This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 HARARE 001316 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AID FOR DCHA/FFP LANDIS, CRUMBLY, MUTAMBA, 
PETERSEN 
DCHA/OFDA FOR PRATT, BARTON, KHANDAGLE, BORNS, 
HALMRAST-SANCHEZ 
AFR FOR COPSON, FORT, BAKER, MACNAIRN 
STATE/AF FOR RAYNOR, DELISI 
PRETORIA FOR DIJKERMAN, HELM, DISKIN 
NAIROBI FOR DEPREZ, RILEY, HALE 
LILONGWE FOR RUBEY 
LUSAKA FOR GUNTHER 
MAPUTO FOR POLAND, BLISS 
MASERU FOR BELLEGARDE 
MBABANE FOR KENNA 
GABORONE FOR FLEURET, MULLINS AND DORMAN 
ROME FOR FODAG FOR LAVELLE, DAVIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREL US ZI
SUBJECT: Situation in Zimbabwe Remains Critical: 
Continuing Government Obstruction Jeopardizes 
Humanitarian Response 
 
REF: A. Pretoria 03182, B. Harare 00978 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. The significant 2002/2003 response by the 
international humanitarian community to the complex food 
security crisis in Zimbabwe averted famine.  Although 
the current harvest is expected to be marginally better 
than last year's, the situation remains fragile and will 
require substantial quantities of continued humanitarian 
assistance.  This season's harvest is expected to 
fulfill only 40 percent of the country's food 
requirements, and "hotspots" of high malnutrition will 
become more critical, particularly in the "hungry" 
season.  The World Food Program (WFP) estimates that up 
to 5.5 million people, almost half the country's 
population, will require food assistance during December 
2003 to March 2004.  Given the downward spiraling 
economy, soaring inflation, political stasis and 
diminished capacity of the government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) 
to import sufficient commodities to meet projected 
needs, the humanitarian situation is likely to 
deteriorate further in coming months. 
 
¶2. Exacerbated at every level by the HIV/AIDS pandemic, 
the current crisis requires innovative and more 
carefully targeted interventions and enhanced 
information-sharing and cooperation among all 
humanitarian partners in country. 
 
¶3. Unfortunately, the capacity of the humanitarian 
community (UN, donors, NGOs and other/private interests) 
to plan and execute such interventions continues to be 
seriously compromised by the government's unwillingness 
to acknowledge the severity of the situation, to release 
officially either government data or survey results 
compiled by the UN and other credible sources, or to 
make any commitment as to GOZ plans to fulfill its 
responsibilities to mitigate food insecurity and other 
critical needs of Zimbabweans.  Further, although 
President Mugabe declared a disaster in many parts of 
the country in April, the government still has not yet 
made a formal request for international humanitarian 
assistance for the coming year.  This, combined with 
continuing government intransigence on key policy and 
operational issues, seriously jeopardizes an effective 
humanitarian response. 
 
-------------------------------- 
RIASCO CONCLUDES THAT CONTINUED 
REGIONAL ASSISTANCE IS NECESSARY 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  On June 11-12, 2003, the United Nations Regional 
Inter-Agency Coordination and Support Office (RIACSO) 
and the Southern African Development Commission (SADC) 
co-hosted a Stakeholders Meeting in Johannesburg, South 
Africa.  The purpose of the meeting was to review the 
response to the Southern African Food Security Crisis 
over the past year, examine the post-harvest situation 
in the six focus countries (Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) and discuss needs and 
plans for humanitarian assistance through April 2004. 
 
¶6.  The main conclusions of the regional meeting were as 
follows: 
-- The substantial humanitarian resources provided to 
the region during the last year, including US 
contributions of food and cash valued at over USD 290 
million, have largely stabilized malnutrition rates and 
facilitated the recovery of national food security. 
-- With the exception of Zimbabwe and southern 
Mozambique, the overall humanitarian situation has 
improved, although localized areas of serious food 
insecurity remain in all countries. 
-- The deepening HIV/AIDS pandemic has contributed to a 
slower-than-normal recovery and will increasingly impact 
humanitarian and developmental programming. 
-- In order to mitigate the impact of future economic 
and climatic shocks there is increasing need to 
implement integrated relief and development programs 
concurrently. 
-- Continued humanitarian assistance is required at 
varying levels in 2003/2004 in all six countries, even 
those which are recovering from the crisis.  [Note: See 
Reftel A for a detailed resume of conclusions and 
recommendations for regional action.  End Note.] 
 
----------------------------------- 
PRELIMINARY SURVEY FINDINGS SUPPORT 
PROJECTIONS FORMED IN A VACUUM 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶7. At the RIASCO meeting, preliminary findings from 
three long-awaited assessments were presented: the 
Vulnerability Assessment Committee (VAC) surveys; the 
FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission (CSAM) 
reports; and the UNICEF nutritional survey for Zimbabwe. 
With the exception of the Malawi VAC, which had not yet 
been completed, all assessments were presented with the 
knowledge and support of the governments involved. In 
the case of Zimbabwe, all three were presented without 
any official concurrence by the GOZ, and none has been 
officially released as of this date. 
 
¶8. In the absence of published data, donors, NGOs, 
International Organizations and UN agencies have been 
drawing up strategies, projections and plans for 
humanitarian assistance as best they can on the basis of 
"working" numbers.  Using these unverified numbers has 
been especially essential for planning implementation of 
agricultural interventions.  In order to plant at the 
optimal time, for example, seed must be sourced, 
ordered, received and distributed in time for November 
planting. There is a risk of getting the quantities 
wrong, but insufficient quantities would be preferable 
to no seed at all or seed planted too late. [Note:  The 
UN 2003 Consolidated Appeal (CAP) for Zimbabwe has 
benefited from the preliminary findings released 
unofficially by the UN and is scheduled to be launched 
23 July 2003.  WFP is also developing a new Regional 
EMOP based on these figures for release in early July 
¶2003.  End Note.] 
 
-------------------------- 
ZIMVAC AND CFSAM RESULTS 
CONFIRM PREVIOUS ESTIMATES 
-------------------------- 
 
¶9. Although the final Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment 
Committee (ZIMVAC) April (2003) update and joint U.N. 
World Food Program (WFP) and Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) Crop and Food Supply Assessment 
Mission (CFSAM) report have not yet been released 
officially, the preliminary findings disclosed at the 
RIASCO meeting and by the UN in Harare this week 
generally confirm the cereal production quantities and 
shortfalls, cereal access and rural food security 
projections for 2003/2004 that have already been 
transmitted to Washington by the Mission (Reftel B). 
 
¶10. To recap the major projections made in Reftel B: The 
projected 2002/03 harvest will be about 800,000 MT for 
maize and about 1,100,000 MT for all cereals, against 
projected requirements of over 2,200,000 MT.  Although 
60 percent higher than last year's maize production 
(498,500 MT), this total remains only 55 percent of 
production in 2000/01 (1,476,240 MT) and less than half 
(48 percent) of Zimbabwe's 1990s average maize 
production (1,705,825 MT), signifying the continuing 
negative impact of erratic weather, the government's 
chaotic land redistribution program and its gross policy 
failures over the past several years affecting all 
aspects of the agricultural production system including 
on-farm operations, producer incentives and shortages of 
essential agricultural inputs such as seeds, fertilizers 
and draught power (fuel). 
 
¶11. There are some significant differences and 
developments reflected in the information just released 
that were not included in Reftel B.  Wheat production is 
now projected to be only 50,000, not the 150,000 MT 
reported previously, increasing the shortfall in all 
cereals to 1,300,000 MT (vs. the 1 million MT estimated 
previously).  With escalating inflation and a relaxation 
of price controls, it is believed that more Zimbabweans 
will not be able to afford to purchase their food 
requirements through market channels this year. 
Accordingly, the final VAC increased the maximum number 
of food vulnerable people to 4.4 million (from 3.9 
million in the prior draft estimate).  ZIMVAC findings 
were based on random samplings of 2,257 households in 
150 sites representing all districts in country, but 
they were conducted in rural areas only.  The CFSAM 
assessment also did not include urban areas, but did 
extrapolate an additional 1.1 million food vulnerable in 
urban areas, making the estimate of the total number of 
people who will require food assistance during the lean 
season to be 5.5 million. 
 
¶12. Additionally, the CFSAM allows for a modest amount 
of buffer or carryover stocks at the end of the 
marketing year in April 2004 (approximately 180,000 MT 
for all cereals), which the ZIMVAC does not.  All of 
these factors result in an increased food import 
requirement in the CFSAM of 1.3 million MT vs. 1 million 
MT in the ZIMVAC.  With varying estimates of outstanding 
and planned "commercial" and food aid imports, the 
resultant net food aid requirement for Zimbabwe for the 
coming year is estimated at more than  450,000 MT. 
 
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NUTRITION SURVEY REPORTS DETERIORATION 
IN MALNUTRITION WITH SPECIFIC HOTSPOTS 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. Preliminary results of the nutrition survey 
conducted by UNICEF in cooperation with the GOZ and NGOs 
during February 2003 were also presented at the June 
RIASCO meeting (despite not yet being officially 
released by the government in Zimbabwe).  The survey 
sample included 50,000 children under five.  The 
aggregate data indicate that while rates of malnutrition 
were essentially stabilized by humanitarian 
interventions in 2002/2003, rates of global acute 
malnutrition (GAM) in Zimbabwe have deteriorated 
slightly since the last comprehensive Demographic and 
Health Survey (DHS) survey in 1999.  In addition, 
"hotspots", where rates of severe acute malnutrition 
(SAM) are prevalent, persist, especially in urban areas 
such as the high density areas of Bulawayo, Harare and 
Mutare, and some rural areas such as Binga and Gokwe. 
Worst affected are children aged 12 - 23 months and 
orphaned children of all ages. 
 
¶14.  Additional findings of note highlighted by UNICEF 
for Zimbabwe were: 
-- National averages, e.g., 1.4 percent SAM, mask large 
differences among regions and districts.  In at least 15 
districts, or approximately 25 percent of the country, 
SAM levels are above 2 percent. 
-- There is a disproportionately high level of SAM in 
relation to GAM nationwide, and in mortality among those 
children being treated for SAM in therapeutic feeding 
centers. (Note: This is believed to be primarily due to 
the as yet unmeasured effect of HIV/AIDS in combination 
with malnutrition and other opportunistic diseases.  End 
Note.) 
-- Districts with lower prevalence of malnutrition 
deteriorated most since the last nutrition survey in 
¶2002. 
-- Districts with higher HIV/AIDS prevalence showed 
greater deterioration in nutritional status. 
-- 17 percent of all deaths recorded in the survey were 
of children less than two years of age. 
-- Lack of access to food is not the sole cause of 
malnutrition.  Many other factors, such as care 
practice, the presence of a mother, the general health 
ambience, access to health care and HIV/AIDS all come 
into play. 
 
¶15. Based on these preliminary results, UNICEF 
recommendations for action include: strengthening 
nutrition surveillance systems; scaling up programming 
around nutrition and HIV/AIDS within an integrated 
framework; scaling up feeding programs, both therapeutic 
and community-based, in areas of high SAM; refining 
program targeting, with an emphasis on orphans and 
acutely vulnerable children; and developing a better 
understanding of the relationship between malnutrition 
in young children and HIV/AIDS.  UNICEF has announced 
that it will release disaggregated data down to the 
district level next week as well as national data on 
EPI, access to health care and vaccinations.  Analysis 
of these data had not been completed when the RIASCO 
presentation was made.  A more detailed report will 
follow when this information becomes available. 
 
--------------------------------- 
CONTINUING GOVERNMENT OBSTRUCTION 
JEOPARDIZES HUMANITARIAN REPONSE 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶16. As noted above and in Reftel B, to date, the GOZ 
continues to obstruct the official release of much of 
this information critical for planning purposes.  In 
addition, we have yet to receive any official 
acknowledgement from the government of the continuing 
gravity of the situation, what they intend to do on 
their own to address it and/or any request for 
additional international assistance to fill the gap. 
With the GOZ grain monopoly still firmly in place, the 
private sector remains a non-player in assisting to meet 
these considerable food needs.  Accordingly, in the 
absence of any substantive policy change on this issue, 
the significant projected "commercial" imports noted 
above (approximately 700,000 MT) effectively represent 
anticipated government inputs in this response (as they 
did last year).  In the absence of any official GOZ 
input on their intentions on this subject, it is 
becoming increasingly difficult for the international 
community to plan the required relief response.  This 
situation is even more critical in considering the 
current "bankrupt" state of the government and economy, 
thus raising serious doubts as to the government's 
continuing ability to meet these substantial critical 
assistance requirements over the coming year. 
 
--------------------- 
IMPLICATIONS FOR USG 
HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE 
--------------------- 
 
¶17.  The major implications of the above for USG 
assistance over the coming year are: 
-- Continuing high levels of vulnerability indicate that 
there will be a need for continuing high levels of 
assistance, similar - albeit at slightly reduced levels 
- to last year to at least maintain the current 
increasingly fragile state of the country's most 
vulnerable groups.  The final magnitude of the 
international relief requirements will depend heavily on 
the government's commitment and increasingly 
questionable capability to meet its projected share of 
the relief requirements.  Government transparency and 
responsiveness, therefore, will be required to 
facilitate a timely and effective coordinated response. 
Increased pressure on the GOZ to open up grain markets 
to private sector players will also be key to 
facilitating a robust response to the on-going crisis 
(especially in urban "hotspot" areas). 
 
-- Due to the more fragmented nature of the needs, 
increased focus will need to be devoted to targeted 
assistance (vs. the more "blanket" approaches pursued 
last year).   One example of this revised approach will 
be greater efforts to assist urban nutritional 
"hotspots" through such efforts as our recently approved 
Market Intervention Pilot Program for Bulawayo set to 
get underway soon.  This more targeted approach will 
require increased government cooperation for timely flow 
of essential information needed to effectively target 
vulnerable groups.  It will also require increased 
access by relief agents to all areas of the country 
(e.g., ex-commercial farming areas) for effective 
targeting of the most vulnerable groups.  Finally, with 
less "room to spare" as a result of the continuing 
nutritional deterioration, and a more fragmented target 
population, greater focus on nutritional surveillance 
and program monitoring will be required to ensure that 
the most vulnerable people are being reached.  Again, 
GOZ cooperation will be required for program access for 
these purposes (which has also been restricted to date). 
 
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MISSION COMMENT 
--------------- 
 
¶18. Based on the above, in addition to continuing 
substantial quantities of food and non-food assistance, 
concerted/renewed efforts will be required this year to 
get the GOZ to enact the reforms necessary to facilitate 
an effective humanitarian response.  In the absence of 
significant government movement on the key actions noted 
above, the country is doomed to another year of 
continuing deterioration in the socio-economic 
livelihoods and nutritional status (possibly to critical 
levels) of millions of Zimbabweans, and a further 
prolongation of the crisis (and concomitant USG and 
international relief requirements).  Based on the 
notable lack of a government response to date, the 
Mission remains highly skeptical that in-country efforts 
to address these all-too-familiar issues will prove any 
more successful than last year.   Accordingly, we 
suggest high-level UN intervention and greater UN, US 
and other public highlighting of GOZ policy failures and 
GOZ responsibilities for mitigating the critical needs 
of Zimbabweans to assist our own efforts in this regard. 
Sullivan