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Viewing cable 03KATHMANDU1237, NEPAL: UNHCR BRIEFING ON BHUTANESE REFUGEES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
03KATHMANDU1237 2003-07-01 09:06 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Kathmandu
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KATHMANDU 001237 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS, PRM: RMACKLER 
LONDON FOR CGURNEY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2013 
TAGS: PREF PREL NP BH
SUBJECT: NEPAL: UNHCR BRIEFING ON BHUTANESE REFUGEES 
 
REF: (A) KATHMANDU 1219 (B) KATHMANDU 1139 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michael E. Malinowski for Reasons 1.5 (b, d). 
 
1. (C) Summary.  In a briefing to the donor community in 
Nepal on June 30, UNHCR Country Director Abraham Abraham 
expressed strong concern over the results of the verification 
of the first camp of Bhutanese refugees.  These results, he 
said, present "serious difficulties" for some refugee 
families.  Refugee demonstrations against the verification 
report continued through June 23; Abraham confirmed Maoist 
student wing involvement in the protests.  A majority of the 
camp's residents are expected to file appeals by the July 2 
deadline.  UNHCR has no indication of how many Khundunabari 
camp residents will choose to return to Bhutan voluntarily, 
although Abraham expected that preliminary numbers would be 
available by late-August, one month before repatriation 
occurs.  Abraham confirmed that UNHCR is not inclined to 
support continued funding of the Khundunabari camp after 
repatriation even if refugees remain for local resettlement. 
Abraham has approached the Government of Nepal (GON) on 
developing a strategy to resettle refugees who do not wish to 
return to Bhutan, but GON responses have been noncommittal. 
UNHCR will continue to seek approval for its involvement in 
verification and repatriation and hopes that donor 
governments will do the same.  End Summary. 
 
2. (U) UNHCR Country Director Abraham Abraham invited all 
diplomatic mission representatives for a briefing on June 30 
regarding the Bhutanese refugee situation, the status of the 
19 Tibetan refugees detained June 24 (Ref A), and an update 
on UNHCR's protection program against gender-based violence 
(septel).  Along with Ambassador Malinowski, the German, 
French and Danish Chiefs of Mission, UK Charge and 
representatives from the EU, Japan, Canada and the World Food 
Program attended the briefing. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Khundunabari Camp Verification Report 
------------------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) Abraham reported that UNHCR has agreed to meet with 
GON and Royal Government of Bhutan (RGOB) officials to 
discuss implementation of the bilateral program despite the 
absence of UNHCR involvement in the verification process. 
Abraham expressed "deep concern" about inconsistencies in the 
Joint Verification Team's (JVT) Khundunabari Camp report 
released June 18 (Ref B). The results present "serious 
difficulties" for refugee families, he said.  Abraham 
confirmed reports that families have been split between 
categories.  In some cases, parents are in Category III 
(non-Bhutanese) and therefore ineligible for repatriation 
whereas their children are in Category II (Bhutanese who 
voluntarily departed) and are eligible for repatriation. 
There are also cases where children as young as three years 
old have been categorized as criminals (Category IV) along 
with their parents.  (Note.  Category III refugees 
(non-Bhutanese) are expected to return to their home country 
while those in Category IV (Bhutanese criminals) can return 
to Bhutan, but would face criminal charges.  End Note.)  The 
Nepalese Foreign Ministry Secretary Madhu Raman Acharya later 
admitted to Abraham that categorizing children as criminals 
had been a mistake.  Although Acharya did not detail how this 
would be prevented, Abraham was hopeful that future 
verifications would be more sensitive to the issue.  Abraham 
cited the need to conduct a complete and simultaneous 
verification of the remaining six camps.  A complete 
verification is necessary to allow the GON and other donor 
countries to move forward with other resettlement options, he 
said. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Refugee Staged Protests, But Now All Is Calm 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Following the release of the JVT report on June 18, 
camp residents were calm, perhaps in a state of shock, 
Abraham said.  However, the following morning, demonstrations 
involving almost the entire 12,000 residents of Khundunabari 
Camp and significant numbers in other camps occurred 
throughout the day of June 19.  On June 20, refugee students, 
complaining that the camp's organizing committee was not 
doing enough to promote the refugees' cause, attempted to 
take over the World Refugee Day celebrations.  However, camp 
security stayed away from the students and allowed the 
refugee leaders and UNHCR officials to defuse the situation. 
 
5. (SBU) On June 21, approximately 300 adult refugees left 
the camp to demonstrate in the nearby community.  Hundreds 
more refugee students also left the camps to demonstrate in 
front of the JVT building in nearby Damak.  Threatening to 
arrest the refugees, security forces called upon the UNHCR 
and other NGOs to talk to the protesters and encourage them 
to return to the camps. (Note: Although the tenor of the 
demonstrations were non-violent, the refugees were breaking 
two Nepali laws, one requiring refugees to obtain permission 
before leaving the camps and the other requiring permission 
before staging a public protest.  End Note.)  Demonstrations 
continued on June 22 and 23 with reports of only small 
skirmishes between students and security forces.  Refugee 
students reportedly threatened refugee leaders in the camp 
and accused them of selling-out to the JVT.  However, after a 
meeting with UNHCR officials on June 23, most refugees turned 
their attention to filing appellate applications. 
 
6. (C) UNHCR officials confirmed reports that the Maoist 
student wing ANNISU-R was involved in motivating and 
organizing the Bhutanese refugee student union protest.  Two 
ANNISU-R leaders, Govinda Thapa and Govinda Koirala, were 
seen in front of the JVT building in Damak on the day of the 
protest.  Rumors abound that ANNISU-R bankrolled the refugee 
students' transportation to and from Damak, but are 
unsubstantiated.  Security forces in Damak reported that the 
next time any ANNISU-R leaders appear in front of the JVT 
building, the police would arrest them. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Majority of Refugees File Appeals 
--------------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) The UNHCR has made it clear to the GON that the 
rules governing the appeal process are unacceptable.  Abraham 
specifically pointed to the fact that appeals must be made to 
the original adjudication body.  Such a body is not likely to 
reverse its previous decision, he said.  Abraham has raised 
this problem with both Prime Minister Thapa, who agreed to 
look into it, and the Indian Ambassador to Nepal, who agreed 
to discuss the issue with both the GON and RGOB.  In 
addition, refugees must submit new documentation or 
information in order to have their appeal heard.  However, 
few, if any, refugees will have new documentation to provide 
the JVT. 
 
8. (SBU) The appeal process is currently the issue of 
greatest concern to the refugees.  Many refugees had 
boycotted the appeal process; only five appeals had been 
submitted within the first week.  However, after UNHCR 
officials explained to the refugees that this was their one 
chance to file a formal protest to the JVT, nearly all 
Khundunabari camp residents rushed to complete the appellate 
application before the July 2 deadline.  At the refugees' 
request, UNHCR has made a photocopier available to enable the 
refugees to submit the application properly. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
The Way Forward:  UNHCR Involvement Remains Unlikely 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
9. (C) Abraham reported briefly on UNHCR Asia and Pacific 
Director Fakhouri's June 24-26 visit to Bhutan.  He said that 
the RGOB has remained adamant against a UNHCR presence in 
Bhutan and, therefore, UNHCR will not be involved in the 
repatriation or resettlement program.  Abraham also confirmed 
that Fakhouri was able to dispel concerns that camps and 
barracks under construction in southern Bhutan will be used 
for refugee resettlement.  However, Abraham seemed skeptical 
that these camps had been built for displaced persons in 
advance of a possible military crackdown on Indian 
separatists in Southern Bhutan, as the RGOB has claimed. 
 
10. (SBU) The UNHCR has received no indication on the numbers 
of Khundunabari Camp residents who will return voluntarily to 
Bhutan under existing conditions.  Abraham said that the 
refugees desire an international presence for their 
protection in Bhutan, implying that without that protection, 
some refugees may decide to apply for resettlement in Nepal 
or abroad.  UNHCR will continue to look for a window of 
opportunity to become involved, he said.  However, UNHCR will 
support only a full, voluntary and monitored repatriation to 
the refugees' home areas.  Abraham expressed frustration with 
the current situation, citing a 2-page long list of questions 
submitted by refugees inquiring about conditions in Bhutan, 
for which UNHCR has been unable to provide answers.  Without 
UNHCR oversight in Bhutan, Abraham said, residents of the 
other six refugee camps will have to rely on repatriated 
Khundunabari Camp refugees to provide information regarding 
conditions in Bhutan. 
 
11. (SBU)  Abraham reported that he recently met with Foreign 
Secretary Acharya on developing a local resettlement program 
 
SIPDIS 
for the refugees not returning to Bhutan.  However, Acharya 
was noncommittal, saying only that the GON would take up that 
discussion after repatriation begins in September.  The GON 
does not want to bias refugees' decisions to return to Bhutan 
by offering local resettlement, Abraham said.  Abraham has 
also raised this issue with Prime Minister Thapa, who 
indicated that discussions on local settlement could begin 
after the Fifteenth Nepal-Bhutan Joint Ministerial taking 
place August 11-14.  The August Ministerial will decide on 
the logistical details of repatriation and resettlement, 
including a final passenger manifest that will help determine 
how many refugees might seek to stay in Nepal.  Abraham 
suggested that donor governments should consider assisting 
the GON with a local resettlement program, especially since 
UNHCR is not inclined to keep Khundunabari Camp open after 
repatriation. 
 
12. (SBU) Abraham concluded the briefing by saying that UNHCR 
is making every effort to dispel the RGOB's suspicions of 
UNHCR and to remain engaged in the process.  But progress has 
been slow and difficult, particularly since the RGOB contends 
that UNHCR has encouraged the refugees to demonstrate against 
the JVT results for Khundunabari Camp.  The World Food 
Program representative commented that WFP has a presence in 
Bhutan and has offered the RGOB assistance for the 
resettlement of the refugees.  Although the RGOB has not 
accepted the offer, it did not decline it outright, she 
reported. 
 
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Comment 
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13. (C) Despite the political, social and economic 
uncertainties, Post predicts that most Khundunabari Camp 
residents in Category II (8,595 people or 70.5 percent) will 
choose to return to Bhutan in hopes of resuming a normal 
life.  Post expects information from the returnees on current 
conditions in Bhutan will begin trickling back to camps in 
Nepal soon after repatriation.  This information will 
strongly influence the six remaining camp refugees' decisions 
on whether to return to Bhutan or apply for resettlement 
elsewhere.  Without international monitoring, it will be 
impossible to confirm or dispel negative impressions of 
conditions in Bhutan, which could discourage further 
repatriation to Bhutan.  Although it remains unlikely that 
the RGOB will allow UNHCR to play a role in the reintegration 
of the refugees in Bhutan, Post will continue to press for 
its involvement.  Post believes it would still be useful to 
demarche Bhutanese donor capitals on the need to pressure the 
RGOB, prior to the 15th Joint Ministerial on August 11, to 
allow for international participation in the repatriation 
process.  End Comment. 
MALINOWSKI