This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 006231 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2013 
TAGS: PTER PREL MOPS MARR TU IZ
SUBJECT: NORTHERN IRAQ AND PKK/KADEK: S/CT BLACK AND TURKS 
AGREE ON STRONG MESSAGE, COOPERATION IN PREPARING THE 
BATTLEFIELD 
 
REF: A. STATE 261988 
     ¶B. ANKARA 5962 
     ¶C. ANKARA 5919 (NODIS) 
     ¶D. ANKARA 5745 
 
 
Classified by DCM Robert S. Deutsch.  Reasons 1.5 b and d. 
 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (S) Coordinator for Counterterrorism Cofer Black and 
delegation met with an interagency GOT delegation led by MFA 
Deputy Undersecretary Sensoy October 2 in Ankara.  Amb. Black 
told the Turks the USG would fight the PKK/KADEK, as it did 
all targets in the Global War on terrorism (GWOT) using all 
the elements of statecraft, and that he hoped the discussion 
would produce a meeting of minds on the shared objective of 
eliminating the PKK/KADEK terrorist threat from Iraq.  Sensoy 
hoped the meeting would be results oriented, was glad things 
were moving in that direction, and sought confirmation that 
the military option would be available as a last resort. 
Amb. Black explained that we were already engaged in a 
process of military planning, and were moving on a number of 
other fronts via intelligence and State channels against the 
PKK/KADEK, but before we used military action, we needed to 
better prepare the battlefield.  We needed to reduce the size 
of the target set the PKK/KADEK represented in northern Iraq. 
 We could do this by fostering increased returns under the 
Reintegration Law, going after sources of financing, seeking 
EU support for designating KADEK a terrorist organization, 
and getting out a clear and unified message from the US and 
Turkey that there was a new day coming, that the option to go 
home was available, but if it were not taken the clock was 
ticking toward the time when that option would disappear as 
would any sanctuary in northern Iraq.  Sensoy asked that we 
not link the return of bona fide refugees from Makhmour Camp 
with the possibilities of return for PKK terrorists under the 
Reintegration Law.  In Makhmour, Amb. Black said, we would 
like the camp population smaller to make the PKK/KADEK more 
easily identifiable, and to show that the equation had 
changed by showing large numbers of returns.  Regarding 
monitoring of Makhmour returnees, Sensoy said Turkey would 
agree to any UNHCR practice consistent with what UNHCR does 
globally.  Sensoy asked if the US could apprehend four or 
five PKK/KADEK leaders and hand them over to Turkey, to 
reinforce our strong message.  He also asked if we could 
consider cutting PKK/KADEK logistics support or disrupt 
PKK/KADEK command and control.  Amb. Black said we would 
follow these matters up in other channels.  The two sides 
agreed to stay in touch and to make strong public statements 
noting that there was US-Turkish agreement on a plan of 
action that would include all elements of statecraft and on 
continuing contacts on the details.  Sensoy said he was 
pleased that we now had a framework that could be filled in 
as we move forward together.  End Summary. 
 
 
¶2. (S) State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism 
Cofer Black and his delegation met in Ankara October 2 with 
an interagency Turkish delegation led by MFA Deputy 
Undersecretary Nabi Sensoy to discuss the PKK/KADEK presence 
in northern Iraq and other GWOT issues.  Amb. Black was 
accompanied by Ambassador Edelman, the DCM and reps from POL, 
PMA, ODC and Regional Affairs.  The rest of the traveling US 
delegation included: from State, Larry Silverman, EUR/SE, 
Andrew Wyllie, PRM, and John Sullivan, S/CT; from OSD Larry 
Franklin; and from the Joint Staff Lt. Col. Tom Milton.  The 
Turkish delegation was the same as at Ref C talks.  Amb. 
Black opened the session by noting that USG would fight the 
PKK/KADEK as it fought others in the GWOT, using all the 
elements of statecraft.  "We may not do it the same way you 
do, but we share the same objective - the elimination of the 
terrorist threat from Iraq," he said.  Sensoy summarized the 
discussion from the Sept. 12 meeting with Amb. Pascoe (Ref C) 
and emphasized that Turkey would like: PKK/KADEK elements in 
Iraq who are Turkish citizens to be repatriated, especially 
the leadership; those who were Iraqi citizens to be disarmed; 
and those of other nationality to be expelled from Iraq. 
None should be given the opportunity to work for political 
organizations or to work against Turkish interests in Iraq. 
Turkey also wanted US support in persuading Iraq's neighbors 
and Europeans to deny entry to PKK/KADEK members and if they 
did enter, to deny them asylum and return them to Turkey. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
US to Eliminate PKK/KADEK Threat - 1st Prep Battlefield 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
 
¶3. (S) Amb. Black noted that the President has said the US is 
committed to ending terror in or from Iraq and had designated 
PKK/KADEK a terrorist organization and that the President was 
also committed to eliminating terrorism in or from Iraq. 
That carried a responsibility to engage and resolve the 
PKK/KADEK problem.  This would not be limited to diplomatic 
activity, although that was part of it.  He reiterated that 
all elements of statecraft would be needed, and that none 
would succeed in isolation.  Good intelligence, press and 
media work and policy all needed to be combined.  Amb. Black 
said this was a USG policy imperative, that we were motivated 
and interested, but that it was a difficult issue in 
competition with others for attention and resources.  He 
explained that by "eliminate" we did not mean that all 
PKK/KADEK elements needed to be killed, but that we would 
eliminate the threat they posed as efficiently and 
effectively as possible.  We were already on a course of 
action that meets Turkish policy goals.  He then described 
the need to prepare the battlefield by reducing the numbers 
of people remaining, concentrating them, and degrading their 
capabilities.  So far, the job of trying to win them over to 
return had not been successful.  We needed to discuss what 
more could be done, he said.  Amb. Black also noted that the 
US military had completed various aspects of its planning, 
which was now under review by high military authorities.  But 
the battlefield needed better preparation to limit the size 
of any eventual military operation.  We must ensure, he said, 
that our opponents are aware of the reduction of their 
options, that those options are limited and attractive to 
meet our needs.  Amb. Black noted that the US had been 
pressing the Europeans to designate KADEK a terrorist 
organization and to deprive them of funds and support.  He 
stressed that anything suggesting the US and Turkey are not 
together in this effort subverts the process, and noted that 
we all needed to be careful about what we told the press. 
The USG message, he emphasized, has been consistent.  We were 
serious about it.  We were adamant to see it through.  We 
must do everything we could, including on reintegration and 
repatriation issues, before we got to sending soldiers into 
the mountains to hunt down PKK/KADEK.  It was also unhelpful, 
he said, to tie counterterrorism activity to the possibility 
of Turkish troop deployments for the stabilization force. 
They are separate issues, and one should not prejudice or 
influence the other. 
 
 
¶4. (S) Sensoy replied that he had hoped the meeting would be 
results oriented and he was glad it was moving in that 
direction.  He asked for confirmation that the military 
option was not excluded as a last resort.  Amb. Black 
confirmed that after preparing via diplomacy, media, 
financial restriction, reducing the numbers, degrading the 
capabilities, etc., that we would engage at the end the 
smallest possible target.  Sensoy agreed with the approach 
and asked what the specific options were individually and 
jointly short of military action.  Amb. Black explained that 
the USG was already engaged and moving down the road in a 
number of areas, via State Dept. activity, intelligence 
exchange and military planning.  If we do this well, he said, 
the military piece should be minor.  If we were to go 
military today it would need to be major, and therefore would 
be inefficient.  Sensoy said Turkey would do whatever the US 
needed it to in order to minimize the target.  He said Turkey 
would work to make the benefits of its Reintegration Law 
better known, but that they had no doubt that it had been 
well publicized and that the people in question knew what 
benefits were available.  The problem was that they did not 
want to surrender.  But if the USG wanted Turkey to do so, 
Sensoy stated, they were prepared to do more, alone or 
jointly.  They could consider leaflets and/or coordination 
with the KDP and PUK.  He said he hoped that a strong message 
would result for the day's meeting informing the PKK 
leadership that the US and Turkey were working on an action 
plan.  Unfortunately, he noted, Turkish intelligence since 
the Sept. 12 meeting indicated that the PKK leaders were 
pleased with developments and felt comfortable and assured 
after the last round of talks.  Amb. Black stated that the 
PKK/KADEK had no grounds to feel any comfort whatsoever.  But 
public diplomacy was important as what is said to the press 
does shape the battlefield.  What should be said is "the 
clock is ticking.  You have some serious choices to make. 
You can go home and be treated equitably.  Have no illusion 
about how this will end."  This, Amb. Black said, is where 
Turkey can make a huge contribution. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Makhmour - Need Better Message to Turks in Iraq 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
 
¶5. (S) Amb. Black told the Turks that based on what he was 
hearing, the PKK/KADEK elements did not think they could 
surrender without very high risk.  Turkey might have to 
minimize even legitimate animosity and bad blood in order to 
change that.  PRM's Andew Wyllie discussed the situation at 
Makhmour Camp, where the population had not gotten the 
message that they were welcome back in Turkey, and that there 
were policies in place to help them reintegrate when they got 
home.  He suggested that two things needed to happen 
simultaneously:  we needed to go into the camp and see who 
was ready for voluntary repatriation and thereby separate out 
those pressing to stay; and the UNHCR was looking for 
conditions that would help argue for repatriation by holding 
up positive examples of returns.  The UNHCR was interested in 
conducting an information program on how reintegration would 
proceed, who would help them and what social infrastructure 
was in place in the returnee environment.  They were also 
looking for a monitoring role in Turkey, as they have 
everywhere else where there are returnees.  There may be some 
residual population at the end who choose not to return but 
instead wish to stay in Iraq.  Sensoy replied that while 
Makhmour was part of the larger picture, Turkey did not see 
its residents as terrorists or as the beneficiaries of the 
Reintegration Law.  Successful returns from Makhmour were not 
relevant to encouraging PKK/KADEK terrorists to surrender 
because Makhmour residents would not be treated as terrorists 
and could return whenever they liked.  They would not be 
restricted by the time limits of the law.  Turkey, he said, 
was duty bound to provide food and shelter and other 
assistance to its returning citizens.  Every year, he said, 
dozens of families return from Makhmour and are successfully 
reintegrated into Turkey.  There are no cases of returnees 
complaining.  He challenged the US delegation to find such a 
case, and then said Turkey did not need to prove to the world 
that it treated its citizens decently.  It did so.  "Please 
do not confuse the issues of Makhmour and the PKK/KADEK," he 
said.  However, he went on, PKK/KADEK is controlling the camp 
and therefore the 200-250 PKK/KADEK elements there should 
first be eliminated so that every individual who wants to 
come home can.  They will all be welcome, he said.  But the 
point of departure in the PKK/KADEK effort cannot be 
resettlement of Makhmour residents.  It is a matter of 
priority, but a separate issue. 
 
 
¶6. (S) Sensoy added that Turkey was interested in 
repatriating the Makhmour population, was talking with the UN 
about it, and had designed a form for residents to use to 
express their will to return.  But Turkey had avoided 
emphasizing the Reintegration Law in Makhmour because Turkey 
did not want Makhmour residents to think Turkey considered 
them terrorists or sympathizers.  This would make them more 
reluctant to return home.  Turkey wanted to send a team to 
Makhmour to determine interest in repatriation.  One Turkish 
delegation member told us in a side conversation that the 
Turks would like to solicit this information only when there 
was no threat that the PKK/KADEK would influence the 
responses through intimidation.  This could be done either 
after PKK/KADEK control of the camp was ended or if the GOT 
team could get answers to the questions on the same day. 
This would prevent PKK/KADEK elements in the camp from 
intimidating the population overnight.  US delegation members 
told them they would have to discuss and clear procedures for 
doing anything in this regard with the UNHCR. 
 
 
---------------------------------- 
Turkey Must Encourage More Returns 
---------------------------------- 
 
 
¶7. (S) Amb. Black said that the US and Turkey seemed to have 
identical goals, but that the USG had heard that there was a 
problem in the message.  People were uncertain about the 
situation they would return to if they came back to Turkey. 
They must know they will truly be welcome unless they have 
committed heinous crimes.  Amb. Black said our job now was to 
change the balance of psychological calculations of those who 
could benefit under the Reintegration Law, so they will see 
where they have a future and where they do not.  In Makhmour, 
he said, we would like the camp population smaller to make 
the PKK/KADEK more easily identifiable, and to show that the 
equation had changed by showing large numbers of returns.  He 
also said we understood that the PKK/KADEK leadership had a 
hold on some information that was denied to the rank and file 
to prevent them from giving up.  We needed to degrade that 
hold on information, he said.  If together the US and Turkey 
sent a message that there was no future for them in Iraq, it 
would increase the overall effectiveness of the Reintegration 
Law.  The stronger the message we send, the better, he said. 
If the message they hear is that in the end nothing will 
happen, that weakens our hand.  We needed to control 
perceptions and force hard choices.  The Camp population was 
a part of the bigger picture in this regard.  It would help 
if the PKK/KADEK knew there was a high probability that 
surrender would be accepted and those who did would be well 
treated.  The war-fighting piece is not the big piece, he 
said.  The big piece is Turkey's ability to entice as many 
home as possible.  "Make it look like a land rush and isolate 
the ones who are left.  That will get them scared," he said. 
Sensoy replied that to get large numbers of surrenders, the 
PKK/KADEK must get a strong message that we mean business, 
that there is an action plan and that if we must, we will use 
force.  Their current comfort level means we did not get the 
message right after the Sept. 12 meeting.  He said Turkey was 
open to suggestions about better promoting the Reintegration 
Law but at the same time needed the message to get out that 
we are going to act.  That, he said, would be the beginning 
of the dissolution of the PKK/KADEK.  He suggested that the 
capture and delivery to Turkey of a few leaders would help a 
great deal, both with the Turkish public and in relieving 
pressure from the PKK/KADEK rank and file to give up and 
benefit from the law. 
 
 
¶8. (S) Amb. Black said that frankly, in the wake of Amb. 
Pascoe's Sept. 12 visit, when the GOT said that the US was 
not taking action, that was not helpful.  It gave comfort to 
the enemy.  We needed to tell PKK/KADEK that there were 
benefits for cooperative behavior and negative consequences, 
including possibly getting killed, for failing to cooperate. 
There is room, Amb. Black asserted, to create more enthusiasm 
for people to come home.  Sensoy said the press play after 
the Sept. 12 meeting did not reflect the atmosphere or 
content of the meeting, but today the Turks needed to show 
what was done in our cooperation in concrete terms.  He said 
that he had given Amb. Pascoe a draft MOU on the elimination 
of the PKK/KADEK from northern Iraq and asked him to study it 
in the hopes that Amb. Black could engage on it today. 
(Comment: In fact, Sensoy passed the draft MOU to DAS Pascoe 
as a non-paper, not as a draft to be reviewed for possible 
agreement.  end comment.)  Sensoy said Turkey also hoped for 
a joint statement after the meeting reflecting our common 
resolve to fight terror and that we were working together on 
an action plan and a timetable, and that no options were 
ruled out.  The timeframe, he stressed, was important.  The 
US shouldn't wait for six months, he said. 
 
 
¶9. (S) Amb. Black explained that we had accepted the draft 
MOU as a non-paper and did not have a considered reaction to 
it, but could provide one at a later time.  Sensoy asked that 
we provide that in diplomatic channels.  He understood that 
it was not our practice to issue joint statements but hoped 
we could at least use the same concepts in our statements to 
the press.  He and Amb. Black agreed that they would address 
the press together after the meeting. 
 
 
-------------------------------- 
Actions Turkey Would Like to See 
-------------------------------- 
 
 
¶10. (S) Sensoy asked what could be done short of military 
action.  Amb. Black answered that we could continue to exert 
influence on the Europeans to designate KADEK as a terrorist 
organization.  EUR/SE's Larry Silverman reviewed the state of 
play with various EU states, and noted that we were also 
pressing the EU to cut PKK/KADEK financing and to ensure that 
if the PKK/KADEK leaves Iraq they do not set up shop in 
Europe.  He noted that we would approach the Syrians with 
similar messages.  Sensoy noted that Turkey had given the US 
a list of 33 PKK/KADEK members, 27 of whom were leaders, 
including the crimes they had committed their aliases and 
maps with their locations.  He asked if the information 
coincided with US information and if we had anything 
additional to share.  He then asked if the US could apprehend 
4 or 5 PKK/KADEK leaders and hand them over to Turkey, 
suggesting this would send a very strong message.  He also 
asked to discuss cutting off PKK/KADEK logistic support, 
especially food, from Iraq's neighbors and the KDP and PUK. 
If it was useful to spread the word about the Reintegration 
Law more broadly, Turkey could prepare leaflets in Arabic and 
Kurdish and discuss with us how and where to drop them. 
Turkey, he said, was also interested in ways to interfere 
with PKK/KADEK command and control. 
¶11. (S) Amb. Black said the USG placed great emphasis on 
reintegration, and that anything Turkey could do to sensitize 
PKK/KADEK members to find return attractive would be crucial, 
whether via leaflets or TV or radio.  "That's where we need 
you the most," he said.  We were, he added, interested in any 
Turkish tactical information on supply lines and urged Turkey 
to follow up on Sensoy's requests for action and information 
through intelligence and military channels.  He recognized 
the impact that going after high value targets would have 
with the Turkish public and with the PKK/KADEK. 
 
 
¶12. (S) Andrew Wyllie added that UNHCR was eager to help pass 
information, and that we needed to ensure they could play 
that role.  They also needed to play the monitoring role, 
which would send a reassuring message in Iraq about 
international presence in the return process.  Sensoy 
answered that Turkey would go along with anything that was 
consistent with UNHCR practice.  "We will not impede them, 
and will work with them to the fullest."  At the suggestion 
of OSD's Larry Franklin, Sensoy said that Turkey would gladly 
be in contact with the Iraqi Governing Council or Iraqi 
ministries as well if that was required. 
 
 
------------------------ 
Satisfaction With Result 
------------------------ 
 
 
¶13. (S) In closing, Amb. Black urged the Turkish delegation 
to report to their superiors that we are already in an active 
process.  We are determined.  We know the objective.  We have 
reviewed the mechanics and must now prepare the battlefield, 
including reducing lethality.  "The horse has left the barn," 
and that we are here to facilitate the process of eliminating 
the PKK/KADEK threat.  Sensoy and Amb. Black agreed that they 
had covered all they could at this point, and that the two 
sides would stay in touch, including via the Embassy, 
intelligence and military channels and over the phone between 
the principals as required.  They did not see the need for 
another such meeting at this point.  Sensoy ended the meeting 
by expressing his satisfaction with the meeting and where the 
issue now stood. "We now have a framework to fill in the 
future," he said. 
 
 
¶14. (U) Amb. Black has cleared this message. 
 
 
¶15. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
EDELMAN