This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 001976 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT. FOR AF KANSTEINER, DUNLAP; AF/S FOR DELISI, RAYNOR 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR J. FRAZER 
LONDON FOR C. GURNEY 
PARIS FOR C. NEARY 
NAIROBI FOR T. PFLAUMER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2013 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ZI
SUBJECT: TAKING STOCK OF TALKS 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Win Dayton, under Section 1.5(b), (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY/INTRODUCTION:  With signals from ZANU-PF and 
MDC suggesting that they may be preparing to resume 
negotiations, Embassy offers this inventory of factors likely 
to play on each party's negotiating posture during the run-up 
to and in the conduct of talks.  To date, neither party 
appears to have a long-term strategy for negotiations. 
Mugabe's party seems willing to engage in talks for 
short-term political gain, presumably with a view to stalling 
or ultimately co-opting the opposition.  The beleaguered MDC 
has devoted most of its efforts to inducing its adversary to 
the table, without appearing to have a well-defined plan 
after that.  Under these circumstances, negotiations may 
prove a slippery slope on which either could lose traction 
quickly.  Notwithstanding the severe imbalance of power 
between the parties, where they go may depend on the 
negotiators' ability to find an unprovocative process away 
from the public glare and to decouple personalities and 
shrill positions from actual interests.  END 
SUMMARY/INTRODUCTION 
 
Talks on Talks 
-------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) The parties in recent months have been behaving 
somewhat more civilly to each other publicly and privately. 
This can be attributed in part to an increasingly important 
contest for international opinion.  ZANU-PF,s immediate 
objectives are two-fold: a lifting of Zimbabwe's suspension 
at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in 
December, and re-engagement by international financial 
institutions that will be critical to the recovery of 
Zimbabwe's collapsed economy.  The MDC leadership is trying 
to foster atmospherics conducive to induce ZANU-PF to return 
to the negotiating table, its only potential path to 
political power.  At the same time, it is actively courting 
greater sympathy among regional African leaders who have been 
the mainstay of Mugabe,s limited international support. 
 
¶3.  (C) The intrinsic significance of merely starting talks 
complicates the process of getting the parties to the table. 
The ruling party's ambivalence toward talks stems from 
competing insecurities: it is desperate to retain its 
historical control in the face of waning popularity, even as 
it tries to burnish its international image.   It views talks 
both as an unwarranted threat to its power and a means to 
enhance international recognition.  As a result, the party 
sends mixed signals on its enthusiasm for talks; most 
observers feel it intends to time the commencement of talks 
to maximize benefit from the international community, fully 
intending to stymie any meaningful subsequent progress. 
 
¶4.  (C)  While the MDC is pushing publicly to get the talks 
re-started, its enthusiasm is tempered by fears among rank 
and file that the party could be swallowed in a "government 
of national unity" by ZANU-PF, just as ZAPU was.   The MDC 
has rejected ZANU-PF preconditions for talks and asserts that 
all issues presented by each side should be on the agenda. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Two recent developments cast a pall over gradually 
improving atmospherics: the government's closure of 
Zimbabwe's only independent daily newspaper, and government 
efforts to bring international humanitarian food relief 
efforts under its control.  While not linked directly by 
either to prospects for talks, the developments undermine the 
government's credibility on its willingness to brook 
alternative bases of authority within the country. 
 
¶6.  (C) A number of events ahead on the calendar may further 
affect the parties' posture on talks: 
 
-- ZANU-PF,s Party Congress, currently scheduled for 
December, and local intra-party elections to be conducted in 
the run-up to the Congress, could have an impact on the 
party's posture toward inter-party talks with the MDC, 
especially if they address leadership succession issues. 
 
-- Resumption of Tsvangirai's treason trial (now scheduled 
for October 27) and adjudication of the MDC's election 
petition (November) may further have an impact on prospects 
for talks. 
 
-- The bishops continue their efforts to facilitate 
resumption of talks, recently pushing party representatives 
to join in a retreat.  Although neither party seems prepared 
to have the bishops act as formal mediators, the parties use 
them to pass messages and to promote confidence-building. 
 
-- The parties also are engaged in periodic discreet talks on 
a new constitution that would be elemental to any overarching 
resolution of issues addressed by inter-party talks. 
 
ZANU-PF Interests 
----------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) The ruling party's assessment of its own interests is 
inextricably linked with its sense of identity: a liberation 
party continuously ruling the country for all of its 23 years 
of existence.  Its rapidly eroding popularity presents a 
world too radically different for many party members to 
absorb.  At one level, the party's centralized leadership by 
one man means that its perceived interests are intertwined 
with Robert Mugabe's.  Chief among his personal objectives 
are physical and financial security, the continued supremacy 
of ZANU-PF, and "survival of his liberation legacy" -- all 
are interrelated.  Re-engagement by the international 
community -- especially international financial institutions 
-- is a ruling party priority, but secondary to its continued 
political dominance.   Looming larger as a priority for party 
members is arresting the economy's disastrous slide, which 
imperils the party's tenuous popularity and the welfare of 
the members, their families, and their constituencies. 
 
MDC Interests 
------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) The five-year old party's umbrella covers a host of 
disparate interest groups united principally by opposition to 
continued ZANU-PF rule.  Accordingly, the MDC's imperatives 
at this stage generally are political, and its economic and 
social agendas remain rather unspecific, secondary, and 
dependent for now on achieving its immediate political 
objectives.  While a new election conducted freely and fairly 
is foremost among party objectives in the short and long 
term, assurances of the proper political and electoral 
environment are even more important than setting a very early 
election date.  Much of the party's short-term objectives 
revolve around public relations at home and abroad, physical 
safety concerns, and fighting rear-guard actions against 
ZANU-PF legal and media attacks. 
 
ZANU-PF Party Discipline 
------------------------ 
 
¶9.  (C) The party's historically rigid party discipline 
hinges on Mugabe's unchallenged authority atop the party and 
on a siege mentality vis--vis the outside world.  The few 
who have challenged party orthodoxy in recent years found 
themselves quickly cast outside any circle of influence. 
Such career- and fear-motivated discipline has proven a 
double-edged sword: it has fueled unswerving loyalty to the 
boss's word while stifling potentially constructive debate 
over courses of action that Mugabe is perceived to favor.  As 
formidable as the discipline has been historically, the 
extent to which it would survive Mugabe's passing remains an 
open question.  Indeed, growing obsession over succession 
complicate party discipline as pretenders to the crown 
posture and seek to undermine each other's credibility before 
Mugabe and within the party. 
 
MDC Party Discipline 
-------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Like ZANU-PF, the MDC has a top-heavy structure, and 
nobody stands as a potential challenger to Morgan Tsvangirai. 
 ZANU-PF efforts to contribute to party divisions secretly 
and in clumsy media campaigns do not appear to be having 
meaningful impact.  Nonetheless, the party's relative youth 
and breadth make it much less disciplined than ZANU-PF. 
Confidentiality appears to be a particular challenge, as when 
 
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the party significantly set back the so-called bishops, 
initiative by leaking its own agenda prematurely to the 
press.  A similar leak on constitutional discussions was 
another instance of MDC difficulties over confidentiality. 
Complicating party discipline is tension between the 
leadership and rank-and-file over whether to pursue 
negotiation (favored by the leadership) or to take more 
provocative measures such as stay-aways and demonstrations. 
Tsvangirai has publicly warned that the party could take to 
 
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the streets again if the government continues to avoid coming 
to the table; however, the MDC leadership remains wary about 
repeating the disappointing stay-away efforts of early June. 
Balance of Power 
---------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) Challenging the prospects for meaningful 
negotiations will be a severe imbalance of power.  At 
ZANU-PF,s disposal is an ability to pass and implement laws 
to perpetuate its command of the levers of power through its 
control of the legislature and ministries.  Its use of 
government machinery for political purposes is comprehensive; 
it has politicized everything from academic tenure to food 
distribution.  The party strongly influences the judiciary 
and can control the progress of key political cases, if not 
always their outcome. 
 
¶12.  (C) No match for the ruling party on resources, the MDC 
nonetheless has something ZANU-PF craves: popular domestic 
support.  In spite of intimidation, economic duress, and 
manipulation of voter rolls, the MDC spanked ZANU-PF in the 
August mayoral and urban council elections.  Signaling 
potential trouble for MDC leverage, however, was very low 
voter turnout and apparent public apathy.  Another key card 
in MDC's hand is its connections to the international 
community, particularly among donor nations.  There is a 
sense among players on both sides that the MDC would be able 
to "deliver" international re-engagement with Zimbabwe upon 
some degree of rapprochement. 
 
Separating People From the Problem 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (C) Deep polarization throughout society here and a 
personalization of political issues are major impediments to 
the negotiating environment.  Both sides have contributed to 
this, with the two sides, vying media outlets often favoring 
rhetoric, exaggeration, and personal vilification over 
objective substantive analysis.  Indeed, the politics of 
personal attack -- evidenced by MDC's petition to have 
Mugabe's election overturned and the Tsvangirai treason trial 
-- are central to each side's overall game plan.  Many on 
both sides view their contest as a winner-take-all zero-sum 
game, reinforcing a pervasive distaste for compromise.  For 
many in the MDC, any discussion of specific issues is 
secondary to the imperative of Mugabe's removal from power. 
Others appear willing to accept some face-saving transition 
and focus on shaping institutions to assure a system of 
functioning checks and balances after Mugabe has departed -- 
whenever that may be.  For its part, ZANU-PF,s posture 
toward the MDC has been dominated by personal animus toward 
Tsvangirai and his challenge to Mugabe's and ZANU-PF,s claim 
 
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of the right to rule based on its liberation credentials. 
Much of this probably is strategic, as the MDC lacks other 
figures who command national stature. 
 
Quest for Common Ground 
----------------------- 
 
¶14.  (C) The issues raised by each side employ charged 
language in the domestic political context and are inherently 
polarizing.  Nonetheless, conceptually they should be 
susceptible to finesse and face-saving resolution if the 
parties can muster the political will.  After shedding some 
of the biased premises from each side's issues, the parties, 
longer term objectives do converge in many ways -- 
redistributive justice under land reform, for example. 
Potentially useful objective criteria for progress may 
revolve largely around adjustment of key laws, such as the 
Electoral Law, media-related laws, the Public Order and 
Security Act (POSA), as well as the leadership of organs 
charged with implementation of such laws. 
 
¶15.  (C) The discreet efforts underway on a new constitution 
would offer ground for additional important measurable 
foundation-laying in a relatively uncharged environment.  The 
current constitution provides for an executive-dominated, 
winner-take-all system.  Both sides claim to favor 
constitutional reforms that could give parliament and other 
institutions greater influence and make Zimbabwe a more 
pluralistic environment for a multi-party system.  Such 
reforms could be structured to better protect and empower a 
non-ruling party through its roles in parliament and local 
government. 
 
¶16.  (C) Ironically, an interest shared (if not binding) 
across party lines is a desire to move Zimbabwe beyond 
Mugabe.  While many in ZANU-PF are anxious about their 
party's prospects after Mugabe, most recognize that Mugabe's 
continued leadership is a liability for the country and the 
party.  This is not to suggest that they are prepared to take 
action overtly against the strongman who holds them together 
in important ways, but they increasingly are receptive to a 
process that will usher him into history.  While it is 
doubtful that any seriously intend to embark on a process 
that could meaningfully diminish the party's grip on the 
country, they may be edging toward a slippery slope. 
SULLIVAN