL - ACTING A/S 
SIMONS, EUR - A/S JONES, EUR/ERA, EUR/UBI, 
DOJ FOR OIA, AFMLS, NDDS 
BRUSSELS FOR NAS, DOJ, AND FBI 
DEA HQS FOR ADMINISTRATOR TANDY AND OFE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR PTER KCRM PREL NL
SUBJECT: DUTCH JUSTICE MINISTER PLANS TO TARGET 
COCAINE SMUGGLERS AT SCHIPHOL AIRPORT 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Action request: Please see Paragraph 7. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Summary: Ambassador Sobel met with the Dutch 
Justice Minister Donner October 1 to discuss the 
Ministry of Justice's proposed Action Plan aimed at 
disrupting the cocaine traffic transiting Schiphol 
airport from the Caribbean.  Currently, GONL 
estimates that 20-40,000 kilos of cocaine comes 
through Schiphol annually, mainly from the 
Netherlands Antilles, but also from Suriname and 
Venezuela.  Only 20-25% is currently being 
interdicted.  One aim of the plan is to triple the 
interdiction rate, thereby reaching a "tipping point" 
at which the cocaine suppliers will decide that it is 
not cost effective to use Schiphol anymore.  A second 
aim is to gain leverage over the government of the 
Netherlands Antilles (GONA) by putting at risk their 
tourist industry.  Targeted airplanes would have to 
go to sealed gates and all passengers would go 
through lengthy, time consuming and intrusive 
procedures.  GONL hopes that the threat of this would 
force Netherlands-Antilles government to deal with 
the problem at source.  The downside to the plan is 
that the resulting arrests would strain the Dutch 
penal system to breaking point.  The Ministry of 
Justice (MOJ) plans, therefore, to prosecute only 
smugglers caught with large amounts of cocaine 
(newspaper accounts suggest 2 kilos or more).  All 
others will be arrested, immediately deported and put 
on an airline blacklist.  Ambassador Sobel voiced 
strong concern that the plan "virtually 
decriminalizes" smaller amounts and places the 
problem back in the lap of the Netherlands Antilles - 
which has similar resource/cell limits. This would be 
particularly harmful to the Netherlands reputation 
given that the Netherlands is also a significant 
source country of Ecstasy.  Donner took his point, 
but claimed that they face a choice between imperfect 
solutions - turnaround or turn a blind eye.  The 
judicial and prison capacities have reached their 
limits.  Embassy requests guidance from INL, ONDCP, 
and DEA.  (Please see para. 7) 
 
END SUMMARY 
 
¶3. (SBU) In a meeting with Justice Minister Donner, 
Ambassador Sobel discussed Dutch plans to disrupt the 
transshipment of cocaine coming through Schiphol 
Airport.  The action plan, which is still being 
formulated, aims to triple the interdiction rate and 
thereby reach a "tipping point" at which suppliers 
see continued use of Schiphol as unprofitable and 
look for alternative supply lines.  Currently, 20- 
40,000 kilos of cocaine are transshipped through 
Schiphol each year.  Approximately 10% is for use in 
the Netherlands with the rest going to other 
countries in Europe (principally Germany, Spain and 
the UK).  The vast majority of the cocaine comes to 
Schiphol on 29 "direct risk" flights each week, 
mainly from the Netherlands Antilles, but also from 
Caracas, Paramaribo and Aruba.  The drugs are either 
ingested by "bollita swallowers" or smuggled in on 
cargo or in luggage.  The Dutch have indicated that 
the crackdown would be temporary and that they would 
review its effectiveness in the short term. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Under a September 2002 plan to fight this 
problem (through increased police monitoring, 
construction of more prison facilities and a prison 
at Schiphol airport), the arrests for smuggling 
increased from 1300 in 2001, to 2200 arrests in 2002. 
MOJ D/DG Jan van den Hoevel, who is directing the 
action plan told the Ambassador that current arrests 
are about 200 per month.  The new plan to triple 
interdiction rates through increased manpower, 
greater use of intelligence, and other methods such 
as the creation of a database to track returnees, 
would lead to a unsustainable burden on the Dutch 
justice and penal system Donner said.  Accordingly, 
the plan will allow Dutch authorities to focus on 
larger smugglers and return those smuggling smaller 
amounts to their place of origin.  By arresting and 
taking to court only those who carry "larger amounts" 
(newspaper accounts suggest 2 kilos or more) Donner 
hopes to deal a blow to the supply of cocaine while 
not overburdening the Dutch legal system.  Those with 
smaller amounts would be arrested but then deported. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Ambassador Sobel strongly voiced his concern 
that failing to deal with those who smuggled smaller 
amounts sent the wrong signal and was not a long-term 
solution to this problem.  Minister Donner noted the 
Ambassador's concern.  Donner further explained that 
it is difficult for the Netherlands to get agreement 
with the Netherlands Antilles as it is "part of 
Kingdom, but cannot be ordered around."  He said that 
he might want to discuss ways in which the USG could 
put pressure on The Antilles.  Ambassador Sobel 
responded that the US recognizes that there are 
complex political issues and we want to be careful 
not to get caught in between the two sides. The U.S. 
is very active in counternarcotics in the Caribbean 
and wants to be as helpful as possible.  Ambassador 
Sobel noted that the upcoming visit of Coast Guard 
Command Collins to the Netherlands offers an 
opportunity to discuss some practical measures. 
Donner agreed that that was a good idea and said that 
an appropriate MOJ official would be glad to meet 
with him. 
 
¶6. (SBU) In a general discussion on drugs policy, 
Ambassador Sobel raised the possibility of having DEA 
Administrator Tandy or ONDCP Director Walters visit 
the Netherlands to share information and views on the 
drug trafficking.  Ambassador Sobel noted that the 
reputation of the Netherlands internationally with 
regard to drugs was not good and that they should 
make efforts to improve this.  Ambassador Sobel said 
that one reason that the Netherlands was attractive 
to drug smugglers and producers was the low 
sentencing and permissive attitude towards drugs in 
this country.  Donner claimed that the actual time 
served for drug crimes in the Netherlands was about 
the same as the rest of Europe. Donner also 
acknowledged that it was worth looking at this 
initiative in a broader context in which the drug 
problem as whole could be attacked. Ambassador Sobel 
stressed that this is an opportunity for the Dutch to 
put additional resources into fighting synthetic 
drugs. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Action request/Comment:  Embassy's judgment 
is that a temporary crackdown at Schiphol is at best 
a stopgap measure that will not make a significant 
long-term difference to the problem of narcotics 
smuggling to the Netherlands.  At the same time, we 
judge that there is no political will or resources in 
the near future for creating the judicial and penal 
capacity needed to handle the flood of drug couriers. 
We think that GONL however might be open to the 
argument that they need to combine this crackdown 
with other measures that would make a difference in 
stemming the traffic.  For example, we might argue 
that the Netherlands should implement in parallel a 
temporary program for the use of criminal infiltrants 
and "pass-throughs" that would enable them to go 
beyond interrupting couriers and begin arresting the 
gang leaders.  These measures would have the added 
value of being useful practices that can be applied 
to the other Dutch drug problem - the production of 
Ecstasy.  Past experience however suggests that 
expectations must not be raised too high. Post seeks 
INL, ONDCP and DEA input on other practical measures 
that we could recommend that the Dutch employ on a 
trial basis in parallel with this crackdown. 
 
 
Sobel