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Diana T Fritz  03/21/2007 05:29:52 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Search Results

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CONFIDENTIAL

SIPDIS
TELEGRAM                                            June 29, 2003


To:       No Action Addressee                                    

Action:   Unknown                                                

From:     AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 3069 - PRIORITY)        

TAGS:     PGOV, PREL, PHUM, KDEM                                 

Captions: None                                                   

Subject:  PROSPECTS FOR GREATER POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN THE   
          UAE                                                    

Ref:      None                                                   
_________________________________________________________________
C O N F I D E N T I A L        ABU DHABI 03069

SIPDIS
CXABU:
    ACTION: POL 
    INFO:   DCM AMB P/M RSO ECON 

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:MMWAHBA
DRAFTED: POL:STWILLIAMS
CLEARED: A/DCM:TEWILLIAMS; PAO:KVVATE

VZCZCADI387
PP RUEHC RUEHEE RHEHNSC RUEAIIA RHEFDIA
DE RUEHAD #3069/01 1801228
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 291228Z JUN 03
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0648
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 003069 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARP 
 
NSC FOR PETER THEROUX 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/13 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PHUM TC
SUBJECT:  PROSPECTS FOR GREATER POLITICAL 
PARTICIPATION IN THE UAE 
 
REF:  A) Abu Dhabi 1813 
 
      B) Dubai 1318 
 
¶1. (U) Classified by Ambassador Marcelle M. Wahba 
for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D). 
 
¶2. (C) SUMMARY: The collapse of Saddam's regime and 
an avowed U.S. policy of encouraging greater 
political participation and economic reform across 
the region in the post 9/11 environment have 
increased expectations within intellectual circles 
here that a broadening of the UAE's extremely 
limited political space is only a matter of time. 
A number of reform-minded Emiratis have raised this 
issue with the Ambassador and other mission 
officers.  These Emiratis hope and believe the time 
is ripe for USG engagement with the UAE leadership. 
The Ambassador intends to continue raising the 
issue with senior Emiratis but we believe that in 
order for our message to have traction, other USG 
interlocutors -- particularly senior Washington 
officials -- should use the occasion of meetings 
with the UAEG leadership to engage them on the 
subject.  As we proceed with the Middle East 
Partnership Initiative (MEPI) in the UAE, we 
recommend an initial focus on rule of law, civil 
society, education curriculum reform, women's 
empowerment and a strengthened NGO movement as the 
building blocks for a gradual liberalization of the 
UAE polity (see septel for our specific MEPI 
recommendations).  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
DUBAI DISTRICT COUNCIL ANNOUNCEMENT GENERATES 
DISCUSSION OF BROADER POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶3. (C) Dubai's announcement in April (Ref B) of the 
establishment of elected district councils touched 
a chord amongst elite Emiratis who have wanted to 
see the UAE federal government take steps towards 
liberalization.  Dubai's move came on the heels of 
the wide-ranging political reforms undertaken by 
Qatar and Bahrain.  The savvy Dubbyans, wishing to 
maintain their city-state's reputation as an 
international business and tourism hub, realized 
the importance of making a similar opening although 
it is not clear if this is a genuine step toward 
political liberalization. 
 
¶4. (C) The Ambassador and de facto Foreign Minister 
Shaykh Hamdan bin Zayid have discussed both Dubai's 
announcement and the issue of political 
liberalization in the UAE in general (Ref B). 
Following his talks with the Ambassador, Hamdan 
apparently reached out to a range of UAE statesmen, 
academics and opinion makers to take the pulse. 
Hamdan personally favors a gradual political 
opening at this time, noting that it would be a 
nice legacy for his father, UAE President Shaykh 
Zayid.  Given the wide respect and affection felt 
across the UAE's seven emirates for Zayid, his 
imprimatur would facilitate the move to 
democratization.  Hamdan, who realizes that the 
subject of political participation will figure 
higher on the bilateral agenda than in the past, 
would like to preempt a formal USG approach.  As he 
put it to the Ambassador in April, "better we do it 
our way," consonant with the UAE's cultural, 
religious and social norms.  The leadership is 
aware of the heightened attention being given to 
democratization at home and abroad.  Abu Dhabi 
Crown Prince Khalifa bin Zayid, in a rare press 
interview, was more forward-leaning on the issue of 
women's empowerment, noting that no changes would 
be necessary to UAE law or the constitution in 
order for women to be able to participate in the 
appointed Federal National Council, but then went 
on to defend the overall political status quo by 
asserting that the existing domestic political 
structure provides for the "inclusion of a 
mechanism for consultations in decision-making." 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
REFORM-MINDED EMIRATIS URGE U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH 
UAEG LEADERSHIP ON GREATER POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶5. (C) In the last several months, a few of the 
individuals tapped by Hamdan have subsequently 
contacted the Ambassador to push for USG 
engagement.  Among them was former Ambassador to 
the U.S. Muhammad Al-Sha'ali who urged the 
Ambassador to use her close ties to the leadership 
to encourage broader participation.  Al-Sha'ali and 
others, noting the positive and rapid changes 
taking place in Qatar and Bahrain and even the more 
modest changes evidenced in Saudi Arabia, fear the 
UAE is falling behind the region.  The Ambassador 
was also approached by Dubai notable Juma'a Al- 
Majed who said a political opening is needed at the 
federal level and hoped that we would use our 
relationship to encourage the Feds in that 
direction.  Al-Majed noted that a good place to 
start would be to push for greater rule of law; he 
specifically mentioned that Abu Dhabi has much work 
to do in this area.  By contrast, in his view, 
Dubai is in better shape; the Dubai courts may not 
be "perfect" but they are far more independent than 
the Abu Dhabi courts. 
 
¶6. (C) Embassy officers have also been approached 
by contacts at the working level, many of whom have 
noted the increased expectation across the UAE of 
an expansion of political rights.  UAE University 
Political Science professor Abdul Khaleq Abdullah 
told us that Dubai made the right decision in 
moving to elected councils (not yet implemented) 
and hoped other emirates would follow suit. 
Another prominent Emirati urged greater press 
freedom and a more robust Federal National Council 
(FNC -- the UAE's putative parliament), empowered 
to discuss more than housing, education, and health 
care, i.e. bread and butter, issues.  None of our 
contacts expect a dramatic political opening, but 
rather more on the lines of a gradual move to 
elected local councils and the participation of 
women in politics. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
DESPITE DEMOGRAPHIC CHALLENGES, UAE SOCIETY IS 
HIGHLY TOLERANT 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶7. (SBU) The UAE's lack of political participation 
mechanisms is at great variance with the 
considerable social, religious and economic freedom 
enjoyed by nationals and non-nationals alike. 
Among the greatest challenges for the Emirati 
leadership is the fact that the national population 
is a small percentage, estimated between 15-20 
percent, of the overall population of almost 4 
million.  The vast majority of the foreigners hail 
from South Asia -- namely Pakistan and India -- and 
the UAEG closely monitors these communities to 
ensure that national/communal rivalries do not 
spill onto the streets of the UAE.  There are also 
substantial populations of expatriate Arabs, 
Europeans and North Americans.  The UAE leadership 
realized early on that it needed a large, talented 
foreign labor pool to build the country.  From the 
early days of the federation, some thirty-two years 
ago, the UAEG has allowed foreigners to freely 
pursue their religious beliefs and has taken a very 
liberal attitude to the different social mores of 
the diverse expatriate population.  Hence, a number 
of Christian denominations have churches in the UAE 
and there are also Hindu and Sikh temples.  The 
bars and private beaches of Abu Dhabi and Dubai 
could easily be mistaken for those in the 
Mediterranean or southern California. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
NO GRASSROOTS PUSH FOR LIBERALIZATION... 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) It is our sense that while some Emirati 
elites would like to see the government take steps 
towards greater political participation, there is 
by no means a "grassroots" movement pressing for 
democratization.  Indeed, Emiratis appear to be 
genuinely pleased with their rulers, particularly 
founding father President Zayid who is widely loved 
and respected. The Emiratis have the advantage of 
living in one of the last cradle-to-grave welfare 
states characterized by a small national population 
and immense wealth mainly derived from the nation's 
prodigious energy resources. 
 
¶9. (C) Helping to relieve some of the short-term 
pressure is the fact that the UAE maintains a 
vibrant and healthy majlis system.  These weekly 
traditional gatherings of Emirati men provide an 
opportunity for decision-makers to hear the 
concerns of their "constituents."  Many of the 
senior Al-Nahyan, including Chief of Staff Muhammad 
bin Zayid and MFA Minstate Hamdan bin Zayid hold 
regular majlises (sometimes twice a week) which any 
Emirati is permitted to attend.  The same is true 
in the UAE's other emirates where influential 
nationals (not just rulers) gather on a regular 
basis. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
...BUT MEDIUM-TERM PRESSURE IS BUILDING 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) While the current strictures on political 
participation are sustainable for the short-term, 
we believe the Emiratis need to start assembling 
the building blocks of a more representative 
society given the pressures that they will 
encounter across the medium-term.  With a more 
inclusive political structure, the leadership will 
be better able to develop and sustain consensus as 
the choices the government needs to make in terms 
of resource allocation get tougher.  At the root of 
all economic/finance issues in the UAE is the fact 
that each emirate retains ownership of its natural 
resources.  Thus Abu Dhabi's oil wealth belongs to 
Abu Dhabi and is "shared" at Abu Dhabi emirate's 
discretion with the Federation and other emirates. 
The primary mechanism for this is Abu Dhabi's 
funding of the federal budget -- the federal 
payroll being the primary provider or jobs for UAE 
nationals. 
 
¶10. (C) The UAE's national population is growing at 
an exponential rate thus increasing the need to 
produce employment for nationals.  The gap between 
the rich and the not so well off is widening, 
particularly between Abu Dhabi and the other, non- 
oil producing emirates.  In the poorer northern 
emirates, living conditions for UAE nationals vary 
from good to inadequate.  In Ras Al-Khaimah, for 
instance, some nationals do not have access to safe 
drinking water, sufficient electricity and adequate 
housing.  In that regard, Abu Dhabi's decision to 
build a water desalination plant in Fujairah to 
ensure the supply of water for the date palm groves 
of Al-Ain has not gone over well with the northern 
Emiratis (nor has Abu Dhabi's opting out of the 
poorly resourced federal health care system in 
order to ensure better care for its residents), 
highlighting some of the undercurrents of 
political, social and economic tension likely to 
surface in the event of more meaningful political 
dialogue here. 
 
 
WAHBA