This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006140 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2008 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PTER IZ TU
SUBJECT: KURDS IN SOUTHEAST FEAR U.S. CRACKDOWN ON PKK 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 5745 
     ¶B. ANKARA 4787 
     ¶C. ANKARA 4499 
 
 
Classified by Polcouns John Kunstadter; reasons 1.5 b and d. 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Kurds in southeastern Turkey fear a possible 
U.S. military action against the PKK/KADEK in northern Iraq, 
and oppose Turkish participation in the Stabilization Force 
because they believe Turkish authorities would use their 
presence in Iraq to crack down on Iraqi Kurds.  Most of our 
contacts denounce recent PKK/KADEK violence, but say people 
in the region have close family ties to the organization's 
members.  Our Kurdish contacts uniformly argue that the GOT 
should offer a general amnesty to all PKK/KADEK militants and 
say U.S. military action against the PKK/KADEK could cause an 
anti-U.S. backlash in the southeast.  End Summary. 
 
 
¶2. (U) Embassy Human Rights Officer and EUR/SE Desk Officer 
traveled to Diyarbakir, Batman, Sirnak, and Mardin provinces 
September 23-26 and met with human rights activists, security 
officials, mayors, governors, attorneys, doctors, and 
religious leaders.  Adana PO also participated in portions of 
the visit as part of a longer orientation tour.  This report 
is based on these meetings. 
 
 
-------------- 
PKK "Our Sons" 
-------------- 
 
 
¶3. (C) Our Kurdish contacts across the board expressed deep 
anxiety about the possibility of a U.S. military crackdown on 
PKK/KADEK militants in northern Iraq.  Batman Mayor Huseyin 
Kalkan put it most bluntly, warning us that an attack on the 
PKK/KADEK would cost the U.S. its new-found support among 
Kurds.  Most of our Kurdish contacts denounced recent 
PKK/KADEK attacks and claimed southeastern Kurds generally 
oppose armed PKK/KADEK activity.  But they uniformly told us 
that people in the region feel a close affinity to the 
organization's members.  "None of the families here are 
neutral," said Nezahat Dagtekin, director of ART Radio/TV in 
Diyarbakir.  "We all have relatives with the PKK in the 
mountains."  Sheikh Abdulbaki Hasimi of Cizre, a major 
political and religious figure in the southeast, was among 
those who warned us that people in the region will react 
harshly if PKK/KADEK leaders are killed.  "They are our sons. 
 They did not come from the moon," he said.  Dagtekin said 
the reaction could become violent, though she declined to 
elaborate on what types of violence might be used or where it 
would be directed. 
 
 
--------------------------- 
Kurds Favor General Amnesty 
--------------------------- 
 
 
¶4. (C) All of our Kurdish contacts rejected the GOT's 
Reintegration Law (reftels) as inadequate and called on the 
GOT to issue a general amnesty for PKK/KADEK militants.  They 
argued that PKK/KADEK violence was a reaction to the 
anti-Kurdish policies of the Turkish State, and that 
organization members were therefore entitled to an amnesty, 
provided they lay down their arms.  Attorney Fahrettin 
Karakoyunlu acknowledged that the continued presence of armed 
PKK/KADEK militants presents a threat to human rights reform 
and economic progress in the southeast.  He said it is 
especially important for the Kurds that the U.S. resolve the 
problem.  But, like others, he pleaded with us to pressure 
the GOT to offer a PKK/KADEK amnesty.  "We recognize that 
Turkey is a U.S. ally, but so are the Kurds," Karakoyunlu 
asserted.  It was clear to poloffs that many Kurds believe 
the U.S. can force the GOT to agree to a PKK/KADEK amnesty. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Embassy: We Support Kurdish Rights, Not Terrorism 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
 
¶5. (C) We replied that the U.S. will continue to support 
Kurdish language and cultural rights, in the context of equal 
rights for all Turkish citizens.  We will continue to press 
Turkey, as an ally, to enact and implement human rights 
reform.  But the U.S. considers the PKK/KADEK a terrorist 
organization and cannot accept its presence in northern Iraq. 
 Of all the countries with large Kurdish populations, Turkey 
is the only democracy.  The GOT is engaged in an intense 
EU-related reform process that holds the prospect of a new 
relationship between the State and the Kurdish community. 
Turkey is the country that has the best chance of solving its 
Kurdish problem through peaceful, democratic means.  Any 
attempt to achieve these goals through violence will squander 
this opportunity. 
 
 
-------------------------------- 
GOT Officials: No Major Backlash 
-------------------------------- 
 
 
¶6. (C) The governors, prosecutors, and security directors 
with whom we spoke rejected the idea that Kurds in the 
southeast would react violently to a crackdown on the 
PKK/KADEK.  Batman Security Director Tahir Bayindir claimed 
that most people in the southeast do not support the 
terrorist organization.  Bayindir predicted that the 
pro-Kurdish Democratic People's Party (DEHAP) would stage 
some protests, but without great effect.  Saban Erturk, chief 
prosecutor of the Diyarbakir State Security Court, agreed, 
averring that "people who tell you otherwise are not to be 
trusted -- they are trying to convince you not to act" 
against the PKK/KADEK. 
 
 
----------------------------------- 
Kurds Oppose Turkish Troops in Iraq 
----------------------------------- 
 
 
¶7. (C) Southeastern Kurds are also concerned about possible 
Turkish participation in the Stabilization Force in Iraq. 
They particularly reject the idea of Turkish troops in 
northern Iraq, but fear that even a deployment through 
northern Iraq to non-Kurdish regions could lead to 
Turkish-Kurdish clashes in Iraq and a crackdown in southeast 
Turkey.  Kalkan accused the Turkish State of organizing 
attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq, arguing that such 
attacks were designed to convince Washington of the need to 
bring Turkish troops into the Stabilization Force.  "You must 
not let the Turkish military trick you into letting them into 
northern Iraq," he said. 
 
 
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Comment 
------- 
 
 
¶8. (C) In the run-up to the Iraq war, Turkish Kurds opposed 
the action, but for different reasons than critics elsewhere 
-- they feared a crackdown by the Turkish military.  When the 
U.S.-led coalition toppled the Iraqi regime without bringing 
Turkish troops into northern Iraq, many Kurdish leaders were 
ecstatic.  A number of them told us they were pleased with 
their "new U.S. alliance," and let us know they expected to 
benefit from a U.S.-led makeover of the Middle East.  While 
we have consistently warned against such unrealistic 
expectations, the Kurdish public, desperate for solutions, 
clings to its hopes.  A U.S. attack on the PKK/KADEK will 
challenge these hopes and expectations, and some of our 
interlocutors hinted that such a military solution could 
spark anti-U.S. sentiment in the southeast. 
 
 
¶9. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
 
 
EDELMAN