Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 03AMMAN6029, JORDAN'S RED-DEAD POSTURING--YOU'RE EITHER WITH US

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #03AMMAN6029.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03AMMAN6029 2003-09-18 16:47 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Amman
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 006029 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA DAS SATTERFIELD, NEA DAS CHENEY, NEA/RA 
LAWSON, NEA/ARN WILLIAMS, NEA/IPA, OES/ENV PAYNE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2008 
TAGS: PREL SENV KWBG JO IS
SUBJECT: JORDAN'S RED-DEAD POSTURING--YOU'RE EITHER WITH US 
. . . .  OR WE'LL DO IT ALONE 
 
REF: A) TEL AVIV 5271 B) AMMAN 5999 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: CDA DAVID HALE, Reason 1.5 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: Jordan,s Planning and Water Ministers, 
Bassem Awadallah and Hazim El-Naser, insisted to visiting NEA 
Senior Science Advisor Charles Lawson that the Red Sea - Dead 
Sea Conveyance (RDC) project feasibility study must happen. 
If the Israelis and Palestinians cannot put the politics of 
such a project aside, "Jordan will go it alone," each 
minister said separately.  GOJ environment-friendly arguments 
about saving the Dead Sea have been overtaken by the 
desalination component of the RDC.  Water is Jordan,s 
biggest challenge, and the pressure is on to identify new 
sources to cope with an unsustainably high birthrate and 
increasing demand.  The long-term solution lies in the RDC, 
argued Awadallah, who was caught off balance when asked to 
consider alternative water sources. 
 
2. (C) Anxious not to lose the spotlight gained at this 
summer,s extraordinary session of the WEF at the Dead Sea, 
Jordan remains resolved to raise the issue at the upcoming 
Dubai IFI meetings (something allegedly agreed to between 
King Abdullah and WB President Wolfensohn) to encourage key 
donors to fund the feasibility study.  Lawson cautioned that 
without Israeli and Palestinian buy-in donors will likely be 
reluctant to support the RDC.  Separately, Israeli MFA 
Multilateral Peace Process Director Yaacov Keidar told us 
that domestic political considerations in Israel were driving 
Jerusalem,s reluctance to support this project; only PM 
Sharon could unblock the Israeli-Palestinian political 
impasse and move forward at this stage.  END SUMMARY. 
 
3. (C) Jordanian officials made their displeasure with 
Israel,s perceived foot-dragging on the draft Terms of 
Reference (TOR) for the Red Sea - Dead Sea Conveyance (RDC) 
feasibility study known to NEA Senior Science Advisor Charles 
Lawson during a series of meetings in Amman September 14-16. 
Explicit in those exchanges were comments from Jordanian 
Minister of Planning, Bassem Awadallah, and Minister of Water 
and Irrigation, Hazim el-Naser, that "we are going to do it," 
regardless of the Palestinians and Israelis.  Awadallah 
related to Lawson that "the King is resolved like nothing 
else" to conduct the RDC feasibility study (and ostensibly 
construct the full-scale project). 
 
4. (C) Explaining that Jordan took a risk last year in 
Johannesburg, rolling out the project with the Israelis, 
Awadallah said that Jordan will move forward with or without 
a resolution of Palestinian-Israeli political differences. 
"We can,t miss any international opportunity to promote 
this," he added, looking forward to the September 23-24 World 
Bank-IMF meetings in Dubai at which he expects the Bank to 
gather a small group of key donors for a presentation on the 
RDC.  The next possible venue to champion the RDC would not 
present itself until next May,s WEF at the Dead Sea, 
unacceptably stalling progress on the project, Awadallah 
said.  (Note:  Jordanian Water Minister El-Naser and Israeli 
Infrastructure Minister Yosef Paritzky have discussed the 
possibility of a Red-Dead session at the January WEF meeting 
in Davos.  End note.) 
 
5. (C) Now that both the Palestinians and Israelis had 
entrenched political positions on the draft TOR, Awadallah 
felt somewhat boxed in by the World Bank,s requirement of 
"letters of intent" to participate from the Israelis and 
Palestinians.  He bemoaned the fact that Israel had taken so 
long to respond to the draft TOR and, when the comments 
arrived last week, raised issues of sovereignty and political 
objections that threaten to derail the project. 
 
 6. (C) Lawson confirmed Awadallah,s fears, relating the 
gist of his September 8-11 meetings with Israeli officials on 
the topic (Ref A) and underscoring the concern of both 
Israelis and Palestinians about language in the TOR that may 
be prejudicial to future final status negotiations.  In an 
effort to bridge the gap, Lawson told Awadallah that he had 
encouraged the Israelis and Palestinians to focus only on the 
technical aspects of the study.  It was becoming clearer, 
however, that Jordan and movement on the RDC are hostage to 
Israeli and Palestinian political posturing.  Further, Lawson 
commented, while the Israelis and Palestinians wish to 
support Jordan in its quest for additional water, neither of 
them anticipates large benefits from the project itself, 
making them less flexible in their willingness to abandon 
their political positions. 
 
7. (C) According to Awadallah, he had received a commitment, 
in principle, from Palestinian Minister of Planning Nabil 
Kassis to support Jordan on the RDC.  (NOTE:  This doesn,t 
jibe with what we heard last week in Ramallah from Kassis, 
who said that the Palestinian's riparian status, as described 
in the draft TOR, was non-negotiable. (Ref A).)  Awadallah 
said that El-Naser,s positive meeting with Israeli Minister 
of Infrastructure Paritsky in Aqaba on August 28 had led the 
Jordanians to believe that they had achieved consensus on a 
trilateral technical committee for the RDC.  So, Awadallah 
asserted, it was with disappointment and frustration that 
they learned of Israeli reluctance to approve the draft TOR 
as written by the World Bank. 
 
8. (C) Lawson received a similar exasperated readout on the 
RDC feasibility study from Water Minister El-Naser. 
Referring to the Israeli comments on the draft TOR, the 
minister said "Jordan questions Israel,s interest in the 
project; we are suspicious of their intentions."  While he 
talked positively of the "preferred option to work together 
with the Palestinians and Israelis," El-Naser confirmed that 
Jordan is prepared to move ahead alone.  According to 
El-Naser, the King said, "if they do not want to join in, we 
will do it anyway."  Confirming Awadallah's hints, El-Naser 
said, "We are no more environmentally conscious than the 
Israelis or Palestinians; we are in need of the water" from 
this project.  "After 2015 we have no more new resources to 
tap," he added.  This was the first such admission to us by a 
GOJ official--and no less the one who has spearheaded the 
marketing of Red - Dead as a "Save the Dead Sea" scheme, not 
just a large scale desalination project. 
 
9. (C) El-Naser said Jordan will proceed with the RDC, 
regardless of Israeli or Palestinian involvement.  Explaining 
that a modified version of the mega-project would involve 
only desalination of Red Sea water, he claimed it could be 
built for about US $700 million.  (Comment: That price would 
be for the construction of the conveyance itself only.  The 
cost of constructing the desalination facilities would be an 
additional US $1-2 billion, depending on the final capacity 
desired.  End comment.)  When asked about seeking neighboring 
states, approval for conducting such a project with 
significant transboundary physical and environmental 
repercussions, he said that Israel does not seem to care 
about the sewage it dumps into the Jordan River north of the 
Dead Sea.  Why should Jordan be held accountable to more 
stringent standards, El-Naser asked rhetorically? 
 
10. (C) Lawson queried El-Naser about identifying new sources 
of water (other than the RDC desalination scheme) for the 
country.  The minister was non-responsive.  He did not want 
to talk about desalination options on the Gulf of Aqaba, the 
water from which could be pumped to Amman through the Disi 
Aquifer project pipeline.  Nor was he receptive to reopening 
discussions about a possible Mediterranean - Dead Sea canal, 
which many hydrologists agree is more economically feasible 
and less disruptive environmentally.  Lawson got a similar 
disinterested response from Awadallah on RDC alternatives. 
 
11. (C) We understand from the Israeli DCM that the newly 
accredited Israeli Ambassador, Yacov Hades Handlesman, got a 
very direct appeal from El-Naser to support the RDC 
feasibility study during this first meeting on September 15. 
El-Naser did not mince words about Jordan,s frustration and 
disappointment over Israel,s politicization of the TOR. 
El-Naser claims he has argued with the Israelis that this is 
a technical study, which can be sanitized of political 
stumbling blocks if the parties so desire. 
 
12. (C) On the margins of another Arab-Israeli multilateral 
meeting, Israeli MFA Multilateral Peace Process Director 
Yaacov Keidar told us domestic political considerations are 
holding up more ardent Israeli support for the RDC project. 
At present, it was politically untenable to enter into any 
kind of agreement or activity that hints at Palestinian 
sovereignty.  The Israeli public would not stand for it and 
no politician would put his/her name to it, despite Israel,s 
unfailing desire to support Jordan as a peace partner.  It 
would take PM Sharon, Keidar asserted, to make this delicate 
decision; he underscored the Israeli Embassy's recommendation 
to El-Naser that Jordanian PM Abul Ragheb phone Sharon 
directly. 
 
13. (C) COMMENT:  Without Israeli and Palestinian consensus 
on the World Bank,s TOR we believe the RDC feasibility study 
is ill-fated.  Should Jordan proceed alone, it lays itself 
open to criticism from its neighbors and the international 
community, and sets itself up for charges of conducting a 
biased study aimed at promoting the project,s feasibility. 
Also, international donors are unlikely to provide funding 
for a Jordan-only feasibility study.  Both Awadallah and 
El-Naser, joint architects of Jordan,s mega-project, have 
the most to gain from successful implementation of the RDC 
and remain its biggest advocates.  Of course, with the most 
personal equities invested, they also have the most to lose. 
King Abdullah has bought into the scheme.  However, we 
question whether senior Jordanian officials have sufficiently 
explored cheaper and more practical options for securing new 
water resources for one of the world,s most water starved 
countries. 
HALE