This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TEGUCIGALPA 001309 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CEN, DRL/PHD, DRL/IL, INL/LP, INR, AND DS 
DOL FOR ILAB 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2013 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV SNAR KCRM KJUS ASEC ELAB PINR HO
SUBJECT: HONDURAN COMMISSION ASSIGNS RESPONSIBILITY FOR LA 
CEIBA PRISON INCIDENT: SECURITY FORCES AND PRISON "TRUSTIES" 
 
REF: A. STATE 138274 
     ¶B. TEGUCIGALPA 861 
     ¶C. 02 TEGUCIGALPA 1755 (ALL NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: Political Section Chief Francisco Palmieri; 
Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: A Special Commission of the Honduran 
National Council for Internal Security (CONASIN) has issued a 
report assigning responsibility to GOH security forces and 
prison "trusties" for the majority of the 68 deaths that 
occurred in an April 5 incident at the El Porvenir prison, 
located just outside the Caribbean port city of La Ceiba, 
Honduras.  Sixty-one of the dead were gang members from Mara 
18, one of Central America's largest gangs.  President 
Ricardo Maduro is seeking U.S. and UK assistance for a 
further investigation of the events.  Post has brought in a 
retired U.S. law enforcement investigator through the Police 
Assistance Program to assist the Internal Affairs Unit of the 
police to further investigate the incident.  End Summary. 
 
CONASIN Ad-Hoc Commission's Report 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) On April 5 prison riot in the El Porvenir (The Future) 
prison, located just outside the Caribbean port city of La 
Ceiba, Honduras, left 68 dead (65 men and three women) and 
approximately 40 wounded (ref B).  Immediately following the 
incident, President Ricardo Maduro ordered an investigation 
into the deaths by an ad-hoc commission of the Honduran 
National Council for Internal Security (CONASIN).  Members of 
the Commission include: Andres Pavon, President of the 
Committee for the Defense of Human Rights in Honduras 
(CODEH); Dinora Aceituno, Secretary General of the 
Confederation of Honduran Workers (CTH, which is affiliated 
with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
(ICFTU)); Jorge Gomez, a businessman and representative of 
the Honduran Council of Private Enterprise (COHEP); and Ana 
Pineda, Deputy Human Rights Commissioner.  (Note:  The Human 
Rights Commission later withdrew from the commission and is 
conducting a separate investigation.  End Note.)  The ad-hoc 
commission was commissioned on April 9 and delivered its 
completed report May 9 to CONASIN, in accordance with the 
30-day timeframe it was given. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Post obtained a copy of the report, which was also 
leaked to the press before it was presented to President 
Maduro, that details the Commission's conclusions after 
investigating the incident.  It is not clear who leaked the 
report, but Maduro is said to be quite upset that it 
happened.  In addition to the Honduran press, the contents of 
the report were included in wire service reports and an 
article in the New York Times, leading the Department of 
State to draft contingency press guidance (ref A). 
 
¶4. (C) PolOff has met with Pavon and Gomez, and spoke by 
phone with Aceituno and Pineda.  All four are good contacts 
of the Political Section.  PolOff also visited the prison May 
15, and was given a tour by the new warden.  The report 
begins by severely criticizing the GOH's combined handling of 
the incident, criticizing the Preventative Police and the 
district attorney for not adequately securing the crime 
scene, the General Direction of Criminal Investigation (DGIC) 
for shoddy initial investigative work, and the forensic 
doctor for moving the bodies without first conducting a 
preliminary inspection.  Visits to the prison the day of the 
incident by VIPs, including President Ricardo Maduro and 
Minister of Public Security Oscar Alvarez, undoubtedly caused 
further contamination of the crime scene, commission members 
told PolOff.  (Note:  Other reports indicated that the crime 
scene had already been cleaned up prior to their arrival. 
End Note.)  The report harshly criticizes the role of the 
prison's "trusties," non-gang member inmates who enforce 
discipline within the prison.  (Note: It appears to Post be 
to a prime example of "the inmates running the asylum."  End 
Note.) 
 
¶5. (C) The CONASIN report notes incredulously that there was 
an agreement signed March 7 between the "trusties" and gang 
member prisoners, drafted on the warden's computer, that 
outlines when and where drugs can be smoked (only in the gang 
members cell blocks).  One commission member went so far as 
to speculate to PolOff that the Honduran north coast 
Atlantida drug cartel may have had a role in instigating the 
April 5 incident to assert control over the lucrative drug 
trade at the prison.  In a May 28 lunch with PolOffs, Gomez 
said that the GOH planned to change some of the report, 
something that was proved true when the final version of the 
report was released June 3.  Pavon denounced the changes, 
which the GOH claims were necessary to not prejudice ongoing 
investigations, and accused the GOH of softening the wording 
and trying to cover up the security forces' responsibility in 
the incident.  Gomez told PolOff that the final version does 
not alter the fundamental conclusions of the CONASIN 
Commission. 
 
The Events of the Day 
--------------------- 
 
¶6. (U) As reported in ref B, initial press reports indicated 
that a riot broke out around 10 a.m. shortly after visiting 
hours, when a scuffle between inmates turned deadly after 
Mara 18 gang members produced pistols and a number of 
machetes and attacked non-gang member prisoners.  According 
to press reports, regular prisoners then reportedly 
brandished weapons of their own and proceeded to attack Mara 
18 members.  The facility is a prison farm where both 
convicts and suspects facing various felony charges are held. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The investigative report's account of the events 
differs greatly from those initial press reports.  In the 
CONASIN report, GOH security forces and "trusties" are held 
responsible for the majority of the deaths and injuries. 
According to the report, which is based on the Commission's 
investigation drawn from testimony of unnamed witnesses 
(including inmates), information from GOH authorities, and 
two site visits to the prison, the incident began at 9:55 am 
on April 5. Mara 18 gang member Mario Roberto Cerrato, AKA 
Boris, allegedly shot and killed Jose Alberto Almendarez, the 
vice president of the "trusties", and wounded Jose Edgardo 
Coca, the president of the "trusties" and a corrupt ex-cop. 
Although numerous accounts appear to confirm this was the 
proximate cause of the ensuing violence, the gun allegedly 
used by Cerrato was never found (nor were any of the other 
alleged firearms supposedly used by gang members).  Another 
gang member known as "Danjers" then assaulted and killed 
non-gang member Angel Emilio Gutierrez.  At this point the 
Penitentiary Police apparently intervened supported by a unit 
of the Fourth Infantry Battalion of the Honduran Army). 
 
¶8. (SBU) At some point during this scuffle the report states 
that Penitentiary Police started firing from towers at the 
corners of the prison.  (Pavon told PolOff that he speculates 
that this firing may have disoriented policeman on the ground 
who then thought that gang members were firing weapons, 
leading police on the ground to fire upon gang members.) 
Dimas Antonio Benitez, a penitentiary policeman on the 
ground, took the pistol of Deputy Warden Oscar Reinery 
Sanchez, who was in charge of the prison at the time of the 
incident due to the fact that the warden was not there.  The 
report states that Benitez then shot and killed gang member 
"Danjers," while "trusty" Jose Quintanilla beat and shot to 
death Cerrato, thus leaving the two gang members who 
allegedly started the incident dead.  The "trusties" then 
forced the rest of the gang members back into their cell 
blocks (two and six).  There were an estimated 70 gang 
members and 180 non-gang members. 
 
¶9. (SBU) According to the CONASIN report, instead of ending 
with five people dead, the violence escalated.  The report 
states that fifteen minutes into the incident the chief of 
the Preventative Police from the Department of Atlantida 
(which includes the city of La Ceiba) arrived with a 
detachment of police in response to a phone call from the 
prison.  The report states that the gang members in cell 
block two then left their cell block with their hands in the 
air, while "trusties" blocked the exit from cell block six. 
Four "trusties" named Santo Aguilar, Yobhany Banegas, Javier 
Solis, and "Sonarriba" then set fire to cell six, leaving the 
gang members inside trapped in the bathroom of the cell block 
trying to avoid the fire which was fueled by mattresses.  The 
report alleges that the police did not remove the obstacles 
that blockaded the exit from cell block six.  According to 
the report, a policewoman shot at four gang members, and a 
policeman in a Cobra Unit (specially trained police) shot a 
gang member in flames who managed to exit cell six despite 
the obstacles. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The report alleges that the Atlantida police did 
not attempt to resolve the situation peacefully, but rather 
shot indiscriminately at gang members, and allowed "trusties" 
to beat, stab, and kill gang members who were trying to 
surrender.  The report states that 17 of the 19 gang members 
injured suffered either gunshots or beatings in the back of 
their heads or necks.  During the melee at least one Cobra 
policeman was injured. 
 
¶11. (SBU) When the chaos ended, 68 people were dead.  Many 
had multiple wounds from one to three different types of 
weapons.  According to the CONASIN report: 
-- 27 had been shot to death 
-- 17 had been beaten/stabbed to death 
-- 24 had been burned to death 
 
¶12. (U) Of the 68 killed: 
-- 61 were members of the Mara 18 gang 
-- five were non-gang member prisoners 
-- three were female visitors (two of those were ages 14-16) 
 
¶13. (U)  Many of the gang members had been transferred to the 
La Ceiba prison from Tamara Prison, the principal Honduran 
prison located outside of Tegucigalpa (ref C).  The report 
criticized conflicting provisions in the Code of Criminal 
Procedure and the Law of Rehabilitation of Criminals with 
regard to transfers of inmates from one prison to another by 
prison authorities.  The surviving gang members have since 
been transferred to a prison in Tela, up the coast from La 
Ceiba.  The La Ceiba prison has been repaired, with little 
sign of what happened April 5, other than a lack of 
mattresses. 
 
Multiple GOH Investigations Into Actions of Security Forces 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) To date, only Deputy Warden Sanchez is under 
arrest.  By all accounts his handling of the incident was 
disastrous.  From panicking so much that he reportedly called 
the Roatan Fire Department (located on a Caribbean island) to 
ask them to call the La Ceiba Fire Department for assistance, 
to letting another policeman take and use his pistol, to 
generally providing no leadership to end the incident with as 
little violence as possible, Sanchez appears to have failed 
on many levels.  The Public Ministry (led by the Attorney 
General), the DGIC, and the Internal Affairs Unit of the 
police, are all investigating the incident to determine what 
charges should be bought against members of the security 
forces or prisoners. 
 
15 (U) PolOff attended a June 5 briefing by the Public 
Ministry that outlined similar preliminary conclusions to the 
CONASIN report and had grisly forensic details from the 
autopsies of the victims.  The Public Ministry's 
investigation in continuing, and no specific security 
officials were named as responsible in the briefing, but 
officials did recommend that any prison police and/or 
"trusties" involved in the incident should be immediately 
transferred from the prison.  Pavon noted at the briefing, 
and the Public Ministry concurred, that despite Maduro's 
order to end the "trusty" system the prison had not yet done 
so due to a lack of trained personnel to replace the 
"trusties."  Maduro has stated that the GOH will prosecute 
any member of the security forces found to have been involved 
in human rights abuses during the incident. 
 
¶16. (SBU) The report, which will be used in all of these 
investigations, recommends that GOH authorities conduct 
ballistic tests to determine, if possible, which units of the 
police and/or military were responsible for which gunshots. 
According to the report, while not alleging that all of these 
security forces took part in the shooting, units of the 
following security forces were at the prison for part or all 
of the incident: 
-- Penitentiary Police 
-- Army Fourth Infantry Battalion (based in La Ceiba) 
-- Preventative Police (reportedly accompanied by Navy and 
Air Force soldiers who conduct joint patrols with the police 
as part of Maduro's crackdown on Honduras' extremely high 
crime rate) 
-- Tourist Police 
-- Cobras (specially trained police) - their presence is 
disputed by some GOH officials 
 
Maduro Asks for FBI; Post Brings In Retired Investigator 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶17. (SBU)  Maduro publicly asked for the assistance of the 
FBI and Scotland Yard to further investigate what happened. 
(The child advocacy NGO Casa Alianza has meanwhile asked for 
Scotland Yard to assist the GOH to investigate over 1,600 
extrajudicial killings of children and youth over the last 
five years.)  As there were no American citizens involved in 
the prison incident, and it does not directly affect U.S. 
national security, Post does not believe that an 
investigation by the FBI (or any other USG law enforcement 
agency) is warranted.  However, Post has brought in a retired 
U.S. law enforcement investigator, through the INL Police 
Assistance Program, to assist the Internal Affairs Unit of 
the police to further investigate the incident.  Post 
facilitated the travel of Minister Alvarez to Puerto Rico to 
gain insights from the FBI and Puerto Rican Police on 
internal affairs investigations.  Maduro also called for a 
250 million lempiras (USD 14.7 million) investment in 
upgrading Honduran prisons, but to date has not asked for USG 
assistance in this effort.  The lack of funds in the GOH 
treasury is likely to hamper any attempt to fulfill that goal. 
 
¶18. (C) Comment:  While not publicly criticizing the report, 
some GOH officials have privately cast aspersions on the 
report as either one-sided or taking all critical statements 
as fact, as well as noting that it was not done by 
professional investigators.  While true that none of the 
commission members are professional investigators, Post notes 
that the GOH has been happy to use CONASIN investigative 
commissions in the past, including one made up of the same 
commission members, to investigate other controversial police 
episodes.  The GOH has also used these reports to buttress 
its decisions and defend its actions in the past.  The most 
difficult questions remain unanswered, including: 
-- 1) why did the gang members suffer such a disproportionate 
amount of the fatalities if they were contained in two jail 
cells? 
-- 2) what did the security forces at the prison do to 
minimize/prevent casualties in their actions? 
-- 3) why hasn't the GOH arrested/suspended anyone beside the 
Acting Prison Warden? 
By its decision to use an ad-hoc CONASIN Commission to 
investigate this incident, the GOH has painted itself into a 
corner, leaving little choice but to support the report 
publicly. 
 
¶19. (C) Comment continued:  Instead of criticizing the 
report, Maduro is now instead calling for U.S. or UK 
assistance in conducting further investigations of the 
incident.  Unfortunately, the poor handling of the crime 
scene, and that fact that the jail has been repaired and the 
bodies buried, could make it extremely difficult for even a 
professional investigation to accurately determine what 
happened in detail.  Nevertheless, Post believes that U.S. 
assistance to the Police Internal Affairs Unit will aid 
Honduran efforts to better understand what happened during 
the riot.  End Comment. 
Pierce