Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 03AMMAN6222, Jordan-Iraq Aviation Issues Reviewed

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #03AMMAN6222.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03AMMAN6222 2003-09-29 14:58 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Amman
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 006222 
 
SIPDIS 
 
TREASURY FOR OASIA - A DEMOPULOS 
CPA FOR TRENT, WILLIS, WAYNE 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAIR EFIN PINR IZ JO
SUBJECT: Jordan-Iraq Aviation Issues Reviewed 
 
REF: Amman 05889 
 
1.  (SBU)  Summary.  The Jordanian Transportation 
Minister told CPA transportation advisors that Jordan 
wishes to cooperate in rebuilding the Iraqi aviation 
sector.  Jordan is ready to provide training to Iraqi CAA 
and airline employees and to work with CPA to return or 
dispose of Iraqi aircraft in Jordan per UN Security 
Council Resolution 1483.  The Jordanians encouraged an 
early visit to Amman by Iraq's transportation minister, 
which could be the next step in moving cooperation 
forward.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU)  CPA Senior Advisor to the Transportation 
Ministry Darrell Trent reviewed Iraq-Jordan aviation 
issues with Jordanian Aviation Minister Nader Dhahabi 
September 25 in Amman.  Accompanying Trent were CPA 
advisors Frank Willis, Rob Wayne and Chris Walker, and 
Embassy econoffs.  Dhahabi was joined by Secretary 
General Alaa Batainah, Civil Aviation Director Hanna 
Najjar, and a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official. 
 
------------------- 
Training for Iraqis 
------------------- 
 
3.  (SBU)  Dhahabi opened the meeting by warmly welcoming 
Trent and team and expressing readiness to be helpful in 
any way.  He noted that the Jordanian CAA's Queen Noor 
Technical College would begin offering training to 29 
Iraqi air traffic controllers on October 4, and hoped 
that this was just the beginning of a long-term 
relationship between the Jordanian and Iraqi CAA's.  The 
minister said that the CAA was also ready to train Iraqi 
Airways employees as soon as the airline was ready.  He 
said that in both cases there was much work to be done, 
since Iraqi knowledge of the international civil aviation 
world was basically frozen at its 1990 level. 
 
------------------------------ 
Iraqi Airways Planes in Jordan 
------------------------------ 
 
4.  (SBU)  In response to Trent's question, Dhahabi said 
Iraqi Airways airplanes that have been in Jordan since 
1991 were not airworthy (see ref).  The planes had been 
sitting on the tarmac unprotected for more than ten years 
and no effort had been made to preserve engines or other 
critical systems.  Jordan did not have maintenance 
records.  The minister estimated that the cost of a "D 
check" overhaul to make the aircraft airworthy would cost 
more than it would to buy aircraft of similar age and 
model on the market.  He thought it could cost up to $7 
million per airplane to make them airworthy, while planes 
on the market with clear histories and maintenance 
records would cost less than half that amount. 
 
5.  (SBU)  Trent said that these were important points, 
but that the fate of the airplanes was also a matter of 
national pride in Iraq.  He said he had promised his 
Iraqi colleagues that he would look in detail at all the 
options before a decision was made.  The Minister offered 
the assistance of Royal Jordanian Airlines and the 
JORAMCO aircraft maintenance company in conducting an 
objective technical assessment of the airplanes.  Boeing 
or Pratt and Whitney experts could participate in such an 
assessment, he said.  The Minister also agreed that Trent 
could physically inspect the aircraft (which Trent and 
Wayne did later that day). 
 
6.  (SBU)  The Minister said Jordan was ready to deal 
with the aircraft as requested by the Development Fund 
for Iraq (DFI) created by UNSCR 1483, noting that it 
applied to "economic resources" as well as to financial 
assets.  The Minister said the accumulated JD 3-4 million 
in landing and parking fees would also have to be dealt 
with.  He suggested that this could be handled 
"politically," with the claim being reduced or dropped if 
requested by the Iraqi authorities.  The Minister used 
this point as an opportunity to extend an invitation to 
the Iraqi transportation minister.  He said that Jordan 
would be pleased to publicize such a visit and 
demonstrate that Iraqis were playing an important role in 
their own affairs. 
 
7.  (SBU)  As for the Falcon-20 executive jet currently 
parked at Amman's Marka Airport, the Minister said Jordan 
was ready to turn the plane over to the DFI once its 
owner had been determined to be the Iraqi government or 
an entity operating on behalf of the Iraqi government per 
UNSCR 1483.  The Minister said it was his understanding 
that the plane had been used to transport senior Iraqi 
officials, but that a legal demonstration of GOI 
ownership was necessary before Jordan could turn it over. 
Asked by Trent, Dhahabi said he had no information about 
the whereabouts of two long missing Iraqi air force 
Falcon-20 jets. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Jordanian-Iraqi Transport Companies 
----------------------------------- 
 
8.  (SBU)  Dhahabi raised the case of the Iraq-Jordan 
land transport company, which is 50% Iraqi government 
owned, and the joint maritime company that is 1/3 Iraqi 
government owned.  The Minister of Finance was in charge 
of determining how these financial assets should be 
treated.  The government had established a temporary 
committee to oversee the ongoing business of these firms 
in the place of their former boards of directors.  The 
General Manager of one of the companies had been 
dismissed because the GOJ committee was not confident he 
was acting in the best interest of the company.  As in 
the case of the airplanes, the Minister said he 
understood that these assets should eventually be turned 
over to the DFI. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Royal Jordanian Operations to Iraq 
---------------------------------- 
 
9.  (SBU)  Trent and Willis expressed appreciation for 
the cooperation offered by Royal Jordanian Airlines (RJ), 
particularly the airline's help in providing charter 
service between Amman and Baghdad for CPA officials and 
others traveling on CPA business.  The Minister said he 
hoped RJ would be "the first" to fly regular flights to 
Baghdad and Basra whenever Iraq was ready to take that 
step.  In the meantime, he said there should be some 
clarification in procedures for authorizing special 
flights into Iraq.  He suggested that there should be one 
Iraqi focal point that provided official permission for 
such flights, observing that a decision by the Centcom 
Regional Air Mobility Command (RAMC) in Doha to provide a 
slot did not constitute approval for a flight.  This 
ambiguity had sometimes created confusion when requests 
were made to Jordan's CAA to approve specific flight 
requests.  Trent said he would clarify the situation. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
10.  (SBU)  The Jordanians are clearly interested in 
developing a long-term aviation relationship with Iraq, 
and are ready to provide training and other help as an 
investment toward that end.  They are anxious to dispose 
of Iraqi aircraft in Jordan, but will want to be assured 
that they do so in complete conformity with UNSCR 1483. 
In the case of the Falcon-50, this means they will need 
evidence of Iraqi ownership or a request from the 
government of registration (Switzerland) before turning 
the aircraft over.  Although the Jordanians are ready to 
cooperate fully with CPA and Iraqi ministries, it is 
politically easier for them to do so when requests come 
to them directly from Iraqi officials.  Thus, an early 
visit to Amman by the Iraqi Transportation Minister could 
help move these issues along. 
GNEHM