This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006208 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2008 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PINS TU IZ
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT SEZER'S SPEECH AT OPENING OF PARLIAMENT 
OPPOSES U.S. ON IRAQ AND REPROVES AK GOVERNMENT 
 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: 1.5 (b,d). 
 
 
¶1. () Summary: In reiterating his opposition to Turkish 
troops for Iraq and in displaying a partisan preference for 
left-of-center opposition CHP over the AK government, 
President Sezer demonstrated again that he is part of the 
problem, not the solution.  End summary. 
 
 
¶2. (C) Admonishing Turkey to achieve EU membership, continue 
economic growth, and strengthen the Turkish military, 
President Sezer used his 90-minute speech inaugurating the 
new session of Parliament Oct. 1 to try to circumscribe 
innovation both in domestic and foreign policy.  He rendered 
his remarks all the more tedious by frequent hortatory 
references to the "Great Leader" Ataturk.  He rendered them 
all the more partisan in favor of opposition CHP by 
repeatedly reproving the AK government for a perceived 
veering away from Kemalist principles, a gambit which 
provoked CHP applause at various points during the speech. 
In sum, Sezer laid out a restrictive, legalist view running 
counter to U.S. interests in both Turkey's domestic and 
foreign policy arenas. 
 
 
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Foreign Policy 
-------------- 
 
 
¶3. (C) Sezer led off the foreign policy section of his speech 
by emphasizing the importance of the "mature strategic 
partnership" with the U.S.  However, his characterization of 
relations with us, while formally positive, was ritualistic 
and static.  In contrast he portrayed relations with Russia 
as dynamic and promising.  He praised the positive trends in 
Turco-Greek relations and expressed pleasure at the way 
relations with Iran have developed since Khatami assumed the 
presidency (Sezer made no mention of Iran's drive for nuclear 
weapons and delivery systems).  On Cyprus he promoted Denktas 
and his approach (no mention of the Annan Plan).  On Armenia, 
while expressing hope for normalization, he put the onus on 
Yerevan. 
 
 
¶4. (U) The difference between Sezer's vision and that of the 
U.S. -- and GOT (para 5) -- was starkest on Iraq.  In a 
carbon copy of his pre-March 1 opposition to Turkish military 
participation, Sezer tried once again to deter Parliamentary 
approval.  He did so by pedantically and at length 
re-asserting that the operative principle of Article 92 of 
the Turkish constitution, which gives sole power to the 
Parliament to authorize Turkish military operations abroad or 
stationing of foreign troops in Turkey, is based on 
"international legitimacy".  He did not define "international 
legitimacy".  Sezer also tried to interpret Article 92 
ultra-narrowly to state that only the Parliament can 
authorize dispatch of troops rather than allowing Parliament 
to grant the government broad authority to choose when and 
how to do so; DefMin Gonul complained about this point to UK 
Ambassador after the speech. 
 
 
¶5. (C) Justice Minister and GOT spokesman Cicek told the 
Ambassador later Oct. 1 that he disagrees with Sezer's overly 
legalistic approach to international legitimacy.  In 
Ambassador's presence Erdogan told Brent Scowcroft Sept. 29 
that the AK parliamentary group would meet this week to 
prepare the ground for eventual approval of a broad 
resolution; DefMin Gonul confirmed to UK Ambassador that the 
meeting has taken place. 
 
 
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Domestic Policy 
--------------- 
 
 
¶6. (U) Sezer avoided giving credit to the AK government for 
its passage of landmark political reform packages which have 
brought Turkey close to fulfilling EU Copenhagen criteria. 
Throughout his speech Sezer sought to warn the AK government 
that in his view it is straying from "unchangeable" Kemalist 
principles such as "secularism".  At one point, by recalling 
that the Supreme Court has the power to try cabinet members, 
he tried to stretch his warning into a threat.  He asserted 
that an (undefined) current of radical religious 
fundamentalism threatens to impose sharia law on Turkey. 
While criticizing Turkish universities and the Higher 
Education Council for failing to meet expectations, he made 
it clear that he opposes the AK government's approach to 
reform of both universities and secondary education. 
 
 
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Comment 
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¶7. (C) Once again Sezer demonstrated his deficient vision of 
Turkey's domestic and foreign policy vistas.  In response to 
reporters' questions afterwards, P.M. Erdogan, who had sat 
impassively throughout, dismissed the speech as "ripe and 
plump" and, in reaction to a question how he assessed Sezer's 
"warnings", disparaged Sezer's comments as merely personal 
views.  Regarding Iraq, we thought it significant that while 
AK M.P.s sat in stony silence, even CHP, which is committed 
to opposing any resolution on troops for a stabilization 
force, refrained from applauding during Sezer's laborious 
attempt to box the Parliament in. 
EDELMAN