This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 002484 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DOD FOR U/S ZAKHEIM, DEPARTMENT FOR A/S WAYNE AND A/S 
JONES, TREASURY FOR A/S QUARLES 
EUR/UBI FOR S.HOLLIDAY, EB FOR BILL GRANT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2008 
TAGS: EAID NL PREL
SUBJECT: RESCHEDULING US IRAQ CORE GROUP VISIT TO THE HAGUE 
 
REF: A. STATE 270486 
 
     ¶B. 9/30 SOBEL-WAYNE AND SOBEL-ZAKHEIM TELCONS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford M. Sobel for Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.     (C) Summary.  Embassy recommends rescheduling proposed 
October 3 delegation visit to the Hague to ensure sufficient 
Dutch ministerial participation.  We believe a White House 
call to PM Balkenende would significantly enhance the 
prospects for success.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.     (C) Due to a Friday October 3 Council of Ministers 
meeting as well as an early morning special session on urgent 
EU matters, the GONL is unable to set up a suitable meeting 
at cabinet level for the U.S. delegation led by U/S Zakheim, 
A/S Wayne, and A/S Quarles.  Ambassador Sobel prevailed on 
Deputy PM/Finance Minister Gerrit Zalm to agree to a very 
early morning breakfast and to make best effort to persuade 
other relevant ministers to attend.  Zalm warned, however, 
that he and others could only be available for 30-40 minutes. 
 Thus far, only one State Secretary has confirmed attendance. 
 
¶3.     (C) Embassy recommends that instead of a stop on 
October 3, an appropriate senior USG team schedule a visit 
before the Madrid conference that will allow both the broad 
participation and the time necessary to persuade the Dutch 
cabinet to take a political decision to reverse policy on 
Iraq reconstruction.  (Note:  in circa April 2003 the Dutch 
cabinet notified parliament of a decision not/not to provide 
bilateral support for Iraq reconstruction.   Instead, the 
GONL is spending EUR 65 million on troop deployment, EUR 21 
million on humanitarian aid, EUR 3 million for seed money for 
Dutch companies in Iraq, and EUR 800K on police training. 
End Note.) 
 
¶4.     (C) Because it will be a significant political 
decision for the GONL to agree to bilateral support for 
reconstruction, we believe our chances of success will be 
greatly enhanced if the U.S. delegation can meet at the 
ministerial level, and in a format that will allow adequate 
time to allow for discussions and ensure participation by all 
relevant ministries.  We see an opportunity to build on PM 
Balkenende's extremely successful September 3 visit to 
Washington and recommend a phone call or message to the PM 
from the White House -- either President or Vice President -- 
urging that his government meet this challenge.  Such a call 
would make clear to the GONL that the USG envoys to the Hague 
come at the White House's behest. 
 
¶5.     (C) In the meantime, we propose to ask the Minister of 
Finance and Minister of Foreign Affairs, who we deem to be 
most sympathetic to our message, to begin advocacy at the 
October 3 cabinet meeting for a policy shift.  We will 
reinforce the point that the stakes in Iraq are so great that 
we must succeed.  We will press the Dutch to see this as a 
strategic necessity, not merely a financial or developmental 
problem.  We would welcome additional guidance from 
Washington agencies in crafting our message to the Dutch 
cabinet. 
SOBEL